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Abstract			 Walden	queers	its	readers.	While	many	have	investigated	Thoreau’s	queerness,	there	has	been	little	notice	of	Walden’s	queerness.	This	project	begins	with	a	situational	analysis	that	identifies	the	melancholic	antecedents	of	Walden	in	Thoreau’s	life	and	his	choices	that	led	to	the	illumination	of	his	melancholia.	Thoreau	had	already	been	experimenting	with	what	Branka	Arsić	identified	as	“literalization.”	Nevertheless,	a	period	of	crisis,	detailed	by	Robert	Milder,	made	him	aware	of	what	Nicolas	Abraham	and	Maria	Torok	have	referred	to	as	the	melancholic’s	blind	skill	of	“demetaphorization.”	I	suggest	that	Thoreau	exploited	this	skill	to	produce	Walden’s	unique	ability	to	feed	on	and,	as	Henry	Abelove	and	Henry	Golemba	have	suggested,	awaken	its	reader’s	desires.	I	combine	a	close	reading	of	Walden	with	selective	study	of	the	text’s	reception.	Walden	delivers	on	Thoreau’s	theory	of	friendship	from	his	first	book,	A	Week	on	the	Concord	and	
Merrimack	Rivers.	Walden’s	friendship	with	its	reader	is	the	agency	that	accomplishes	what	Henry	Golemba	and	Lawrence	Buell	have	noted	as	a	blurring	of	the	boundary	between	reader	and	text.	To	investigate	this	friendship	and	Walden’s	accommodations	of	faux	friendship,	I	construct	a	Burkean	perspective	by	incongruity	using	research	in	the	nature-writing	and	rhetoric	disciplines	that	intersect	with	Thoreauvian	studies.	This	incongruity	is	analyzed	using	not	only	Burke’s	theories	of	literary	form	and	literature	as	equipment	for	living,	but	also	Deleuze’s	process	philosophy	and	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	analyses	of	the	war	machine	and	their	spatial	analysis.	This	project	complexifies	Erin	Rand’s	research	on	polemics,	using	Deleuze’s	multiplicity	not	only	to	explain	why	polemics	are	unpredictable,	but	also	to	address	what	Sarah	Hallenbeck	has	referred	to	as	“the	crisis	of	agency.”	I	suggest	an	expansion	of	José	Esteban	Muñoz’s	research.	The	question	of	how	one	actually	transitions	from	melancholia	to	disidentification	cannot	be	adequately	answered	with	terms	like	Stuart	Hall’s	‘oppositional	reading’	or	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	‘de/reterritorialization.’	I	also	suggest	that	queer	utopian	thinking	and	poststructuralism	are	more	compatible	than	previously	argued.	This	dissertation	is	itself	a	polemic,	straining	the	possibilities	of	friendship	in	the	service	of	queerness.	
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Introduction:	Reawakening	Desire	with	Wild	Readings	
	
	 On	July	10,	2012,	the	195th	anniversary	of	Henry	David	Thoreau’s	birth,	Ken	Butigan	analyzed	a	recent	act	of	protest	(2012).	Before	I	discuss	the	details,	consider	the	analysis:	The	power	of	Thoreau’s	archetypal	civil	disobedience	action	over	a	century	and	a	half	ago	rings	through	this	one:	withdrawing	consent	from	the	state’s	policies	that	offend	core	values	and	one’s	own	conscience;	doing	so	by	delivering	the	message	“in	person,”	using	the	most	powerful	language	at	our	disposal,	the	vulnerable	but	resisting	body;	the	potential	effect	which	conscientious,	centered	and	nonviolent	action	can	have	on	those	carrying	out	the	policies	in	question	and	on	those	who	chafe	under	them,	as	well	as	the	larger	population	of	self-described	bystanders.	(para.	8)	Butigan’s	quote	“in	person”	as	the	touchstone	of	Thoreauvian	protest	comes	from	Thoreau’s	essay	“Resistance	to	Civil	Government”	(1849,	p.	198).	This	display	of	conscience	usually	finds	its	way	into	the	examples	of	Mohandas	Gandhi	and	Rev.	Dr.	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.	to	describe	protests	involving	thousands.	However,	the	act	of	protest	that	inspired	Butigan	to	write	involved	only	two	protesters	during	an	act	that,	by	itself,	could	not	hope	to	produce	an	official	acknowledgement.	Instead,	the	motive	of	the	protest	was	a	simple	expression	of	their	desire;	a	desire	that	state	law	held	to	be	illegitimate.		 Seven	days	prior	to	Butigan’s	article,	Mark	Jiminez	and	Beau	Chandler,	residents	of	Dallas,	Texas,	went	to	the	county	clerk’s	office	to	get	married.	They	knew,	contrary	to	their	mutual	love,	that	they	would	be	turned	away.	They	brought	no	weapons	and	raised	no	voices	in	anger.	They	simply	informed	the	media	and	their	allies,	which	were	present	with	cameras	recording.	As	Butigan	reports,	“The	men	are	composed	and	clear”	(para.	7).	The	clerk’s	comments	are	inaudible	to	the	camera.	However,	the	response	is	not:	“That’s	very	unfortunate	for	us	because	we	love	each	other	and	want	to	get	married”	(michturn,	2012).		The	two	men	then	handcuffed	themselves	to	each	other,	calmly	sat	on	the	floor	in	the	middle	of	the	room,	and	waited,	married	together	by	steel.	When	the	office	staff	announced	that	the	office	was	closing	and	that	everyone	had	to	leave,	Jiminez	calmly	said	that	they	would	remain	until	they	received	a	marriage	license.	The	next	video	record	shows	the	two	men	being	escorted	out	of	the	lobby	in	police	custody.	The	two	men	posted	bond	later	that	night,	and	were	received	with	applause	by	Dallas	LGBTQ	activists.		 “Unfortunate”	is	an	apt	adjective.	These	men	risked	a	$2,000	fine	and	had	to	wait	nearly	three	more	years	for	the	Supreme	Court	to	legitimate	their	desire	to	marry	(Butigan,	2012).	Even	after	Obergefell	v.	Hodges	(2015),	opponents	continue	to	deny	the	legitimacy	of	same	sex	marriage	(Yuhas	&	Dart,	2015).	It	would	seem	foolish	for	Jiminez	and	Chandler	to	risk	arrest	and	penalty	knowing	that	the	office	would	not	grant	their	request.	However,	that	was	not	their	motive.	They	showed	us	through	“the	perception	and	the	performance	of	right”	(Thoreau,	1849,	p.	197)	that	the	status	quo	was,	to	use	Jiminez’s	word,	unfortunate.	Activists	have	a	long	relationship	with	Thoreau’s	logic.	Mohandas	Gandhi,	who	was	integral	in	India’s	struggle	for	independence,	found	his	writings	to	be	
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useful	in	explaining	the	merits	of	his	nonviolent	resistance	method.	Rev.	Dr.	Martin	Luther	Link	Jr.	famously	credits	Thoreau	for	inspiring	his	lifelong	pursuit	of	social	justice	that	led	to	the	1964	Civil	Rights	Act.	Thoreau	has	been	philosophically	recruited	for	the	benefit	of	famous	civil	rights	giants,	and	he	continues	to	serve	in	that	capacity.		In	addition	to	illuminating	the	well-known	episodes	of	civil	rights	activism	in	our	history	books,	he	has	also	served	as	a	champion	of	the	average	person	struggling	for	the	right	to	speak	honestly.	Maggie	Sullivan	Murphy,	in	a	response	to	a	pro-rape	meetup	group	in	Portsmouth,	New	Hampshire,	had	this	to	write	concerning	Thoreau’s	contribution:	I	think	that	it's	important	to	do	more	than	speak	politely	to	evil.	Many	people,	much	more	noble	than	I,	used	various	tactics	to	disrupt	groups	like	these.	Disruption	is	part	of	the	non-violent	protest	action	described	and	utilized	by	Thoreau,	Gandhi,	King	and	most	recently,	Black	Lives	Matter.	If	they	have	the	right	to	assemble	and	use	hate	speech,	then	I	have	the	right	to	assemble	and	be	as	obnoxious	as	humanly	possible.	(quoted	by	Dinan,	2016,	para.	2)	This	rhetoric	of	“counter	friction,”	to	borrow	a	phrase	from	Thoreau	(1849,	p.	198),	continues	today.	In	the	gay	marriage	protest	article	discussed	above,	Butigan	finds	that	the	wisdom	behind	Thoreau’s	political	philosophy	is	that	it	focuses	on	individual	choices:	the	quest	for	social	justice	does	not	hinge	on	one’s	ability	to	mobilize	voters,	silence	opposition,	and	conform	to	a	standard	model	for	historical	movements.	Instead,	the	quest	for	social	justice	hinges	on	the	existence	of	a	multitude	of	singular	examples	of	conscience	in	the	midst	of	injustice.	Thoreau	has	been	used	countless	times	as	a	symbol	of	protest,	and	vast	scholarship	reveals	this	legacy,	but	his	works	train	us	to	do	more	than	that.	Besides	“Resistance	to	Civil	Government,”	Thoreau’s	famous	masterpiece,	Walden,	provides	other	resources—queer	resources—that	take	us	beyond	the	norms	of	protest.	
Walden	subsumes	the	point	of	civil	disobedience,	albeit	in	a	different	style	of	writing,	and	it	goes	farther.	“Resistance	to	Civil	Government”	is	a	treatise,	one	written	straightforward	in	the	vein	of	Thoreau’s	lecture	on	that	topic.	Walden	contains,	among	many	things,	an	allegory	of	an	individual	placed	under	arrest	by	a	tax	collector,	of	a	naturalist	with	a	queer	interest	in	two	colonies	of	ants	engaged	in	heroic	struggle.	These	two	anecdotes	capture	Thoreau’s	thesis	on	civil	disobedience,	which	uses	disengagement	and	nonviolent	confrontation	to	boycott	unethical	social	practices	and	by	that	absence	induce	others	to	take	notice.	However,	Walden	offers	more	than	simply	a	mythos	for	reinforcing	the	stock	theory	of	civil	protest	that	is	often	articulated	in	schools.	More	than	announcing	a	duty,	Walden	works.	In	Walden,	Thoreau’s	infectious	queerness	makes	his	contribution	special.	Thoreau	was	writing	during	the	middle	of	the	19th	Century,	the	era	of	our	westward	expansion.	This	colonization	of	the	hinterland	required	new	families	to	produce	children,	new	farms	to	grow	food,	new	roads	and	railroads	to	market	resources,	new	communication	technologies	to	integrate	it,	and	everything	that	stood	in	the	way	of	this	burgeoning	expansion	of	the	American	empire	was	treated	with	disdain	(Howe,	2007;	Sellers,	1991).	Walden	praises	none	of	the	familial	values	that	American	society	came	to	expect	from	her	writers	(Abelove,	2003).	Henry	Abelove	has	found		
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ample	evidence	of	Thoreau’s	queer	reception	(p.	29).	For	instance,	the	Boston	Globe,	in	reviewing	Thoreau’s	Walden,	wrote,	“The	author	had	not,	even	in	his	imagination,	peopled	his	hut	at	the	pond	‘with	a	loving	and	beloved	wife	and	blooming	children’”	(p.	29).	The	National	Era	openly	wondered	how	long	society	would	last	if	they	“squatted	on	solitary	duck-ponds,	eschewing	matrimony”	and	“casting	off	all	ties	of	family”	(p.	29).	It	is	no	surprise	that	Thoreau’s	contemporaries	criticized	him	for	being	“eccentric”	(p.	29).	But	you	will	not	find	that	criticism	within	Walden.	After	Thoreau’s	death,	Ralph	Waldo	Emerson	tried	to	erase	this	public	perception	of	Thoreau’s	eccentricity,	replacing	that	appearance	with	one	that	was	unfriendly,	political,	and	cerebral	(Harding,	1995).	This	move	loses	touch	with	the	enormously	wide	breadth	of	Thoreau’s	desires,	such	as	his	fascination	with	the	absurd	antics	of	squirrels,	his	awe	at	the	repeated	patterns	found	in	both	sand	and	leaves,	his	empathy	for	the	deep	melancholies	of	owls,	the	ways	in	which	a	pond	can	resemble	a	giant	eye	gazing	into	the	cosmos,	his	faith-like	confidence	that	we	could	measure	all	of	it.	Thoreau	was	not	afraid	of	society,	nor	was	he	unfriendly.	He	desired	to	see	the	men	and	boys	in	town,	and	recounted	his	asexual	attempt	to	seduce	a	woodchopper	in	the	safety	of	his	cabin	(Abelove,	2003,	pp.	34-36).	Thoreau	passionately	felt	that	each	person	had	an	important	part	to	play	in	the	cosmic	drama,	and	he	pursued	his	own	with	the	awareness	that	he	had	a	duty	to	respect	the	ability	of	others	to	do	the	same,	even	if	that	means	giving	the	reader	special	interpretive	license	(Buell,	1995;	Golemba,	1990).	The	lasting	power	of	Walden	is	not	the	specific	issues	that	Thoreau	spoke	to	in	his	time	or	how	it	equips	individuals	to	oppose	public	culture;	rather,	Walden	remains	durable	because	of	the	manner	in	which	his	queer	method	cultivated	a	reawakening	of	individual	desire	(Abelove,	2003,	p.	37;	Golemba,	1990).	Civil	disobedience	is	a	common	ingredient	that	reminds	individuals	that	they	should	not	sponsor	state	efforts	to	obstruct	individual	desire,	but	civil	disobedience	is	only	the	beginning	of	one	man’s	contribution	to	a	project	of	awakening	that	can	be	traced	to	the	Stoics	and	continues	today	among	process	philosophers.	Consider	a	few	effects	of	Walden	that	exceed	the	rubric	of	civil	disobedience.	Amy	Wang,	a	teacher	in	Oregon,	interpreted	Walden	as	a	self-help	tutorial	for	people	living	with	the	special	needs	of	autism	(2015).	She	found	wisdom	in	his	careful	placement	of	an	abode	far	enough	from	the	town	to	avoid	crowds,	but	close	enough	to	foster	frequent	interpersonal	encounters.	Alexandra	Nicewicz	Carroll,	rejecting	the	practice	of	New	Years	Resolutions,	suggested	that	we	replace	the	Resolution	with	an	Intention,	citing	Thoreau.	She	quoted	Thoreau’s	Walden:	“Go	confidently	in	the	direction	of	your	dreams.	Live	the	life	you	have	imagined.”1	Reading	Thoreau’s	story	as	merely	an	exercise	in	resistance	seems	far	removed	from	a	person	who,	in	truth,	was	squatting	on	his	friend’s	land	(with	his	permission)	in	order	to	study,	write,	and	find	his	own	way	(Harding,	1982).																																																									1	Although	Carroll	(2015,	para.	12)	misquotes	Thoreau,	her	attribution	is	a	paraphrase	of	the	following	passage	from	Walden:	“If	one	advances	confidently	in	the	direction	of	his	dreams,	and	endeavors	to	live	the	life	which	he	has	imagined,	he	will	meet	with	a	success	unexpected	in	common	hours”	(1985,	p.	580).		
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The	Supreme	Court’s	affirmation	of	gay	marriage	rights	in	the	United	States,	like	Thoreau’s	civil	disobedience,	is	just	one	step	in	the	collaborative	quest	for	desire.	Queer	folk	still	face	reproach	and	violent	denial,	and	moving	from	civil	disobedience	to	Walden	coincides	with	another	step	in	United	States	queer	advocacy.	LGBTQ	employees	have	limited	state-level	legal	protections	in	the	United	States.	This	does	not	account	for	legal	attempts	that	are	underway	in	various	states	and	cities	to	roll	back	protections	that	already	exist.	In	2015,	anti-trans	advocates	in	Houston,	Texas,	repealed	an	ordinance	that	allowed	transpeople	to	use	bathrooms	that	match	their	gender	identities	(Lett,	2015).	This	repeal	has	encouraged	North	Carolina	to	pass	sweeping	anti-LGBTQ	legislation,	which	has	only	recently	been	repealed,	only	to	give	private	businesses	the	freedom	to	discriminate	against	nonconforming	individuals.	Numerous	studies	have	shown	that	transgender	and	gender	nonconforming	people	face	high	percentages	of	the	population	who	see	their	expressions	as	illegitimate,	and	this	scorn	has	been	linked	to	high	rates	of	depression	and	suicide	(Haas,	Rodgers,	&	Herman,	2014).	The	freedom	of	gays	and	lesbians	to	pursue	their	dreams	leaves	much	to	be	desired.		
Exigence	Most	activists	and	Thoreauvian	scholars	have	remained	within	the	confines	of	civil	disobedience	and	have	not	graduated	to	the	ways	that	Walden	reawakens	desire	(Abelove,	2003,	p.	37;	Golemba,	1990).	This	has	happened	for	a	few	reasons.	The	first	reason	is	practical.	The	ways	in	which	civil	disobedience	can	be	exploited	in	political	contexts	are	vast,	and	activists	on	both	sides	of	queer	politics	will	be	able	to	draw	upon	its	heuristic	for	the	foreseeable	future.	Queer	people	can	be	disobedient	in	many	ways,	but	it	should	be	pointed	out	that	opponents	of	queer	advocacy	are	also	aware	of	Thoreau’s	political	philosophy	(Lopez,	2015),	and	the	recent	rollbacks	of	queer	rights	demonstrate	that	civil	disobedience	is	insufficient.	The	second	reason	is	theoretical.	The	vast	majority	of	research	on	Walden	positions	it	in	terms	of	its	ecological	possibilities	and	as	an	extension	of	civil	disobedience,	rather	than	the	queer	way	it	provides	a	robust	and	erotic	model	for	living.	Few	academics	have	tested	Walden	in	terms	of	queer	advocacy.	There	is	a	nascent	field	that	bridges	ecology	and	queer	studies,	but	its	connection	to	Thoreau	remains	tenuous.2	Thoreauvian	studies	has	mostly	failed	to	exploit	Walden’s	queer	mission	to	reawaken	desire	because	it	does	not	take	queer	desire	seriously	as	a	force	worthy	of	consideration.	There	are	two	reasons	for	this,	but	they	both	have	to	do	with	the	old	American	avoidance	of	queerness.	The	first	reason	is	a	general	lack	of	attention.	Queer	studies	has,	until	recently,	remained	at	the	periphery	of	academic	study,	and	queerness	is	perhaps	forever	out	of	alignment	with	heteronormative	culture	(Warner,	2002).	In	addition	to	this	general	lack	of	service,	specific	failures	to	notice	the	queerness	of	Thoreau	and	others	have	affected	research	trajectories.	For																																																									2	Catriona	Mortimer-Sandilands	and	Bruce	Erickson’s	(2010)	introduction	to	their	anthology	on	queer	ecology	mentions	Thoreau	only	once	in	passing	in	a	single-paragraph	review	of	19th	century	literature.		
	 5	
example,	Robert	Richardson’s	biography	of	Thoreau,	perhaps	the	most	recent	(1986)	source	on	the	man’s	life,	made	no	mention	of	Thoreau’s	queerness,	and	this	lack	has	filtered	to	every	other	secondary	source	that	relied	on	Richardson.	In	addition,	even	though	Michael	Warner	has	focused	on	Thoreau’s	alleged	homosexuality	(1992),	he	has	continued	to	analyze	Walden	as	a	force	that	opposes	common	sense	rather	than	as	a	champion	for	the	enabling	of	desire	(2002).	Another	more	disturbing	example	is	the	reception	of	Francis	Matthiessen’s	American	
Renaissance	(1941	as	cited	by	Abelove,	2003).	This	book,	arguably	one	of	the	most	important	seminal	texts	of	American	studies,	helped	establish	America	as	part	of	the	university	curriculum	and	made	America’s	literature	worthy	of	examination	in	political	and	historical	disciplines	(Abelove,	2003).	However,	the	reception	of	the	text	was	qualified	with	an	“edginess,	reserve,	and	wariness”	of	“an	erotic	focus	in	the	book,	a	focus	that	is	somehow	obtrusive	though	never	quite	explicit”	(pp.	61-62).	Henry	Abelove	continued:	What	is	inexplicit,	what	is	merely	suggested,	is	the	question	the	book	frames	without	asking:	what	was	the	erotic	meaning	of	that	democracy,	the	erotic	dynamic,	the	ties,	affections,	affiliations,	that	bound	together	those	white	men,	supposititiously	equal,	supposititiously	brothers,	who	were	the	privileged	subjects	of	the	old	republic?	And	if	we	could	know	that	erotic	dynamic,	would	we	know	something	pertinent	to	the	tasks	of	improving	and	deepening	and	expanding	and	advancing	and	even	reconstructing	democracy	in	the	present.	(pp.	62-63)		The	fact	that	American	Renaissance	was	published	in	1941	made	it	impossible	for	Matthiessen	to	discuss	his	desires	openly.	Matthiessen’s	homosexuality	has	been	well	documented	in	retrospect	(Steinberg,	2009).	The	reception	of	Matthiessen’s	
American	Renaissance	is	a	representative	anecdote	of	a	refusal	to	take	queer	desires	seriously	as	anything	more	than	as	a	gadfly	of	popular	culture.	Finally,	with	respect	to	Thoreauvian	studies,	its	inattention	to	Thoreau’s	erotics	has	given	the	majority	of	its	literature	a	prominent	blind	spot.		
Literature	Review	This	review	addresses	relevant	intersections	of	Thoreau	with	and	between	queer	studies,	rhetoric,	and	ecology.	In	this	review,	I	first	discuss	the	attention	Thoreau	has	received	in	queer	studies.	Second,	I	confront	an	issue	over	the	definition	of	‘queer’	in	queer	rhetoric.	Third,	I	review	the	rhetorical	research	on	Thoreau.	Fourth,	I	discuss	ecology’s	attention	to	Walden	as	environmental	literature.	Fifth,	I	address	queer	ecology’s	emphasis	on	melancholic	writing.	I	conclude	the	review	by	identifying	research	questions	that	focus	on	the	relationship	between	melancholic	writing	and	Walden’s	queer	rhetorical	form.		
Queer	Studies	Henry	Abelove	represents	queer	studies’	interest	in	Thoreau.	He	conducted	a	reception	study	of	Walden	and	identified	Thoreau’s	queer	turn	away	from	sexual	reproduction.	In	this	section,	I	present	Abelove’s	position	to	reveal	an	odd	polysemy			
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around	the	salience	of	Thoreau’s	sexuality	that	has	problematized	the	meaning	of	queer.		 Modern	readers	are	quick	to	dismiss	Thoreau	as	an	antisocial	bore,	but	this	prejudice	is	premature.	According	to	Abelove	(2003),	after	Walden’s	publication	in	1854,	reviewers	complained	that	Thoreau’s	literary	persona	was	eccentric	and	selfish	(pp.	29-30).	These	derogations	stemmed	from	Walden’s	conspicuous	silence	about	marriage,	domesticity,	and	sex	(p.	30).	This	offended	the	values	of	Thoreau’s	contemporaries,	and	Emerson	stepped	in	to	erase	the	rumor	that	Thoreau	was	affectionate	with	the	young	men	in	Concord	(pp.	31-32).	Emerson’s	interference	with	Thoreau’s	oeuvre	has	been	well	established,3	but	it	is	still	an	open	question	as	to	how	much	of	Thoreau’s	hermit	persona	was	really	a	person	who	saved	his	affections	for	other	men.	Fortunately,	Thoreau	was	able	to	preserve	a	few	cleverly	hidden	clues	in	Walden,	found	by	Abelove,	that	reveal	a	different	kind	of	person	than	a	sour	misanthrope.		 Walden	reveals	that	Thoreau	had	a	mature	network	of	friends.	He	could	be	intellectually	seductive,	not	only	with	his	friends,	but	also	with	his	written	audience.	Thoreau	visited	the	village	“to	see	the	men	and	boys”	(1985,	p.	456	as	quoted	by	Abelove,	2003,	p.	35).	In	addition,	Thoreau	received	visitors	at	his	cabin.	The	most	notable	record	in	Walden	of	one	of	these	visits	is	with	a	woodchopper.	According	to	Abelove	(2003),	“No	other	person	who	appears	in	Walden	is	so	extensively	described”	(p.	35).	Thoreau	identified	the	color	and	texture	of	his	sunburned	neck,	the	leather	of	his	boots,	and	his	slapstick	behavior	(p.	35).	When	the	woodchopper	visits,	they	read	literature	(p.	35).	Thoreau’s	choice,	Homer,	is	extraordinary	because	he	has	the	woodchopper	read	a	portion	from	The	Iliad,	in	Greek,	where	Achilles	is	consoling	his	grieving	lover	(Patroclus),	reminding	him	that	many	of	their	friends	are	still	alive	(p.	36).	The	woodchopper,	who	can	pronounce	Greek,	reads	the	words,	and	Thoreau	translates	(p.	35).	This,	for	Abelove,	is	the	seductive	relationship	that	Thoreau	establishes	with	his	reader:	Throughout	Walden	Thoreau	repeatedly	asks	his	readers	the	same	question	that	he	translates	from	Homer	for	the	woodchopper:	Why	so	unnecessarily	sad?	Why	so	unnecessarily	discontented?	Just	as	Thoreau	tries	to	arouse	the	woodchopper,	so	he	tries	to	arouse	his	readers	to	what	he	again	and	again	calls	“life.”	Just	as	he	hands	the	woodchopper	a	book,	so	he	does	to	his	readers,	and	as	readers	we	are	therefore	all	positioned,	regardless	of	our	gender	or	sexual	taste,	as	the	objects	of	a	homosexual	seduction.	In	addition,	the	more	successfully	we	are	enabled	to	read	Walden,	that	is,	the	farther	we	get	beyond	just	sounding	the	letters,	the	more	willing	we	show	ourselves.	(p.	36)																																																									3	Harding	(1995)	explains:	“Emerson	believed	that	Thoreau’s	greatest	claim	to	fame	was	as	a	Stoic,	and	he	tended	to	overemphasize	the	cold	and	the	negative	in	his	portrait;	indeed,	he	so	overdid	it	that	he	inadvertently	turned	many	people	away	from	Thoreau.	Several	years	later	when	he	came	to	edit	Thoreau’s	Letters	to	Various	Persons	(1965),	he	did	the	same	thing	again,	editing	out	of	the	letters	anything	that	showed	warmth	and	human	kindness”	(p.	5).		
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We	do	not	know	the	wood-chopper’s	sexual	orientation,	and	so	the	reader	knows	nothing	more	than	his	words:	“That’s	good”	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	437	as	quoted	by	Abelove,	2003,	p.	36).	At	that	moment,	Thoreau	was	not	a	misanthrope,	but	was	instead	seductive	of	others	(p.	36)	and	a	queer	inducer	of	melancholia.		 Thoreau	was	not	gay,	but	he	was	queer.	It	is	tempting	to	pigeonhole	Thoreau	as	gay	or	bisexual	by	virtue	of	the	suggestiveness	of	this	exchange.	It	is	important	to	remember	that	Thoreau	was	critical	of	sensuality	and	found	the	woodchopper	to	be	particularly	sensual,	but	not	vicious	or	diseased.	Nevertheless,	Thoreau’s	choice	of	literary	moment	has	given	Abelove	ample	cause	to	interpret	Thoreau	as	he	did.	Since	I	have	a	different	reading	here,	this	leads	to	a	queer	polysemy.	Does	queer	have	a	sexual	denotation,	as	many	people	in	the	LGBTQ	community	assert,	or	does	it	refer	to	the	establishment	of	difference?		
Queer	Rhetoric		 Queer	rhetoric	subscribes	to	both	essential	and	process	perspectives.	‘Queer’	can	refer	to	an	audience’s	interpretation	of	queerness.	It	can	also	refer	to	the	way	that	an	act	of	communication	is	done.	In	this	section,	I	discuss	this	split,	and	then	I	adopt	a	process	perspective	for	my	interpretation	of	Walden.	What	does	queer	mean?	Queer	rhetoric	indicates	that	the	answer	depends	on	how	the	word	is	used.	Some	argue	that	it	involves	sex,	while	others	deny	that	it	is	necessary	to	sex	queerness.4	Queer	is,	in	fact,	an	essentially	contested	concept	(Jackman,	2010).	The	primal	wedge	that	divides	definitions	is	the	part	of	speech	to	which	queer	belongs.	Queer	is	a	noun,	an	adjective,	and	a	verb.	Although	these	parts	are	permeable	and	do	not	exhaust	its	possibilities,	I	use	them	as	an	entrance	into	the	topic	of	definition.	On	one	hand,	queer	tends	to	have	an	anti-normative	essence	when	used	as	a	noun	or	as	an	adjective.	Each	person	is	a	lens	that	selects	examples	of	queer	people	and	objects	judged	against	his	or	her	conception	of	queerness	(Bessette,	2016;	West,	2013).	Today,	queer	people	and	objects	are	different	than	or	resistant	to	heteronormativity	(Dunn,	2011).	By	their	very	existence,	queers	“trouble	sexual	normalcy	and	its	discriminations”	(Morris,	2006,	p.	147)	by	being,	like	the	young	Abraham	Lincoln,	“different,	awkward,	oddly	demonstrative”	(Morris,	2013,	p.	407).	On	the	other	hand,	when	queer	is	a	verb,	it	is	something	that	is	done.	To	queer	something	is	to	change	it	to	being	not	normal	(Morris,	2007a),	and	the	meaning	of	normal	is	by	no	means	a	settled	issue	(Bessette,	2016).	The	use	of	queer	as	a	verb	does	not	always	have	the	sexual	denotation,	although	this	often	does	happen	today.	It	can	also	be	defined	by	its	ability	to	do	queer	work,	particularly	to	other	ideas	(Rand,	2013b).	In	particular,	an	act	of	queering	“play[s]	norms	against	one	another”	(West,	2013,	p.	540)	and	may	even	produce	readings	of	texts	that	are	at	variance	from	the	intentions	of	authors	(Dunn,	2011).	Erin	Rand	(2008)	has	provided	one	example	of	this	non-sexual	deployment	of	queering	that	I	use	to	analyze	Walden.	She	has	developed	criteria	for	the																																																									4	Some	scholarship	declines	to	define	queer	altogether.	See	Morris	(2007b,	2015a,	2015b).		
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rhetorical	form	of	polemics	and	argued	that	the	polemic	is	a	queer	rhetorical	form.	Rand’s	queering	of	the	polemic	enables	a	queer	analysis	of	Walden’s	form.	Rand’s	analysis	of	the	polemic	as	queer	falls	on	the	verb	side	of	the	definitional	wedge	because	she	categorizes	the	polemic	as	a	rhetorical	form.	This	move	is	different	from	traditional	analyses	of	the	polemic	because	a	rhetorical	form	is	supposed	to	have	nothing	to	do	with	semantic	content	(Rand,	2008,	p.	301)	and	everything	to	do	with	how	the	speech	act	is	carried	out	(pp.	298-299).	Rand	argued	that	there	are	“four	specific	features	that	are	unique	to	the	polemical	form”	(p.	301).	The	possibility	that	Walden	is	a	polemic	is	provocative,	but	even	more	interesting	is	the	fact	that	Rand	found	the	polemic	to	be	a	queer	rhetorical	form,	a	form	marked	with	unpredictability.	For	Rand,	the	“unpredictable	relationship	between	an	intending	agent	and	the	effects	of	an	action”	(p.	312)	makes	a	rhetorical	form	queer.	Because	of	their	volatility	and	their	risky	flouting	of	the	conventions	of	argumentation,	“the	characteristics	of	polemics	make	them	especially	prone	to	being	put	to	unforeseen	uses”	(p.	310).	They	serve	as	a	foil	for	more	“complex,	rational,	and	theoretically	based	language”	elsewhere	(p.	311).	Polemics	provoke	people	to	make	space	for	communication.	In	other	words,	the	“‘failure’	of	a	polemic	to	do	exactly	as	its	author	intended	is	thus	the	very	resource	for	its	productivity”	(p.	313).		 Thoreau’s	‘intentions’	have	been	violated	in	unpredictable	ways.	The	stereotyped	purpose	of	Walden’s	rhetoric	is	to	catalogue	Thoreau’s	stay	at	Walden	Pond.	However,	this	stereotype	is	at	variance	with	the	users	of	Walden,	some	of	whom	I	have	already	discussed	in	the	introduction.	To	provide	a	more	thorough	answer	to	why	this	has	occurred,	I	turn	to	rhetorical	studies.		
Rhetoric		 Rhetorical	studies	shows	that	Walden’s	meaning	is	wildly	unpredictable	because	it	contains	an	unusual	narrative	structure	and	was	written	in	an	unusual	style.	This	narrative	and	style	evolved	during	a	period	of	melancholia	that	Thoreau	experienced	over	many	years	in	his	early	life.	In	this	section,	I	review	the	rhetorical	forms	that	have	already	been	identified	and	discuss	the	details	of	Thoreau’s	melancholia.		 Walden’s	unusual	nature	derives	from	the	way	in	which	it	features	multiple	voices	that	contrast	with	Thoreau’s	persona.	Henry	Golemba	(1990)	argued	that	
Walden’s	Thoreau	strategically	poses	as	a	model	individualist,	constraining	him	to	downplay	his	cooperative	side.	In	addition,	Thoreau	incorporated	a	variety	of	voices	into	his	text,	and	it	is	difficult	to	isolate	them	individually	(Buell,	1995;	Bickman,	1992).	This	fusion,	which	has	been	regarded	as	a	Bakhtinian	carnival	(Schueller,	1986),	creates	a	“language	of	paradox,	ambiguity,	oxymoron,	indirection,	and	exaggeration”	that	provides	a	fertile	field	for	reader	interpretation	(Golemba,	1990,	p.	203).		 These	multiple	voices	in	Walden	produce	a	provocative	language.	The	fertility	in	this	field	of	interpretation	permits	the	reader	to	run	in	unanticipated	directions	with	unsanctioned	meaning.	Thoreau	goads	the	reader	to	take	flights	of	interpretation	by	speaking	a	“language	of	desire”	(p.	233,	p.	234).	Taking	an	analogy	from	Thoreau’s	old	correspondent,	Harrison	Blake,	Golemba	argued	that	this	
	 9	
language	of	desire	feels	like	a	posted	letter	that	has	not	quite	yet	arrived	(p.	228).	This	feeling	of	not	quite	having	arrived	fosters	anxiety	that	induces	the	reader	to	recover	something	that	has	been	lost	(p.	228),	and	that	recovery,	wherever	it	comes	from,	becomes	Walden’s	interpretation.	Robert	Milder	(1995)	reads	many	of	these	voices	in	Walden	as	the	various	stages	of	Thoreau’s	development.	After	exhaustive	research	into	Thoreau’s	prolific	journal	and	draft	manuscripts	of	Walden,	Milder	concluded	that	Walden	is	more	than	Thoreau’s	portrait	of	reality,	circa	1854.	It	combines	both	a	narrated	story	and	an	enacted	story	(p.	54)	tracing	and	retracing	his	development,	his	painful	lessons	and	failures,	and	intimates	a	humbled	student	of	nature	who	still	had	more	to	learn	(p.	55).	The	multiple	Thoreaus	presented	in	Walden	are	arranged	to	form	a	complex	set	of	sequences,	each	of	which	expose	different	developments	and	tensions.	
Walden’s	genius,	argued	Milder,	lies	in	the	complex	organization	of	these	lessons	and	cleverly	hidden	questions.	As	Milder	argued,	these	lessons	and	questions	are	imbricated	in	specific	agon	clusters	that	showcase	specific	struggles,	Thoreau’s	failure	to	reconcile	these	struggles,	and	the	lessons	that	he	gleaned.	Milder’s	analysis	of	these	tensions	coalesce	around	at	least	three	clusters:	one’s	freedom,	one’s	purity,	and	one’s	relationship	with	the	world.		 Milder	found	that	many	of	these	complex	sequences	came	about	because	of	a	profound	crisis	that	occurred	between	1849	and	1854.	This	is	the	time	period	between	Thoreau’s	first	and	second	book	publications	(pp.	52-53).	As	Fink	(1992)	and	Milder	(1995)	have	pointed	out,	the	impetus	for	this	crisis	had	something	to	do	with	the	fact	that	his	first	published	book,	A	Week	on	the	Concord	and	Merrimack	
Rivers,	was	a	humiliating	failure.	That	book	is	about	loss:	the	loss	of	not	only	his	close	brother	John	in	1842,	but	also	the	loss	of	a	pastoral	image	of	America	from	his	youth.	Failing	such	a	personal	debut	project	must	have	been	devastating.	However,	perhaps	what	truly	made	this	time	period	a	crisis	for	Thoreau	was	the	fact	that	this	failure	snowballed	into	a	rift	between	him	and	his	mentor	and	owner	of	Walden	Pond,	Ralph	Waldo	Emerson	(Milder,	1995).		Thoreau’s	crisis,	his	estrangement	from	Emerson,	occurred	because	A	Week	established	Thoreau’s	public	disagreement	with	Emerson’s	philosophy	of	Transcendentalism.	Emerson	held	that	the	great	moral	and	eternal	truths	that	guided	humanity	were	located	within	each	individual	mind,	and	that	each	of	us	had	a	duty	to	reach	within	ourselves	to	find	and	share	these	truths.	A	Week	was	a	spectacular	departure	from	Emerson,	finding	the	fount	of	truth	not	within	each	person,	but	within	the	whole	of	nature	itself,	which	included	the	human	mind.	For	whatever	reason,	Emerson	warmly	supported	Thoreau’s	final	manuscript	before	publication,	urging	him	to	publish	it	on	credit	(Fink,	1992).	However,	after	publication,	Emerson	turned	about-face	and	refused	to	write	a	review	of	it	(p.	248).	This	rebuke	intensified	Thoreau’s	downward	spiral	because	Emerson’s	silence	served	to	wave	the	writing	industry	away	from	Thoreau,	condemning	him	to	oblivion.	Thoreau	published	A	Week	at	his	own	expense,	and	he	was	barely	able	to	make	his	debt	payments	by	working	in	his	father’s	pencil	factory	and	doing	hard	work	outdoors	as	a	surveyor	(Milder,	1995,	p.	99).	
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	 Thoreau’s	embarrassment	led	to	a	painful	distancing	of	himself	from	his	friends,	but	this	isolation	would	be	a	blessing	in	disguise.	“Genial	misanthropy”	is	a		fair	assessment	of	Thoreau	during	this	crisis	(p.	104).	To	compensate	for	his	solitude,	Thoreau	tried	to	befriend	nature	and	its	dispassionate	laws,	continued	to	dream	about	being	a	successful	writer,	and	remained	faithful	to	his	journal	writing	(p.	105).	His	prose	progressively	described	more	and	explained	less	(Golemba,	1990,	pp.	223-224),	and	he	feared	that	the	world	was	losing	its	wonder	(Milder,	1995).	He	sought	to	renew	this	wonder	through	nighttime	walks	alone	in	the	woods;	it	was	in	these	times	and	places	of	being	profoundly	lost	that	he	found	nature,	there	all	along	in	his	mind,	teaching	him	something	(pp.	110-111).		
Ecology		 Research	on	Walden	as	ecological	literature	shows	that	Thoreau	learned	that	nature	is	nonlinear	and	should	be	regarded	as	an	equal.	In	this	section,	I	review	the	research	by	Lawrence	Buell	(1995),	who	discusses	the	nature	of	this	nonlinearity	and	the	importance	of	Thoreau’s	filial	love	affair	with	nature.		 Buell	argued	that	Walden	has	a	nonlinear	seasonal	progression.	This	nonlinearity	exists	for	two	reasons.	First,	as	Buell	has	identified,	Thoreau	must	have	realized	that	his	own	recovery	was	nonlinear:	he	made	breakthroughs,	and	these	breakthroughs	occurred	because	of	previous	setbacks.	Walden	zigzags	in	its	advocacy,	reflecting	Thoreau’s	inconsistent	progress	and	coinciding	with	the	irregularity	of	evolution.	Second,	and	more	importantly,	as	Buell	has	pointed	out,	Thoreau	discovered	that	placing	the	ego	at	the	center	of	the	world	was	problematic.	
Walden	destabilizes	the	persona	of	Thoreau,	making	it	difficult	to	trace	his	position	through	it	(Buell,	1995;	Milder,	1995).	Without	a	stable	authority	to	restrain	the	reader’s	interpretations,	flights	of	interpretation	become	possible.	However,	Thoreau	left	behind	abundant	resources	to	help	recover	these	personae,	and	this	recovery	leads	to	different	ways	to	interpret	Walden	(Milder,	1995).		 The	nonlinear	nature	of	Walden	embodies	Thoreau’s	growth	into	a	genuine	peer	of	nature	(Buell,	1995).	His	journals	and	drafts	of	Walden	testify	to	his	gradual	evolution	from	an	egalitarian	survivalist	to	a	whole	human	who	was	capable	of	regarding	“nonhuman	agents	as	bona	fide	partners”	(p.	179).	In	the	first	draft	of	
Walden,	Thoreau’s	argument	is	an	unambiguous	nod	to	Emersonian	metaphysics	with	a	working-class	twist.	He	told	a	mostly	easy	romance	between	nature	and	a	transparent	eyeball	in	the	woods,	he	covered	his	blunders,	and	praised	the	tools	that	he	already	had.	However,	with	each	subsequent	draft,	Thoreau’s	appreciation	for	nature’s	lessons	grew	to	cover	Walden’s	entire	surface	and	disrupted	any	normal	boundary	between	author	and	content	(Milder,	1995).	Perhaps	the	most	important	lesson	that	links	these	lessons	together	is	the	realization	that	a	true	love	is	an	equal.	There	is	no	better	way	for	a	text	to	do	this	than	by	inviting	the	reader	to	become	a	co-author.	Walden	is	a	text	that	turns	on	an	unpredictable	relationship	between	itself	and	its	intended	meaning.	This	move	is	profoundly	democratic,	and	because	it	involves	internal	moves	that	destabilize	its	own	identity,	Thoreau’s	ecology	is	queer.				
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Queer	Ecology	
	 Queer	ecology	demonstrates	the	importance	of	melancholia.	In	this	section,	I	show	why	melancholia	is	of	interest	to	queer	ecology,	define	it	as	a	distinct	phenomenon,	and	discuss	why	research	in	this	area	should	focus	on	Walden’s	language	of	desire.		 Despite	its	personal	nature,	melancholia	is	an	important	topic	because	it	grows	out	of	situations	of	social	denial.	For	Catriona	Mortimer-Sandilands	(2010),	melancholia	“is	focused	exactly	on	the	condition	of	grieving	the	ungrievable:	how	does	one	mourn	in	the	midst	of	a	culture	that	finds	it	almost	impossible	to	recognize	the	value	of	what	has	been	lost?”	(p.	333).	Melancholia	finds	purchase	not	only	in	queer	studies,	where	popular	culture	has	long	held	queer	attachments	to	be	barely	tolerable,	but	also	in	ecology,	which	has	had	to	confront	“a	society	that	cannot	acknowledge	nonhuman	beings,	natural	environments,	and	ecological	processes	as	appropriate	objects	for	genuine	grief”	(p.	333).	Melancholia	is	the	condition5	of	denying	or	being	denied	one’s	desires6	in	the	midst	of	loss.	Mortimer-Sandilands	showed,	through	analysis	of	Judith	Butler	and																																																									5	Melancholia	has	a	long	history	that	dates	back	to	antiquity	and	survives	today	with	a	different	meaning.	In	the	19th	century,	before	and	during	the	establishment	of	psychiatry	as	a	legitimate	medical	field,	melancholia	was	a	term	that	referred	to	an	explanation	for	madness	that	involved	mysterious	anatomical	lesions	(Berrios,	1988,	pp.	298)	and	moral	degeneration	(Misbach	&	Stam,	2006,	p.	49).	The	symptoms	of	affect,	such	as	sadness,	were	not	a	part	of	the	concept	(Berrios,	1988,	p.	298).	In	the	insane	asylums,	patients	with	melancholia	either	recovered	on	their	own	or	went	on	to	develop	more	intense	and	terminal	forms	of	insanity,	and	the	early	19th	century	saw	the	erosion	of	traditional	social	support	structures	and	growing	asylum	populations	(Misbach	&	Stam,	2006,	p.	50).	This	epidemic	encouraged	a	paradigm	shift	in	the	emerging	field	of	psychiatry	at	the	hands	of	neurologists	(p.	50).	Moral	degeneration	became	less	relevant	to	medical	empiricism,	and	because	the	anatomical	lesions	were	nowhere	to	be	found,	their	apparent	size	shrank	until	they	became	metaphorical	(Berrios,	1988,	p.	299).	In	the	U.S.	context,	between	the	late	1860s	and	the	1900s,	melancholia	underwent	a	complex	conceptual	reframing	and	was	ultimately	replaced	by	mental	depression	and	bipolar	disorder	(Misbach	&	Stam,	2006,	p.	50;	Berrios,	1988,	p.	302).	There	is	little	terminological	equivalence	between	melancholia	and	these	terms.	There	is	not	enough	space	here	to	detail	this	evolution,	which	involved	several	“bridge”	diagnoses	and	typologies	that	are	no	longer	commonly	used,	but	it	should	be	enough	to	say	that	most	people	with	depression	and	bipolar	disorder	today	would	not	have	been	diagnosed	with	melancholia	in	the	early	19th	century	(Berrios,	1988,	p.	298,	p.	300).	Depression	and	bipolar	disorder	are	symptom	terms,	leaving	behind	the	anatomical	and	moral	mechanisms	of	causation	that	melancholia	represented	as	explanations.	Today,	melancholia	survives	in	the	psychoanalytic	realm	as	a	term	of	explanation	for	why	a	person’s	mourning	continues	interminably.	6	In	this	project,	I	use	a	process-oriented	understanding	of	desire,	defining	it	as	“the	production	of	production”	(Deleuze	&	Guattari,	2009,	p.	6).		
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Freud’s	writings,	that	not	everyone	grieves	the	same	way.	In	this	theoretical	orientation,	which	has	been	summarized	by	these	three	authors,	some	people	are	encouraged	or	permitted	to	mourn	the	loss	of	the	objects	of	their	desires.	Normal	mourning	occurs	in	cases	where	the	psychic	trauma	would	be	too	great	for	the	loss	to	be	accepted	all	at	once	(Arsić,	2016).	Alternatively,	the	subject	may	simply	not	be	ready	to	part	with	the	object	(Butler,	1999).	To	accommodate	this	gradual	process,	the	psyche	constructs	a	fantastic	version	of	the	lost	object,	an	illusion	that	is	made	possible	by	a	metaphorical	swallowing,	consuming,	or	acquiring	(Leader,	2008),	with	that	metaphor	being	concealed	from	the	subject’s	awareness	(Abraham	&	Torok,	1994a).	This	normal	mourning	involves	a	feeling	of	anger,	first	directed	inward	during	the	stage	of	denial,	and	then	outward	toward	the	desired	object	that	is	now	absent	in	reality	(or	related	objects;	Leader,	2008),	and	the	fantasy	of	the	object’s	continued	existence	is	slowly	diminished	at	the	pace	in	which	the	psyche	is	able	to	absorb	the	truth	(Arsić,	2016).	Mourning	does	not,	by	itself,	induce	the	subject	to	‘move	on’	from	the	loss;	rather,	mourning	slowly	lessens	the	intensity	of	one’s	grief	so	that	it	can	be	managed	in	the	context	of	continued	living	(Leader,	2008,	p.	99).	As	Darian	Leader	has	observed,	not	only	is	grief	distinct	from	mourning	(p.	8),	but	old	losses	are	apt	to	be	resurged	when	subsequent	losses	occur;	old	losses	stick	to	fresh	ones,	especially	when	they	occur	to	others	in	a	social	group	(p.	67).	On	the	other	hand,	some	people	lose	more	than	just	objects	of	desire,	but	their	desires	as	well;	as	Butler	clarified,	instead	of	mourning,	a	melancholic	individual	incorporates	a	lost	object	into	their	psyche	as	usual,	but	once	there	it	becomes	a	permanent	resident	of	the	subject’s	identity	(as	cited	by	Mortimer-Sandilands,	2010).	It	has	nothing	to	do	with	narcissism	or	overwhelming	pain,	but	instead	it	is	the	halting	of	a	process.	This	happens	subconsciously;	most	people	are	unaware	why	they	are	melancholic	(p.	335).	Anger	still	occurs,	but	since	the	desired	object	has	been	devoured,	anger	remains	turned	inward	as	guilt	(p.	335).	Melancholia	is	a	mourning	frozen	in	time,	but	the	guilt	continues	to	gnaw.	Butler	argued	that	melancholia	does	indeed	apply	to	sexual	desires,	and	that	one’s	gender	identity	is	susceptible	to	melancholic	incorporation	when	specific	sexual	desires	are	disavowed	(1997	as	cited	by	Mortimer-Sandilands,	2010).	As	Leader	(2008)	has	put	it,	the	melancholic	dies	along	with	the	loss	(p.	8).	Because	melancholia	can	last	for	months,	years,	or	even	a	lifetime,	melancholic	writing	is	an	important	means	of	recovery	from	the	arresting	death	of	melancholia.	The	most	important	observation,	in	my	opinion,	that	Mortimer-Sandilands	(2010)	made	concerning	melancholic	writing	is	her	notice	of	Jan	Zita	Grover’s	notice	that	it	can	accomplish	“imaginative	feats”	(p.	345).	These	feats	“emerge	from	a	conscious,	laborious	process	of	reflection	grounded	in	intimate	experiences	and	local	histories,	in	the	precise	ways	in	which	pain	and	loss	are	manifest	in	lives	and	events”	(p.	345).	Melancholic	writing	involves	the	reader	with	the	features	of	melancholic	experience,	and	those	features	demonstrate	to	the	reader	the	transition	from	melancholia	to	mourning.	This	experience	has	the	potential	to	induce	a	recovery	from	melancholia.	In	Thoreau’s	case,	an	attentive	reader	of	Walden	has	an	experience	that	follows	Thoreau’s	descent	into	winter	and	redemption	in	spring.	The	lesson	of	melancholia	can	only	be	obtained	through			
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painstaking	attention	to	the	phenomenon	of	melancholia.	That	lesson	does	not	occur	when	the	writer	discusses	melancholia	abstractly.	An	example	of	Thoreau’s	melancholic	writing	that	has	this	functionality	appears	in	Walden	in	an	unlikely	place.	The	central	chapter	of	Walden,	“The	Ponds,”	is	often	regarded	by	readers	as	the	most	descriptive	and	least	evaluative	chapter	in	the	entire	book.	It	is	a	summertime	chapter	that	marks	an	almost	imperceptible	change	in	the	tone	of	the	book.	In	his	description	of	Walden	Pond,	Thoreau	laments	about	the	untold	civilizations	that	have	used	this	pond	as	their	Delphic	fountain.	The	version	that	he	had	in	hand	when	he	published	A	Week	leaves	this	history	unexplored.7	However,	in	later	drafts,	he	added,	among	other	things,	this	segment:	Yet	perchance	the	first	who	came	to	this	well	have	left	some	trace	of	their	footsteps.	I	have	been	surprised	to	detect	encircling	the	pond,	even	where	a	thick	wood	has	just	been	cut	down	on	the	shore,	a	narrow	shelf-like	path	in	the	steep	hillside	alternatively	rising	and	falling,	approaching	and	receding	from	the	water’s	edge,	as	old	probably	as	the	race	of	man	here,	worn	by	the	feet	of	aboriginal	hunters,	and	still	from	time	to	time	unwittingly	trodden	by	the	present	occupants	of	the	land.	This	is	particularly	distinct	to	one	standing	on	the	middle	of	the	pond	in	winter,	just	after	a	light	snow	has	fallen,	appearing	as	a	clear	undulating	white	line,	unobscured	by	weeds	and	twigs,	and	very	obvious	a	quarter	of	a	mile	off	in	many	places	where	in	summer	it	is	hardly	distinguishable	close	at	hand.	The	snow	reprints	it,	as	it	were	in	clear	white	type	alto-relievo.	The	ornamented	grounds	of	villas	which	will	one	day	be	built	here	may	still	preserve	some	trace	of	this.	(1985,	p.	466)	At	the	outset	of	Walden,	Thoreau	is	adamant	that	his	desire	is	that	people	should	find	their	own	way,	and	so	I	read	this	passage	as	a	confession	that	he	has	not	been	entirely	going	his	own	way.	What	is	remarkable	here	is	that	Thoreau	could	not	notice	this	old	path	in	the	summer,	but	had	to	stand	on	the	middle	of	the	frozen	pond.	He	predicted	that	in	the	future	this	old	path	would	still	be	noticeable.	Becoming	aware	of	one’s	habits	and	the	loss	of	originality	can	reawaken	desire,	and	Thoreau’s	language	in	this	passage	is	charged	with	a	significant	fertility.		
Summary	and	Inquiry	We	began	this	review	with	the	discovery	that	Walden	permits	itself	to	be	interpreted	as	queer.	It	can	be	interpreted	as	such	in	homosexual	(Abelove,	2003),	asexual,	and	melancholic	ways,	leading	it	to	have	an	indeterminate	meaning.	Queer	is	an	essentially	contested	concept	(Jackman,	2010),	making	Walden	queer	at	a	formal	level	and	through	a	text’s	unforeseen	potential	(Rand,	2008).	
Walden	employs	various	literary	forms,	and	uses	a	queer	language	of	desire	to	describe	Thoreau’s	life	in	the	woods	(Golemba,	1990).	This	strategy	involves	the	reader	in	the	process	of	authorizing	its	content,	leaving	it	with	indeterminate	meaning	that	goads	the	reader	to	recover	it	(p.	228).	This	is	the	source	of	its	queerness.																																																										7	This	observation,	and	many	others	like	it	in	this	dissertation,	was	made	possible	by	a	digital	encoding	of	Ronald	Clapper’s	dissertation	(Schacht,	n.d.).		
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One	of	Walden’s	literary	forms	is	a	seasonal	progression,	developed	out	of	the	author’s	fall	into,	overwintering	in,	and	spring	back	from	melancholia	(Buell,	1995).	Extant	drafts	written	by	Thoreau,	his	journal,	and	his	biography	reveal	that	Thoreau	gradually	introduced	his	language	of	desire	during	a	period	of	melancholia,	which	followed	a	pattern	similar	to	Walden’s	fall,	winter,	and	spring	(Milder,	1995).	He	also,	by	his	own	claim	in	the	opening	passages	of	the	text,	wrote	the	bulk	of	these	seasons	into	Walden	during	this	time.	Thoreau’s	crisis	led	him	to	encounter	nature,	learn	from	it	as	an	equal,	and	redeemed	him	by	making	him	understand	his	powers	of	careful	observation	and	description.	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	interacts	with	his	melancholic	writing.	Melancholic	writings	have	already	been	subjected	to	research,	which	found	their	strength	in	the	particularity	of	their	descriptions	that	show	the	specific	features	of	melancholic	experience	(Mortimer-Sandilands,	2010).	Research	has	already	noted	that	Thoreau’s	powers	of	description	were	particularly	strong.	However,	the	melancholic	writings	that	Mortimer-Sandilands	examined	focused	on	queer	and	ecological	content,	not	queer	form.	Walden	is	unique	for	its	use	of	melancholic	writing	in	a	queer	rhetorical	form.	In	light	of	this	fresh	combination,	this	dissertation	addresses	two	questions:		RQ1:	How	does	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	interact	with	his	melancholic	writing?		RQ2:	How	does	this	interaction	implicate	queer	studies	and	queer	movements?		
Method		 This	section	describes	the	means	of	analysis	in	the	dissertation.	The	analytical	tasks	are	a	presentation	of	the	situation	of	Walden,	how	the	various	rhetorical	forms	within	it	interact,	and	how	that	interaction	implicates	queer	studies	and	queer	movements.		 As	Kenneth	Burke’s	early	works	(1941/1973,	1935/1984a,	1937/1984b)	show,	one	must	know	the	artist’s	situation	before	it	is	possible	to	understand	what	the	art	communicated.	This	requirement	warrants	a	more	thorough	discussion	of	the	historical	state	of	affairs	in	the	19th	century	coupled	with	the	particular	details	of	Thoreau’s	own	biography	and	oeuvre.		 My	analysis	of	Walden	is	specifically	a	formal	analysis.	Kenneth	Burke’s	early	writings	on	the	relationship	between	situations	and	literary	responses	are	rich	resources	of	formal	method	for	analyzing	Walden’s	status	as	equipment	for	living	(1941/1973).	Thoreau	responded	to	his	situation	with	a	unique	combination	of	conventional	and	impious	attitudes,	and	Burke	helps	to	assemble	incongruous	perspectives	(1935/1984a).	To	develop	answers	to	the	research	questions,	I	propose	to	exercise	the	typologies	explored	in	Burke’s	Counter-statement	(1931/1968)	so	that	I	can	chart	Thoreau’s	complex	formal	sequences.		 Thoreau	deployed	a	language	of	desire,	and	this	addition	queers	what	would	be	a	normal	formal	analysis.	I	investigate	the	relationship	between	the	forms	and	chart	changes	to	Thoreau’s	unique	language	of	desire.	Rand	(2008)	argued	that	all	rhetorical	forms	enable	a	range	of	meanings	and	purposes.	Nevertheless,	the	meaning	of	the	content	of	that	form	is	especially	contingent	on	the	reader	of	Walden			
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(Buell,	1995;	Golemba,	1990).	To	this	end,	it	is	important	to	chart	a	selective	constellation	of	readings	of	Walden	to	construct	a	perspective	by	incongruity.	Leah	Ceccarelli	(1998)	argued	that	an	appropriate	method	to	understand	polysemic	texts	that	have	high	levels	of	hermeneutic	depth	should	involve	“a	close	reading	of	the	receptional	evidence,	with	an	eye	toward	the	construal	of	message	content	by	different	interpretive	communities”	and	“a	close	reading	of	the	text	itself”	(p.	410).		
Outline	This	dissertation	is	divided	into	two	main	parts	and	a	conclusion.	The	first	part	of	the	dissertation	addresses	the	topic	of	melancholia	through	both	biography	and	close	textual	analysis	of	Thoreau’s	early	works.	The	second	part	focuses	on	
Walden’s	form,	first	from	a	nature-writing	perspective,	then	from	a	rhetorical	perspective,	and	then	from	a	polemical	perspective.	Finally,	the	conclusion	reviews	the	dissertation,	answers	the	research	questions,	and	explores	how	this	implicates	future	research	on	melancholia	and	queer	studies	in	the	communication	discipline.	Not	including	this	Introduction	chapter,	this	dissertation	has	six	chapters.	Chapter	One	provides	an	accounting	of	a	narrative	of	Thoreau’s	life	that	focused	on	his	vulnerability	to	melancholia,	the	real	losses	and	blunders	that	he	experienced,	and	the	breakthrough	in	self-loss	that	assisted	him	in	recognizing	his	condition	and	the	skill	that	he	invented	to	hide	that	condition.	Chapter	Two	traces	Thoreau’s	progression	through	three	stages	of	melancholia:	entrenchment,	transfer,	and	recognition.	These	waypoints	are	reflected	by	his	published	works:	the	journal	and	magazine	publications	that	he	published	before	1849,	his	first	book,	A	Week,	and	finally	his	writings	on	walking	after	1849.	Chapter	Three	identifies	how	Walden	defines	the	parameters	of	friendship	with	itself,	as	well	as	its	offer	of	spacious	hospitality	toward	readers	who	are	not	ready	for	or	willing	to	take	the	challenge	of	befriending	the	text.	Chapter	Four	discusses	the	procession	of	friendship	in	between	literary	forms	in	Walden	at	different	levels	of	scale,	revealing	an	interaction	between	perceptual	striation	and	smoothening	that	uncovers	a	holey	space	(see	Deleuze	&	Guattari,	1987)	for	Thoreau	to	reveal	his	philosophy	of	self-respect.	Chapter	Five	investigates	the	borders	of	Walden’s	friendship	with	the	reader	through	an	investigation	of	the	unpredictable	agency	of	Walden’s	polemical	characteristics	(see	Rand,	2008).	Finally,	the	Conclusion	chapter	engages	the	research	of	José	Esteban	Muñoz	(2009,	1999).		
Coda		 Despite	the	tendency	of	scholars	to	ignore	the	queer	legacy	of	Thoreau,	his	message	has	reached	a	much	larger	audience.	Many	people	love	to	read	Walden	without	understanding	why	Thoreau’s	rhetorical	situation	has	increased	in	relevancy.	Until	that	understanding	becomes	commonplace,	I	am	comforted	that	there	are	individuals,	like	Mark	Jiminez	and	Beau	Chandler,	who	married	themselves	years	before	the	state	recognized	their	partnership.	These	men,	like	the	melancholic	owls	that	kept	Thoreau	up	at	night,	exercised	their	desires	in	a	culture	that	often	only	responds	to	what	is	“expedient”	(Thoreau,	1849,	p.	189).	Perhaps	in			
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the	future	more	individuals	will	be	able	to	draw	from	this	relief,	reawaken	their	slumbering	passions,	and	live	their	own	dreams.		 	
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Chapter	One:	A	Narrative	of	Melancholia	
	There	we	lay	under	an	oak,	on	the	bank	of	the	stream,	near	to	some	farmer’s	cornfield,	getting	sleep,	and	forgetting	where	we	were;	a	great	blessing,	that	we	are	obliged	to	forget	our	enterprises	every	twelve	hours.	Minks,	muskrats,	meadow-mice,	woodchucks,	squirrels,	skunks,	rabbits,	foxes,	and	weasels,	all	inhabit	near,	but	keep	very	close	where	you	are	there.	The	river	sucking	and	eddying	away	all	night	down	toward	the	marts	and	the	seaboard,	a	great	wash	and	freshet,	and	no	small	enterprise	to	reflect	on.	.	.	.	One	sailor	was	visited	in	his	dreams	this	night	by	the	Evil	Destinies,	and	all	those	powers	that	are	hostile	to	human	life,	which	constrain	and	oppress	the	minds	of	men,	and	make	their	path	seem	difficult	and	narrow,	and	beset	with	dangers,	so	that	the	most	innocent	and	worthy	enterprises	appear	insolent	and	a	tempting	of	fate,	and	the	gods	go	not	with	us.	But	the	other	happily	passed	a	serene	and	even	ambrosial	or	immortal	night,	and	his	sleep	was	dreamless,	or	only	the	atmosphere	of	pleasant	dreams	remained,	a	happy	natural	sleep	until	the	morning;	and	his	cheerful	spirit	soothed	and	reassured	his	brother,	for	whenever	they	meet,	the	Good	Genius	is	sure	to	prevail.	—Thoreau’s	A	Week	on	the	Concord	and	Merrimack	Rivers,	“Sunday”	(1985,	pp.	93-94)			 The	roots	of	Thoreau’s	melancholia	began	to	form	with	his	relationship	with	his	family,	and	especially	with	his	brother.	Despite	the	fact	that	they	had	different	personalities,	the	two	men	shared	a	love	for	one	another	that	could	only	have	been	possible	because	of	a	loving	family.	Paradoxically,	this	same	family	was	responsible	for	cultivating	co-dependency	that	induced	psychological	heteronomy.	Henry	was	the	intellectual	genius,	but	John	was	the	social	genius.	Henry	had	difficulty	finding	work,	but	John	held	the	steady	job.	Whereas	Henry	whispered	the	language	of	nature,	John	was	the	representative	man	of	culture	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	198).	Henry	loved	his	brother,	and	deferred	to	his	desires.	They	vacationed	together,	slept	together,	and	taught	together,	but	it	was	always	John	who	held	the	keys	to	society.	It	is	not	unfair	to	say	that	Henry	looked	up	to	his	older	brother	with	admiration,	even	when	his	parents	had	decided	to	send	Henry	to	college	and	not	John.		When	John	died,	abruptly,	a	void	opened	in	Henry’s	heart,	and	he	spent	years	formulating	an	expression	of	that	grief.	Thoreau’s	first	attempt	to	fill	that	void	was	to	replace	his	brother	with	his	mentor,	Emerson,	and	the	promise	of	a	writing	career	that	came	with	him	(see	Fink,	1992)	in	what	seems	to	be	a	case	of	“involuntary	surrogation”	(Roach,	1996,	pp.	5-6).	Emerson	was	impressed	with	Thoreau’s	performance	at	Harvard	College,	and	Thoreau	was	similarly	impressed	with	Emerson’s	lectures	and	published	essays	(Richardson,	1986).	When	John	died,	Emerson	took	Thoreau	under	his	wing,	and	eventually,	under	his	roof;	he	included	Thoreau	into	the	circle	of	Transcendentalists,	and	offered	him	privileged	opportunities	to	get	his	essays	published	in	his	journal	(Fink,	1992;	Harding,	1982).	
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However,	differences	soon	fractured	the	famous	friendship;	Thoreau	had	good	reason	to	believe	that	Emerson	was	not	making	good	on	his	notions	to	find	enlightenment	in	nature	(Sattelmeyer,	1989).	It	was	Thoreau,	and	not	Emerson,	who	became	the	Transcendentalist	in	nature.		It	was	nature,	and	not	Emerson,	who	would	be	Thoreau’s	best	friend.	Aggrieved	over	the	loss	of	the	illusion	that	Emerson	was	a	genuine	friend	for	Thoreau,	he	turned	away	from	publishing	and	towards	surveying	for	a	livelihood	(Milder,	1995).	He	went	on	a	trip	to	Cape	Cod	to	reacquire	what	he	had	lost,	and	developed	a	habit	of	walking	through	the	wilderness	of	his	hometown	(Milder,	1995;	Harding,	1982).	In	1851,	when	Thoreau	was	anesthetized	with	ether	(Milder,	1995),	he	made	a	breakthrough:	nature	was	his	friend,	and	in	its	ability	to	disorient	the	nighttime	walker	lay	the	key	to	restoring	the	desires	that	he	thought	had	been	debased	by	social	pressure.	This	chapter	is	divided	into	three	parts.	The	first	part	of	this	chapter	addresses	Thoreau’s	susceptibility	to	melancholia.	Thoreau’s	actions	make	it	clear	that	he	had	a	heteronomic	relationship	with	his	family	(Lebeaux,	1984).	This	involved	a	willingness	to	subordinate	his	own	desires	in	a	way	that	made	him	susceptible	to	melancholia.	The	second	part	of	this	chapter	discusses	several	losses	and	blunders.	Because	of	the	difficulty	in	discerning	Thoreau’s	emotions	in	his	biographical	record,	any	conclusion	of	exactly	when	he	contracted	melancholia	has	to	be	left	to	speculation	in	light	of	an	overall	survey	of	these	losses	and	ironies.	Finally,	I	discuss	his	nighttime	walks	in	the	woods	and	his	experience	with	losing	himself	with	the	unexpected	assistance	of	ether.	Isolation	made	Thoreau	aware	of	his	melancholia	and	provided	him	with	clues	that	helped	him	invent	Walden.	This	chapter	begins	with	two	stories	of	the	Thoreau	brothers	and	one	man’s	quest	to	create	meaning	in	a	world	that	was	crumbling	around	him.	There	were	many	sad	moments	in	Thoreau’s	early	life,	and	many	of	them	were	linked	to	the	loss	of	his	brother.	One	of	these	stories	had	to	do	with	their	time	teaching	together.	The	other	one	of	these	stories	had	to	do	with	a	woman	whom	they	both	loved	and	wanted	to	marry.	Both	are	integral	puzzle	pieces	that	reveal	a	growing	melancholia	that	scholars	have	already	identified	in	Thoreau.	The	purpose	here	is	to	present	that	condition	so	that	Thoreau’s	subordination	of	his	own	desires	may	be	laid	bare	for	examination.	The	first	strokes	of	that	picture	need	to	be	drawn	from	Thoreau’s	family	biography.		
The	Thoreau	Family	According	to	Walter	Harding	(1982),	the	Thoreau	family	was	a	tight	unit,	with	Henry’s	mother	being	the	hub.	Henry’s	father,	John	Sr.,	was	a	quiet	and	hard	working	businessman,	good	to	his	wife	and	children,	and	always	filled	with	a	sense	of	responsibility	to	them	(p.	13).	His	“business	flaw,”	wrote	Walter	Harding,	“was	apparently	his	good	nature”	(p.	13).	Henry’s	mother,	Cynthia,	was	a	social	butterfly	who	loved	to	talk	and	form	alliances;	she	was	the	most	crucial	person	in	the	house,	holding	social	gatherings	there,	and	served	as	the	vice	president	of	the	Concord	Female	Charitable	Society	(Sullivan,	2009,	p.	31).	Cynthia	had	an	enormous	influence	on	Henry’s	life,	imparting	in	Henry	his	sense	of	civic	duty,	his	familiarity			
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with	Latin,	and	his	acquaintance	with	the	local	botanical	life	(p.	33).	While	it	makes	sense	to	assume	that	both	parents	had	strong	moral	compasses	and	were	instrumental	in	instilling	a	sense	of	social	justice	into	their	children,	it	was	Cynthia	as	matriarch	that	advocated	for	natural	familiarity,	familial	cohesion,	and	intellectual	curiosity	(p.	33).	Early	in	their	marriage,	the	young	couple	was	bogged	down	with	failed	business	ventures,	and	they	were	itinerant	(p.	27).	They	eventually	settled	down	in	Concord,	Massachusetts,	with	socially	active	relatives,	and	were	able	to	produce	a	stable	and	nurturing	environment	for	their	children;	they	rented	out	rooms	and	made	pencils	(Sullivan,	2009;	Harding,	1982).		 Most	of	Thoreau’s	frugal	life	was	spent	boarding	with	his	family,	and	the	Thoreau	family	relied	on	boarders	for	a	significant	portion	of	its	income	during	and	after	Henry’s	life	(Harding,	1982).	When	Henry	was	five,	the	family	returned	to	Concord	(Sullivan,	2009).	When	he	was	able,	Henry	contributed	to	the	setup	by	paying	for	his	own	room	and	providing	entertainment	to	the	occupants	in	the	rhythmic	forms	of	dance	and	flute	playing	(p.	31).	In	addition	to	having	Henry	as	a	paying	renter	of	the	Thoreau	family,	the	home	was	also	used	to	board	four	students	for	Thoreau’s	private	school	for	a	few	months	in	1838	before	Henry	leased	the	Concord	Academy	building	(Harding,	1982,	p.	75).		 In	“The	Landlord”	(1843d),	Thoreau	praised	the	enterprise	of	the	boardinghouse,	singling	out	the	public	virtue	of	its	Landlord	for	discussion.	This	archetype,	argued	Thoreau,	had	“sacrifice[d]	the	tender	but	narrow	ties	of	private	friendship”	(p.	427)	and	exchanged	it	for	“a	broad,	sun-shiny,	fair-weather-and-foul	friendship	for	his	race;	who	loves	men,	not	as	a	philosopher,	with	philanthropy,	nor	as	an	overseer	of	the	poor,	with	charity,	but	by	a	necessity	of	his	nature”	(p.	427).	The	signature	character	trait	of	the	Landlord	is	the	abandonment	of	privacy.	The	guest	of	the	Landlord	is	welcome	in	the	kitchen,	and	“all	the	secrets	of	housekeeping	are	exhibited	to	the	eyes	of	men,	above	and	below,	before	and	behind”	(p.	428).	Thoreau	argued	that	it	is	in	such	a	public	place	of	habitation	that	“the	real	and	sincere	life	which	we	meet	in	the	streets	was	actually	fed	and	sheltered”	(p.	428).	In	contrast,	the	Landlord’s	neighbor	hides	behind	a	screen	of	trees	and	relies	on	a	fence	to	keep	visitors	away.	Harding’s	(1982)	biography	of	Thoreau	shows	that	the	similarity	between	the	archetype	in	the	essay	“The	Landlord”	and	the	Thoreau	family	is	too	striking	to	ignore.	After	Thoreau	began	to	lease	the	Concord	Academy	building	(for	$20	per	year;	p.	75),	his	school	business	picked	up	considerably	and	he	was	pleased	to	be	in	need	of	his	brother’s	help	with	teaching	(p.	76).	There,	the	brothers	taught	numerous	boarding	students	and	had	steady	employment	until	1841	(p.	76,	pp.	87-88).	For	some	reason,	instead	of	continuing	his	teaching	without	his	brother,	as	he	originally	did,	Henry	shuttered	the	school	and	resigned	from	the	profession	of	teaching	entirely	(pp.	87-88,	p.	122).	In	1844,	a	year	after	“The	Landlord,”	the	Thoreau	family	was	approved	for	a	mortgage	to	purchase	their	first	plot	of	land,	where	the	family	built	their	first	home,	which	would	also	be	used	for	boarders	(Sullivan,	2009,	p.	143).	Later,	in	Walden,	Thoreau	wrote	about	not	using	a	lock	on	his	cabin	door,	expressing	openness	to	being	able	to	entice	strangers	to	examine	his	habitation	and	provisions,	and	being	open	to	the	prying	eyes	of	passing	travelers	as		
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he	hoed	his	beans.	Thoreau,	like	the	Landlord,	loved	everyone.	It	is	no	accident	that	Thoreau	wrote	that	the	Landlord	“is	a	more	public	character	than	a	statesman”	and	that	he	should	be	exempt	from	paying	taxes	(1843d,	p.	429).	Before	they	moved	to	Concord,	they	visited	a	glacial	pond	at	the	outskirts	of	the	town	(Sullivan,	2009).	The	most	important	and	salient	portrait	of	this	environment	is	recorded	in	Thoreau’s	journal	and	his	masterpiece,	Walden.	This	image	is,	of	course,	on	the	shore	of	Walden	Pond.	It	takes	place	when	Thoreau	was	either	five	or	seven	years	old.	It	was,	for	Thoreau,	one	of	the	most	ancient	scenes	stamped	on	the	tablets	of	my	memory,	the	oriental	Asiatic	valley	of	my	world,	whence	so	many	races	and	inventions	have	gone	forth	in	recent	times.	That	woodland	vision	for	a	long	time	made	the	drapery	of	my	dreams.	That	sweet	solitude	my	spirit	seemed	so	early	to	require	that	I	might	have	room	to	entertain	my	thronging	guests,	and	that	speaking	silence	that	my	ears	might	distinguish	the	significant	sound.	Somehow	or	other	it	at	once	gave	the	preference	to	this	recess	among	the	pines,	where	almost	sunshine	and	shadow	were	the	only	inhabitants	that	varied	the	scene,	over	the	tumultuous	and	varied	city,	as	if	it	had	found	its	proper	nursery.	(Thoreau,	1906a,	pp.	380-381)	John	and	Cynthia	were	there	with	their	four	children,	Helen,	John	Jr.,	“David	Henry,”	and	Sophia.	Chowder	cooked	over	an	open	fire	(Sullivan,	2009).	It	was	in	this	moment	that	he	began	his	friendship	with	Walden	Pond.	As	they	grew	up,	each	brother	used	his	strength	to	compensate	for	the	other’s	weakness	(Harding,	1982).	In	school,	Thoreau	was	teased	because	he	did	not	want	to	play	with	the	other	children,	preferring	“to	sit	on	the	sidelines	and	watch”	(p.	18).	One	of	his	schoolmates	later	wrote	that	he	was	“an	odd	stick,	not	very	studious	or	devoted	in	his	lessons,	but	a	thoughtful	youth	and	very	fond	of	reading				.	.	.	not	given	to	play	or	to	fellowship	with	the	boys;	but	shy	and	silent”	(p.	30).		
The	Thoreau	Brothers	The	year	1833	was	the	educational	crossroads	for	the	Thoreau	brothers.	Despite	showing	great	promise	as	a	carpenter,	Henry	was	selected	by	his	parents	to	attend	Harvard	college	because	of	his	intellectual	abilities	(p.	32).	The	Thoreaus	were	not	wealthy	during	Henry’s	childhood,	and	could	only	afford	to	send	one	of	their	children	to	college	(p.	32).	Harvard	during	its	early	years	was	uninspiring	and	rote;	a	constant	source	of	resentment	for	the	student	body	and	for	Thoreau	for	his	entire	life	(Richardson,	1986).	However,	what	he	failed	in	enthusiasm,	he	gained	in	his	mastery	of	several	languages,	mathematics,	history,	and	his	acquaintance	with	Emerson	(Harding,	1982).		
Pedagogy	Thoreau’s	employment	problems	began	soon	after	his	graduation	(p.	53).	When	Thoreau	graduated	from	college,	he	surprisingly	found	a	lucrative	teaching	position	(p.	52).	Unfortunately,	his	family	values	chafed	against	the	unofficial	corporeal	punishment	policy	of	the	school,	and	he	resigned	his	position	(p.	53).	This	inconvenienced	the	faculty	enormously,	and	they	must	have	been	able	to	extract		
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their	revenge	on	Thoreau,	because	he	could	not	find	a	teaching	position	anywhere	at	any	of	the	existing	schools	(pp.	55-59).	He	looked	as	far	as	Maine	for	teaching	work	(p.	58).	Desperate,	he	started	his	own	boarding	school	(p.	75).		Thoreau’s	boarding	school	brought	him	into	closer	proximity	to	his	brother,	but	the	arrangement	lasted	for	less	than	three	years	(p.	87).	Thoreau’s	“academy”	debuted	in	the	fall	of	1838	(p.	75).	Thoreau	started	with	only	four	students,	but	that	number	quickly	grew,	and	he	found	himself	needing	his	brother	to	work	with	him	(pp.	75-76).	John	was	eager	to	work	with	his	brother,	for	the	two	of	them	were	excellent	teachers,	and	shared	the	same	attitude	toward	student	discipline	(pp.	79-80).	Unfortunately,	John	was	also	afflicted	with	tuberculosis,	and	his	teaching	duties	caused	his	condition	to	deteriorate	with	alarming	speed	(p.	87).	The	brothers’	Concord	Academy	had	not	even	been	open	for	three	years	when	John	had	to	quit	(p.	87).	Then,	Henry	closed	the	school	(pp.	87-88).	Why?	He	didn’t	have	to;	he	had	started	the	academy	by	himself	(p.	75).	Instead,	he	applied	to	one	teaching	position,	and	failing	that,	he	resigned	himself	to	shoveling	manure	for	75	cents	a	day	(p.	122).	The	answer	to	why	the	academy	closed	lies	in	John’s	failing	health	and	Henry’s	growing	sense	of	isolation.	As	early	as	1833,	John’s	health	was	visibly	deteriorating;	he	got	frequent	nosebleeds	that	sometimes	caused	him	to	faint	(p.	87).	In	this	time	period,	Henry	“had	been	thinking	of	retiring	to	some	lonely	spot	where	he	might	rest	and	devote	himself	to	writing”	(p.	122).	He	had	experimented	with	simple	living	at	the	end	of	his	college	days	by	camping	at	Flint	Pond	(Eidson,	1951	as	cited	by	Thoreau,	1995).	Harding	explained	that	Thoreau	found	his	living	solution,	or	more	accurately,	Thoreau’s	solution	found	him	(p.	127).	In	April	1841,	he	decided	to	purchase	a	dismal	and	isolated	farm	plot	called	the	Hollowell	Place	(p.	123).	As	Thoreau	detailed	in	Walden,	days	later,	the	wife	on	the	farm	had	second	thoughts,	and	convinced	her	husband,	and	Thoreau,	to	return	the	property.	After	the	Hollowell	farm,	Emerson	offered	to	let	Thoreau	board	at	his	house	in	exchange	for	a	few	hours	of	handyman	work	per	day	(pp.	127-128).	The	hours	were	flexible,	and	Thoreau	honored	the	agreement	(p.	127).	He	also	enjoyed	Emerson’s	vast	library,	and	access	to	a	living	scholar	who	was	more	than	willing	to	share	his	philosophical	ideas	(pp.	127-131).	All	of	this	nurtured	a	seductive	promise	of	a	career	in	writing	and	lecturing	to	match	the	older	scholar.	Almost	immediately,	Thoreau’s	isolation	dissolved	when	he	became	acquainted	with	Emerson’s	child,	Edith	(p.	128).	However,	the	relationship	between	Thoreau	and	Emerson	was	not	perfect;	Emerson	treated	Thoreau	as	less	than	an	equal,	and	Thoreau	deeply	resented	this	subtle	treatment	(Sattelmeyer,	1989).	Eventually,	Thoreau	tried	to	live	elsewhere	to	make	a	living.	He	moved	to	Staten	Island	in	New	York	to	try	to	break	into	the	writing	market	(and	tutor	Emerson’s	cousin),	but	by	the	time	he	moved	there,	the	market	was	thoroughly	saturated	(Fink,	1992).	He	moved	back	and	most	likely	continued	to	irritate	his	landlord.	Eventually,	Emerson	decided	to	let	Thoreau	pursue	his	solitary	living	on	a	new	woodland	property	that	Emerson	had	recently	purchased	(Harding,	1982).		
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Thoreau	was	capable	of	deep	affection,	warmth,	love,	and	conflict	(Abelove,	2003),	and	his	relationship	with	Edith	Emerson	is	proof	that	the	man	was	not	a	hermit.	Thoreau	was	also	capable	of	romance	(Harding,	1982).		
Love		 In	1839,	one	of	the	women	who	boarded	with	the	Thoreaus	was	a	Mrs.	Joseph	Ward,	precipitating	love	(p.	77).	On	June	17,	her	grandson,	Edmund	Sewall,	visited	her	for	a	week	(p.	77).	As	the	poets	say,	it	was	love	at	first	sight	(p.	77).	Two	days	later,	Thoreau	went	on	to	compose	a	poem	in	honor	of	this	11-year-old	boy,	invoking	a	number	of	chords	that	would	suggest	a	powerful	queerness	by	today’s	standards	(pp.	77-78).	Thoreau	thought	the	poem	important	enough	to	him	that	he	included	it	in	his	first	book,	A	Week.	In	the	19th	century	cultural	atmosphere,	such	affection	was	not	unusual	(pp.	78-79).	In	fact,	the	Sewalls	thought	it	was	wonderful,	and	asked	Thoreau	to	write	a	similar	poem	for	Edmund’s	younger	brother,	George	(pp.	78-79).	It	was	in	reference	to	Edmund	that	Thoreau	famously	wrote,	“I	might	have	loved	him,	had	I	loved	him	less”	(p.	78).		 Perhaps	Thoreau	found	something	lovely	about	the	Sewall	lineage,	because	he	fell	in	love	with	another	Sewall	less	than	a	month	later	(pp.	94-96).	On	July	20,	Edmund’s	sister,	Ellen,	came	with	the	Wards	to	visit	the	Thoreaus	(p.	94).	Thoreau	had	met	her	before	on	a	number	of	occasions,	but	he	was	not	nearly	as	responsive	then	as	on	this	occasion	(p.	94).	Thoreau	had	been	slow	to	develop	romantic	interests,	and	when	he	saw	the	17-year-old	woman,	he	fell	head	over	heels	in	love	with	her	(p.	94).	He	showered	her	with	poetry,	became	obsequious,	and	only	refused	to	do	as	she	asked	when	she	wanted	him	to	attend	church	(pp.	94-96).		 Henry’s	brother	also	developed	affections	for	Ellen	(p.	97).	After	her	two-week	stay	in	Concord,	she	had	inadvertently	left	behind	some	Indian	relics	(p.	96).	John	mailed	them	to	her,	along	with	a	note	that	he	and	his	brother	were	taking	a	vacation	trip	on	the	Concord	and	Merrimack	Rivers	(pp.	96-97).	When	they	returned,	John	immediately	left	to	visit	Ellen,	ignoring	her	aunt’s	warning	that	her	parents	were	away	and	that	it	would	be	imprudent	to	seek	her	affections	at	such	a	time	(p.	97).	Nevertheless,	John	made	the	trip,	and	they	had	a	lovely	time.	John	and	Ellen	went	walking,	and	spent	time	together	with	her	brothers	(p.	97).	George	also	found	John	to	be	delightful,	but	interestingly,	he	kept	slipping	up	by	calling	him	Henry	(p.	97).	That	December,	Ellen	wrote	to	her	aunt,	then	boarding	with	the	Thoreaus;	she	felt	that	the	house	had	been	deserted	since	she	had	left	to	board	with	the	Thoreaus		(pp.	97-98).	Ellen	wished	“a	thousand	times”	to	see	her	aunt,	John,	and	Henry	again	(p.	97).		 Ellen	had	little	choice	but	to	reject	both	Henry	and	John	(pp.	101-102).	Her	father	strongly	disapproved	of	them	(p.	100).	Undaunted,	John	proposed	to	Ellen	in	July	the	next	year,	and	she	accepted	(p.	100).	However,	she	changed	her	mind	(p.	100).	Harding	argued	that	her	mother	intervened,	knowing	that	Mr.	Sewall’s	conservative	Unitarianism	would	never	stand	for	such	a	marriage.	However,	Richardson	(1986,	p.	60)	felt	that	the	evidence	for	this	was	uncertain,	and	suggests	that	her	family	did	not	intervene.	Henry,	at	his	end	of	the	correspondence,	was	aware	of	what	had	transpired	(Harding,	1982,	p.	100).	However,	like	us,	he	did	not		
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know	why	she	changed	her	mind	(p.	100).	Henry	was	free	to	make	a	proposal	of	his	own,	in	writing	(p.	101).	However,	this	time,	Ellen	did	consult	with	her	father	(pp.	101-102).	His	response	reveals	just	how	protective	of	his	family	he	was,	and	how	much	he	distrusted	the	Thoreau	brothers	(pp.	101-102).	He	demanded	that	Ellen	write	a	cold	letter	rebuffing	Henry,	and	she	agreed	that	no	other	response	would	suffice	(pp.	101-102).	Ellen	felt	awful	for	being	forced	to	treat	Henry	with	such	disregard,	but	she	had	little	choice	but	to	turn	him	down	(p.	102).	Later,	she	wrote:	“I	wonder	if	his	thoughts	ever	wander	back	to	those	times	when	the	hours	sped	so	pleasantly	and	we	were	so	happy.	I	think	they	do.	I	little	thought	then	that	he	cared	so	much	as	subsequent	events	have	proved”	(p.	103).	Harding	concluded	that	Ellen	actually	preferred	Henry	over	John	(p.	100).	At	the	time,	Ellen	had	already	met	the	man	who	was	destined	to	be	her	future	husband	(p.	103).		
	 Summary		 The	relationship	between	Henry	and	John	was	complex,	filled	with	joy,	hardship,	love,	and	heartache.	The	biographical	records	of	Henry	David	Thoreau	offer	a	glimpse	of	a	man	who	had	desires	of	his	own	and	the	willingness	to	pursue	them,	but	at	this	stage	of	his	life,	he	ultimately	privileged	the	desires	of	other	people	(Lebeaux,	1984).		
Graduating	Loss	and	Blunder		 When	Thoreau	graduated	from	Harvard	College	in	1837,	the	economic	environment	was	already	placing	pressures	on	him	to	make	a	living.	Martin	Van	Buren	had	just	been	inaugurated	as	President	of	the	United	States,	who	promised	to	follow	in	the	footsteps	of	his	predecessor,	Andrew	Jackson	(Howe,	2007;	Sellers,	1991).	Jackson’s	economic	policies	had	started	a	recession	that	began	three	months	before	Thoreau’s	graduation	and	would	last	until	his	retreat	to	Walden	Pond	in	1845	(Howe,	2007;	Sellers,	1991).	It	was	the	United	States’	first	double-dip	recession,	which	evolved	into	the	first	economic	depression	of	capitalism	in	the	New	World. 	 With	the	decline	of	Thoreau’s	teaching	prospects,	Thoreau	made	a	herculean	effort	to	make	money	as	a	writer	(1982).	His	more	successful	efforts	were	with	his	mentor,	Emerson,	who	gave	the	young	scholar	the	advantage	of	a	journal	that	was	chronically	in	need	of	submissions	(Fink,	1992).	In	1840,	he	published	his	first	text	in	the	Transcendentalist	journal,	The	Dial	(1840),	and	he	would	publish	several	more	articles	in	that	journal	before	it	folded	(Fink,	1992).	By	that	time,	Thoreau	had	secured	a	few	important	connections	in	other	publishing	venues	(Fink,	1992).	While	there	are	several	occasions	where	Thoreau	was	paid	for	his	writing,	in	the	end	writing	did	not	make	Thoreau	money	(Fink,	1992).	Most	of	his	income	was	secured	through	his	father’s	pencil	factory	and	doing	survey	work;	after	A	Week,	all	of	Thoreau’s	income	would	be	coming	from	surveying	(Sullivan,	2009).	Nevertheless,	Thoreau	placed	an	amazing	amount	of	effort	into	the	vocation	of	writing,	and	gambled	with	the	financial	risk	of	self-publishing	in	1849	(Fink,	1992).	 					
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Loss	of	Privacy	Two	factors	influenced	Thoreau’s	coping	after	Ellen	Sewall	and	John.	The	first	was	the	enigmatic	nature	of	his	journal	writing.	The	second	was	a	scientific	instrument.	Thoreau’s	public	is	astonishing.	Besides	having	lived	in	a	boardinghouse	with	astonishingly	public	boundaries,	Thoreau	did	not	use	his	journal	for	emotional	release.	Instead,	it	began	as	a	scrapbook	(Harding,	1982,	p.	71).	Before	1849,	it	is	exceptionally	difficult	to	use	it	as	a	barometric	genealogy	of	his	emotions.	After	1849,	when	Thoreau’s	writings	became	more	observational	rather	than	simply	analytical,	the	reader	must	intuit	the	writer’s	mood	from	the	sensory	detail,	and	one	risks	projecting	one’s	own	feelings	onto	the	author	(see	Golemba,	1990).	Despite	writing	on	January	26,	1841,	that	“good	writing	as	well	as	good	acting	will	be	obedience	to	conscience”	(Thoreau,	2009,	p.	14),	there	are	few	clues	in	the	journal	pages	of	his	state	of	mind.	A	passage	from	three	days	later	illustrates	this	difficulty:	Of	all	strange	and	unaccountable	things	this	journalizing	is	the	strangest.	It	will	allow	nothing	to	be	predicated	of	it;	its	good	is	not	good,	nor	its	bad	bad.	If	I	make	a	huge	effort	to	expose	my	innermost	and	richest	wares	to	light,	my	counter	seems	cluttered	with	the	meanest	homemade	stuffs	.	.	.	(p.	15)	Of	course,	as	anyone	who	has	kept	a	diary	knows,	such	an	outlet	is	supposed	to	be	therapeutic.	Denying	himself	such	a	personal	and	uncensored	tapestry	must	have	had	an	effect	of	slowing	the	procession	of	his	emotions.	In	addition,	the	fact	that	he	shunted	his	feelings	into	the	privacy	of	lyric	poetry	is	further	evidence	that	Thoreau	felt	that	his	journal	was	not	a	safe	place	to	express	himself.8	Emerson,	in	the	most	telling	anecdote	of	their	differences,	made	no	secret	that	he	thought	that	Thoreau’s	poetry	was	inferior,	further	discouraging	that	outlet	(Harding,	1982).	That	discouragement	became	so	great	that	at	some	point	he	incinerated	most	of	his	poetry	(p.	117).	It	was	Emerson	who,	at	the	beginning	of	their	friendship,	advised	Thoreau	to	start	his	journal	(Thoreau,	2009).	It	is	possible	that	his	acquaintance	with	such	a	popular	intellectual	figure	made	Thoreau	believe	that	his	personal	writings	would	become	the	object	of	scrutiny	after	his	death.		 The	safe	place	that	Thoreau	found	to	validate	his	emotions	was	the	spaciousness	of	nature,	and	his	scientific	ability	to	focus	on	nature	enabled	him	to	pursue	his	relationship	with	nature	and,	for	lack	of	a	better	term,	lose	himself.	In	the																																																									8	Michael	Warner	argued	that	lyric	poetry	is	private:	“Lyric	poems	are	in	fact	produced	by	particular	persons	and	addressed	to	others,	and	they	circulate	in	public	media	(even	if	only	in	manuscript).	But	to	read	them	as	lyric,	we	ignore	those	facts	and	reinterpret	both	the	speaking	event,	the	boundaries	of	the	text,	and	all	the	figures	of	apostrophe	in	the	text	(even,	or	especially,	in	love	lyrics,	which	have	a	special	vocabulary	of	love	that	allows	us	to	do	this).	The	rhetoric	of	lyric,	including	its	affects,	scenes,	and	temporality,	exploits	this	reading	convention.	In	reading	something	as	lyric,	rather	than	regard	the	speaking	voice	as	wholly	alienated	to	the	text,	we	regard	it	as	transcendent.	Though	it	could	only	be	produced	through	the	displacement	of	writing,	we	read	it	with	cultivated	disregard	of	its	circumstance	of	circulation,	understanding	it	as	an	image	of	absolute	privacy”	(2002,	pp.	80-81).		
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fall	of	1840,	Thoreau	introduced	surveying	into	his	school’s	academy	curriculum,	and	made	a	purchase	that	probably	saved	his	sanity	in	later	years	(Harding,	1982).	The	purchase	was	for	a	hybrid	instrument,	a	combination	of	a	surveyor’s	level	and	a	circumferentor	(p.	83).	With	this	device,	he	was	able	to	take	the	students	at	the	academy	on	field	trips	and	teach	them	how	to	survey	(p.	83).	Thoreau	must	have	also	been	able	to	use	it	as	an	excuse	to	take	walks	into	nature	without	his	students,	and	for	that	matter,	anyone.	The	fact	that	Thoreau	became	familiar	with	the	use	of	a	circumferentor	is	important,	because	of	the	status	of	surveying	technology	at	the	time.	As	Gerard	L’Estrange	Turner	(1998)	has	pointed	out,	in	the	19th	century,	circumferentors	had	for	the	most	part	been	replaced	with	more	modern	theodolites.	Nevertheless,	circumferentors	were	still	the	favored	instrument	for	use	in	woodlands	and	in	areas	with	uncleared	ground	(p.	43).	It	was	in	these	secluded,	inaccessible,	often	dark	places	that	Thoreau	preferred	to	explore,	and	helped	him	be	in	an	environment	that	validated	his	emotions.	Only	through	this	means	of	distancing	himself	from	the	public	world,	which	would	become	even	more	important	to	his	mental	health	later	in	life,	would	he	be	able	to	focus	on	his	scholarly	writing.		
Loss	of	a	Brother		 Thoreau’s	only	refuge	against	romantic	and	professional	rejection	was	nature,	both	on	the	page	and	in	the	world.	His	brother’s	health	was	deteriorating,	and	soon	he	would	be	unable	to	fulfill	his	teaching	duties	(Harding,	1982,	p.	87).	With	“almost	physical	hunger	he	went	for	long	walks	in	the	winter	woods,	and	avidly	took	in	the	migrating	otter	tracks,	the	young	pines	springing	up	in	the	corn	fields.	Everything	was	striking,	beautiful,	sustaining”	(Richardson,	1986,	p.	86).	In	addition	to	seeking	a	tangible	relationship	with	natural	surroundings,	Thoreau	continued	to	have	a	voracious	reading	appetite.	He	delved	into	the	Georgics	of	Virgil,	using	the	ancient	poet	to	appreciate	the	travails	in	his	own	life	(pp.	87-88).	In	the	
Georgics,	the	Jovian	god	“brought	the	Golden	Age	to	an	end	so	that	man	might	have	to	work	in	order	to	earn	and	savor	the	good	things	won	through	work”	(pp.	87-88).	Virgil	also	appreciated	the	seasons,	and	his	prowess	with	depicting	the	cycles	of	labor	“showed	Thoreau	just	how	much	detail	was	required	to	sustain	a	literary	work	designed	to	convey	the	feel	of	the	land”	(p.	88).	After	the	academy,	Thoreau	fully	came	under	Emerson’s	“spell”	(Richardson,	1986,	p.	96).	In	early	1841,	Emerson	came	to	visit	Thoreau	when	he	was	sick	with	bronchitis,	leaving	the	younger	man	“with	the	unutterable	security	and	exaltation	that	comes	when	someone	the	world	loves	loves	us”	(p.	99).	Joseph	Roach	(1996)	has	found	widespread	historical	evidence	that	whenever	“actual	or	perceived	vacancies	occur	in	the	network	of	relations”	that	are	disrupted	by	loss,	“survivors	attempt	to	fit	satisfactory	alternatives”	in	a	process	called	“surrogation”	(p.	2).	In	the	case	of	Thoreau,	Emerson	would	be	John’s	first	involuntary	(pp.	5-6)	surrogate	candidate,	since	I	suspect	that	Emerson	never	intended	to	replace	John,	but	simply	wished	to	give	Thoreau	the	ability	to	realize	his	potential.	A	few	months	later,	Emerson	invited	Thoreau	to	board	at	his	house	in	exchange	for	his	handyman			
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skills,	and	the	arrangement	would	last	for	two	years	(p.	103).	Put	to	work	and	challenged	intellectually,	Thoreau	appeared	to	be	moving	forward	(p.	103).	However,	both	Richardson	(1986)	and	Harding	(1982)	clearly	show	that	Emerson’s	friendship	and	mentorship	could	not	adequately	compensate	Thoreau	for	the	loss	of	his	brother.	The	next	year,	Henry’s	brother	John	Jr.	cut	himself	while	stropping	a	shaving	razor,	and	came	down	with	a	horrific	case	of	tetanus	(Harding,	1982,	p.	134).	When	Thoreau	heard	of	his	brother’s	illness,	he	came	home	to	be	with	his	brother	(Richardson,	1986,	p.	113).	However,	there	was	nothing	that	could	have	been	done.	John’s	body	seized	and	he	died	in	his	brother’s	arms	after	days	of	excruciating	agony	(Harding,	1982,	p.	134).	Henry	himself	was	astonishingly	quiet	for	days	afterwards,	worrying	his	family	and	even	himself	(pp.	135-136).	Then,	Henry	too	came	down	with	the	same	symptoms—a	“psychosomatic	illness”	that	embodied	his	sympathy	for	his	brother	(p.	136).	He	recovered	physically,	but	the	death	of	John	Jr.	opened	a	void	in	Henry’s	life	that	would	not	easily	be	filled	(p.	136).	Steven	Fink	(1992)	shows	that,	from	an	academic	perspective,	Emerson’s	assistance	was	divine.	Emerson	had	just	acquired	a	pile	of	natural	history	resources,	and	felt	that	his	nature-loving	protégé	would	be	up	to	the	task	of	producing	a	nature-writing	piece	(p.	41).	The	gift	virtually	guaranteed	another	publication	(p.	42).	It	must	have	been	a	religious	experience,	which	perhaps	explains	why	Thoreau’s	journal	in	this	period	is	filled	with	an	uncommon	number	of	references	to	God	and	speculations	about	what	great	tasks	he	seemed	destined	to	fulfill	(p.	39).	Fink	interpreted	these	journal	comments	as	evidence	that	Thoreau	began	to	see	himself	as	a	kind	of	prophet,	selected	by	Providence	to	survive	his	late	brother	and	deliver	their	word	to	the	human	race	(p.	39).		 It	took	less	than	a	year	for	cracks	to	appear	in	the	Emerson-Thoreau	friendship	(Sattelmeyer,	1989).	In	September,	Thoreau	began	to	fear	that	he	was	“living	with	Mr.	Emerson	in	very	dangerous	prosperity”	(quoted	by	Richardson,	1986,	p.	109).	As	Roach	has	pointed	out,	surrogation	often	fails	(1996).		 In	the	winter	of	1842-1843,	Nathaniel	Hawthorne	was	enjoying	his	first	winter	as	a	resident	of	Concord,	but	his	appreciation	was	no	match	for	Thoreau’s	nymph-like	behavior	(Harding,	1982).	Hawthorne	particularly	appreciated	Thoreau’s	unpretentious	company,	often	vanishing	from	his	own	home	just	to	avoid	visitors	(to	his	wife’s	embarrassment;	p.	139).	Emerson	too	was	a	frequent	presence	with	Thoreau	and	Hawthorne	during	these	excursions	(p.	139).	However,	neither	Hawthorne	nor	Emerson	could	match	Thoreau’s	spritely	skill	with	his	ice	skates	(p.	139).	As	Harding	wrote,	Thoreau	performed	“dithyrambic	dances	and	Bacchic	leaps	on	the	ice”	while	Hawthorne	moved	stiffly	and	Emerson	had	no	sense	of	balance	(p.	139).		 Thoreau’s	happy	presentation	of	self	to	Hawthorne	was	an	act.	Thoreau	was	sick	for	most	of	that	winter;	he	wrote	in	his	journal	that	he	viewed	himself	as	“a	diseased	bundle	of	nerves	standing	between	time	and	eternity	like	a	withered	leaf”	(quoted	in	Richardson,	1986,	p.	120).	He	also	wrote	about	having	a	happy	streak	in	him	that	never	seemed	to	last,	and	he	“tried	to	keep	up	his	spirits	in	the	face	of	numerous	and	prolonged	illnesses”	(p.	120).	His	attitude	was	especially	telling	in	a	letter	that	he	wrote	to	his	friend,	Mrs.	Lucy	Brown,	on	January	25,	1843.	It	was	a	
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tortured	letter,	sent	with	the	self-consciousness	of	not	having	any	good	news	to	share:	 I	am	mistaken,	or	rather	impatient	when	I	say	this,	—for	we	all	have	a	gift	to	send,	not	only	when	the	year	begins,	but	as	long	as	interest	and	memory	last.	I	don’t	know	whether	you	have	got	the	many	I	have	sent	you,	or	rather	whether	you	were	quite	sure	where	they	came	from.	I	mean	the	letters	I	have	sometimes	launched	off	eastward	in	my	thought;	but	if	you	have	been	happier	at	one	time	than	another,	think	that	then	you	received	them.	But	this	that	I	now	send	you	is	of	another	sort.	It	will	go	slowly,	drawn	by	horses	over	muddy	roads,	and	lose	much	of	its	little	value	by	the	way.	You	may	have	to	pay	for	it,	and	it	may	not	make	you	happy	after	all.	But	what	shall	be	my	new-year’s	gift,	then?	Why,	I	will	send	you	my	still	fresh	remembrance	of	the	hours	I	have	passed	with	you	here,	for	I	find	in	the	remembrance	of	them	the	best	gift	you	have	left	to	me.	We	are	poor	and	sick	creatures	at	best;	but	we	can	have	well	memories,	and	sound	and	healthy	thoughts	of	one	another	still,	and	an	intercourse	may	be	remembered	which	was	without	blur,	and	above	us	both.	(Sanborn,	1895,	pp.	53-54	quoted	in	part	by	Richardson,	1986,	p.	121)	Thoreau’s	only	defense	here	against	his	feeling	of	sadness	was	nostalgia	for	happier	times,	and	this	coping	strategy	crept	into	his	professional	writings.		
Loss	of	a	Surrogate		 Meanwhile,	according	to	Harding’s	account,	Thoreau	was	feeling	restless	with	his	life	(1982).	He	began	to	seek	forms	of	employment	that	did	not	involve	manual	labor	in	March	1843,	and	wrote	to	Emerson	to	ask	him	for	advice	in	that	endeavor	(p.	145).	At	the	time,	Emerson	was	staying	with	his	brother	on	Staten	Island	during	the	New	York	leg	of	his	lecture	circuit	(p.	145).	Emerson’s	brother,	William,	the	County	Seat	Judge	of	Richmond	Court,	had	a	number	of	children	that	he	wanted	to	see	well	educated	(p.	145).	They	talked	about	Thoreau’s	situation,	and	Emerson	agreed	with	his	brother’s	proposition	that	Thoreau	would	be	an	ideal	candidate	for	tutoring	the	children	(p.	145).	What	we	know	about	the	correspondence	between	Thoreau	and	Emerson	we	know	from	Emerson’s	correspondence	with	his	brother,	and	the	following	words	need	to	be	read	through	that	lens:	I	have	to	say	that	Henry	Thoreau	listens	very	willingly	to	your	proposition[;]	he	thinks	it	exactly	fit	for	him	&	he	very	rarely	finds	offers	that	do	fit	him.	He	says	that	it	is	such	a	relation	as	he	wishes	to	sustain,	to	be	the	friend	&	educator	of	a	boy,	&	one	not	yet	subdued	by	schoolmasters.	(p.	145)	There	was	a	lot	of	truth	in	Emerson	words.	Thoreau’s	previous	relationship	with	Edmund	Fuller	indicates	that	Thoreau	did	like	to	teach	young	men.	However,	the	fact	that	Thoreau	deliberately	shuttered	his	academy	when	he	could	have	kept	it	open	does	not	cohere	with	Emerson’s	correspondence.	If	Thoreau	was	so	desperate	for	work,	and	he	must	have	experienced	that	desperation	after	he	quit	his	teaching	position	in	1837,	then	there	was	a	more	important	motive	for	Thoreau’s	decision	to			
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move	to	New	York.	As	Emerson	mentioned	later	in	his	letter	to	his	brother,	Thoreau	still	wanted	to	make	writing	a	profession	(p.	146).		 Thoreau	returned	to	his	family	from	New	York	at	the	tail	end	of	1843	with	his	tail	between	his	legs	(p.	157).	He	failed	to	do	anything	in	New	York	but	network	with	publishers	and	get	further	into	debt	(p.	157;	Fink,	1992).	He	put	the	experience	out	of	his	mind,	and	immediately	went	to	work	in	his	father’s	pencil	factory	(Harding,	1982,	p.	157).	He	made	a	number	of	breakthroughs	in	the	pencil	manufacturing	process,	and	developed	a	method	of	adjusting	the	hardness	and	brittleness	of	the	pencil	graphite	(p.	157).	He	worked	in	the	factory	so	much	that	he	began	to	dream	about	it	(p.	157).		 At	this	point,	Thoreau’s	relationship	with	Emerson	was	deteriorating	(Sattelmeyer,	1989,	pp.	192-193	as	cited	by	Rossi,	2010).	“It	is	clear	that	Emerson’s	enthusiasm	for	his	younger	friend	had	been	steadily	moderating	for	several	years,	beginning	as	early	as	1842	and	1843”	(Sattelmeyer,	1989,	p.	192).	As	Roach	(1996)	has	observed,	“surrogation	rarely	if	ever	succeeds”	(p.	2).	Up	until	this	point,	Emerson	had	been	a	boon	to	Thoreau	is	several	ways,	including	being	an	editorial	advocate,	moneylender,	employer,	and	job	finder	(Fink,	1992).	Soon	he	would	also	be	allowing	his	friend	to	stay	on	a	newly	purchased	plot	of	wilderness	land	(Harding,	1982).	However,	in	Emerson’s	judgment,	Thoreau	was	squandering	his	blessings	(Fink,	1992).	He	complained	in	writing	about	the	“phlegmatic”	“Natural	History	of	Massachusetts”	and	how	“nervous	&	wretched”	he	felt	to	read	“A	Winter	Walk”	(Sattelmeyer,	1989,	p.	193).	Sattelmeyer	also	pointed	out	that	while	Emerson	was	complaining	privately	about	Thoreau’s	prolixity,	he	was	publishing	fawning	praise	about	Ellery	Channing’s	poems	(Emerson,	1843	as	cited	by	Sattelmeyer,	1989).	It	is	not	surprising	that	at	this	time,	Emerson	wrote	in	the	privacy	of	his	journal,	“H[enry]	will	never	be	a	writer[;]	he	is	active	as	a	shoemaker”	(quoted	by	Sattelmeyer,	1989,	p.	193).		 At	the	end	of	April	1844,	Thoreau	took	a	break	from	pencil	making	and	went	on	an	even	more	disastrous	trip	than	his	stay	in	New	York	(Harding,	1982,	pp.	159-161).	This	time,	it	was	a	vacation	with	his	friend	Edward	Sherman	Hoar	to	boat	on	the	Sudbury	River	(p.	159).	The	river	trip	never	materialized	(p.	160).	Their	mistake	occurred	when	they	stopped	to	cook	a	mess	of	fish	they	caught	before	they	had	rowed	a	mile	up	the	river	(p.	160).	Their	fire	produced	sparks	that	lit	the	dry	grass,	and	soon	their	cooking	fire	was	a	blaze	that	they	could	no	longer	control	(p.	160).	Desperate,	the	two	men	raced	in	separate	directions	for	help	(p.	160).	Edward	took	the	boat	down	the	river;	Thoreau	ran	on	foot	through	the	woods	towards	town	(p.	160).	Thoreau	relayed	the	news	to	the	owner	of	the	woods,	and	they	returned	to	the	scene	(p.	160).	By	this	time	the	fire	was	half	a	mile	wide,	and	they	realized	that	they	needed	more	help	(p.	160).	The	owner	of	the	woods	ran	to	town	(p.	160).	However,	Thoreau	had	run	two	miles,	and	his	weak	lungs	were	spent	(p.	160).	Instead	of	walking	to	town	or	waiting	for	assistance,	he	shamefully	sneaked	off	to	the	cliffs	of	Fair	Haven,	and	watched	as	the	town	citizens	responded	(p.	160).	On	May	3,	the	
Concord	Freeman	reported	that	the	fire	had	burned	300	acres	and	caused	two	thousand	dollars	of	damage	(p.	161).	If	it	were	not	for	the	fact	that	Edward	Hoar’s	father	was	the	leading	citizen	of	the	town,	the	two	might	have	been	prosecuted	in	
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court	(p.	161).	For	the	rest	of	his	life,	Thoreau	was	infamous	among	the	residents	of	Concord	for	causing	what	James	Kendall	Hosmer	called	“the	forest	fire”	(Lebeaux,	1984,	p.	118).		 The	fire	fiasco	weighed	on	Thoreau,	but	even	in	his	journal	he	gave	no	indication	of	having	a	guilty	conscience.	He	wrote	nothing	of	it	for	six	years.	Then,	in	his	journal,	he	wrote	an	account	of	what	had	occurred.	What	is	particularly	telling	about	Thoreau’s	version	is	how	little	responsibility	and	blame	he	seems	to	have	accepted.	He	excused	himself,	on	account	of	some	convenient	facts,	such	as	the	matter	of	the	forest	not	really	belonging	to	anyone,	and	that	he	interpreted	everyone’s	excitement	as	merely	an	opportunity	to	throw	water	on	some	flames.	It	seems	more	likely	that	Thoreau	was	in	denial,	that	he	was	actually	ashamed	of	the	episode,	and	that	he	could	not	bring	himself	to	be	accountable	for	what	had	occurred.	Whatever	his	personal	feelings	about	the	fire,	Thoreau	continued	to	focus	on	his	writing	and	worked	with	his	father	making	pencils	(Harding,	1982).		 Historians	do	not	have	to	speculate	how	Thoreau’s	behavior	affected	his	relationship	with	Emerson.	In	1844,	Emerson	published	his	second	series	of	essays,	which	included	“Experience.”	In	that	essay,	Emerson	complained:	“We	see	young	men	who	owe	us	a	new	world,	so	readily	and	lavishly	they	promise,	but	they	never	acquit	the	debt;	they	die	young	and	dodge	the	account:	or	if	they	live,	they	lose	themselves	in	the	crowd”	(1983,	p.	474	as	quoted	by	Sattelmeyer,	1989,	p.	194).	In	the	privacy	of	his	journal,	Emerson	recorded	these	words	with	explicit	reference	to	Thoreau	(Sattelmeyer,	1989,	p.	194).		 In	the	summer	of	that	year,	the	Thoreau	pencil	business	was	doing	well	enough	that	Mrs.	Thoreau	had	decided	that	they	should	own	a	house	(Harding,	1982,	pp.	177-178).	On	September	10,	1844,	Mr.	Thoreau	made	a	down	deposit	of	25	dollars	for	a	three-quarters-acre	lot	(p.	177).	Two	days	later,	he	was	approved	for	a	$500	mortgage	(p.	177).	Henry’s	assistance	was	integral.	He	dug	and	stoned	in	a	cellar,	and	then	helped	his	father	build	the	house	(pp.	177-178).	They	bought	two	vacant	Irish	shanties,	and	used	the	lumber	to	add	a	lean-to	shed	to	house	the	pencil	business	(p.	178).	The	town	assessors	valued	the	two-story	complex	at	$1100	(p.	178).	Thoreau	not	only	had	learned	how	to	build	a	house,	but	he	also	learned	how	to	do	it	on	a	shoestring	budget.		 At	this	time,	Thoreau	had	been	dreaming	for	a	long	time	of	living	by	himself	in	a	house	built	by	himself,	and	now	it	seemed	that	he	could	make	his	dreams	a	reality	(p.	181).	All	he	needed	was	a	place	upon	which	to	build.	He	had	tried	to	squat	at	Flint	Pond	after	he	graduated	from	college,	but	the	plan	did	not	work	out	with	Mr.	Flint	(Eidson,	1951	as	cited	by	Thoreau,	1995).	Fortunately,	Emerson	had	just	recently	bought	the	area	surrounding	Walden	Pond	for	300	dollars,	and	he	reluctantly	agreed	to	let	Thoreau	build	a	cabin	at	the	pond	(Sattelmeyer,	1989,	pp.	195-196).	As	soon	as	the	1844-45	winter	broke,	he	dug	another	cellar	a	few	hundred	feet	from	the	shores	of	Walden	Pond	(p.	181).	Then,	he	bought	a	local	shack,	dismantled	it,	and	moved	the	lumber	to	the	construction	site	(pp.	180-181).	He	also	borrowed	an	axe,	and	proceeded	to	chop	down	pine	trees	for	studs	(p.	179).	He	bought	some	nails,	and	went	to	work	framing	his	cabin	(p.	182).	He	must	have	been	terrible	with	a	hammer,	as	excavators	later	found	an	unusual	number	of	bent	
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nails	buried	at	the	construction	site	(p.	182).	Furthermore,	Thoreau	had	detailed	his	costs	for	construction	supplies,	and	his	nails	entry	was	unusually	expensive	(p.	182).	He	then	asked	his	friends	to	help	him	raise	the	frame.9	He	sheathed	his	hut	with	used	and	sundried	boards	from	Collins’	shanty,	and	began	to	occupy	it	on	Independence	Day,	1845	(pp.	180-181).		 Thoreau	knew	that	if	he	wanted	to	become	a	successful	writer,	he	had	to	“get	away	from	it	all”	(Harding,	1982,	p.	179)	and	away	from	the	heteronomy	of	his	mentor	and	his	family.	His	cabin	was	his	answer.	Thoreau	spent	two	years,	two	months,	and	two	days	at	the	cabin.	He	left	his	cabin	for	two	trips:	the	first	time	was	during	his	night	in	jail,	and	the	second	time	was	his	trip	to	Mount	Katahdin	(Lebeaux,	1984,	p.	47).	He	returned	to	civilized	life	again	after	he	had	completed	first	drafts	of	the	only	books	he	would	publish	in	his	lifetime:	A	Week,	and	Walden	(Harding,	1982).		 Thoreau’s	purpose	of	going	to	Walden	Pond	is	a	riddle,	and	the	difficulty	of	the	riddle	has	to	do	with	the	fact	that	his	purposes	for	moving	to	Walden	Pond	changed	dramatically	after	he	moved	in.	In	terms	of	economics,	it	was	a	necessary	move	if	he	wanted	to	get	any	work	done	as	a	writer.	Henry	was	living	in	the	attic	of	the	new	Thoreau	home	(Harding,	1982),	and	the	increased	number	of	renters	there	must	have	been	a	distraction.	As	Thoreau	claimed	in	Walden,	his	purpose	for	living	in	the	woods	was	“to	live	deliberately”	(1985,	p.	394),	which	has	been	interpreted	in	a	number	of	ways.	To	some	it	means	that	he	lived	simply,	attempting	to	reduce	his	cost	of	living.	To	others	it	means	that	he	wished	to	interrogate	the	essence	of	living,	in	the	spirit	of	“A	Winter	Walk,”	(1843b)	by	experimenting	with	asceticism.	My	interpretation	of	the	situation	is	that	he	had	two	objectives	in	mind	when	he	went	there:	to	create	a	place	to	work	that	would	suit	his	needs	for	solitude	when	it	was	necessary;	to	find	a	place	to	live	that	pleased	him.	These	two	purposes	are	interrelated.	Furthermore,	Thoreau	found	additional	advantages	that	gave	him	still	another	reason	why	such	sojourns	are	worth	undertaking.	He	was	reacquainting	himself	with	nature,	and	slowly	opening	himself	to	the	relationship.	However,	during	Thoreau’s	famous	stay	at	the	pond,	his	understanding	of	friendship	was	not	fully	developed.	He	was	still	limiting	his	friendships	to	animate	relationships,	despite	his	claims	to	the	contrary	in	Walden.		 Although	Thoreau’s	residence	at	Walden	Pond	was	a	time	of	work	and	solitude,	there	was	plenty	of	time	to	be	social	and	have	friends	(Abelove,	2003).	As	Thoreau	indicated	in	Walden,	he	made	frequent	walks	to	town.	He	also	boasted	that	his	friends	found	his	Spartan	dwelling	to	be	more	than	sufficient	for	having	a	good	time.	Ellery	Channing	bunked	with	Thoreau	at	the	cabin	for	two	weeks	(Harding,	1982).	The	anonymous	woodchopper	described	in	Walden	was	a	real	person,	Alek	Therien,	and	the	man	was	quite	fond	of	Thoreau	(Bradford,	1963).	It	is	clear	from																																																									9	His	assistants,	not	named	in	Walden,	included	the	following:	“Emerson,	Bronson	Alcott,	Ellery	Channing,	George	William	Curtis	and	his	brother	Burrill,	and	Thoreau’s	favorite	Concord	farmer,	Edmund	Hosmer,	and	his	sons	John,	Edmund,	and	Andrew”	(Harding,	1982,	p.	181).		
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the	number	of	social	gatherings	and	Thoreau’s	unwillingness	to	be	a	recluse	that	Thoreau	only	wanted	to	be	alone	some	of	the	time.		 Thoreau’s	stay	at	Walden	Pond	was	enormously	productive.	As	he	explained	in	Walden,	in	terms	of	productivity,	not	only	did	he	maintain	a	bean	field,	but	he	also	wrote.	In	the	two	years	that	he	spent	at	the	pond,	Thoreau	produced	more	writing	than	during	any	other	two	year	stretch	of	time	in	his	life	(Richardson,	1986).	He	continued	to	write	in	his	journal,	which	was	just	beginning	to	shape	up	into	a	visible	work	of	writing	in	its	own	right.	It	is	not	surprising	that	Thoreau	began	to	search	for	a	publisher	to	arrange	for	his	first	book	to	be	printed	(Fink,	1992).			 Surprisingly,	the	end	of	Thoreau’s	residence	at	Walden	Pond	came	at	the	request	of	Emerson’s	wife,	Lidian	(Sattelmeyer,	1989	as	cited	by	Rossi,	2010).	Waldo	had	decided	to	take	a	trip	to	England	(Harding,	1982,	p.	197).	Lidian	was	unwell,	and	because	Emerson	was	going	to	be	away	for	a	longer	time	period	than	his	domestic	tours,	she	felt	it	to	be	important	to	ask	someone	trustworthy	to	stay	with	her	and	the	children;	Thoreau	agreed	and	returned	to	town	(Sattelmeyer,	1989).			 According	to	Sattelmeyer	(1989),	Thoreau’s	stay	at	the	Emerson	house	without	his	mentor	reveals	a	great	deal	about	the	growing	distance	between	the	two	men	and	a	growing	intimacy	between	Thoreau	and	Lidian.	While	Waldo	was	in	England,	he	was	in	correspondence	with	Lidian	and	Thoreau	(pp.	196-198).	Waldo’s	relationship	with	Lidian	suffered	(p.	196).	Not	only	was	Lidian	physically	unwell,	but	she	was	also	dependent	on	Thoreau	(Harding,	1982,	p.	197).	Lidian	complained	of	a	cold	Waldo	through	her	letters.	Emerson	brushed	off	her	pleas	for	warmth	and	promised	to	return	“shortly	and	behave	the	best	I	can”	(Sattelmeyer,	1989,	p.	197).	Sattelmeyer	quoted	Gay	Wilson	Allen,	who	concluded	that	Emerson	took	the	trip	not	because	he	needed	money,	but	because	he	was	“bored	and	dissatisfied	with	his	life”	(p.	196).	In	one	of	Thoreau’s	letters	to	Waldo,	he	wrote,	“Lidian	and	I	make	very	good	housekeepers.	She	is	a	very	dear	sister	to	me”	(p.	197).	Thoreau’s	use	of	“sister”	was	not	just	a	casual	jab	or	an	accident.	In	Thoreau’s	journal,	he	wrote	about	this	relationship	more	explicitly:	I	still	think	of	you	as	my	sister.	I	presume	to	know	you.	Others	are	of	my	kindred	by	blood	or	of	my	acquaintance	but	you	are	mine.	You	are	of	me	&	I	of	you			I	can	not	tell	where	I	leave	off	and	you	begin.—			there	is	such	a	harmony	when	your	sphere	meets	mine			To	you	I	can	afford	to	be	forever	what	I	am,	for	your	presence	will	not	permit	me	to	be	what	I	should	not	be.	(quoted	by	Sattelmeyer,	1989,	p.	198)		The	entry	went	on	to	make	it	clear	that	Thoreau	was	not	talking	about	his	actual	sisters	(p.	199).	Then,	Thoreau	ended	his	entry	with	an	explanation	for	why	this	relationship	was	so	important	to	him:	On	the	remembrance	of	whom	I	repose—	—	So	old	a	sister	art	thou—so	newly	hast	thou	recreated	me.	Who	speakest	never	colored	words—who	art	not	possessed	by	a	demon.	Who	dwellest	in	the	morning	light	whose	eyes	are	like	the	morning	star			Who	comest	to	me	in	the	morning	twilight	(quoted	by	Sattelmeyer,	1989,	p.	199)	Thoreau	was	replacing	Waldo	with	Lidian	as	his	friend.	In	other	words,	Lidian	was	the	second	candidate	for	John’s	surrogate	in	Thoreau’s	world	of	fraternal	loss.		
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According	to	Sattelmeyer,	one	of	the	Emerson	children	also	felt	the	need	to	compensate	for	their	father’s	absence.	In	the	same	letter	that	Thoreau	confessed	to	Waldo	that	he	had	begun	to	view	Lidian	as	a	sister,	he	reported	the	behavior	of	the	Emerson	children	in	a	way	that	would	have	disturbed	any	father.	In	the	letter,	Thoreau	continued:	Ellen	and	Edith	and	Eddy	and	Aunty	Brown	keep	up	the	tragedy	and	comedy	and	tragic-comedy	of	life	as	usual.	.	.	[Eddy]	very	seriously	asked	me,	the	other	day,	‘Mr.	Thoreau,	will	you	be	my	father?’	I	am	occasionally	Mr.	Rough-and-Tumble	with	him	that	I	may	not	miss	him,	and	lest	he	should	miss	you	too	much.	So	you	must	come	back	soon,	or	you	will	be	superseded.	(quoted	by	Sattelmeyer,	1989,	p.	197)	Although	we	must	guess	as	to	Waldo’s	reaction	to	these	comments,	the	fact	remains	that	Thoreau	was	taking	on	Waldo’s	role	as	“paterfamilias,”	not	only	to	Emerson’s	wife,	but	to	the	Emerson	children	as	well	(p.	196).	Unfortunately,	as	Roach	has	observed,	“the	very	uncanniness	of	the	process	of	surrogation,	which	tends	to	disturb	the	complacency	of	all	thoughtful	incumbents,	may	provoke	many	unbidden	emotions”	and	might	also	induce	forgetting	(pp.	2-3).	Thoreau	later	wrote	in	his	journal	that	he	did	not	know	why	he	left	Walden	Pond	when	he	did	(Arsić,	2016).	Thoreau’s	forgetting	can	easily	be	attributable	to	an	anxiety	over	securing	an	appropriate	replacement	for	a	sibling.		 When	Emerson	returned,	he	brought	two	things	back	with	him	that	alienated	Thoreau	(Sattelmeyer,	1989).	First,	he	brought	his	old	status	as	head	of	household	back	to	where	it	belonged.	Thoreau	moved	back	into	his	parents’	house,	and	continued	to	make	pencils	(Harding,	1982,	p.	234).	He	also	continued	to	search	for	a	publisher	willing	to	print	his	first	book;	Thoreau	was	having	problems	finding	a	publisher	that	would	front	the	printing	costs	(Fink,	1992).	The	second	thing	that	Emerson	brought	back	was	a	different	man	than	the	one	that	had	left	the	U.S.	the	previous	year.	Sattelmeyer	(1989)	wrote,	“He	was	suddenly	full	of	praise	for	England	and	the	English—their	wonderful	manufacturing	economy,	transportation,	and	even	culture—and	was	much	more	stereotypically	the	Boston	Brahmin	than	he	had	even	been	before”	(p.	197).	To	illustrate	how	much	he	had	changed,	Sattelmeyer	pointed	out	that	Emerson	had	even	developed	a	habit	of	smoking	after-dinner	cigars,	and	found	himself	in	need	of	a	club.	He	“soon	joined	Alcott	in	founding	the	Town	and	Country	Club,	a	loose-jointed	organization	much	more	given	to	sociability	and	dinners	than	the	earlier	Transcendental	Club	had	been”	(p.	197).	Thoreau	did	not	join	the	club,	but	he	did	continue	to	care	for	Lidian	(p.	197).		 What	followed	was	one	of	the	most	foolish	things	that	Thoreau	ever	did	in	his	life:	he	published	his	first	book	on	credit	(Fink,	1992).	Thoreau	was	most	likely	discouraged	after	being	rejected	by	publishers,	but	that	does	not	explain	the	errant	foolishness	of	his	financial	gamble,	especially	with	his	awareness	of	the	shackles	of	debt.	Perhaps	his	lack	of	self-regard	was	a	result	of	feelings	of	guilt	caused	by	melancholia,	as	Butler	(1997)	and	Leader	(2008)	predicted?	Thoreau	could	not	afford	to	front	the	printing	costs	for	a	thousand	copies	of	A	Week	(p.	214).	He	consulted	with	his	mentor,	Emerson,	who	seemed	to	have	a	positive	opinion	of	the	text	(p.	212).	He	urged	Thoreau	to	publish	the	book	with	his	own	funds,	as	Emerson	
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had	done	previously	with	his	own	publications	(p.	212).	As	it	turned	out,	Emerson	was	simply	repeating	to	Thoreau	his	own	advice	from	1844.10	Thoreau	entered	into	an	agreement	with	Munroe	publishers:	they	agreed	to	publish	the	book,	but	on	the	condition	that	Thoreau	would	pay	the	publishing	costs	if	the	book	failed	to	sell	(p.	199).	He	signed	the	contract	in	1849,	and	it	only	took	a	few	months	for	him	to	discover	that	he	had	made	an	enormous	mistake	(Harding,	1982).	The	book	received	mixed	reviews	from	newspapers	and	magazines,	and	Emerson	refused	to	give	it	any	public	review	(Fink,	1992).	Furthermore,	Munroe,	noticing	that	it	had	no	real	stake	in	ensuring	that	the	book	did	well,	made	no	effort	to	publicize	it	(p.	213).	Most	of	the	books	sat	in	a	warehouse	until	the	publisher	told	Thoreau	that	they	no	longer	had	any	space	to	store	the	copies;	he	retrieved	the	unsold	copies,	and	Thoreau	stored	them	in	his	parents’	house	(Harding,	1982,	p.	254).	There	is	an	interesting	perspectival	contrast	to	be	drawn	from	Thoreau’s	actions.	Those	two	perspectives	are	the	prospective	and	the	retrospective,	which	match	up	with	Milder’s	(1995)	contention	that	Walden	tells	both	a	narrated	story	and	an	enacted	story	of	the	Walden	experience.	Thoreau	did	something	that,	in	prospect,	was	an	enormously	foolish	thing,	and	he	suffered	with	debt	for	years	before	he	paid	it	off.	However,	in	retrospect,	Thoreau’s	failure	set	him	up	to	learn	a	special	lesson	from	nature	about	friendship.	This	is	why	friendship	is	important.	The	importance	of	irony	comes	into	play	when	Thoreau’s	forecast	made	him	blind	to	specific	facts	about	his	plan	to	publish	a	book	and	treat	nature	as	an	obedient	subject	(p.	96).		
Loss	of	Prestige		 Unfortunately,	the	failure	of	Thoreau’s	first	book,	combined	with	his	past	embarrassments,	would	make	it	impossible	for	his	mourning	strategy	to	succeed.	The	Massachusetts	Quarterly	Review	asked	Emerson	to	review	A	Week,	but	Emerson	refused,	citing	that	“he	was	of	Thoreau’s	‘same	clan	&	parish’”	(quoted	by	Lebeaux,	1984,	p.	106).	Not	to	be	denied,	the	journal	commissioned	Lowell,	who	wrote	a	devastatingly	mixed	review	that	“gave	with	one	hand”	and	“took	away	with	the	other”	(Harding,	1982,	p.	250).	Instead	of	admiring	and	respecting	Thoreau,	his	contemporaries	treated	him	as	laughing	stock	for	the	neighborhood:	the	irresponsible	son	who	burned	a	forest	and	got	away	with	it	(Lebeaux,	1984).	A	poignant	example	of	this	dynamic	between	the	Concord	locals	and	Thoreau	was	penned	by	James	Hosmer	years	later:																																																									10	Steven	Fink	(1992)	showed	that	during	negotiations	to	get	Margaret	Fuller’s	book	published	in	1844,	Thoreau	was	an	ardent	advocate	of	self-publishing.	Emerson	wrote	to	Fuller	that	“Henry	Thoreau	has	been	showing	me	triumphantly	how	much	cheaper	&	every	way	wiser	it	would	be	to	publish	the	book	ourselves	paying	the	booksellers	only	a	simple	commission	for	vending	it	&	conducting	personally	the	correspondence	with	distant	booksellers”	(p.	212).	Fink	went	on	to	note	that	Fuller	did	not	take	Thoreau	and	Emerson’s	advice.	Her	choice	“turned	out	to	be	an	especially	wise	one”	(p.	212).		
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Thoreau	in	those	days	was	known	in	the	town	as	an	irregular,	eccentric	spirit,	rather	hopeless	for	any	practical	purpose.	He	could	make	a	good	lead-pencil	but	having	mastered	the	art	he	dropped	it,	preferring	to	lead	a	vagabond	life,	loitering	on	the	river	and	in	the	woods,	rather	to	the	disquietude	of	the	community,	though	he	had	a	comfortable	home	cared	for	by	his	good	mother	and	sister.	.	.	.	This	strange	man,	rumor	said,	had	written	a	book	no	copy	of	which	had	ever	been	sold.	.	.	.	The	edition	fell	dead	from	the	press,	and	all	the	books,	one	thousand	or	more,	he	had	collected	in	his	mother’s	house,	a	queer	library	of	unsold	books	which	he	used	to	exhibit	to	visitors	laughing	grimly	over	his	unfortunate	venture	into	the	field	of	letters.	My	aunt	sent	me	one	day	to	carry	a	message	to	Mrs.	Thoreau	and	my	rap	on	her	door	was	answered	by	no	other	man	than	this	odd	son	who,	on	the	threshold	received	my	message.	He	stood	in	the	doorway	with	hair	which	looked	as	if	it	had	been	dressed	with	a	pine-cone,	inattentive	grey	eyes,	hazy	with	faraway	musings,	an	emphatic	nose	and	disheveled	attire	that	bore	signs	of	tramps	in	woods	and	swamps.	Thinking	of	the	forest	fire	I	fancied	he	smelled	of	smoke	and	peered	curiously	up	the	staircase	behind	him	hoping	I	might	catch	a	glimpse	of	that	queer	library	all	of	one	book	duplicated	many	times.	(Hosmer,	1912,	pp.	235-236	as	quoted	in	part	by	Lebeaux,	1984,	p.	118)	Despite	the	withering	criticism	in	these	words,	they	contain	several	important	truths	for	the	present	study.	Abandoning	the	pencil-making	business,	loitering	in	the	wild,	and	having	to	pay	for	hundreds	of	unsold	books	were	all	realities	which	Thoreau	had	to	live	with	after	his	“unfortunate	venture”	of	self-publishing.		
Loss	of	Friendships			 According	to	Milder,	despite	having	access	to	a	larger	living	space,	or	rather	because	of	it,	Thoreau	found	his	network	of	friends	drifting	away	(1995).	The	years	beginning	in	1849	are	the	infamous	years	in	which	the	friendship	between	Emerson	and	Thoreau	cooled	down	and	approached	a	dissatisfying	low	that	would	last	for	the	rest	of	their	lives	(Milder,	1995;	Sattelmeyer,	1989).	However,	Thoreau’s	friendship	problems	were	by	no	means	limited	to	Emerson	(Milder,	1995).	On	February	15,	1851,	for	example,	Thoreau	wrote	the	following	in	his	journal:	Fatal	is	the	discovery	that	our	friend	is	fallible,	that	he	has	prejudices.	He	is,	then,	only	prejudiced	in	our	favor.	What	is	the	value	of	his	esteem	who	does	not	justly	esteem	another?	Alas!	Alas!	when	my	friend	begins	to	deal	in	confessions,	breaks	silence,	makes	a	theme	of	friendship	(which	then	is	always	something	past),	and	descends	to	merely	human	relations!	As	long	as	there	is	a	spark	of	love	remaining,	cherish	that	alone.	Only	that	can	be	kindled	into	a	flame.	I	thought	that	friendship,	that	love	was	still	possible	between.	I	thought	that	we	have	not	withdrawn	very	far	asunder.	But	now	that	my	friend	rashly,	thoughtlessly,	profanely	speaks,	recognizing	the	distance	between	us,	that	distance	seems	infinitely	increased.	
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Of	our	friends	we	do	not	incline	to	speak,	to	complain,	to	others;	we	would	not	disturb	the	foundations	of	confidence	that	may	still	be.	(1906b,	pp.	161-162)	There	are	two	imports	to	glean	from	this	journal	entry.	The	first	fact	is	that	the	level	of	specificity	found	here	is	typical	of	Thoreau’s	whole	journal.	We	do	not	know	who	Thoreau	was	referring	to	or	if	there	was	anyone	in	particular	who	precipitated	this	entry.	Most	of	Thoreau’s	journal	entries	are	open-ended	enough	that	he	probably	predicted	that	someone	would	be	reading	his	journal,	and	he	carefully	maintained	the	silence	of	particular	friendships	within	the	confines	of	his	journal.	The	second	fact	that	is	revealed	by	this	journal	entry	is	that	Thoreau	was	predicating	a	pattern	from	a	single	example.	He	went	from	noticing	when	his	“friend	begins	to	deal	in	confessions,”	to	making	remarks	about	an	unwritten	principle,	“Of	our	friends	we	do	not	incline	to	speak,	to	complain,	to	others.”	This	indicates	that	Thoreau	was	noticing	a	pattern	of	behavior	that	was	not	particular	to	a	single	friendship.	It	also	posits	silence	and	patience	as	hallmarks	of	genuine	friendship.		
Summary		 The	losses	and	blunders	that	Thoreau	experienced	were	profound	and	unrelenting.	Some	of	Thoreau’s	losses	cannot	be	appreciated	within	the	bounds	of	his	own	life,	such	as	the	public	nature	of	the	Thoreau	family.	For	him,	such	conventions	were	seen	as	right,	even	though	Thoreau	himself	followed	the	family	form	imperfectly.	Other	losses	were	acute,	such	as	Thoreau’s	loss	of	his	brother.	This	was	the	major	loss	of	his	life,	more	significant	than	the	losses	of	his	friends,	his	mentor,	and	even	his	prestige;	it	fed	into	the	melancholia	that	had	begun	before.	Finally,	some	of	the	losses	were	chronic,	such	as	his	loss	of	steady	employment,	his	loss	of	the	surrogates	that	he	had	cultivated	to	replace	his	brother,	and	the	steady	drifting-away	of	his	friends	when	his	melancholia	reached	fever	pitch	in	1849.	In	addition	to	his	losses,	Thoreau	committed	several	blunders.	His	decision	to	move	to	Staten	Island	in	1843,	his	decision	to	boat	on	the	Sudbury	River	in	1844,	and	his	decision	to	publish	his	first	book	on	credit	saddled	him	with	275	dollars	of	debt	(Harding,	1982,	p.	254)	and	an	even	more	dubious	reputation	of	being	a	foolish	momma’s	boy.	The	shock	that	came	from	the	spectacular	change	of	fortune	from	a	privileged	member	of	the	Transcendental	Club	to	a	fallen	protégé	of	a	friend-turned-faux	was	a	complex	blow	to	Thoreau’s	ego,	an	upheaval	to	his	life	plan,	and	the	beginning	of	a	life	experience	that	prepared	him	to	write	Walden	(Milder,	1995).	Thoreau	had	already	completed	three	drafts	of	Walden	by	the	time	he	sent	the	final	proofs	of	A	Week	to	the	printing	press,	but	it	was	nothing	close	to	the	masterpiece	that	he	developed	by	the	time	it	was	published	in	1854	(p.	52).	The	pain	was	palpable,	the	worries	and	pressures	in	his	life	were	real,	and	he	could	do	little	about	it	but	shrink	away	from	his	network	of	friends	and	colleagues	(p.	104).	The	only	comfort	that	carried	Thoreau	the	five	years	between	1849	and	1854	was	the	unconditional	love	that	cold	facts	and	cold	darkness	offered	to	him.	The	going	was	tough,	but	time	continued	to	move	inexorably	forward.	The	breakthrough	for	Thoreau	occurred	during	a	dental	operation	that	involved	the	use	of	a	general	
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anesthetic,	and	the	experience	sharpened	his	sense	of	what	was	so	important	about	his	melancholic	walks	in	solitude	(p.	110).		
Thoreau’s	Heroic	Journey	into	the	Ether		 Thoreau’s	breakthrough,	which	happened	in	1851,	cured	him	of	his	heteronomy.	As	Richard	Lebeaux	argued,	Thoreau	“was	coming	to	realize,	when	he	could	afford	to	let	down	his	guard	and	be	honest	with	himself,	that	he	had	oriented	himself	too	much	to	others’	expectations	and	demands—his	family’s,	Emerson’s,	his	townspeople’s,	the	literary	establishment’s”	(1984,	p.	114).	Years	of	effort	and	hard	work	had	produced	sad	fruit,	and	he	came	to	realize	“that	it	is	not	easy	to	find	your	own	way”	(p.	116).	He	took	a	trip	to	Cape	Cod	later	that	year	“to	recapture	a	sense	of	wildness	and	put	distance	between	himself	and	the	pollution	of	civilization;	the	ocean	was	a	vaster	(though	less	benign)	version	of	the	pond”	(p.	122).	He	was	aggrieved	at	the	loss	of	his	friends	in	the	Emerson	family	(pp.	122-123).		 While	Thoreau	was	leaning	toward	abandoning	pencil	making,	he	did	not	abandon	surveying	(Harding,	1982).	Because	he	was	staying	with	his	parents,	his	rent	must	have	been	relatively	low,	and	his	surveying	jobs	and	pencil	work	at	the	end	of	1849	were	sufficient	both	to	make	his	debt	payments	and	to	buy	a	dedicated	notebook	(p.	235).	As	Harding	put	it,	“Deciding	to	turn	professional,	he	made	up	a	list	of	fourteen	books	to	study,	had	his	compass	repaired,	acquired	a	surveyor,	a	blank	journal,	and	some	drawing	paper,	and	inquired	about	the	prices	of	a	drawing	instrument”	(p.	235).	According	to	John	Gordan	(1955),	at	some	point	(we	are	not	sure	when),	Thoreau	had	a	broadside	advertisement	printed	in	a	local	circulating	journal,	magazine,	or	newspaper.	The	evidence	for	this	advertisement	was	an	old	scrap	of	paper	that	had	been	reproduced	from	an	original	that	has	long	since	been	lost	(Harding,	1982,	p.	235).	“The	piece,”	Gordan	wrote,	“is	unrecorded	in	any	published	Thoreau	bibliography	or	checklist”	(1955,	p.	253):	LAND	SURVEYING	[/]	Of	all	kinds,	according	to	the	best	[/]	methods	known;	the	necessary	data	supplied,	in	order	that	the	boundaries	of	Farmers	may	be	accurately	described	in	Deeds;	Woods	lotted	off,	distinctly	and	according	to	a	regular	plan;	Roads	laid	out,	&c.,	&c.	Distinct	and	accurate	Plans	of	Farms	furnished,	with	the	buildings	thereon,	of	any	size,	and	with	a	scale	of	feet	attached,	to	accompany	the	Farm	Book,	so	that	the	land	may	be	laid	out	in	a	winter	evening.	Areas	warranted	accurate	within	almost	any	degree	of	exactness,	and	the	Variation	of	the	Compass	given,	so	that	the	lines	can	be	run	again.	Apply	to	[/]	HENRY	D.	THOREAU.	(pp.	254-255	as	quoted	by	Harding,	1982,	p.	235)	According	to	Gordan,	it	is	possible	that	this	broadside’s	publication	preceded	the	publication	of	A	Week,	and	it	is	possible	that	it	was	not	published	until	well	after	1851.	I	would	venture	to	conclude	that	the	time	of	publication	was	around	this	time	period	in	1849	when	Thoreau	found	himself	completely	dependent	on	surveying	for	income.	Harding	also	reported	that	Thoreau	did	not	yet	have	enough	funds	in	1849	to	repair	his	own	compass,	and	had	to	borrow	working	equipment	from	Cyrus	Hubbard	until	he	could	purchase	working	equipment	in	the	spring	of	1850	(1982,	p.	235).	
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	 After	A	Week,	Thoreau	published	nothing	for	three	years	(Fink,	1992).	It	was	a	time	for	working,	reading,	reflection,	and	walking.	In	a	May	31	1850	journal	entry,	he	wrote	about	the	forest	fire	incident	(1906b,	pp.	21-27).	He	made	copious	notes	of	his	first	of	many	trips	to	Cape	Cod;	those	notes	turned	into	a	manuscript	that	ended	up	as	a	posthumous	publication	(Harding,	1982).	His	journal	began	to	swell	in	1850	(Lebeaux,	1984).		 The	journey	that	proved	to	be	most	profitable	for	Thoreau	was	one	in	which	no	amount	of	money	would	provide:	it	was	a	trip	that	cost	him	his	teeth	(Milder,	1995).	For	his	May	12,	1851	journal	entry,	Thoreau	wrote	about	his	experience,	or	rather	lack	of	experience,	with	being	anesthetized	with	ether	to	remove	his	teeth	and	replace	them	with	false	teeth.	It	is	interesting	that	Richardson	(1986)	did	not	record	this	episode	in	his	biography.	However,	Harding’s	older	(1982)	biography	does	record	this	incident,	but	Harding	perhaps	did	not	understand	the	significance	of	the	event.	Instead,	he	attributed	the	perceptual	change	in	Thoreau’s	writing	to	a	realization	that	he	was	getting	older.	I	find	that	the	breakthrough	for	Thoreau	came	from	the	ether,	or	rather	the	return	from	the	ether,	not	from	the	necessity	of	having	his	teeth	replaced.	If	old	age	were	the	catalyst,	he	wouldn’t	have	posited	his	false	teeth	as	an	example	of	“how	much	Art	outdoes	Nature”	(quoted	by	Harding,	1982,	p.	296).		 For	Thoreau,	ether’s	power	was	in	its	ability	to	unplug	an	individual’s	array	of	senses	and	cause	an	irreversible	change.	As	Thoreau	wrote	in	his	journal,	while	you	are	under,	“You	are	a	sane	mind	without	organs”	(1906b,	p.	194),	making	a	statement	that	is	eerily	similar	to	Deleuze’s	famous	“body	without	organs,”	“an	organism	without	parts	which	operates	entirely	by	insufflation,	respiration,	evaporation	and	fluid	transmission”	(1990,	p.	88).	For	Thoreau,	as	for	many	people	who	have	been	through	similar	ordeals,	such	an	experience	brought	a	new	youthfulness	to	his	writing	that	had	not	previously	been	there	(Harding,	1982).	This	was	the	‘boon,’	as	Joseph	Campbell	(1949/2008,	p.	148)	has	referred	to	it,	that	Thoreau	returned	from	the	ether.	Harding	detailed	a	number	of	giggle-worthy	things	that	appeared	in	his	journal	after	his	psychedelic	experience	(1982).	He	“was	squeezing	pokeberries	and	rejoicing	to	see	their	rich	purple	wine	staining	his	hand”	(p.	296).	He	noted	“the	aroma	of	wild	grapes	on	the	wind	and	thought	he	possessed	the	sense	of	smell	in	greater	perfection	than	usual”	(p.	296).	He	began	to	swim	in	the	nude,	ritualistically,	bathing	himself	at	every	stream	encountered	during	his	walks	(p.	296).	Sometimes	he	would	walk	down	rivers	dressed	in	nothing	but	“a	hat	and	occasionally	a	shirt	to	protect	himself	from	the	sun”	(p.	296).	Thoreau’s	behavior	was	strange	enough	that	Channing	wrote	about	his	refusal	to	follow	Thoreau’s	breaks	from	convention	(p.	296).		 Months	later,	the	breakthrough	was	continuing	to	unfold,	to	change	the	way	he	read	his	senses.	That	summer,	he	began	to	describe	his	nighttime	walks	with	a	newfound	intensity;	as	Lebeaux	observed,	walking	at	night	gave	Thoreau	“a	privileged	perspective	not	available	to	‘day	men’”	(1984,	p.	132).	This	privilege	became	so	important	to	Thoreau	that	he	sometimes	pulled	all-nighters	to	be	able	to	enjoy	a	walk	in	the	woods	“in	order	to	imbibe	his	own	brand	of	moonshine”	(p.	132).	On	August	19,	1851,	Thoreau	wrote	about	the	need	for	a	“meteorological	journal	of		
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the	mind.	You	shall	observe	what	occurs	in	your	latitude,	I	in	mine”	(1906b,	p.	403).	The	line	became	famous	enough	that	it	was	quoted	in	Annie	Dillard’s	text,	Pilgrim	at	
Tinker	Creek	(2007).		 Thoreau	already	understood	the	power	of	walking,	but	his	experience	with	taking	ether	further	awakened	him	to	his	transformative	capabilities	as	a	writer	(Milder,	1995).	The	connection	between	these	two	practices,	walking	and	description,	became	clear	in	the	additions	that	he	made	to	Walden	during	this	time	(pp.	52-53).	He	focused	more	on	the	minutia	of	sensory	data	that	flows	during	the	winter	and	the	lessons	that	the	body	learns	when	the	active	season	shuts	down	and	returns	in	a	way	that	invites	polysemic	interpretation.	Winter	is	the	resting	season,	like	the	taking	of	ether	(or	any	other	psychedelic	compound).	Like	getting	lost	in	the	woods	on	a	stormy	night,	it	produces	profound	changes	in	individual	identity	(Buell,	1995).		 The	change	of	individual	identity	that	getting	lost	does	can	be	profoundly	restorative,	but	not	regressively	so.	As	Lebeaux	concluded	about	Thoreau’s	nighttime	walks,	the	practice	“was	a	means	to	regain	access	to	the	youthful	inspiration	and	vitality	he	had	lost”	(p.	133).	More	than	simply	regaining	access,	these	walks	at	night	functioned	as	a	way	to	filter	and	separate	his	desires	from	the	desires	around	him.	As	anyone	who	has	taken	large	doses	of	psychedelics	or	traveled	to	a	foreign	country	can	say,	the	experience	of	being	completely	“turned	round”	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	459)	can	be	profoundly	deprogramming	of	one’s	cultural	values.	The	return	of	a	traveler	or	a	psychonaut	from	a	‘trip’	can	be	just	as	transformative	as	the	trip	itself,	revealing	what	practices	and	rituals	are	done	for	the	sake	of	genuine	desire,	social	pressure,	and	what	may	be	done	to	relieve	heteronomy.		
Coda		 When	I	re-read	the	quote	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	I	am	reminded	of	what	Thoreau	wrote	on	his	birthday	in	1851.	In	the	quote	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	Thoreau	was	trying	to	sleep,	but	the	bank	of	the	Merrimack	River	kept	Thoreau’s	mind	interested	in	the	many	enterprises	that	the	river	makes	possible,	enterprises	that	other	people	and	other	animals	are	engaged	with.	He	resisted	sleep	because	he	was	thinking	about	others.	Eventually,	he	and	his	brother	fell	asleep,	and	had	different	experiences	that	night.	One	brother	had	a	pleasant	sleep,	but	the	other	was	plagued	with	a	bad	dream.	When	the	morning	arrived,	the	assured	brother	consoled	his	mortified	friend.	The	horror	turned	out	to	be	more	than	just	a	dream.	Thoreau	went	on	to	encounter	the	Evil	Destinies,	who	had	the	power	to	make	those	who	come	under	their	influence	doubt	the	sincerity	and	legitimacy	of	their	desires.	What	was	Thoreau	to	do	now	that	his	brother	was	dead?	Could	his	friend-as-nature	really	console	him?		 On	July	12,	1851,	when	Thoreau	turned	34,	he	wrote	what	seems	to	me	an	affirmative	response	to	that	question,	and	a	response	to	what	he	had	published	two	years	prior:	8	P.	M.	—	Now	at	least	the	moon	is	full,	and	I	walk	alone,	which	is	best	by	night,	if	not	by	day	always.	Your	companion	must	sympathize	with	the		
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present	mood.	The	conversation	must	be	located	where	the	walkers	are,	and	vary	exactly	with	the	scene	and	events	and	the	contour	of	the	ground.	Farewell	to	those	who	will	talk	of	nature	unnaturally,	whose	presence	is	an	interruption.	I	know	but	one	with	whom	I	can	walk.	I	might	as	well	be	sitting	in	a	bar-room	with	them	as	walk	and	talk	with	most.	We	are	never	side	by	side	in	our	thoughts,	and	we	cannot	hear	each	other’s	silence.	Indeed,	we	cannot	be	silent.	We	are	forever	breaking	silence,	that	is	all,	and	mending	nothing.	How	can	they	keep	together	who	are	going	different	ways!	I	start	a	sparrow	from	her	three	eggs	in	the	grass,	where	she	had	settled	for	the	night.	The	earliest	corn	is	beginning	to	show	its	tassels	now,	and	I	scent	it	as	I	walk,	—its	peculiar	dry	scent.	(This	afternoon	I	gathered	ripe	blackberries,	and	felt	as	if	the	autumn	had	commenced.)	Now	perchance	many	sounds	and	sights	only	remind	me	that	they	once	said	something	to	me,	and	are	so	by	association	interesting.	I	go	forth	to	be	reminded	of	a	previous	state	of	existence,	if	perchance	any	memento	of	it	is	to	be	met	with	hereabouts.	I	have	no	doubt	that	Nature	preserves	her	integrity.	Nature	is	in	as	rude	health	as	when	Homer	sang.	We	may	at	last	by	our	sympathies	be	well.	(1906b,	pp.	302-303)			 	
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Chapter	Two:	Roots	of	Melancholia	
	In	dark	places	and	dungeons	the	preacher’s	words	might	perhaps	strike	root	and	grow,	but	not	in	broad	daylight	in	any	part	of	the	world	that	I	know.	The	sounds	of	the	Sabbath	bell	far	away,	now	breaking	on	these	shores,	does	not	awaken	pleasing	associations,	but	melancholy	and	somber	ones	rather.	One	involuntarily	rests	on	his	oar,	to	humor	his	unusually	meditative	mood.	It	is	as	the	sound	of	many	catechisms	and	religious	books	twanging	a	canting	peal	round	the	earth,	seeming	to	issue	from	some	Egyptian	temple	and	echo	along	the	shore	of	the	Nile,	right	opposite	to	Pharaoh’s	palace	and	Moses	in	the	bulrushes,	startling	a	multitude	of	storks	and	alligators	basking	in	the	sun.	—Thoreau,	A	Week	on	the	Concord	and	Merrimack	Rivers,	“Sunday”	(1985,	p.	63)			 The	epigraph	to	this	chapter	is	perhaps	Thoreau’s	most	direct	engagement	with	the	effects	of	melancholia	in	1849.	Several	chapters	later	in	A	Week,	in	what	appears	to	be	a	solution	for	this	“unusually	meditative	mood,”	Thoreau	prescribed	the	light	of	day	that	promises	to	banish	the	shadows	that	are	cast	by	our	bodies	and	spirits.	For	this	early	Thoreau,	grief	always	comes	from	a	dark	shadow,	and	the	solution	is	to	accept	the	fact	that	“constant	abrasion	and	decay	of	our	lives	makes	the	soil	of	our	future	growth”	(p.	286).	We	simply	need	to	expose	our	darkness	or	illuminate	ourselves,	turn	the	humus	and	sustain	the	aerobic	oxidation	of	decay,	and	“if	we	preserve	ourselves	untarnished,	we	are	able	to	enlighten	our	shaded	side”	(p.	287).		 In	A	Week,	Thoreau	did	not	distinguish	between	the	loss	of	an	object	of	desire	and	the	loss	of	desire	itself	when	he	prescribed	daylight.	This	solution	assumes	that	“there	is	no	ill	which	may	not	be	dissipated,	like	the	dark,	if	you	let	in	a	stronger	light	upon	it”	(p.	287),	but	what	if	the	person	is	tarnished,	as	Richard	Bridgman	complained	about	Thoreau	(1982)?	What	if	we	decide	or	are	forced	not	to	let	in	or	out	that	stronger	light?	Too	bad?	This	is	a	special	concern	to	those	of	us	who	have	become	melancholic,	who	have	allowed	others	to	corrupt	what	we	believe	is	worthy	of	grief.	In	A	Week,	Thoreau	does	not	seem	to	have	crafted	his	solution	for	the	melancholic	individual,	but	for	people	who	have	lost	a	legitimate	object	of	desire.		 In	1849,	when	A	Week	was	published,	Thoreau	was	already	experiencing	melancholia,	but	he	was	not	fully	aware	of	this	fact.	The	text	of	A	Week	reveals	this;	there,	his	medicinal	poetry	assuages	the	intensity	of	his	grief	at	the	loss	of	his	brother	and	his	image	of	pastoral	America.	It	does	this	by	attempting	to	reproduce	loss	within	the	mind	of	the	reader	in	a	way	that	presumes	to	know	the	reader’s	desires.	A	Week	is	beautiful	and	its	language	is	dense.	It	is	difficult	to	read,	and	to	a	large	extent	it	was	not	the	easy	reading	that	the	natural	history	and	travelogue	readers	preferred,	producing	a	tension	that	would	leave	Thoreau	with	additional	loss.	Unfortunately,	Thoreau’s	grief	strategy	was	blind	to	the	realities	of	the	publishing	world.	In	the	scenario	Thoreau	set	up,	his	ritual	of	mourning	needed	to	be	legitimated	and	accepted	by	his	readers.	This	did	not	happen,	and	when	Thoreau	
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discovered	that	his	grief	was	solitary	among	humans,	he	became	aware	of	his	melancholia	and	the	universal	possibilities	of	friendship	that	helped	him	mourn	and	restore	his	powers	of	metaphorical	thinking	while	preserving	his	grief	for	his	lost	brother.			 After	1849,	Thoreau	rediscovered	a	profound	and	deep	relationship	with	nature	in	Walden,	departing	subtly	but	significantly	from	his	arguments	about	friendship	in	A	Week.	Moreover,	this	friendship	with	nature	was	not	an	attempt	at	surrogation	(Roach,	1996),	for	it	was	not	designed	to	replace	John.	Rejected	by	companions	and	left	to	labor	under	the	weight	of	his	financial	debt	in	oblivion,	Thoreau	discovered	how	to	relate	to	“nonhuman	agents	as	bona	fide	partners”	(Buell,	1995,	p.	179).	Thoreau’s	friendship	with	nature	led	him	back	to	his	desire	to	publish	with	a	seasoned	awareness,	and	reawakened	the	desires	that	he	had	suppressed	early	in	his	career	at	the	behest	of	Emerson,	John,	and	the	rest	of	his	family.	Nature	(in	its	infinite	modes	of	expression)	was	his	best	friend:	more	reliable	and	more	honest	about	his	situation	than	his	mentor,	Emerson.	One	of	nature’s	modes,	melancholia,	taught	Thoreau	how	to	relate	to	language	not	just	literally,	but	when	he	recovered,	also	revealed	to	him	the	interface	between	literal	and	metaphorical	levels	of	meaning.	While	biographers	have	been	able	to	ascertain	the	fact	that	Thoreau	had,	in	fact,	been	experiencing	melancholia,	they	have	not	been	able	to	identify	why	he	was	experiencing	that	condition	and	how	his	understanding	of	it	evolved.	Arsić	(2016)	has	investigated	Thoreau’s	regenerative	process	of	grieving,	tracing	his	encounter	with	melancholia	to	John’s	death.	In	truth,	Thoreau’s	melancholia	antedated	that	tragedy.11	To	help	make	my	case,	this	chapter	examines	his	writings.	Before	I	do	so,	it	is	important	to	revisit	melancholia	theory.	I	do	this	not	simply	to	reconsider	the	current	literature	on	the	Freudian	tradition	of	melancholia,	but	also	to	examine	Arsić’s	analysis	of	Thoreau’s	own	take	on	the	topic,	which	anticipates	and	departs	from	the	Freud	in	important	ways.	After	discussing	the	theoretical	matter	of	melancholia,	I	address	Thoreau’s	early	works,	split	into	three	time	periods	that	correspond	to	three	stages	of	Thoreau’s	experience	with	melancholia:	entrenchment,	
transfer,	and	recognition.	The	first	segment	on	entrenchment	assesses	Thoreau’s	early	works,	focusing	on	material	he	wrote	before	his	first	book.	The	second	segment	on	transfer	focuses	on	that	first	major	work:	A	Week	on	the	Concord	and	
Merrimack	Rivers.	This	second	segment	also	introduces	literature	on	irony	and	friendship.	The	third	segment	that	highlights	Thoreau’s	recognition	of	his	melancholia	focuses	on	“Walking,”	his	masterpiece	essay	that	describes	of	a	technique	that	assisted	him	to	produce	Walden.	Thoreau’s	situation	and	his	melancholic	condition,	I	argue,	was	entrenched	in	a	suppressed	desire	to	do	philosophy	using	an	evolving	technique	of	experimental	writing	that	he	appropriated	from	Emerson	and	modified	for	his	own	purposes.	This																																																									11	One	clear	explanation	for	Arsić’s	(2016)	trace	of	Thoreau’s	melancholia	no	further	back	than	John’s	death	is	her	claim	that	“The	Service”	was	published	when	he	submitted	it	to	The	Dial	(see	p.	47).	My	contention	is	that	melancholia	was	a	preexisting	condition	for	Thoreau	when	John	died.		
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desire	is	most	obvious	in	Thoreau’s	first	essays,	one	of	which	was	rejected	by	Margaret	Fuller,	a	senior	Transcendentalist	to	Thoreau.	Fuller’s	1840	rejection	of	Thoreau’s	essay,	“The	Service,”	is	an	important	moment	in	the	shaping	of	Thoreau’s	trajectory	as	a	writer,12	and	an	indication	that	Thoreau	was	most	likely	already	suffering	from	the	classic	Freudian	form	of	melancholia	that	Judith	Butler	has	further	developed	as	a	compound	of	loss	and	disavowal	(1997).	My	motivation	for	writing	Chapter	One	was	to	bolster	my	contention	that	the	stage	for	this	melancholia	stretched	back	into	his	early	life	and	the	lost	genealogy	of	his	family’s	parenting	strategies.	After	Fuller’s	rejection,	Thoreau	was	handed	multiple	opportunities	to	write	on	other	topics	in	writing	genres	that	were	significant	departures	from	Thoreau’s	preferred	style	and	topics	(Fink,	1992).	When	John	died,	as	Arsić	(2016)	has	observed,	Thoreau	sought	to	grieve	in	perpetuity.	My	argument	about	melancholia	does	not	deny	this	perpetual	grief,	but	rather	produces	a	tension	with	it	because	Thoreau	was	trying	to	express	a	grief	that	he	was	also	trying	to	disavow.	Thoreau	bowed	significantly	to	market	pressures	to	produce	writing	that	would	sell	(Fink,	1992),	butting	up	against	his	desires	that	found	a	prominence	in	his	“Persius”	and	“The	Service”	essays	and	his	desire	to	grieve	for	his	brother.	During	these	years,	Arsić	(2016)	observed	that	Thoreau	had	thoroughly	developed	a	skill	of	“literalization”	(p.	8).	Since	Arsić	did	not	trace	Thoreau’s	melancholia	further	back	than	John’s	death,	she	does	not	attribute	this	literalization	to	Thoreau’s	melancholia.	My	contention	is	that	Thoreau’s	extended	experience	with	melancholia	was	the	germ	that	cultivated	and	magnified	this	skill.	His	literalization	is	plain	to	see	in	the	first	version	of	Walden,	but	it	had	not	yet	become	his	“language	of	desire”	(Golemba,	1990,	p.	233,	p.	234).	Thoreau	resurrected	his	queer	experimental	writing	and	lyrical	exegesis	in	A	
Week,	taking	a	gamble	that	the	marketplace	would	validate	his	grief	by	allowing	that	grief	to	be	transferred	to	them.	A	Week	was	not	a	failure	because	it	was	a	bad	book.	On	the	contrary,	as	Fink	(1992)	pointed	out,	A	Week	was	meticulously	engineered	and	offers	an	intimate	portrait	of	the	values	in	the	Thoreau	family,	especially	a	view	of	Henry	and	John	Jr.	as	semi-fused	personalities.	Instead,	A	Week	failed	because	Thoreau	was	trying	to	ask	an	archive	to	do	the	work	of	a	repertoire	(see	Taylor,	2003).	This	error	led	him	to	get	a	bad	publishing	deal,	and	this	happened	because	he	wanted	to	publish	his	book	for	an	audience	that	was	not	prepared	for	or	accepting	of	it	(p.	215).	This	audience	problem	was	caused	by	the	fact	that	the	text	was	archival	in	nature,	which	made	for	an	inflexible	scenario	of	loss	(see	Taylor,	2003).	The	fact	that	his	mentor,	Emerson,	did	not	share	his	true	feelings	about	his	book	until	after	its	publication	intensified	Thoreau’s	feelings	of	betrayal	(Fink,	1992,	p.	248).	Had	A																																																									12	Fuller	wrote	her	rejection	of	“The	Service”	to	Thoreau	on	December	1,	1840	(Thoreau,	1902,	p.	ix).	However,	Fink	(1992)	has	pointed	out	that	Emerson	probably	anticipated	the	rejection,	as	evinced	by	Emerson’s	written	apologia	to	Fuller	in	August	of	that	year,	and	Fuller’s	not	placing	the	essay	in	the	October	issue	of	The	
Dial	(pp.	30-31).	This	anticipation	would	have	been	communicated	to	Thoreau	far	earlier	than	Fuller’s	letter.	The	letter	was	simply	confirmation	of	the	two	men’s	suspicions.		
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Week	been	printed	with	a	different	publishing	firm	and	stripped	down	to	the	form	and	style	of	“Ktaadn”	or	Cape	Cod,	or	perhaps	made	into	a	lecture	performance	that	sought	to	transfer	a	repertoire	to	an	audience	who	could	modify	Thoreau’s	scenario	and	transfer	the	repertoire	to	others	(see	Taylor,	2003),	A	Week	would	most	likely	have	been	more	successful	in	terms	of	circulation	(Fink,	1992,	p.	215).	However,	it	would	not	have	been	such	an	intense	and	durable	fusion	of	an	autobiography	and	a	counter-monument	to	his	late	brother	and	pastoral	America.	When	A	Week	failed	to	sell,	it	further	invalidated	Thoreau’s	grief	and	forced	him	to	work	as	a	surveyor	to	pay	off	his	debt	(Harding,	1982).		
A	Week’s	publication	precipitated	a	personal	crisis	for	Thoreau	(Milder,	1995),	inducing	him	to	retreat	further	into	the	wilderness	with	the	company	of	nature	and	sadness	where	he	discovered	that	nature	shared	the	grief	that	he	had	made	contingent	on	human	validation.	This	natural	validation	revealed	to	Thoreau	how	to	write	that	recovery	for	others.	This	crisis	started	around	late	1849	with	the	unfolding	commercial	failure	of	A	Week	and	his	falling	out	with	Emerson	(Milder,	1995;	Fink,	1992).	His	melancholia	and	nighttime	walks	both	forced	him	to	engage	with	the	interface	between	the	literal	and	the	metaphorical	aspects	of	language,	enabling	him	not	just	to	literalize	his	prose,	as	Arsić	observed,	but	also	to	leave	metaphorical	significance	fallow	in	wild	furrows	for	his	readers	to	sow	their	own	seeds	and	witness	how	friendship	functions.	The	triad	of	melancholia,	irony,	and	nomadic	sauntering	are	the	experiences	and	practices	that	he	used	to	invent	
Walden.			
Melancholia		 Melancholia	is	a	difficult	topic	to	analyze	because	its	psychic	workings	are	concealed	from	self-discovery	by	melancholics,	and	twice	removed	from	professional	analysis.	However,	I	argue	that	it	is	this	self-sealing	nature	of	melancholia	that	bestows	a	special	skill	of	communication	that	can	be	carried	forward	beyond	recovery	to	help	others	recover.	Unfortunately,	the	traditional	mode	of	recovery,	detailed	by	the	Freudian	tradition,	curtails	the	importing	of	this	special	skill	for	therapeutic	purposes	and	gives	psychoanalysis	an	undeserved	monopoly	on	melancholia	therapy.	Thoreau’s	own	experience	with	melancholia	and	his	recovery	from	it	provides	a	powerful	alternative	to	the	Freudian	model	that	ends	this	monopoly	by	turning	former	melancholics	into	walking	advocates	and	cures.		 The	Freudian	model	posits	two	different	models	of	mourning,	and	they	both	have	one	important	similarity	and	one	important	difference.	Originally,	the	Freudian	model	posited	that	mourning	was	done	for	the	purpose	of	replacing	a	lost	object	(Butler,	1999,	1997),	but	Darian	Leader’s	(2008)	more	recent	version	of	Freudian	mourning	indicates	that	the	purpose	is	for	the	subject	to	live	with	loss.	The	similarity	between	‘normal’	mourning	and	melancholia	is	at	the	beginning	of	the	process,	since	both	begin	with	the	illusion	that	the	object	has	not	actually	been	lost	(Arsić,	2016).	This	illusion	is	made	possible	by	a	figure	that	Abraham	and	Torok	called	“antimetaphor,”	which	is	“not	simply	a	matter	of	reverting	to	the	literal	meaning	of	words,	but	of	using	them	in	such	a	way—whether	in	speech	or	deed—that	their	very	capacity	for	figurative	representation	is	destroyed”	(1994a,	p.	132).		
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Arsić’s	analysis	seems	to	agree	that	this	“demetaphorization”	(Rand,	1994,	p.	105)	is	a	characteristic	of	melancholia,	although	her	sources	vary	in	their	accounts	of	how	it	comes	about.	The	difference	between	the	two	kinds	of	mourning	comes	into	play	when	the	two	processes	progress	through	time.	This	difference	is	produced	by	the	presence	or	absence	of	another	process	known	as	‘introjection,’	which	is	a	process	that	occurs	in	everyday	life	where	we	appropriate	desires	from	the	objects	in	our	world	to	which	we	are	attached	(Rand,	1994,	p.	100).	These	objects	are	phenomenal,	and	as	such	they	are	being	constructed	from	sensory	data	as	we	form	attachments	to	them.	When	loss	occurs,	melancholic	individuals	disavow	their	desires	(for	any	number	of	reasons,	such	as	coercion	from	the	agent	that	caused	the	loss,	seduction	by	prospective	surrogates,	or	feelings	of	betrayal	caused	by	the	loss	itself),	and	it	is	the	disavowal	that	stops	the	process	of	introjection	(Butler,	1997).	Unfortunately,	according	to	the	model	developed	by	Abraham	and	Torok,	the	only	way	to	dissolve	the	“antimetaphorical	activity”	(Butler,	1999,	p.	87)	is	slowly	through	introjection.	Normal	mourners	begin	their	journey	in	denial	(the	first	stage	of	loss),	and	introjection	carries	them	to	the	next	stage	of	anger	directed	outwards	at	the	pace	in	which	demetaphorization	is	dispelled.	Furthermore,	as	the	reality	of	loss	gradually	sets	in,	the	process	of	introjection	continues	with	the	memory	of	the	lost	object—with	the	understanding	that	the	memory	was	produced	by	someone	or	something	that	has	been	lost.	Thus,	contrary	to	some	understandings	of	this	process	(e.g.,	Rand,	2007),	mourning	does	not	achieve	a	detachment	of	desire	(i.e.,	decathexis)	from	the	lost	object.	Grief	never	truly	ends,	but	the	process	of	recovery	from	demetaphorization,	which	I	identify	as	mourning,	does	resolve,	affirming	Darian	Leader’s	(2008)	contention	that	grieving	and	mourning	are	two	different	things,	and	that	the	proper	goal	of	mourning	is	not	to	eliminate	grief,	but	to	reduce	its	intensity	so	that	it	may	coexist	with	life.	Ordinarily,	overcoming	the	barrier	of	demetaphorization	is	a	natural	process	accomplished	during	mourning	by	allowing	introjection	to	do	its	work,	but	in	melancholia,	an	intervention	is	needed;	the	Freudian	tradition	intervenes	on	one	level;	Thoreau	intervenes	on	two	levels.	In	the	Freudian	tradition,	overcoming	the	barrier	of	demetaphorization	that	guarantees	the	secured	encryption	of	melancholia	involves	a	partnership	that	targets	the	disavowal	of	desire,	not	melancholia	itself	(Abraham	&	Torok,	1994c).	Responding	to	the	usual	and	dysfunctional	response	to	melancholia	that	urges	the	aggrieved	to	‘move	on,’	Abraham	and	Torok	point	out	that	any	push	that	condemns	or	threatens	the	crypt	itself	is	counterproductive	because	what	melancholic	subjects	need	to	do—what	they	have	disabled	themselves	from	doing—is	mourn	for	the	lost	object	and	address	the	legitimate	reasons	why	it	has	been	retained	(p.	156).	Telling	melancholics	to	‘move	on’	tells	the	subjects	that	their	encryptions	of	their	lost	objects	are	illegitimate,	that	they	need	to	be	disavowed,	thereby	reinforcing	the	shackles	of	melancholia	(p.	156).	What	those	around	melancholic	subjects	should	do,	instead	of	threatening	the	crypt,	is	to	embrace	the	crypt,	and	to	display	friendly	hospitality	for	the	secret	within	the	crypt;	this	requires	that	the	contents	of	the	crypt	be	“laid	out	in	the	open	and	recognized	as	the	unalienable	property	of	the	subject”	(p.	156).	Once	this	occurs,	melancholic	subjects	can	introject	the	contents	of	the	crypt	(Butler,	1999,	1997).	Psychoanalysis,			
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according	to	Abraham	and	Torok,	facilitates	this	by	inducing	the	melancholic	to	project	the	crypt	onto	the	psychoanalyst	and	using	them	as	a	symbol	of	the	lost	object—a	stand-in	for	the	crypt	itself.	For	Thoreau,	this	was	not	an	option.	For	Thoreau,	the	problem	was	that	he	thought	that	he	had	dealt	with	the	melancholia	that	had	occurred	with	the	death	of	his	brother,	but	in	fact	he	had	a	prior	melancholia	that	had	escaped	his	awareness,	and	psychoanalysts	did	not	yet	exist.	Thus	the	issues	of	recognition	and	the	requirement	of	psychoanalytic	assistance	affect	how	well	Freudian	intervention	works.	Thoreau’s	intervention	deals	with	this	problem	by	inducing	ego	death,	which	for	Thoreau	was	caused	by	his	experience	with	ether,	and	for	those	of	us	without	access	to	such	a	compound,	we	are	to	get	lost	on	a	sauntering	walk.	When	ego	death	occurs,	the	melancholic	is	forced	to	come	to	terms	with	the	fact	that	the	lost	object	has	in	fact	been	lost,	because	the	subject	(along	with	the	object)	has	died.	However,	since	the	memory	is	obviously	still	present,	it	is	recognized	as	not	the	object	that	was	lost.	Branka	Arsić	(2016)	argued	that	Thoreau	departured	from	the	Freudian	model,	building	an	alternative	that	advocates	perpetual	grief	for	losses	that	are	constantly	occurring	and	constantly	being	transformed	anew.	Thoreau’s	preferred	grief,	according	to	Arsić,	was	a	kind	of	perpetual	mourning	that	resists	mourning	through	representational	means,	giving	the	incorporated	object	its	own	life	at	the	expense	of	oneself.	In	this	kind	of	mourning,	argued	Arsić,	the	bereaved	refuses	the	conventional	wisdom	that	one’s	memories	or	perceptions	are	representations.	This	is	the	consequence	of	Thoreau’s	literalization,	which	Arsić	argued	can	be	implicitly	traced	as	far	back	as	1837	and	became	explicit	in	1842	(this	explication	happened	after	Fuller’s	rejection	of	“The	Service”	in	1840).	By	my	reading	of	Arsić,	she	held	that	Thoreau	lived	with	demetaphorization	for	his	entire	life.	My	reading	of	Thoreau	is	that	he	recovered	from	this	insistence	on	literality,	and	appreciated	the	spacious	capacity	of	the	phenomenal	world	to	accommodate	both	literal	and	metaphorical	meaning—space	for	all	of	one’s	remembered	losses—all	sources	of	desire.13	In	any	event,	it	is	a	good	thing	that	Thoreau	found	a	way	to	mourn	through	non-representational	means,	since	Leader	(2008)	was	adamant	that	symbolic	mourning	is	necessary	to	dissolve	demetaphorization.	As	it	is	my	contention	that	Thoreau’s	recovery	was	enabled	through	a	friendship	with	nature,	and	not	by	unilaterally																																																									13	Perhaps	the	most	lucid	evidence	of	Thoreau’s	recovery	was	a	March	7,	1852	journal	entry,	quoted	by	Henry	Golemba	(1990,	p.	8):	“As	I	look	down	the	rail-road,	standing	on	the	west	brink	of	the	Deep	Cut—I	seem	to	see	in	the	manner	in	which	the	moon	is	reflected	from	the	west	slope	covered	with	snow,	in	the	sort	of	misty	light	as	if	a	fine	vapor	were	rising	from	it—a	promise	or	sign	of	spring.	This	stillness	is	more	impressive	than	any	sound,—the	moon,	the	stars,	the	trees,	the	snow,	the	sand	when	bare,—a	monumental	stillness,	whose	void	must	be	supplied	by	thought.	It	extracts	thought	from	the	beholder,	as	the	void	under	a	cupping-glass	raises	a	swelling.	How	much	a	silent	mankind	might	suggest!	There	is	no	snow	on	the	trees.	The	moon	appears	to	have	waned	a	little,	yet,	with	snow	on	the	ground,	I	can	plainly	see	the	words	I	write.	What	a	contrast	there	may	be	between	this	moon	and	the	next!”	(1906c,	pp.	340-341).		
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projecting	his	own	significance	onto	it,	nature’s	non-representational	mode	of	communication	is	a	unique	walk	to	recovery	that	gives	the	necessary	space	for	metaphorical	interpretation	to	be	introduced	by	the	observer.	Whatever	the	ultimate	truth	is	regarding	how	we	mourn	and	grieve	or	should	mourn	and	grieve,	the	cause	of	melancholia	is	the	disavowal	of	desire,	and	it	is	this	disavowal	that	produces	and	intensifies	the	literalization	or	demetaphorization,	the	latter	which	scholarship	has	noticed	as	a	touchstone	of	the	melancholic	experience.	The	longer	an	individual	bears	with	the	experience	of	melancholia,	the	more	thoroughly	they	are	familiarized	with	the	practice	of	stripping	symbols	of	their	metaphorical	fertility,	and	the	symbols	are	left	bare.	It	is	my	contention	that	Thoreau	restored	the	legitimacy	of	his	desires	that	he	set	aside	when	he	bowed	to	the	writing	constraints	that	Fuller	articulated	when	she	informed	Thoreau	that	“The	Service”	was	unacceptable.	Since	he	spent	years	as	a	melancholic,	he	carried	a	profound	familiarity	with	literalization/demetaphorization	forward	in	his	writing	practices,	but	also	returned	with	a	restored	awareness	that	literal	meaning	has	room	for	metaphors,	and	that	that	space	draws	on	what	the	reader	has	suppressed.			
Thoreau’s	Early	Career		 This	section	analyzes	Thoreau’s	major	writings	that	he	composed	before	A	
Week.	In	this	time	period,	Thoreau’s	oeuvre	is	varied	and	spans	different	genres.	This	‘literature’	review	is	structured	into	three	main	parts.	The	first	part	focuses	on	his	seminal	essay,	which	has	been	neglected	in	the	secondary	literature.	This	essay,	“Aulus	Persius	Flaccus,”	has	been	dismissed	or	ignored	by	many	scholars.	I	find	that	although	it	was	written	in	a	style	that	is	not	easy	to	read	and	that	it	is	exceptionally	abstract,	it	contain	arguments	that	are	important	clarifications	that	set	Thoreau	apart	from	not	only	Emerson,	but	also	most	thinkers	who	follow	Hegel.	The	second	part	of	this	review	focuses	on	the	nature-writing	essays.	These	essays	were	written	with	a	different	style	and	focus	than	his	early	essays	and	the	remaining	essays	that	I	will	discuss	in	the	third	part	of	this	section.	These	nature-writing	essays	form	a	compositional	tension	when	juxtaposed	with	first	book,	A	Week.	This	tension	is	evidence	of	the	melancholia	that	Thoreau	was	unable	to	recognize.	The	final	part	of	this	review	focuses	on	other	writings	that	do	not	fit	into	the	nature-writing	genre.	These	essays	demonstrate	Thoreau’s	development	of	a	symbolic	statement	about	desire.		
“Persius”	The	first	essay	in	Thoreau’s	career,	“Aulus	Persius	Flaccus,”	is	an	important	opportunity	to	view	some	of	Thoreau’s	philosophical	perspectives	before	they	were	integrated	into	his	nature	writing.	“Persius”	shows	that	Thoreau	was	following	Spinoza	and	ignoring	Hegel.	Thoreau’s	debut	publication,	“Aulus	Persius	Flaccus”	(1840),	is	the	densest	and	most	underappreciated	example	of	writing	that	he	ever	published	in	his	lifetime.	In	just	four	pages	of	text	with	wide	margins,	Thoreau	brought	special	attention	to	Persius’	lineage,	and	described	a	model	for	affirmative	difference	that	does	not	rely	exclusively	on	negation	when	he	shows	the	learning	curve	of	genius.		
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The	main	argumentative	project	in	“Persius”	is	to	announce	Thoreau’s	criticism	of	uninspired	satire.	Perhaps	the	most	important	sentence	in	the	essay	lays	this	reasoning	out:	“Truth	never	turns	to	rebuke	falsehood;	her	own	straightforwardness	is	the	severest	correction”	(p.	118).	For	Thoreau,	what	made	satire	inspired	was	not	an	abstract	Muse,	but	a	process	that	frees	the	satirist	from	the	object	of	complaint.	Thoreau	wrote	that	there	is	“a	sort	of	necessary	order	in	the	development	of	Genius”	(1840,	p.	118).	This	order	consists	of	three	waypoints:	Complaint,	Plaint,	and	then	Love.	Perhaps	what	made	the	essay	so	difficult	to	analyze	was	the	fact	that	Thoreau	never	explained	what	difference	he	meant	between	“complaint”	and	“plaint.”	In	the	modern	colloquial	sense,	there	is	no	difference	between	those	two	words.	Etymologically,	however,	‘complaint’	is	different	from	‘plaint’	with	respect	to	object	relations.	On	the	one	hand,	a	complaint	involves	a	target,	situation,	or	condition.	An	example	of	this	is	a	legal	complaint.	In	common	law,	a	legal	complaint	always	occurs	against	at	least	one	other	party	(James,	1961).	A	plaint	is	a	somewhat	archaic	word,	and	it	is	actually	the	root	word	of	complaint.	The	difference	is	‘plaint’	is	missing	the	prefix	‘com,’	which	means	“together.”	This	means	that	the	first	step	toward	genius	was	separating	satire	from	the	original	target	that	served	as	the	impetus	of	attack	in	the	first	place.	The	separation	that	the	transition	from	‘complaint’	to	‘plaint’	accomplishes	is	a	transition	from	the	tears	of	sorrow	to	the	tears	of	joy,	a	natural	progression	(Thoreau,	1840).	Thoreau	argued	that	the	highest	form	of	poetry	and	nature	herself,	which	offers	the	gentlest	“reproof	to	the	hearer”	(p.	118),	is	like	the	“sighs	of	her	winds	in	the	woods”	(p.	118).	For	Thoreau,	“As	long	as	there	is	satire,	the	poet	is,	as	it	were,	particeps	criminis”	(1985,	p.	252).	The	importance	of	graduating	beyond	negation	cannot	be	overestimated	in	Thoreau’s	philosophy,	and	in	Thoreau’s	life.	As	anyone	who	is	familiar	with	Hegelian	philosophy	knows,	negation	is	the	central	component	that	allows	his	dialectical	engine	to	function.	Negation	links	together	thesis	and	antithesis,	and	brings	a	new	antithesis	to	the	new	synthesis.	Thoreau’s	philosophy	does	not	propose	that	any	person	or	any	idea	should	exist	merely	to	oppose	another	person	or	another	idea,	but	will	eventually	stand	on	their	own	merits	and	sing	the	song	that	they	hear.	This	is	why	Thoreau	wants	each	person	to	graduate	beyond	complaint.	This	incompatibility	between	Thoreauvian	and	Hegelian	thought	complicates	the	relationship	between	Thoreau	and	other	scholars	who	have	used	a	Hegelian	framework	to	write	about	Thoreau	(Warner,	2002,	1992)	and	queer	culture	(Muñoz,	2009),	a	point	I	return	to	in	the	Conclusion	chapter.		
Writing	Nature	From	Massachusetts	to	Maine		 In	what	became	a	series	of	nature-writing	essays,	Thoreau’s	effort	to	reconcile	his	desires	with	the	opportunities	presented	to	him	is	visible	in	two	ways.	First,	Thoreau’s	idea	that	his	career	as	a	writer	made	him	into	a	prophet	is	noticeable	in	each	of	his	nature-writing	essays,	but	this	role	that	Thoreau	carved	out	for	himself	evolved	toward	the	empowerment	of	his	audience	rather	than	towards	the	empowerment	of	his	own	prophetic	role	(Fink,	1992).	Second,	Thoreau’s	nature-writing	essays	are	a	fascinating	inventory	of	experimental	writing.	Thoreau	began		
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his	career	in	nature	writing	with	a	gift	publication	from	Emerson	(p.	42),	and	the	reader	has	a	brief	opportunity	to	find	Thoreau	being	honest	about	what	interested	him	and	what	did	not.	After	Thoreau	was	able	to	secure	publishing	outlets	outside	of	the	Transcendentalist	territory	of	The	Dial	and	realized	that	Emerson	was	using	him	to	fill	his	journal,	the	reader	begins	to	see	this	Thoreau	returning	to	a	bold	experimentation	with	poetry	and	prose,	reminiscent	of	his	writing	in	his	“Persius”	and	“The	Service”	essays.	As	the	essays	progress	in	more	competitive	outlets,	the	reader	finds	Thoreau	moving	away	from	poetry	and	towards	a	subtle	awareness	of	feeling	and	desire.	Specifically,	Thoreau’s	nature	writing	essays	became	subtly	more	preoccupied	with	the	phenomenon	of	melancholia.		In	this	section,	I	am	concerned	with	the	audiences	targeted	by	the	nature	writing	articles	produced	by	Thoreau	before	A	Week:	“Natural	History	of	Massachusetts,”	“A	Walk	to	Wachusett,”	“A	Winter	Walk,”	and	“Ktaadn	and	the	Maine	Woods.”	These	articles,	when	examined	as	a	progression	of	writing	skill	and	motivation,	reveal	a	writer	who	was	continuing	to	grapple	with	a	reading	audience	that	was	more	interested	in	the	commodity	of	nature	than	the	philosophical	imports	that	Thoreau	cherished	from	those	observations.	When	these	essays	are	read	as	a	series	of	publications,	Thoreau’s	role	of	prophet	began	as	defined	and	embraced,	but	transformed	into	a	role	that	was	increasingly	deflected	away	from	himself	and	towards	the	audience	(Fink,	1992).	After	“Natural	History	of	Massachusetts,”	the	reader	is	exposed	to	an	array	of	writing	experiments,	which	lead	to	a	curiously	elided	concern	with	melancholia.	In	the	last	of	these	articles,	“Ktaadn,”	Thoreau’s	narrative	is	positively	dark,	leading	one	to	doubt	Robert	Richardson’s	(1986,	p.	116)	and	Robert	Sullivan’s	(2009,	p.	94)	conclusion	that	his	brother’s	death	somehow	freed	him.	Instead,	I	argue,	his	brother’s	death	placed	a	special	obligation	on	Henry;	he	began	to	burn	like	a	candle,	and	the	flame	was	not	entirely	his	own.	This	mission	would	continue	until	after	A	Week’s	failure	to	sell.		 The	nature-writing	essays	that	Thoreau	wrote	before	A	Week	reveal	a	writer	who	appeared	to	be	progressing	towards	two	writing	conventions.	The	first	convention	acknowledged	the	prophetic	role	of	Thoreau	as	author,	and	this	role	was	slowly	democratized	to	include	the	audience	in	the	prophetic	process	of	revelation	(Fink,	1992).	Thoreau	began	this	role	by	being	a	prophet	in	the	traditional	sense,	of	making	prophecies	and	sharing	those	prophecies	with	his	readers	(1842).	Later,	he	experimented	with	sharing	the	empirical	method	of	revelation,	showing	the	audience	how	to	reach	the	prophetic	role	themselves,	first	by	walking	up	a	mountain,	and	then	taking	a	winter	walk	(1843a,	1843b).	Then,	Thoreau	resorted	to	pure	description	to	avoid	spoiling	the	empirical	method,	and	letting	the	readers	reach	their	own	conclusions	regarding	what	qualifies	as	the	prophetic	role	and	the	substance	of	prophecy	during	a	bruising	trek	up	Mt.	Katahdin	(1848).	The	second	convention	involved	the	reader	as	an	active	part	of	the	reading	experience.	Thoreau	began	his	nature-writing	with	a	straightforward	exposition	of	the	philosophical	issues	that	concerned	him	(1842).	Later,	he	experimented	with	complex	prose	and	poetry	that	required	great	effort	and,	sometimes,	special	knowledge,	to	interpret	his	writing	(1843a).	Then,	Thoreau	resorted	to	the	strategic	use	of	description	and	the			
	 49	
avoidance	of	explanation,	to	force	the	reader	to	do	more	work	of	interpretation	(1848).		 Thoreau’s	published	nature-writing	reveals	a	budding	writer	who	was	struggling	with	a	dejection	that	threatened	to	consume	him.	“A	Winter	Walk”	and	“Ktaadn”	are	appropriate	examples.	He	saw	the	sad	descent	that	his	brother	was	taking	into	infirmity,	and	he	found	himself	completely	helpless	to	forestall	the	entropy	that	was	unfolding	all	around	him.	When	John	died,	Emerson	tried	to	provide	him	with	distracting	opportunities,	but	those	opportunities	ended	up	returning	Thoreau	to	his	losses.	He	did	not	want	to	let	go,	but	his	career	path	was	pushing	him	to	do	just	that.	Thoreau	produced	other	works	before	A	Week,	which,	taken	together,	amount	to	a	coherent	statement	of	his	practice	of	desire.	In	his	first	book,	which	I	discuss	later	in	this	chapter,	Thoreau	was	reluctant	to	leave	any	of	his	innovations	or	arguments	behind,	and	portions	of	most	of	them	were	imported	into	the	heart	of	the	manuscript.	Thoreau’s	omnibus	book	revealed,	with	the	exception	of	a	few	fleeting	relationships,	the	brutal	historical	fact	that	Thoreau	was	surrounded	by	a	capitalist	society	that	did	not	share	his	values,	and	did	not	value	his	uncommonly	queer	and	loving	soul.	It	only	cared	about	his	labor.		
Toward	a	Statement	About	Desire		 Five	of	Thoreau’s	early	writings,	when	taken	together,	capture	his	theoretical	and	empirical	relationship	with	desire.	Thoreau	had	a	developed	understanding	of	what	he	did	not	want	to	do,	but	the	affirmative	project	of	pursuing	his	own	desires	was	not	sufficiently	developed.	He	had	learned	a	considerable	amount	from	his	friend,	Emerson,	and	Thoreau’s	family	was	enormously	influential	on	his	values,	as	his	essays	reveal.	However,	Thoreau	had	yet	to	appreciate	a	more	important	relationship	that	he	had	already	begun	to	cultivate:	friendship	with	nature.	Thoreau’s	frustrations	with	and	disinterest	in	the	intricate	facets	of	the	publishing	industry	were	the	most	significant	reasons	why	his	first	book	failed.	Thoreau	did	not	understand	or	accept	the	fact	that	the	human	world	of	publishing	is	a	part	of	nature,	and	his	ironic	confidence	in	his	mastery	of	it	was	the	most	significant	factor	that	made	him	aware	of	his	melancholic	crisis	in	1849.		 The	myriad	statements	that	Thoreau	made	during	this	time	period	about	desire	can	be	summarized.	This	summary	is	an	extract	of	five	quotations	from	five	of	his	essays	joined	together	into	a	statement	that	presents	Thoreau’s	emerging	perspective:	Accept	that	“the	past	cannot	be	presented”	(1843c,	p.	57),	ward	against	“a	love	of	popularity”	(2001,	p.	64),	and	be	“a	more	public	character	than	a	statesman”	(1843d,	p.	429);	we	must	“succeed	alone,	that	we	may	enjoy	our	success	together”	(1843e,	p.	461),	and	I	will	work	with	“language	itself,	and	the	common	arts	of	life”	(1844,	p.	292).	These	five	lines	were	taken	from	the	following	five	essays:	“Dark	Ages”	(1843c),	“Sir	Walter	Raleigh”	(2001),	“The	Landlord”	(1843d),	“Paradise	(to	be)	Regained”	(1843e),	and	“Homer,	Ossian,	Chaucer”	(1844).	As	the	concatenated	poem	above	illustrates,	the	essays	that	Thoreau	produced	in	1843	and	1844	form	the	kernel	of	his	understanding	of	desire.	Thoreau	was	invested	in	the	ways	in	which	memory	is	stored	within	whole	cultures	and		
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individuals	(1843c).	At	this	time	in	Thoreau’s	development,	probably	because	of	his	close	proximity	to	a	number	of	powerful	and	intelligent	scholars	who	were	grappling	with	the	temptations	of	fame,	the	motives	for	being	a	productive	member	of	society	became	a	major	concern	to	him.	His	earliest	influences	were,	of	course,	his	family	members,	but	Thoreau	was	still	having	difficulty	discovering	an	affirmative	statement	about	his	own	beliefs.	His	essay	on	poetry	was	the	closest	thing	to	such	a	statement	about	(one	of)	his	own	passions,	but	that	perspective	needed	more	time,	writing,	and	maturity	to	find	its	own	voice.	The	poem	begins	by	constructing	an	identity	in	negative	terms,	mirroring	the	“complaint”	phase	in	Thoreau’s	“Persius”	essay.	As	this	poem	continues,	the	reader	sees	Thoreau’s	family	lineage	in	his	praise	for	an	idealized	public	citizen.	After	all	of	this,	Thoreau	starts	to	recognize	his	own	attraction	to	instrumental	individualism	and	his	passion	for	working	with	language	and	the	arts	of	prosaic	living.	The	two	major	lessons	that	Thoreau	had	yet	to	learn	have	to	do	with	the	ironic	nature	of	his	own	philosophical	contradictions,	and	the	fact	that	his	writings	on	friendship	show	that	he	was	failing	to	recognize	what	was	the	most	important	friendship	in	his	life.	Thoreau’s	inability	to	learn	these	lessons	until	after	1849	indicate	that	he	did	not	sufficiently	understand	irony	or	friendship.			
A	Week	with	Irony	and	Friendship	In	this	section,	I	discuss	the	relationship	of	irony	and	friendship	at	a	theoretical	level	and	with	respect	to	Thoreau’s	situation.	Irony	and	friendship	are	timeless	topics	in	philosophy,	and	continue	to	be	relevant	in	communication	studies.	In	addition,	they	are	my	two	main	concerns	with	respect	to	the	text	of	his	first	book.		
Irony		 Scholarly	interest	in	irony	dates	back	at	least	as	far	as	Ancient	Greece	(Carlson,	1993).	Plays	were	producing	characters	afflicted	with	the	trope	of	folly,	and	other	characters	bent	on	exposing	these	follies,	and	characters	that	could	tell	jokes	about	it	(Muecke,	1969).	These	plays	introduced	specific	stock	characters	that	interacted	with	each	other,	performed	folly,	and	produced	important	experiences	for	the	audience	(Burke,	1941/1973).	The	insight	that	is	produced	when	audiences	are	forced	to	respond	to	multiple	incompatible	perspectives	and	learn	vicarious	lessons	is	the	essence	of	irony	that	is	carried	into	contemporary	theoretical	discussions	about	this	topic	(Muecke,	1969).		
	 Ancient	Irony	Ancient	Greek	theatre’s	most	important	contribution	to	the	current	inquiry	rests	between	stock	characters	(Muecke,	1969).	These	stock	characters	showcase	attitudes	and	patterns	of	interaction	with	each	other	that	produce	ironic	states	of	affairs	within	a	dramatic	situation	(Burke,	1941/1973).	Three	of	these	characters,	the	eiron,	the	alazon,	and	the	bomocholus,	always	appeared	in	Greek	comedy	(Muecke,	1969).	The	eiron	and	the	alazon	also	appeared	in	the	finest	examples	of	Greek	tragedy,	interacting	to	produce	dramatic	ironic	situations.			
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Ancient	Greek	theater	helps	us	understand	irony	through	the	interactions	of	these	stock	characters.	The	eiron,	as	its	name	suggests,	is	the	master	of	irony	(Muecke,	1969;	Karstetter,	1964).	Audiences	find	the	eiron	employing	what	Aristotle	in	his	Nicomachean	Ethics	(1984,	p.	1750;	1108a22	as	cited	by	Muecke,	1969)	described	as	understatement	and	self-depreciation	to	humiliate	others	who	exhibit	innocent	and	confident	unawareness.	The	alazon	fulfills	the	role	of	the	oblivious	character	that	underestimates	skeptical	cautions,	speaks	beyond	competence,	and	falls	victim	to	folly	(Muecke,	1969;	Karstetter,	1964).	The	important	contrast	between	the	eiron	and	the	alazon	occurs	at	an	epistemic	level,	requiring	the	alazon	to	display	hubris	or	express	confident	anticipations.	The	last	stock	character,	the	
bomolochus,	known	as	the	buffoon	who	supplies	comedic	wit,	crude	and	direct	address	to	the	audience,	employs	several	narrative	tools,	and	a	privileged	vantage	point,	that	allow	the	author	to	share	information	with	the	audience	relatively	transparently	(Muecke,	1969).		 Muecke	noted	that	the	alazon	need	not	appear	as	a	stage	character	in	ironic	performances.	Offstage	characters	or	naïve	audience	members	can	fulfill	the	role	of	the	alazon,	and	Muecke	even	went	so	far	to	say	that	modern	alazonys	(behavior	or	speech	befitting	the	alazon)	can	take	the	form	of	a	salient	school	of	thought	or	prevailing	worldview,	regardless	of	whether	the	ironic	text	identifies	specific	alazon	examples	and	objects	of	ridicule.	Likewise,	as	Muecke	pointed	out,	the	eiron	also	need	not	appear	in	the	ironic	performance	as	a	definite	character;	because	the	Greek	chorus	almost	no	longer	appears	in	modern	dramatic	productions,	the	ironist’s	goal	and	method	may	fold	into	a	narrator,	the	author,	the	story,	or	life	itself.		 The	Ancient	Greek	framework	of	irony	is	crucial	to	understanding	how	ancient	performances	invented	dramas	that	audiences	were	able	to	use	to	witness	irony.	However,	this	analysis	is	incomplete	without	a	discussion	of	how	audiences	reach	this	understanding	at	a	psychological	level.	To	make	this	point,	I	turn	to	Kenneth	Burke.		
	 Burke’s	Irony	Burke	contained	his	analysis	of	irony	within	three	texts:	the	first	in	his	
Attitudes	Toward	History	(1937/1984b),	another	in	his	Philosophy	of	Literary	Form	(1941/1973),	and	finally	in	his	Grammar	of	Motives	(1945/1969).	The	first	instance	of	Burke’s	attention	to	irony	was	couched	within	his	analysis	of	‘comic	correctives’	or	a	‘comic	frame’	(1937/1984b).	For	Burke,	“The	comic	frame,	in	making	a	man	the	student	of	himself,	makes	it	possible	for	him	to	‘transcend’	occasions	when	he	has	been	tricked	or	cheated,	since	he	can	readily	put	such	discouragements	in	his	‘assets’	column,	under	the	head	of	‘experience’”	(p.	171).	This	comic	frame	“should	enable	people	to	be	observers	of	themselves,	while	
acting”	(p.	171).	However,	this	analysis,	while	significant,	did	not	address	the	internal	mechanisms	of	irony	or	how	the	audience	comes	to	see	itself	as	a	proper	object	of	critique	or,	to	use	Burke’s	terminology,	how	the	audience	experiences	drama.	In	“Mainsprings	of	Character,”	Burke	(1941/1973)	explained	why	audiences	cannot	experience	drama	without	witnessing	dramatic	irony:	
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Dramatic	irony	arises	from	a	relationship	between	the	audience	and	the	play.	The	audience	knows	that	certain	tragic	events	are	destined	to	take	place.	It	also	hears	some	figure	on	the	stage	boasting	of	good	times	to	come.	And	in	the	audience,	as	spectator,	arises	dramatic	irony.	The	audience	is	powerless	to	affect	the	course	of	events;	at	the	same	time,	its	sympathy	for	the	characters	makes	it	long	to	alter	the	course	of	events—and	this	divided	attitude,	a	sense	of	being	with	the	people	as	regards	one’s	sympathies	but	
aloof	as	regards	one’s	ability	to	forestall	the	movements	of	destiny,	this	awareness	of	a	breach	between	one’s	desires	and	one’s	understanding,	this	is	ironic.	(p.	419).		Writers	exploited	this	dramatic	mechanism	in	the	nineteenth	century,	according	to	Burke,	to	vent	their	disapproval	of	popular	ambitions.	Within	irony,	dramatists	could	express	their	inability	to	change	events	that	they	disdained	by	depicting	“people	headed	with	confidence	toward	desolate	ends”	(p.	419).	Burke	noted	Haakon	Chevalier’s	focus	on	certain	character	traits,	such	as	irresponsibility,	which	allowed	Anatole	France	to	exploit	the	ironic	spectator.	Furthermore,	Burke	rejected	the	idea	of	a	pure	or	separate	spectator,	emphasizing	the	need	for	a	naïve	audience.		 	As	a	kind	of	summary,	in	“Four	Master	Tropes,”	Burke	(1945/1969)	borrowed	Vico’s	terminology	and	built	a	framework	around	four	overlapping	tropes:	metaphor,	metonymy,	synecdoche,	and	irony.	Irony	is	an	interactive	process	that	occurs	within	the	other	tropes	to	“produce	a	development”	(p.	512).	Each	of	the	“participating	‘sub-perspectives’”	is	an	integral	contributor	to	the	development	of	a	“perspective	of	perspectives,”	and	“only	through	an	internal	and	external	experiencing	of	folly	could	we	possess	(in	our	intelligence	or	imagination)	sufficient	‘characters’	for	some	measure	of	development	beyond	folly”	(p.	512).	The	requirement	that	irony	consists	of	a	development	led	Burke	to	emphasize	that	none	of	the	individual	characters	can	be	equivalent	or	foreign	to	the	development	itself.		
Discussion		 Thoreau’s	life	up	to	1849	was	ironic	on	two	counts.	At	one	level,	Thoreau’s	decision	to	publish	A	Week	on	credit	assumed	the	role	of	the	alazon.	He	ignored	the	realities	of	the	publishing	industry	and	exposed	himself	to	275	dollars	of	unnecessary	debt	(Sullivan,	2009).	To	put	this	into	perspective,	he	could	have	purchased	Walden	Pond	with	that	money	(Fink,	1992).	Thoreau	could	not	have	pinned	this	error	on	his	mentor’s	bad	advice,	since	it	was	his	own	advice	to	Emerson	in	1844	that	led	to	Emerson’s	own	foolish	attitude	about	self-publishing	(p.	212).	Second,	the	content	of	A	Week	provided	a	detailed	and	honest	presentation	of	Thoreau-as-alazon.	In	the	book,	Thoreau	boasted	that	he	“found	all	things	thus	far,	persons	and	inanimate	matter,	elements	and	seasons,	strangely	adapted	to	my	resources.	No	matter	what	imprudent	haste	in	my	career;	I	am	permitted	to	be	rash”	(1985,	p.	240).	He	also	described	nature	as	predictably	obeying	the	laws	of	nature,	adding,	“This	world	is	but	canvas	to	our	imaginations”	(p.	238).	Thoreau	woefully	underestimated	the	complexity	of	the	publishing	industry,	indicating	that	either	he	underestimated	nature,	did	not	recognize	the	hostility	of	the	publishing	industry	(or	the	public	culture	which	was	fed	by	the	publishing	industry)	as	a	part	of	that	nature,	
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or	both.	It	is	obvious	that	his	relationship	with	nature	was	still	immature,	making	it	necessary	for	nature	to	teach	him	an	expensive	lesson	about	irony	and	friendship.		
Thoreau’s	Procession	of	Friends		 For	Thoreau,	friendship	is	the	giving	and	receiving	between	intermixed	individuals	(Crosswhite,	2010).	Its	only	risk,	as	Thoreau	wrote,	is	that	the	process	will	end,	which	puts	former	friends	into	a	position	of	grief.	In	this	section,	I	present	Thoreau’s	understanding	of	friendship	in	1849.	It	is	helpful	to	understand	Thoreau’s	theory	of	friendship	because	it	not	only	helps	identify	the	irony	of	Thoreau’s	decision	to	publish	A	Week,	it	shows	the	advantage	of	Thoreau’s	future	extension	of	friendship	to	nature,	and	it	exposes	some	contradictions	surrounding	the	public	nature	of	friendship.		 It	should	be	obvious	to	any	reader	of	A	Week	that	Thoreau	conceived	of	friendship	as	a	process,	not	a	structural	state	of	affairs.	For	Thoreau,	as	Crosswhite	has	discussed,	friendship	is	giving	and	receiving	(p.	167).	Friendship	involves	friends	with	each	other,	but	it	is	not	the	friends’	relationship	that	makes	it	a	friendship;	instead,	it	is	a	form	of	“indwelling”	between	people	that	breaks	the	illusion	of	independent	self-sufficiency	(p.	166).14	It	is	inevitable	that	friendship	ends	when	seen	through	a	structural	framework	(p.	166).	Because	giving	and	receiving	is	the	procession	of	friendship,	and	that	the	giving	and	receiving	is	cultivated	from	previous	giving	and	receiving,	friendship	survives	the	supposed	denouement	of	particular	relationships	(p.	168).	According	to	Thoreau,	the	grief	that	is	felt	at	the	end	of	particular	friendships	can	be	analyzed	in	two	ways:	a	contrast	between	our	unworthiness	to	be	an	individual’s	friend	and	our	perceived	unworthiness	to	be	their	friend,	which	measures	“the	intensity	of	our	grief”	(1985,	p.	242),	and	a	shade	that	envelops	the	image	of	a	lost	friend	when	the	aggrieved	subject	blocks	the	source	of	light	(p.	286).		The	theory	of	friendship	developed	by	Thoreau	was	a	reorientation	to	friendship	that	involved	an	abandonment	of	a	structural	understanding	of	friendship	and	a	move	toward	understanding	friendship	as	a	process	(Crosswhite,	2010).	For	Thoreau,	friendship	is	giving	and	receiving	(p.	167),	and	it	is	an	intermixing	of	individuality	in	which	“we	give	the	best	to,	and	receive	the	best	from”	(1985,	p.	218).	It	is	nothing	more	than	the	moments	when	friends	are	imbricated	with	each	other,	changing	each	other	(Crosswhite,	2010,	p.	168).	“The	best”	are	no	external	material	goods,	nor	are	they	instrumental	advantages	or	pleasures.	Instead,	“the	best”	are	introjections	to	ourselves	that	are	supplied	by	friendship:	“the	virtue	which	we	appreciate	we	to	some	extent	appropriate,	so	that	thus	we	are	made	at	last	more	fit	for	every	relation	of	life”	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	225).	For	Thoreau,	friendship	is	no	more	and	no	less	than	that	mutual	appropriation	of	virtue.	It	is	“evanescent”	(p.	213	as	quoted	by	Crosswhite,	2010,	p.	167).	At	the	same	time,	however,	friendship	for	Thoreau	is	a	“perpetual	and	all-embracing	service”	that	is																																																									14	According	to	Crosswhite,	“indwelling”	is	just	one	translation	of	perichoresis,	“the	old	theological	word	for	that	relation	among	the	members	of	the	Christian	Trinity.”	(2010,	p.	166).		
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found	over	and	over	again,	changing	friends	into	new	beings,	turning	them	into	a	friend	of	new	friends,	and	creating	new	and	wider	possibilities	for	friendship	(1985,	p.	217	as	quoted	by	Crosswhite,	2010,	p.	168).	For	Thoreau,	the	paradox	that	afflicts	Aristotle’s	framework	of	friendship	is	not	a	paradox	at	all	(Crosswhite,	2010,	p.	168).	Instead,	Aristotle’s	paradox	happens	because	of	two	misconceptions.	First,	virtuous	individuals	cannot	be	assessed	apart	from	their	friends(hips)	(p.	168,	pp.	170-171).	Second,	friendship	should	not	be	framed	as	a	structural	achievement	(p.	166).	Thoreau’s	framework	for	friendship,	which	was	his	most	significant	theoretical	contribution	in	A	Week,	was	advanced	as	a	combination	of	empirical	observation	and	philosophical	analysis.	Friendship	contradicts	several	of	our	assumptions	about	how	public	culture	works.	Friendship	is	traditionally	seen	as	a	relationship	that,	for	the	most	part,	occurs	outside	of	public	view.	However,	this	is	a	fiction	generated	by	structural	understandings	of	friendship.	According	to	Thoreau,	friendship	comes	into	existence	by	virtue	of	our	daily	engagement	with	strangers,	some	who	will	be	imagined	and	realized	as	friends	by	their	naming.	In	other	words,	friendship	is	a	counterpublic	that	exposes	the	contradiction	of	the	standard	public	sphere	literature	that	characterizes	strangerhood	and	intimacy	as	opposed	(see	Warner,	2002).		 Thoreau’s	analysis	of	friendship	consists	of	his	“Wednesday”	chapter	in	A	
Week	and	must	be	placed	in	the	context	of	what	Thoreau	reported	for	that	day.	In	that	chapter,	Thoreau	engaged	in	a	mixture	of	empirical	description	and	digression.	It	was	a	day	in	which	Thoreau	and	his	brother	were	rowing	up	the	Merrimack	River.	In	the	context	of	a	travel	narrative,	the	digressions	could	be	interpreted	as	Thoreau’s	musings	that	were	occurring	to	him	during	the	rowing,	floating,	sailing,	and	walking	that	was	being	narrated	in	exquisite	detail.	Thoreau	noticed	that	there	were	some	islands	in	the	river	that	were	not	there	previously.	In	addition,	near	a	spectacular	waterfall,	Thoreau	noticed	various	holes	in	the	bedrock.	Finally,	he	recalled	a	relationship	between	two	men	who	lived	in	the	area	that	he	had	read	about	in	the	local	annals.	All	three	of	these	observations	are	important	opportunities	to	describe	Thoreau’s	theoretical	understanding	of	friendship.		 As	William	Rossi	(2010,	p.	121)	has	observed,	river	islands	became	Thoreau’s	metaphor	to	describe	friendship,	highlighting	the	difference	between	processual	and	structural	orientations	toward	friendship.	During	their	river	trip,	John	and	Henry	noticed	that	there	were	a	number	of	islands	that	periodically	formed	at	river	confluences.	These	islands,	when	compared	to	Thoreau’s	memory	of	his	previous	encounter	with	the	area,	were	ephemeral.	The	existence	of	these	islands	results	from	a	calming	of	the	river	water	in	specific	places,	and	the	depositing	of	river	sediment	in	those	calm	places.	The	islands	are	simply	an	incidental	and	evanescent	structural	effect	of	friendship	between	rivers,	and	the	appearance	and	location	of	that	friendship	changes	over	time.		 In	addition	to	a	consideration	of	river	islands	as	a	metaphor,	“Wednesday”	also	discussed	the	formation	of	a	curious	geological	phenomenon	near	the	river’s	waterfalls.	While	the	two	brothers	were	at	a	waterfall,	they	noticed	that	there	were	holes	that	had	been	carved	out	of	solid	bedrock.	Thoreau	reported	the	silly	conclusion	that	the	English	arrived	at	to	explain	the	existence	of	these	holes:	they		
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thought	that	these	holes	were	artificially	carved	by	the	natives	to	hide	provisions	from	invaders.	Native	Americans	did	not	produce	these	holes.	Instead,	they	were	produced	by	large	river	stones	that	had	been	caught	in	specific	water	currents,	and	were	forced	to	spin	in	place	for	enough	millennia	to	carve	holes	into	the	bedrock.	These	stones,	which	Thoreau	thought	were	perhaps	serving	endless	penance	for	past	sins,	demonstrate	Thoreau’s	open-ended	reframing	of	friendship	as	a	process.	I	see	two	ways	to	interpret	this	description	and	tracing	of	the	holes	in	the	river,	one	of	which	arrives	at	Thoreau’s	understanding	of	friendship.	In	one	reading,	there	is	something	in	common	in	each	of	the	relationships	that	exist	in	Thoreau’s	description:	between	the	(1)	water	currents,	(2)	the	river	stones,	(3)	the	bedrock,	and	(4)	the	Native	Americans.	In	another	reading,	the	relationships	that	exist	in	Thoreau’s	description	depict	relationships	that	involve	apparent	disparities.	Misunderstanding	the	process	of	how	these	holes	were	formed	amounts	to	an	understanding	of	friendship	as	a	relationship	between	self-sufficient	individuals.	Only	one	of	these	readings	agrees	with	the	perpetual	aspect	of	friendship	that	Thoreau	advanced.	In	the	first	reading	of	the	river	holes,	Thoreau	was	able	to	discuss	the	ephemeral	moment	of	friendship	caught	in	a	stabilized	pattern	of	repetition	that	showcases	its	timeless	features.	Although	there	is	apparently	none	of	the	parity	of	friendship	between	the	stone	and	the	bedrock,	the	stone	grinds	away	at	the	bedrock.	As	Thoreau	wrote,	“As	if	by	force	of	example	and	sympathy	after	so	many	lessons,	the	rocks,	the	hardest	material,	had	been	endeavoring	to	whirl	or	flow	into	the	forms	of	the	most	fluid”	(1985,	p.	202).	The	stones	were	spinning	because	they	had	inherited	a	pattern	of	motion	from	the	water	currents,	and	were	passing	that	lesson	to	the	bedrock.	The	giving	that	occurs	in	friendship	is	displayed	here	surviving	the	relationship	between	the	river	stones	and	the	river	itself,	creating	a	hole	in	the	bedrock	that	the	Native	Americans	used	for	themselves	for	their	own	purposes.	In	this	sense,	the	river	gave	the	stones	a	flowing	motion,	and	the	stones	gave	the	bedrock	a	spinning	motion,	and	the	bedrock	gave	the	natives	holes	in	which	to	hide	their	provisions.	In	return,	the	water	was	given	a	path	in	which	to	flow	to	the	ocean,	the	bedrock	ground	the	stones	to	sediment	(which	were	the	material	of	the	river	islands),	and	the	Natives	gave	a	special	reverence	to	the	river.	This	giving	and	receiving	never	ends,	and	at	the	same	time,	the	parties	to	the	relationship	are	changed	in	the	encounters.		 In	the	second	reading	of	the	river	holes,	Thoreau	found	a	way	to	respond	to	a	structural	understanding	of	friendship	that	he	was	attempting	to	correct.	The	stone	spins	in	the	water,	grinding	itself	away	against	the	bedrock.	That	spinning	produces	a	hole,	an	absence,	and	that	hole	becomes	deeper	and	more	difficult	to	escape	the	longer	the	stone	performs	its	penance.	The	only	fortuitous	effect	of	this	phenomenon	is	that	others	will	be	able	to	take	advantage	of	the	hole,	and	others	will	misunderstand	how	that	hole	was	formed.	Many	relationships,	Thoreau	warns,	are	nothing	more	than	a	trap	in	which	someone	feels	that	their	daily	work	is	to	inscribe	their	message	of	penance	into	the	earth.	So	be	it,	but	the	hole	enlarges	the	more	the	stone	invests.	Such	stones	are	either	worn	away	by	eons	of	spinning,	are	freed	by	a	chance	flood,	or	reach	low	enough	in	their	holes	that	they	fall	through	the	bottom	of	
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the	bedrock,	disappear	into	oblivion,	and	cause	the	river	to	leak	“through	in	anticipation	of	the	fall”	(p.	202).		In	“Wednesday,”	Thoreau	was	describing	two	different	understandings	of	friendship.	One	of	these	understandings	is	advanced	by	the	English	explorers.	To	the	English,	the	Native	Americans	were	using	the	river	for	their	own	purposes,	learning	nothing	from	the	lessons	of	nature.	In	this	framework	of	friendship	between	the	river	and	the	natives,	the	two	parties	provide	goods	to	each	other,	and	part	ways	when	their	period	of	friendship	ends.	The	two	parties	only	use	each	other	to	appropriate	their	virtue,	producing	the	requisite	giving	and	receiving	that	constitutes	the	process	of	friendship.	In	this	framework,	the	form	of	the	hole	was	invented	by	the	Native	Americans.	The	Native	Americans	produced	a	void	in	the	riverbed	in	exchange	for	its	life-giving	water.	However,	this	framework	ignores	the	chain	of	inheritance	that	links	together	the	water,	the	stones,	the	bedrock,	and	the	Native	Americans.	The	forms	that	are	given	at	each	stage	of	this	inheritance	again	reveal	that	friendship	is	a	“perpetual	and	all-embracing	service”	that	does	not	end	at	the	boundaries	of	a	singular	friendship	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	217	as	quoted	by	Crosswhite,	2010,	p.	168).	The	hiding	place	that	the	Native	Americans	found	exists	because	of	the	friendship	between	the	water	and	the	river	stones,	and	between	the	river	stones	and	the	bedrock.	The	giving	outlasts	particular	friendships	because	friendship	is	giving	and	receiving,	and	not	the	relations	between	water	and	stone,	or	between	stone	and	bedrock,	or	between	hole	and	human.	Friendships,	like	river	islands	(Rossi,	2010,	p.	121),	are	the	movements	of	the	sediment	of	other	friendships,	which	will	be	passed	on…		 Besides	islands	and	river	stones,	Thoreau	described	a	real	friendship	in	what	has	been	a	thoroughly	abstract	and	metaphorical	treatment	of	friendship.	This	real	friendship	existed	between	a	white	man	and	a	Native	American:	Wawatam,	a	Chief	of	a	tribe	of	Odawa	Native	Americans,	and	Andrew	Henry,	a	fur-trader	(Little	Traverse	Bay	Bands	of	Odawa	Indians,	2014;	National	Park	Service,	n.d.).	This	“almost	bare	and	leafless”	friendship	began	after	one	of	Wawatam’s	vision	quests,	which	involved	“fast,	solitude,	and	mortification	of	body”	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	223).	In	Wawatam’s	vision,	he	saw	a	white	brother	and	decided	to	adopt	him.	After	his	vision,	Wawatam	came	to	the	white	man’s	lodge,	told	Henry	about	his	vision,	and	decided	that	the	two	men	should	be	brothers.	They	“buried	the	hatchet,”	and	they	made	plans	to	“hunt	and	feast	and	make	maple-sugar	together”	(p.	223).	At	length,	Wawatam	repaid	his	material	debt	of	hospitality	to	Henry	through	his	tribe,	and	the	two	were	durable	friends.	Their	friendship	appeared	to	endure	beyond	their	last	meeting,	even	as	Henry	had	to	flee	other	Native	Americans	who	wished	to	kill	him.	As	Henry	departed,	Wawatam	gave	a	heartfelt	speech	to	his	tribe,	and	continued	to	speak	even	after	Henry’s	boat	was	out	of	earshot.		 The	significance	of	the	Wawatam-Henry	friendship	consists	of	the	two	men’s	perception	of	honor	even	in	the	face	of	an	exceedingly	basic	relationship.	Theirs	was	a	friendship	that	consisted	of	the	exchange	of	material	goods,	and	there	was	very	little,	but	still	significant,	mutual	ascendancy	toward	virtue	achieved	between	the	two	men.	However,	Thoreau’s	point	in	telling	this	story	is	not	only	to	show	that	friends	are	strangers	before	they	are	named	(a	point	that	I	will	return	to),	but	also	to		
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make	the	distinction	between	friendships	as	they	exist,	and	friendships	as	they	are	imagined.	For	Thoreau,	“Friendship	is	not	so	kind	as	is	imagined”	(p.	224).	It	was	not	the	setting	aside	of	differences	and	the	sharing	of	provisions	that	impressed	Thoreau.	Instead,	Thoreau	took	the	story	as	an	opportunity	to	describe	how	friendship	can	behave	with	“a	certain	disregard	for	men	and	their	erections,	the	Christian	duties	and	humanities,	while	it	purifies	the	air	like	electricity.”	(p.	224).	This	is	why	Thoreau	concluded	that	the	dissolution	of	a	friendship	comes	from	“unworthiness”	rather	than	a	disparity	of	deeds	or	even	physical	departure	(p.	216,	p.	226).	For	Thoreau,	there	are	perhaps	no	individuals	who	are	actually	worthy	of	being	“true	and	lasting”	friends	(p.	226).	Actual	worthiness	is	less	important	than	felt	worthiness.	To	explain	why	perception	and	actuality	are	two	different	things	in	friendship,	Thoreau	compared	friendship	to	a	scientific	illusion	of	intuition	that	is	still	well	known	in	physics,	which	he	called	the	hydrostatic	paradox	(p.	221).	The	hydrostatic	paradox	is	an	intuitive	bias	discovered	by	Blaise	Pascal;	living	in	the	17th	century,	Pascal	made	a	number	of	scientific	and	theological	insights,	including	a	hydrostatic	principle	that	science	has	named	Pascal’s	law	(Acott,	1999).	According	to	Pascal’s	law,	in	a	fluid,	a	change	of	pressure	at	one	point	in	the	fluid	will	be	transmitted	to	all	points	in	the	fluid.	Figure	1	is	a	scientifically	sound	illustration	of	two	of	“Pascal’s	vases.”			
				The	illustration	appears	to	be	wrong	because	the	human	mind	habitually	does	not	expect	the	liquid	to	be	where	it	is	represented.	If	we	pretend	that	the	two	vases	are	separate	containers,	“the	fluids	in	the	two	containers	exert	the	same	downward	force	on	their	respective	bases,	and	yet	the	containers	clearly	have	different	weights”	(Walker,	1998,	p.	378).	We	expect	the	liquid	to	move	to	the	left	and	overflow	the	smaller	cylinder.	However,	since	the	two	vases	are	connected	at	their	bases,	the	level	of	the	liquid	is	appropriately	equal	on	both	sides	of	the	vessel.	The	mind	is	tempted	to	conflate	volume	and	pressure,	trapped	by	the	intuition	that	weights	need	to	be	equal.		
Figure	1:	Pascal's	Vases	
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	 The	difference	between	perception	and	actuality	in	the	context	of	friendship	carries	psychological	significance	for	the	parties	involved	that	becomes	salient	when	they	are	aggrieved.	Since	friendship	is	the	giving	and	the	receiving,	and	not	the	status	of	our	relationship	with	our	friends,	it	is	inevitable	that	our	friends	are	going	to	change	in	ways	that	are	outside	of	our	control,	both	in	their	identities,	relation	to	ourselves,	and	their	presence/absence	(Crosswhite,	2010).	After	a	friendship,	there	is	perhaps	always	going	to	be	a	perception	of	our	unworthiness,	which	Thoreau	defined	as	“the	intensity	of	our	grief,	.	.	.	our	atonement,	[which]	measures	the	degree	by	which	this	is	separated	from	an	actual	unworthiness”	(1985,	p.	242).	This	is	why	it	is	possible	for	people	to	feel	immense	amounts	of	grief	for	seemingly	insignificant	relationships	after	the	process	ends,	and	why	grief	never	truly	ends.	For	Thoreau,	since	friendship	occurs	before	it	is	named,	grief	only	becomes	salient	after	the	fact.	The	grief	that	people	feel	is	a	manifestation	of	the	difference	between	the	perception	and	actuality	of	our	worthiness	to	be	party	to	a	specific	friendship.	Finally,	because	everyone’s	grief	is	different,	not	everyone	is	equally	affected	by	the	hydrostatic	paradox.	The	more	one	becomes	familiar	with	the	principles	of	hydrostatics,	the	more	one’s	intuitions	are	brought	in	alignment	with	the	behavior	of	fluid	in	Pascal’s	vases.		 There	is	another	level	of	the	experience	of	grief	that	goes	beyond	the	difference	between	perception	and	actuality	with	respect	to	friendship	worthiness.	This	implication	of	grief	is	linked	to	Thoreau’s	understanding	of	melancholia.	Desire	can	be	imagined	with	reference	to	the	above	illustration	of	Pascal’s	vases.	Add	some	liquid	to	one	side	of	the	apparatus,	and	the	liquid	will	flow	to	the	other	side	and	achieve	equilibrium.	On	the	other	hand,	the	negative	side	of	desire	is	melancholia,	a	plug	in	the	plumbing	of	the	vases,	which	produces	its	own	depressive	effects.	For	Thoreau,	a	state	of	melancholia	is	one	in	which	“One	involuntarily	rests	on	his	oar,	to	humor	his	unusually	meditative	mood”	(p.	63).	In	this	mood,	animals	are	startled	and	are	in	a	state	of	disease.	Thoreau’s	description	of	this	discomfort	is	of	a	shaded	side	of	a	person,	the	side	that	faces	away	from	the	light.	Thoreau	wrote,	“This	is	his	grief”	(p.	286).	It	should	be	like	our	shadow,	but	since	it	has	been	demetaphorized,	it	
is	our	shadow,	always	there,	restricting	our	view	of	whatever	falls	in	the	shade.	At	its	most	intense,	it	achieves	orbit,	functioning	like	the	“moon	eclipsed”	(p.	286).	The	treatment	is	to	“preserve	ourselves	untarnished”	so	that	the	divine	light	will	return	the	shaded	objects	to	illumination	(p.	287;	see	also	Arsić,	2016).		
	 Discussion		 So,	who	are	our	friends?	Thoreau’s	argument,	that	friendship	occurs	before	it	is	named,	has	public	implications	that	go	beyond	relationships	between	people	who	are	thought	of	as	friends.	The	relationships	that	Thoreau	had	in	mind,	including	the	relationships	between	strangers,	were	just	as	important	to	him	as	the	relationships	between	friends	who	have	named	each	other.	The	following	stanza,	taken	from	A	
Week’s	“Wednesday”	chapter,	sings	this	belief:		 No	warder	at	the	gate		 Can	let	the	friendly	in,		 But,	like	the	sun,	o’er	all		 	
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He	will	the	castle	win,		 And	shine	along	the	wall.	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	235)	We	cannot	know	the	difference	between	a	stranger	and	a	friend	until	friendship	has	been	established	by	name.	This	has	implications	for	public	sphere	theory	concerning	counterpublics.		Thoreau’s	address	to	his	possible	friends	is	a	counterpublic.	Since	Thoreau’s	address	to	possible	friends	was	an	address	to	strangers,	friendship	for	Thoreau	is	a	relationship	that	is	imagined	(p.	224).	According	to	Michael	Warner,	publics	(and	some	counterpublics)	are	invoked	merely	through	attention	to	circulating	texts	or	address	and	are	“embedded	in	the	background	and	self-understanding	of	its	participants	in	order	to	work”	(2002,	p.	9).	This	is	a	controversial	claim,	according	to	Warner,	because	we	tend	to	think	of	the	public	as	having	a	non-contingent	existence,	like	an	office	park,	that	does	not	depend	at	all	on	the	imaginative	powers	of	people	who	merely	pay	attention	to	an	act	of	communication.	However,	as	Warner	argued,	this	is	an	important	fiction	that	we	ignore	when	we	engage	in	public	interaction,	and	this	fiction	becomes	most	salient	when	we	consider	counterpublics.		 Thoreau’s	counterpublic	address	to	those	who	might	turn	out	to	be	his	friends	exposed	him	to	hostility.	As	Warner	warned,	because	counterpublics	and	publics	theoretically	speak	to	the	same	pool	of	strangers	(p.	120,	p.	122)	counterpublics	risk	estrangement	and	hostility	from	the	public	to	which	their	participants	must	speak	(p.	122,	p.	130).	However,	it	is	not	necessarily	the	counterpublic	that	instigates	this	hostility.	The	hostility	that	earns	counterpublics	its	‘counter’-ness	is	sometimes	a	hostility	originating	from	the	imagined	community	of	strangers.	As	Warner	admitted,	“Counterpublics	are	‘counter’	to	the	extent	that	they	try	to	supply	different	ways	of	imagining	stranger	sociability	and	its	reflexivity”	(pp.	121-122).	It	is	important	to	remember	that	being	different	from	‘normal’	publics	does	not	necessarily	mean	‘counter,’	unless	of	course	one	gives	identity	priority	over	difference,	as	Hegel	did	(Hardt,	1993).	Warner	openly	relied	on	Hegel	as	a	framework	for	interpreting	his	conclusions	about	opposition	and	negation	(1992),	and	so	it	is	easy	to	see	him	concluding	that	aberrant	examples	of	publics	that	ignore	the	standard	framework	for	public	engagement	are	branded	as	counterpublics.	However,	my	disagreement	with	Warner	over	the	assumed	primacy	of	identity	does	not	discount	the	reality	that	Thoreau	realized	his	risk	of	estrangement	from	the	public	sphere	because	he	publicly	abandoned	the	opposition	between	strangerhood	and	intimacy.	Heteronormative	culture	is	invested	in	maintaining	this	opposition	between	strangerhood	and	intimacy	(Warner,	2002).		 Friendship	was	an	important	topic	for	Thoreau	for	two	reasons:	Emerson	and	John.	In	one	way,	Thoreau’s	analysis	of	friendship	was	a	response	to	Emerson’s	“Friendship”	and	a	public	grieving	of	their	decaying	relationship;	their	personal	relationship	was	certainly	not	to	be	lauded	as	an	example	of	Thoreau’s	friendship,	and	it	may	have	been	Thoreau’s	way	of	expressing	his	understanding	of	its	immanent	denouement	(Hodder,	2010,	p.	137).	In	another	way,	Thoreau’s	relationship	with	his	late	brother	epitomized	Thoreau’s	understanding	of	friendship.	To	Thoreau,	John	was	a	Representative	Man	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	198),	a	mountain	(Thoreau,	1843a,	p.	31),	and	a	loss	that	deserved	to	be	written	about	as		
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his	first	full-length	book.	The	loss	left	him	with	grief,	and	A	Week	was	an	attempt	to	connect	with	others	to	atone	for	that	grief.	Thoreau’s	atonement	mirrored	the	speech	that	Wawatam	gave	in	honor	of	his	brother,	Henry.	The	expression	of	honor	for	Thoreau	hinged	on	his	ability	to	preserve	the	memory	of	his	brother	in	his	audience,	and	when	it	became	evident	that	his	audience	was	unwilling	to	experience	the	depths	of	Thoreau’s	story	so	that	his	brother	may	be	forgotten,	Thoreau	was	forced	to	confront	a	poverty	of	friendship	as	he	understood	it	in	his	immediate	life.		
Thoreau’s	Counter-Monument	to	John		 Thoreau’s	first	book,	A	Week	on	the	Concord	and	Merrimack	Rivers,	was	designed	to	introduce	the	reader	to	the	two	Thoreau	brothers.	It	is	both	an	autobiography	and	a	transmission	of	the	memory	of	John	to	the	reader.	Because	Henry	and	John	are	treated	as	a	good	example	of	friendship,	it	is	impossible	for	the	reader	to	tease	apart	the	two	individuals	and	consider	them	in	isolation	from	each	other	as	self-sufficient	individuals	(Fink,	1992).	This	is	both	an	indication	of	their	closeness,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	Thoreau	had	incorporated	his	brother	into	his	identity	(Arsić,	2016).	Thoreau	needed	to	express	his	grief	for	the	loss	of	his	brother,	but	he	also	recognized	that	an	artifact	would	only	be	a	temporary	accommodation	for	the	crypt	of	his	brother.	Instead	of	building	a	monument,	Thoreau	imported	his	many	theoretical	explorations	that	he	had	made	early	in	his	writing	career	into	a	crushing	omnibus,	and	then	made	his	audience	responsible	for	remembering	and	forgetting	his	brother	on	the	“sacred	space”	of	a	represented	pastoral	America	(McGeough,	2011,	p.	i).	The	miscalculation	that	caused	his	debut	book	to	fail	was	the	fact	that	Thoreau	could	not	secure	a	readership	willing	to	participate	in	this	program	of	loss	(Fink,	1992).	Without	readers,	Thoreau	could	not	bury	his	brother	within	them.	Without	that	burial,	Thoreau	could	not	mourn	for	his	brother	in	the	nonrepresentational	manner	that	he	had	insisted	was	needed	to	maintain	one’s	grief	(Arsić,	2016).	In	this	section,	I	read	A	Week	as	a	counter-monument.	First,	I	review	the	theoretical	matter	on	counter-monuments.	The	second	step	in	this	discussion	is	to	show	how	A	Week	manifests	these	characteristics.	Finally,	I	analyze	where	Thoreau	went	awry.		
The	Character	of	Counter-Monuments	Ryan	McGeough	(2011)	established	that	there	were	significant	cultural	differences	between	Germany	and	the	United	States	regarding	the	establishment	of	counter-monuments.	In	McGeough’s	review,	counter-monuments	force	their	audiences	to	be	responsible	for	remembering.	German	counter-monuments	“attempt	to	deny	or	avoid	sacred	space”	(p.	80),	usually	through	the	selection	of	prosaic	locations	and	modes	of	display	that	serve	as	catharsis	and	camouflage.	As	a	contrast	to	this	trend,	“American	counter-monuments	embrace	the	idea	of	sacred	space,	but	contest	access	to	it”	(p.	80).	This	tendency	of	American	counter-monuments	to	embrace	and	regulate	sacred	spaces	happens	is	a	result	of	what	McGeough	described	as	a	tension	between	monuments	and	counter-monuments	that	appears	to	be	less	salient	in	German	memorializing.	As	McGeough	explained,	
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the	American	attempt	to	reconcile	multiple	perspectives	had	an	effect	of	its	own:	as	each	party	contested	the	narrative	associated	with	a	particular	monument,	additional	monuments	were	added	to	the	sacred	space	in	a	process	of	accretion	that	accumulated	monuments	in	one	sacred	space.	This	accretion	of	monuments,	according	to	McGeough,	caused	the	monuments	to	mutate	into	a	counter-monument	through	the	emergence	of	irony,	a	monument	of	monuments,	a	perspective	of	perspectives.			
The	Sacred	Space	of	A	Week	Thoreau	knew	that	to	communicate	his	fraternal	grief,	it	would	not	be	enough	to	create	a	monument	for	his	brother.	His	“Dark	Ages”	and	a	litany	of	local	examples	in	A	Week	make	it	evident	that	he	recognized	the	limitations	of	monuments.	Only	by	installing	the	memory	of	John	within	the	minds	of	his	readers	and	inducing	the	reader	to	lose	that	memory	would	Thoreau	feel	satisfied	that	his	grief	for	his	late	brother	was	adequately	transferred.	This	installation	and	loss	of	memory	required	that	he	construct	a	narrative	and	then	deconstruct	that	narrative	(see	Fink,	1992,	p.	220).	The	fact	that	Thoreau	was	grieving	for	his	brother	is	evident	in	A	Week.	Recall	that	a	person’s	grief,	in	the	context	of	A	Week,	is	the	sad	shade	that	is	felt	as	a	condition	of	melancholia	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	286)	measured	by	the	difference	between	a	person’s	actual	worthiness	to	be	a	friend	and	their	perceived	worthiness	(p.	242).	Thoreau	expressed	in	verse,	his	most	effective	and	private	emotional	outlet,	that	his	perceived	worthiness	of	being	his	brother’s	friend	was	different	from	his	actual	worthiness	(p.	133;	1843a,	p.	31).	The	efforts	of	A	Week	were	directed	at	expressing	Thoreau’s	atonement,	which	still	existed	seven	years	after	John’s	death.	The	main	orienting	theory	of	A	Week	was	Thoreau’s	“Dark	Ages”	(1843c).	“Dark	Ages”	reminded	people	that	they	are	responsible	for	historical	memory.	Thoreau	argued	that	there	are	facts	that	are	constantly	being	forgotten,	and	that	there	is	a	strong	and	fruitless	tradition	of	creating	monuments	to	forestall	the	process	of	forgetting.	According	to	Thoreau,	we	remember	the	lessons	that	were	confided	to	us	in	song	and	dance,	and	we	do	not	know	the	lesson	of	the	Egyptian	pyramids	for	this	reason.	Instead	of	building	larger	and	more	durable	memorials,	Thoreau	insisted	that	living	people	are	the	appropriate	containers	of	living	facts.	Thoreau	regarded	history,	the	practice	of	recording	history,	and	the	future	that	preservationist	historians	share	with	their	archive,	as	fated	to	a	gradual	descent	into	oblivion.	Only	a	monument	that	accepted	the	darkness	of	history—a	counter-monument—would	transmit	the	memory	of	his	brother	to	the	minds	of	his	readers.	For	most	of	us,	it	is	not	easy	to	absorb	lessons	from	a	book;	it	is	more	effective	to	remember	lessons	confided	to	us	through	practice.	Thoreau	recognized	this,	and	programmed	his	text	accordingly.	A	Week	is	much	more	than	a	kaleidoscopic	collection	of	facts	about	pastoral	America	and	his	fraternal	relationship.	The	book	is	capable	of	doing	actual	work	on	the	reader.	Every	part,	especially	the	digressions,	drives	the	practice	of	memory	transfer	and	forgetting.	Many	lines	of	quoted	poetry	were	transcribed	by	Thoreau	in	Latin	without	any	given	translation,	making	it	necessary	for	a	19th	century	reader	to	accomplish	that		
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translation	through	learning	the	language	or	by	consultation	with	an	expert,	such	as	Thoreau	himself	at	one	of	his	Lyceum	lectures.	In	addition,	the	text	does	not	cite	many	of	its	sources	(although	Thoreau	does	cite	an	abundant	number	of	them).	By	my	count,	there	were	39	specific	authors	that	Thoreau	quoted	without	attribution.	Perhaps	Thoreau	meant	for	the	names	of	these	poets	to	be	forgotten,	for	it	illustrates	an	important	lesson	for	the	reader.	The	reader	is	responsible	for	the	task	of	remembering,	and	there	are	likely	people	alive	today	that	would	be	able	to	connect	the	quoted	verses	and	the	names	of	these	individuals.	Fortunately,	I	was	able	to	use	Google’s	search	technology	to	identify	these	authors.	In	the	19th	century,	consulting	with	experts	on	poetry	or	Thoreau	himself	would	have	been	the	only	ways	to	discover	these	names.	This	demonstrates	two	things.	First,	it	shows	that	Thoreau’s	passion	went	beyond	philosophical	or	theological	texts,	as	was	Emerson’s	main	areas	of	concern.	Thoreau	was	enormously	interested	in	poetry	as	well,	and	the	unattributed	quotation	of	verse	from	these	various	poets,	like	the	discipline	of	performance	studies,	“challenges	the	disciplinary	compartmentalization	of	the	arts”	(Taylor,	2003,	p.	26).	Second,	like	un-translated	Latin,	this	list	shows	that	Thoreau	was	actively	engaging	with	his	readers	to	encourage	them	to	do	the	necessary	work	of	memorializing	and	forgetting.	Reading	and	understanding	A	Week	requires	the	cultivation	of	the	capability	of	an	archive	to	achieve	what	Diana	Taylor	has	termed	a	“system	of	transfer”	(p.	xvii).	As	Taylor	argued,	embodied	“acts	of	transfer”	are	“an	important	system	of	knowing	and	transmitting	knowledge”	(p.	26).	It	functions	in	a	fundamentally	different	way	than	“the	archive	of	supposedly	enduring	materials	(i.e.,	texts,	documents,	buildings,	bones)”	(p.	19).	Repertoires	are	competencies	built	into	the	memories	of	the	living,	and	they	lack	the	durability	that	archivists	prefer	(pp.	18-19).	It	is	no	accident	that	transferring	repertoires	to	surrogates	“work[s]	against	notions	of	easy	access,	decipherability,	and	translatability”	(p.	15).		Thoreau’s	A	Week,	at	a	textual	level	and	relatively	speaking,	is	now	easily	accessed,	deciphered,	and	translated,	but	its	mechanism	of	transmission	of	loss	is	not.	According	to	Steven	Fink,	“Thoreau	loaded	his	narrative	with	an	almost	crushing	burden	of	meditative	digressions	and	essays”	(1992,	p.	235).	In	light	of	this	unexpected	duty,	Thoreau	subtly	commented	on	his	own	writing,	setting	up	the	“scenario”	of	the	text	(Taylor,	2003,	p.	28),	giving	the	reader	riddles	on	how	to	engage.	For	example,	in	reference	to	the	“playful	wisdom”	of	the	Heetopades	of	Veeshnoo	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	119),	Thoreau	wrote:	The	story	and	fabulous	portion	of	this	book	winds	loosely	from	sentence	to	sentence	as	so	many	oases	in	a	desert,	and	is	as	indistinct	as	a	camel’s	track	between	Mourzouk	and	Darfour.	It	is	a	comment	on	the	flow	and	freshet	of	modern	books.	The	reader	leaps	from	sentence	to	sentence,	as	from	one	stepping-stone	to	another,	while	the	stream	of	the	story	rushes	past	unregarded.	.	.	.	It	is	the	characteristic	of	great	poems	that	they	will	yield	of	their	sense	in	due	proportion	to	the	hasty	and	deliberate	reader.	To	the	practical	they	will	be	common	sense,	and	to	the	wise	wisdom.	.	.	(p.	119)	In	other	words,	Thoreau	placed	an	enormous	burden	on	his	reader	to	attend	to	the	“gestures,	attitudes,	and	tones”	(Taylor,	2003,	p.	28)	in	the	“stream	of	the	story”	and		
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do	the	investigatory	footwork	necessary	to	gain	access	to	the	numerous	shadow	texts.	If	readers	did	not,	they	were	supposed	to	be	left	merely	with	“common	sense.”	For	the	wise	readers,	engaging	with	the	text,	and	going	beyond	the	text,	would	transmit	memory	to	the	reader,	who	would	then	lose	it.	Only	then	would	the	reader	approach	an	adequate	understanding	of	Thoreau’s	loss.	However,	Thoreau’s	text	is	subject	to	the	rules	of	archival	preservation	and	reproduction,	not	the	embodied	mode	of	transmission	that	Taylor	argued	makes	the	scenarios	of	repertoires	supple	in	the	hands	of	those	who	embody	them.	The	archival	status	of	A	Week	made	it	impossible	for	anyone	to	modify	Thoreau’s	specific	scenario.		 To	force	the	reader	to	choose	between	common	sense	and	wisdom,	Thoreau	deconstructed	his	own	narrative	(Fink,	1992,	p.	220),	and	it	is	the	forced	choice	that	made	his	scenario	incapable	of	embodied	modification.	The	deconstruction	was	accomplished	because	of	an	interaction	between	the	two	kinds	of	‘spaces’	in	the	text.	One	of	these	spaces	was	the	world	surrounding	the	Thoreau	brothers	on	their	river	trip.	It	consisted	of	an	exquisite	“sacralization”	of	the	surrounding	environment:	a	careful	attention	to	the	names	of	the	fish,	meticulous	descriptions	of	the	techniques	of	the	other	sailors	and	boatmen	on	the	river,	and	an	accounting	of	the	many	human	personalities	that	represented	a	deceased	pastoral	America.15	The	other	space	was	Thoreau’s	mental	world	that	unfolded	during	A	Week’s	many	digressions.	Thoreau’s	mental	world	was	set	in	many	places	and	times	in	the	past,	including	previous	sojourns	by	himself	and	with	other	companions,	and	analytical	essays	that	touched	upon	various	topics.	The	opening	chapter	of	A	Week	gave	a	preview	of	what	sights	the	traveler	would	see	during	such	a	trip.	For	example,	Thoreau	told	the	would-be	traveler,	You	shall	see	rude	and	sturdy,	experienced	and	wise	men,	keeping	their	castles,	or	teaming	up	their	summer’s	wood,	or	chopping	alone	in	the	woods,	men	fuller	of	talk	and	rare	adventure	in	the	sun	and	wind	and	rain,	than	a	chestnut	is	of	meat;	who	were	out	not	only	in	’75	and	1812,	but	have	been	out	every	day	of	their	lives;	greater	men	than	Homer,	or	Chaucer,	or	Shakespeare,	only	they	never	got	the	time	to	say	so;	they	never	took	to	the	way	of	writing.	Look	at	their	fields,	and	imagine	what	they	might	write,	if	ever	they	should	put	pen	to	paper.	Or	what	have	they	not	written	on	the	face	of	the	earth	already,	clearing,	and	burning,	and	scratching,	and	harrowing,	and	ploughing,	in	and	in,	and	out	and	out,	and	over	and	over,	again	and	again,	erasing	what	they	had	already	written	for	want	of	parchment.	(1985,	p.	9)	These	men	and	women	worked	against	the	sacredness	of	their	living	inscriptions	upon	the	earth.	When	Thoreau	turns	the	attention	of	the	reader	away	from	the	conventional	travel	narrative	in	his	digressions,	he	demonstrates	nature’s																																																									15	McGeough	has	reported	that	the	process	of	“sight	sacralization”	consists	of	five	steps:	(1)	naming,	(2)	framing	and	elevation,	(3)	enshrinement,	(4)	mechanical	reproduction,	and	(5)	social	reproduction	(2011,	pp.	48-49).	Reading	the	portions	of	
A	Week	that	involve	travel	narrative	proceeds	through	these	stages.	Thoreau’s	mental	space—his	digressions—worked	against	the	sacredness	of	the	travel	narrative.		
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indifference	to	the	losses	that	are	sustained	in	these	environments.	The	travel	narrative	is	no	safe	space,	and	everything	in	it	is	at	risk	of	disappearing	within	the	mind	of	the	reader.	In	fact,	as	Thoreau	admitted	in	the	text,	it	was	already	gone	at	the	time	the	book	was	published.	“Books	of	natural	history”	are	of	no	help	either,	as	Thoreau	pointed	out,	for	they	“aim	commonly	to	be	hasty	schedules,	or	inventories	of	God’s	property,	by	some	clerk”	(p.	79).	Constructing	and	then	deconstructing	Thoreau’s	narrative	in	A	Week	had	the	effect	of	burying	John	and	the	sacred	space	of	pastoral	America	under	the	story’s	immense	edifice,	installed	within	the	mind	of	the	reader.	The	prose	is	dense,	without	reprieve.	Every	detail	is	a	potentially	significant	facet	to	be	juxtaposed	with	something	in	the	next	or	the	previous	digression,	and	the	reader’s	memory	becomes	laden	with	a	growing	inventory	of	archival	data.	In	addition,	Thoreau’s	own	poetry	is	enigmatic,	and	cannot	be	set-aside	without	sacrificing	a	significant	part	of	the	story.	As	a	result,	the	reading	of	the	text	slows	to	a	crawl,	the	reader’s	memory	begins	to	leak	through	like	the	river,	and	the	reader,	perhaps	if	he	or	she	notices	this	process	of	loss,	understands	that	Thoreau	had	meant	for	this	to	happen.	This	is	the	same	situation	that	Thoreau	described	in	his	metaphor	of	ancient	history	as	a	“picture	on	the	wall”	(1985,	p.	125;	1843c,	p.	528),	describing	the	comments	made	by	observers	of	history	concerning	what	is	behind	that	picture.	Just	like	Walter	Benjamin’s	“Angelus	Novus,”	it	is	the	result	of	“one	single	catastrophe	which	keeps	piling	wreckage	upon	wreckage	and	hurls	it	in	front	of	his	feet”	(1968,	p.	257).	Thoreau	was	burying	his	brother	in	the	minds	of	his	readers,	trying	to	induce	grief.		 The	act	of	transfer	that	A	Week	attempts	to	accomplish	is	necessarily	paradoxical.	For	Thoreau’s	technique	to	work	on	an	audience,	it	must	both	construct	a	legitimate	historical	narrative,	and	then	undermine	it	(Fink,	1992).	In	theory,	Thoreau	accomplished	those	two	tasks.	As	Steven	Fink	pointed	out,	Thoreau	“charts	his	route	with	geographic	precision,	identifying	each	village,	each	tributary,	each	lock;	he	observes	local	commerce	and	agriculture”	(p.	221).	Thoreau	also	went	beyond	these	observations,	taking	note	of	the	changes	that	have	occurred	to	these	marks	upon	the	landscape	over	time.	Then,	“Thoreau	undermines	this	conventional	historical	perspective	by	asserting	nature’s	indifferences	to	such	changes”	(p.	220).	
A	Week	“ultimately	turns	on	itself,	achieving	its	ends	by	undermining	its	means—not	only	an	excursion	that	undermines	the	value	of	travel	but	finally	a	book	in	which	language	itself	must	give	way	to	a	higher	silence”	(p.	220).		 There	is	no	surviving	effigy	in	A	Week	for	John.	Thoreau	went	to	painstaking	steps	to	describe	him	in	a	context	that	seems	to	be	as	sacred	as	his	late	brother.	However,	to	force	the	reader	of	A	Week	to	absorb	and	lose	a	memory	of	him,	Thoreau	incorporated	a	complex	system	of	digressions	into	a	narrow	thread	of	a	travel	narrative.	This	system	worked	to	overburden	the	memory	of	the	reader	and	transferred	a	lesson	to	the	reader	regarding	the	necessity	of	forgetting.	No	durable	monument	could	accomplish	that	task.	Only	by	developing	the	reader’s	repertoire	of	memory	and	forgetting	would	they	understand	Thoreau’s	need	to	assuage	the	intensity	of	his	grief,	which	is	what	mourning	is	all	about:	preserving	himself	untarnished	and	recruiting	an	audience	to	help	him	along	the	endless	process	of	equalizing	his	actual	and	perceived	unworthiness	of	having	been	John’s	friend.		
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	 A	Week’s	Ironic	Oversight		 In	practice,	the	system	of	transfer	that	Thoreau	attempted	to	accomplish	was	a	failure.	This	is	most	salient	in	the	context	of	A	Week’s	relationship	with	his	audience.	As	Lloyd	Bitzer	argued,	the	success	of	any	rhetorical	action	turns	on	the	audience	as	the	mediator	of	change	(1968).	The	change	that	Thoreau	asked	of	his	audience	was	nothing	less	than	the	willingness	to	endure	the	grueling	process	of	attempting	to	construct	a	travel	narrative	and	follow	him	through	a	maze	of	digressions	that	deconstructed	that	narrative	(Fink,	1992).	Much	of	Thoreau’s	audience	was	unwilling	to	follow	him	for	two	reasons.	First,	Thoreau’s	marketing	strategy	for	his	book,	ironically,	failed	to	account	for	the	complexities	of	the	publishing	industry	as	a	legitimate	ecological	system	of	nature.	Second,	for	many	of	the	individuals	who	did	answer	his	call	to	read,	the	reading	experience	proved	to	be	too	uncomfortable	and	taxing	(pp.	241-242).	Furthermore,	the	scenario	for	experiencing	the	trip	and	losing	that	memory	was	inflexible	due	to	its	archival	nature	(Taylor,	2003).	This	left	a	few	of	Thoreau’s	friends	who	understood	his	project	(Fink,	1992,	p.	242)	and	were	willing	to	follow	the	scenario	that	he	had	arranged	for	the	reading	experience.	However,	this	number	was	far	less	than	the	thousand-copy	print	run	for	which	Thoreau	contracted.		 Thoreau’s	inattention	to	an	important	relationship	with	nature,	which	would	develop	years	later,	was	an	ironic	testament	to	his	blindness	to	the	impending	failure	of	A	Week.	This	blindness	can	be	seen	within	the	story,	outside	of	the	story,	and	at	the	interface	between	the	inside	and	the	outside.	Internally,	A	Week’s	most	ironic	oversight	was	Thoreau’s	unwillingness	to	engage	with	works	of	human	artifice	as	legitimate	natural	constructions.	Today,	one	of	Thoreau’s	most	important	contributions	to	ecology	was	his	rejection	of	the	nature-human	divide.	However,	in	1849,	this	divide	was	very	much	intact	in	his	thinking.	As	Burke’s	theory	of	irony	shows,	irony	culminates	in	a	“comic	frame”	that	makes	audiences	self-critical,	and	it	requires	an	element	of	humility	(1937/1984b).	That	humility	was	missing	in	Thoreau’s	text.	In	A	Week,	Thoreau’s	absence	of	humility	can	be	seen	in	two	ways.	The	first	manifestation	of	Thoreau’s	confident	unawareness	can	be	seen	through	a	comparison	of	his	theory	of	friendship	and	his	practices	of	friendship	with	nature,	or	partial	lack	thereof.	The	second	way	that	Thoreau	refused	to	countenance	humility	was	through	the	rescue	of	a	missing	specimen	of	fruit.		 Thoreau’s	meditation	on	friendship	should	have	made	him	receptive	to	friendship	with	inanimate	objects	in	nature,	but	his	theoretical	stance	at	this	time	was	qualified.	The	allegorical	reading	of	the	transient	river	islands	and	the	spinning	rocks	underneath	the	waterfalls	brings	the	relationship	of	friendship	into	close	proximity	with	things	that	are	not	people,	nor	are	these	allegorical	examples	biologically	alive.	This	raises	the	question:	why	did	Thoreau	prejudice	the	case	of	friendship	against	“mere	wood	and	stone”	(1985,	p.	218)?	The	theoretical	answer	to	that	question	is	that	he	was	merely	following	Aristotle,	who	argued	that	one	does	not	share	friendship	with	inanimate	objects	(e.g.,	wine;	Crosswhite,	2010).		The	fact	that	A	Week	did	not	countenance	friendship	with	inanimate	objects	is	most	evident	when	Thoreau	discussed	the	Billerica	Dam.	His	description	of	this	
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artificial	feature	was	fetishized	and	idolized.	As	my	analysis	of	Thoreau’s	theory	of	friendship	shows,	it	is	important	that	friends	perceive	themselves	to	be	equal.		There	are	three	different	ways	to	engage	with	things.	These	ways	have	been	assessed	in	detail	by	W.	J.	T.	Mitchell	(2005)	and	Diana	Taylor	(2003).	Mitchell	argued	that	these	three	different	“relations	to	things”	(p.	188)	are	identified	by	the	type-name	that	is	often	given	to	them:	fetish,	idol,	and	totem.	The	difference	between	these	types	of	object-relations	can	only	be	assessed	by	inquiring	“into	what	it	says	and	does,	what	rituals	and	myths	circulate	around	it”	(p.	189).	A	fetish	is	an	object	that	is	evaluated	as	inferior,	and	the	subordination	“seems	deeply	linked	with	trauma”	(p.	192),	frustration,16	privacy,	and	colonialism.	An	idol	is	an	object	that	is	evaluated	as	superior,	and	the	superordination	is	linked	with	iconoclasm,	the	norms	of	language	and	theater,	authority,	and	the	“‘received	systems’	of	philosophy”	(p.	189).	Finally,	a	totem	is	an	object	that	is	evaluated	as	equal,	and	the	kinship	is	linked	with	friendship,	tribal	identity,	monuments,	and	ritual	scapegoating.17	Diana	Taylor	extended	this	analysis.	She	showed	that	two	of	these	categories,	the	idol	and	the	fetish,	are	strategically	used	by	critics	to	delegitimate	the	object-relations	of	others.18	However,	as	soon	as	this	practice	of	delegitimation	reaches	to	destroy	the	‘fetish’	or	the	‘idol,’	a	new	object	is	created	out	of	the	fragments	(Taylor,	2003);	for	Mitchell,	this	is	the	great	irony	of	iconoclasm.	The	Billerica	Dam	is	artificial,	and	Thoreau	used	this	constructedness	as	a	means	to	delegitimate	the	dam	through	an	abuse	of	both	fetishism	and	idolatry.	Thoreau’s	descriptions	made	it	clear	that	the	dam	had	caused	an	enormous	amount	of	ecological	harm.	In	Thoreau’s	discussion	of	the	fish	migration	patterns	disrupted	by	the	dam,	he	suggested	that	it	was	inevitable	that	some	greater	friend	of	the	fish	would	take	a	crowbar	and	smash	the	dam.	This	is	iconoclasm,	and	it	doesn’t	acknowledge	the	reality	that	the	dam	was	responsible	for	Henry	and	John’s	convenient	passage	through	the	locks.	In	addition,	in	Thoreau’s	discussion	of	the	then-recent	floods	affecting	the	farmers,	his	attention	to	the	discovery	of	the	cause	of	the	flooding	is	particularly	telling:	“speedy	emissaries	revealed	the	unnatural	secret,	in	the	new	float-board,	wholly	a	foot	in	width,	added	to	their	already	too	high	privileges	by	the	dam	proprietors”	(1985,	p.	32).	This	is	strategic	fetishism	in	Thoreau’s	denaturing	of	the	float-board	through	a	reduction	of	the	board	to	simple	economic	greed.	Interestingly,	Thoreau	did	not	subject	the	canal	locks	to	this	level	of																																																									16	W.	J.	T.	Mitchell	associated	the	fetish	with	what	he	called	‘desire.’	However,	since	Mitchell	defined	desire	as	a	lack	(“in	the	gap	between	demand	.	.	.	and	need”;	2005,	p.	73),	I	have	adjusted	Mitchell’s	terminology	to	reflect	my	evaluation	of	how	Mitchell	would	respond	to	my	framework.	17	The	term	“scapegoating”	has	connotations	of	pathological	illness.	However,	as	Kenneth	Burke	argued,	there	is	a	distinction	between	ritual	scapegoating	and	pathological	scapegoating.	Ritual	scapegoating	involves	a	ritual	in	which	some	of	the	sins	of	the	group	are	transferred	to	the	scapegoat	before	sacrifice.	Pathological	scapegoating	involves	a	spontaneous	blaming	of	a	scapegoat	for	all	of	the	group’s	problems	(Burke,	1941).		18	W.	J.	T.	Mitchell	(2005)	restricted	this	practice	of	delegitimation	to	the	iconoclasts.		
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attack.	The	description	of	the	canal	locks	occurs	only	once	in	the	text.	For	Thoreau,	“These	old	gray	structures,	with	their	quiet	arms	stretched	over	the	river	in	the	sun,	appeared	like	natural	objects	in	the	scenery,	and	the	kingfisher	and	sandpiper	alighted	on	them	as	readily	as	on	stakes	or	rocks”	(p.	194).	The	shunting	of	the	dam	and	its	float-board	into	the	categories	of	idol	and	fetish	is	clear	evidence	of	Thoreau’s	failure	to	recognize	the	possibility	of	friendship	with	nature	in	1849.	This	lack	of	humility	occurred	because	Thoreau	could	have	had	a	relationship	of	giving	and	receiving	insights	about	nature	with	the	dam,	as	destructive	as	it	was	to	the	local	residents.	Alternatively,	Thoreau	could	have	left	his	discussion	of	the	dam	as	laconic	and	benign	as	his	description	of	the	locks.	The	closest	that	Thoreau	came	to	experiencing	folly	inside	A	Week	was	when	the	two	brothers	almost	lost	fruit	that	they	were	preparing	to	enjoy.	Toward	the	end	of	“Wednesday,”	the	two	brothers	were	setting	up	camp.	They	unpacked	their	prize	melon	that	had	been	in	the	boat	from	the	beginning	of	their	voyage.	It	was	warm,	and	so	they	placed	it	in	the	cool	water	at	the	river’s	edge.	After	they	finished	pitching	the	tent	and	returned	to	the	boat,	the	melon	was	gone.	The	two	brothers	rushed	onto	the	boat	and	frantically	rowed	down	the	river	in	pursuit	of	their	fruit.	Eventually,	in	the	failing	light,	they	were	just	able	to	find	it.	There	was	no	further	mention	of	the	episode,	and	no	humility	associated	with	almost	losing	their	prized	melon.	The	Thoreau	family	was	famous	for	their	watermelon	parties	(Sullivan,	2009).		 The	internal	picture	of	A	Week’s	irony	is	just	as	clear	as	the	external	picture,	and	it	is	much	easier	to	demonstrate.	Steven	Fink	exposed	Thoreau’s	oversights	running	up	to	A	Week’s	publication.	Thoreau	made	two	external	errors	in	his	compositional	choices	and	his	marketing	decisions.	Both	of	these	mistakes	are	external	in	the	sense	of	involving	Thoreau’s	audience.	The	compositional	choice	was,	unsurprisingly,	identical	with	the	technique	of	constructing	and	deconstructing	his	travel	narrative,	and	the	marketing	decision	was	Thoreau’s	willingness	to	fund	his	own	publication	(Fink,	1992).		 The	construction	and	deconstruction	of	A	Week’s	travel	narrative	inherently	made	difficulties	for	Thoreau’s	audience.	Part	of	this	difficulty	was	the	level	of	trust	Thoreau	placed	into	the	ability	of	the	audience	to	detect	his	technique.	As	Fink	pointed	out,	large	portions	of	“Monday”	were	self-reflexive	comments	(p.	237).	However,	Thoreau	veiled	these	comments	as	references	to	other	works,	particularly	the	Bhagavad	Gita	and	the	Laws	of	Menu.	This	made	it	more	difficult	for	lay	readers	to	understand	that	Thoreau	was	referring	to	his	own	text.	Furthermore,	without	this	key,	readers	were	apt	to	be	overwhelmed	by	the	complex	juxtapositions	between	the	thin	thread	of	empirical	observations	and	the	numerous	disparate	digressions	laid	out	throughout	the	text	(p.	237).	Most	of	the	readers	were	left	with	no	compass	with	which	to	navigate	the	tributaries,	and	as	such,	the	text	appeared	merely	to	“juxtapose	the	superficial	with	the	profound,	alternating	between	the	literal	and	the	abstract,	and	so	giving	his	reader	no	real	choice	in	how	to	use	the	book”	(p.	237).		 The	problem	of	audience	access	to	the	higher	levels	of	meaning	in	A	Week	was	confirmed	empirically	by	Thoreau’s	own	readers.	While	there	were	many	positive	reviews,	a	number	of	them	took	notice	of	this	problem	of	access	and	voiced		
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their	irritation	(pp.	241-242,	pp.	250-251).	Perhaps	the	most	notable	example	of	these	review	complaints	came	from	James	Russell	Lowell,	a	contemporary	poet	of	Thoreau	who	graduated	from	Harvard	a	year	after	him	(Harding,	1982).	Lowell	is	famous	for	publishing	severe	criticism	of	Thoreau’s	writings,	belittling	him	for	being	a	copy	of	his	mentor.	With	respect	to	A	Week,	Lowell	thought	that	the	digressions,	including	Thoreau’s	semi-intimate	address	to	possible	friends,	were	inappropriate	(Lowell,	1849,	p.	47	as	discussed	by	Fink,	1992,	pp.	250-251).	Other	critical	reviewers	were	unhappy	with	Thoreau’s	transparent	pantheism,	but	by	far	the	most	complaints	were	made	against	Thoreau’s	violation	of	the	genre’s	conventions	(Fink,	1992,	p.	244,	p.	251).	Other	reviewers	were	more	accepting	of	Thoreau’s	genius	(p.	242).	Nevertheless,	there	was	no	consensus	among	the	reviewers	(p.	251).	The	sales	of	the	book	were	dismal,	and	the	75	copies	that	were	distributed	to	the	reviewers	were	provided	at	Thoreau’s	own	expense	(p.	251).	Thoreau’s	publisher	did	nothing	to	popularize	the	book,	having	no	stake	in	its	success	(p.	251).		 In	between	A	Week’s	commercial	failure	and	the	empirically	verified	inability	of	the	majority	of	its	possible	readers	to	follow	Thoreau’s	scenario,	the	most	significant	failure	of	Thoreau’s	project	in	1849	was	in	its	archival	interface	between	those	internal	and	external	mechanisms.	As	I	discussed	in	my	review	of	Taylor’s	(2003)	typology	of	archives	and	repertoires,	the	main	difference	between	the	two	forms	is	in	relation	to	the	scenario	in	which	they	are	presented	to	their	audiences	and	the	options	that	exist	for	response.	As	Taylor	argued,	repertoires	“enact	embodied	memory”	by	allowing	people	to	“participate	in	the	production	and	reproduction	of	knowledge	by	‘being	there,’	being	a	part	of	the	transmission”	(p.	2).	A	repertoire	can	change	its	scenario	from	one	performance	to	the	next,	or	it	can	change	from	one	surrogate	to	the	next.	These	alterations	to	the	scenario	can	happen	for	any	number	of	reasons,	but	the	most	salient	is	when	it	is	deemed	in	need	of	revision	to	meet	the	needs	of	local	conditions	(Roach,	1996,	pp.	28-29).	Compared	to	repertoires,	archives	have	relatively	inflexible	scenarios,	since	“what	changes	over	time	is	the	value,	relevance,	or	meaning	of	the	archive,	how	the	items	it	contains	get	interpreted,	even	embodied”	(Taylor,	2003,	p.	19).	Archives	are	selected	over	repertoires	precisely	because	they	are	“resistant	to	change”	(p.	19),	and	as	such,	the	archive	of	A	Week	reaches	us	with	the	recalcitrance	that	a	repertoire	would	not	have.	If	A	Week	were	a	repertoire,	the	memory	would	be	able	to	be	modified	in	two	important	ways.	First,	since	A	Week	did	not	adequately	account	for	the	nature	of	the	publishing	industry	(indeed,	A	Week	is	still	read	far	less	than	Walden),	embodied	transmissions	of	the	memory	of	the	Thoreau	brothers’	river	trip	could	be	made	more	appealing	through	careful	venue	and	style	choices.	Specifically,	the	seasick	readers	who	can	get	no	farther	than	common	sense	might	have	a	better	chance	of	experiencing	Thoreauvian	grief	by	witnessing	a	performance	of	A	Week	than	by	reading-to-forget.	Second,	and	perhaps	more	importantly,	because	a	repertoire	is	open	to	alteration	as	it	is	transmitted	from	one	performer	to	the	next,	those	performance	choices	would	always	be	provisional	and	open	to	further	experimentation	by	new	imaginations.	The	only	check	on	this	transmission	is	the	existence	of	a	reminder	of	what	a	repertoire	is	supposed	to	perform.	Absent	that,	there	is	no	check	on	alterations	between	surrogates.	For	Roach	(1996),	
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“discontinuities	rudely	interrupt	the	succession	of	surrogates,”	and	genealogies	have	revealed	that	any	promise	of	a	preserved	origin	is	a	political	fantasy	(p.	25).		
	 Summary		 A	Week	was	both	an	autobiography	and	a	counter-monument,	albeit	a	durable	one	that	reliably	repeats	itself.	Through	this	generic	invention,	Thoreau	violated	the	conventional	expectations	of	the	travel	narrative,	and	alienated	many	of	his	readers.	Thoreau	was	grief-stricken,	and	his	plan	to	assuage	the	intensity	of	that	grief	involved	recruiting	his	readers	to	share	in	the	experience	of	loss	in	a	process	of	construction	and	deconstruction	(Fink,	1992),	sacralization	and	desacralization	(McGeough,	2011).	This	two-stage	process	was	supposed	to	bury	Thoreau’s	brother	under	the	immense	weight	of	dozens	of	stories	of	pastoral	America,	installed	within	the	minds	of	his	readers.	Unfortunately,	Thoreau	was	asking	far	too	much	from	most	of	his	readers,	and	his	expectation	of	selling	a	thousand	copies	evinces	Thoreau’s	ironic	shortsighted	lack	of	interest	in	the	public	dynamics	of	the	publishing	industry.	Without	a	comic	frame	(Burke,	1937/1984b)	and	a	living	repertoire	that	could	stand	to	alter	Thoreau’s	scenario	(Taylor,	2003),	Thoreau’s	audience	was/is	in	jeopardy	of	not	understanding	why	the	two-stage	process	that	results	in	loss	was	or	is	necessary	or	useful.		 As	much	pain	as	this	failure	sustained	the	intensity	of	Thoreau’s	grief,	it	is	clear	that	he	needed	to	experience	what	it	is	like	to	be	an	alazon	to	understand	why	having	such	an	experience	is	important	for	himself	and	his	readers.	Thoreau	had	expectations	concerning	what	he	was	going	to	be	getting	out	of	his	relationship	with	nature	and	his	audience.	His	shortsighted	relationship	with	the	publishing	industry	shows	that	he	expected	it	to	lack	parity.	His	risky	engagement	with	the	audience	that	he	invoked	by	addressing	strangers	in	the	travel	narrative	industry	shows	that	he	did	not	expect	the	ambivalence	that	his	book	attracted.	The	next	section	shows	how	the	ensuing	years	of	Thoreau’s	life	brought	him	to	recognize	and	profit	from	his	mistakes,	to	appreciate	the	awesome	value	that	nature	held	in	store	for	him	during	his	solitary	walks	in	the	middle	of	the	night,	as	well	as	to	develop	a	blueprint	for	bringing	a	similar	experience	to	his	readers	that	did	not	invite	the	wrath	of	his	critics	or	the	apathy	of	his	readers.		
Walking	to	the	Crypt	of	Melancholia		 In	the	early	1850s,	Thoreau	was	working	on	a	lecturing	project	about	walking	(Fink,	1992).	He	had	lectured	on	the	topic	about	three	weeks	prior	to	his	experience	with	ether	(Milder,	1995).	The	themes	of	Thoreau’s	“Walking”	(1862)	included	the	nomadic	nature	of	walking,	how	it	values	the	wild,	and	what	happens	to	the	walker	during	the	process.	Thoreau’s	argument	in	“Walking”	that	I	want	to	highlight	here	is	his	notice	that	walking	forces	people	to	pay	attention	to	their	sensory	experiences,	and	those	experiences	occur	in	the	present	moment.	While	simultaneously	living	in	the	present	moment	and	not	staying	in	one	place,	not	tracking	one’s	place,	walkers	are	uniquely	suited	to	practicing	healthy	skepticism.	Thoreau’s	skepticism	is	a	mode	of	thinking	that	constantly	challenges	cultural	and	environmental	knowledge,	turning	the	experience	of	walking	into	a	powerful	and		
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simple	practice	for	anyone	to	live	with	their	surroundings	and	to	use	that	life	as	a	standard	to	assess	the	legitimacy	of	their	desires.		 In	this	section,	I	review	the	themes	embedded	in	“Walking.”	It	should	be	no	surprise	that	the	essay	is	a	complex	weaving	of	interrelated	themes.	In	my	opinion,	it	is	Thoreau’s	finest	essay,	holding	more	potential	for	political	change	than	“Resistance	to	Civil	Government.”	Once	I	have	introduced	the	topics	of	“Walking,”	I	discuss	how	the	themes	are	all	directed	toward	the	redemptive	powers	of	walking.	As	I	discussed	toward	the	end	of	Chapter	One,	Thoreau’s	breakthrough	moment	was	being	anesthetized	with	ether	(Milder,	1995).	The	psychedelic	experience	made	Thoreau	aware	of	not	only	the	possibility	of	friendship	between	himself	and	nature,	but	it	also	made	him	aware	that	his	condition	of	melancholia	invoked	a	specific	incapacity	(i.e.,	an	incapacity	to	recognize	that	he	had	metaphorically	incorporated	his	losses	into	himself).	My	purpose	of	bringing	up	“Walking”	is	ultimately	to	argue	that	the	essay’s	major	power	is	in	its	ability	to	tell	the	reader	how	to	have	a	psychedelic	experience	without	a	psychedelic	compound.	That	ability	gives	the	walker	a	profound	analogical	command	of	language,	making	melancholic	walkers	aware	of	Arsić’s	literalization	or	Abraham	and	Torok’s	demetaphorization.		
Walking:	“The	Enterprise	and	Adventure	of	the	Day”		 For	Thoreau,	walking	is	a	wild	art.	It	is	a	form	of	sauntering	which	aims	only	to	reach	the	“Holy	Land”	(1862,	p.	657)	of	“leisure,	freedom,	and	independence”	(p.	658).	This	holy	land	is	forever	elsewhere,	not	in	any	place	where	one	frequents	or	stays.	According	to	Thoreau,	“It	requires	a	direct	dispensation	from	Heaven	to	become	a	walker”	(p.	658).	Many	of	us	try	to	be	walkers,	to	follow	the	form	of	the	saunterer,	but	for	Thoreau	our	failure	to	be	“Walkers”	is	our	unpreparedness	or	faint-hearted	unwillingness	to	leave	behind	everything	that	we	have	claimed	and	gathered	(p.	658).	To	leave	that	assemblage	of	people	and	things	requires	courage	and	readiness,	and	that	prerequisite	grows	larger	in	proportion	to	the	people	and	things	that	urge	us	to	stay.		 Thoreau	himself	was	reliant	on	walking	to	live.	Thoreau	openly	admitted,	“I	think	that	I	cannot	preserve	my	health	and	spirits,	unless	I	spend	four	hours	a	day	at	least—and	it	is	commonly	more	than	that—sauntering	through	the	woods	and	over	the	hills	and	fields,	absolutely	free	from	all	worldly	engagements”	(p.	658).	Thoreau	found	the	public	cultural	tendency	to	stay	in	one	place	to	be	toxic,	so	much	so	that	he	thought	that	mechanics	and	shopkeepers	“deserve	some	credit	for	not	having	all	committed	suicide	long	ago”	(p.	658).	For	Thoreau,	the	attraction	of	walking	is	not	avoidance	of	anything	or	an	instrument	for	some	other	purpose;	walking	“is	itself	the	enterprise	and	adventure	of	the	day”	(p.	659).	In	other	words,	walking	is	living.		 The	challenge	of	walking	is	to	walk	without	purpose	(p.	659).	According	to	Thoreau,	leisure,	freedom,	and	independence	emerge	from	the	practice,	and	it	is	impossible	to	saunter	to	any	particular	destination	or	with	intention	(p.	659).	For	Thoreau,	walking	is	the	witnessing	of	wildness	by	perpetually	returning	to	one’s	senses	(p.	659).	This	is	why	Thoreau	believed	that	not	everyone	was	cut	out	to	be	a	walker,	because	most	people	are	not	interested	in	walking	in	this	way	(p.	658).	Thoreau	confessed	that	even	he	sometimes	found	it	difficult	to	walk	properly	to	the		
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woods	because	of	his	attraction	to	and	preoccupation	with	civilized	occupations	and	destinations	(p.	659).	According	to	Thoreau,	when	one	reaches	the	wilderness,	he	or	she	notices	how	small	the	world	of	civilization	was	in	comparison	to	the	world	in	which	we	live	(p.	660).	This	is	a	striking	way	to	contemplate	the	limitations	of	the	public	sphere	and	what	commonly	passes	for	knowledge	within	it.		 It	can	be	difficult	to	find	the	woods	if	one	does	not	aim	for	it	in	one’s	journey	(p.	659).	For	Thoreau,	his	best	guidance	was	an	observation	that	his	instincts,	when	allowed	their	freedom,	move	toward	where	the	“earth	seems	more	unexhausted	and	richer”	(p.	662).19	In	practice,	Thoreau	found	that	this	left	him	“attracted	solely	by	a	few	square	rods	of	impermeable	and	unfathomable	bog”	(p.	666).	He	even	proposed	to	build	his	house	in	such	a	swamp,	so	that	anyone	who	wished	to	visit	him	had	to	walk	into	it	(p.	666).	The	most	socialized	would	not	make	the	trek	(p.	666).			
Embracing	“The	Insufficiency	of	All	That	We	Called	Knowledge	Before”			 For	Thoreau,	the	wild	is	a	holy	fertility,	but	that	fertility	goes	beyond	a	mere	horticultural	fortune	and	reaches	an	epistemic	register	(p.	667).	Superficially,	the	wild	provides	fertile	lands	for	farming	and	property	development.	The	fertility	of	swamps	is	no	secret	to	farmers.	Some	farmers,	wrote	Thoreau,	had	made	a	commercial	enterprise	out	of	the	practice	of	draining	and	clearing	swamps	(p.	667).	At	a	deeper	level,	wild	fertility	yields	a	“Sympathy	with	Intelligence”	that	provides	the	humus	of	our	intellectual	growth	(p.	671).	This	sympathy	with	intelligence	for	Thoreau	makes	ignorance	useful	and	beautiful	(pp.	670-671).	Thoreau	argued	that	useful	ignorance	is	beautiful	because	it	is	responsible	for	correcting	and	challenging	what	we	think	we	know	(p.	671).	For	Thoreau,	this	is	“Sympathy	with	Intelligence”	(p.	671).	To	prove	this,	Thoreau	asked	the	following	rhetorical	question:	“Which	is	the	best	man	to	deal	with,—he	who	knows	nothing	about	a	subject,	and,	what	is	extremely	rare,	knows	that	he	knows	nothing,	or	he																																																									19	In	the	19th	century,	Thoreau	found	the	wild	by	walking	toward	the	west.	Thoreau’s	correlation	of	the	richness	of	wilderness	(specifically,	uncultivated	land)	and	the	west	seems	to	have	tempted	him	to	make	connections	between	cultural	advancement	and	westward	movement,	and	his	writing	in	this	section	has	made	him	an	easy	target	for	Edward	Said’s	critique	of	orientalism	(1978).	To	a	certain	presentist	extent,	Thoreau	deserves	to	be	critiqued	as	an	orientalist,	but	this	criticism	needs	to	be	tempered	by	awareness	that	his	observations	were	historical,	not	theoretical.	Thoreau	did	not	pretend	that	any	single	locale,	such	as	Atlantis,	ancient	Greece,	“The	Orient,”	or	any	other	mythical	name	was	the	origin	of	civilization.	In	fact,	he	was	moving	away	from	origins,	observing	that	civilization	seems	to	be	moving	westward,	and	a	glance	back	toward	established	civilizations,	such	as	Atlantis,	Europe,	ancient	Greece,	East	Asia,	or	beyond,	tell	us	from	where	the	fruit	of	the	wild	has	been	imported.	Thoreau’s	orient	was	not	a	specific	place,	such	as	Asia,	but	a	cardinal	direction,	one	that	is	not	sound	in	2017.	Indeed,	if	Thoreau	were	alive	today,	his	direction	of	advancement	would	not	be	westward,	but	would	be	either	downward	into	the	oceans	or	upward	into	space	at	“a	tangent	to	this	sphere”	(1985,	p.	579).		
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who	really	knows	something	about	it,	but	thinks	that	he	knows	all?”	(p.	671).	When	someone	is	guided	by	useful	ignorance,	they	seek	more	experience	to	identify	the	boundaries	of	what	is	known,	and	that	experience	is	obtained	because	one	does	not	have	“the	habit	of	seeking	after	a	law	which	we	may	obey”	(p.	671).	It	is	a	“higher	knowledge”	that	culminates	in	“a	grand	surprise	on	a	sudden	revelation	of	the	insufficiency	of	all	that	we	called	Knowledge	before”	(p.	671).		
Finding	“The	Literature	Which	Gives	Expression	to	Nature”		 When	Thoreau	was	walking	through	the	woods	during	his	nighttime	walks,	he	discovered	that	the	usual	sources	of	literature	were	not	suited	to	the	natural	forms	of	expression	that	he	witnessed	(Lebeaux,	1984).	As	Richard	Lebeaux	observed,	“Nature	would	provide	him	with	a	language,	private	and	yet	rooted	in	external	reality,	for	discussing	and	imaging	his	life”	(p.	137).	This	was	an	involuntary	and	serendipitous	“return	to	the	primitive	analogical	and	derivative	senses	of	words”	(Thoreau,	1906b,	p.	462	as	quoted	by	Lebeaux,	1984,	p.	137).		 The	literature	that	gives	expression	to	nature	is	one	that	functions	analogically,	but	in	such	a	way	that	allows	metaphorical	encoding	(p.	137).	For	Richard	Rorty	(1989),	such	use	of	language	prevents	anyone	from	saying	whether	the	sentences	are	true	or	false,	at	least	until	others	pay	attention	to	them	and	imbue	them	with	fresh	meaning.	As	Rorty	wrote,	“One	can	only	savor	it	or	spit	it	out”	(p.	18).	This	is	where	Thoreau	discovered	that	a	void	of	metaphorical	content	allowed	nature,	of	which	we	are	a	part,	to	do	its	work:	Where	is	the	literature	which	gives	expression	to	Nature?	He	would	be	a	poet	who	could	impress	the	winds	and	streams	into	his	service,	to	speak	for	him;	who	nailed	words	to	their	primitive	senses,	as	farmers	drive	down	stakes	in	the	spring,	which	the	frost	has	heaved;	who	derived	his	words	as	often	as	he	used	them,—transplanted	them	to	his	page	with	earth	adhering	to	their	roots;	whose	words	were	so	true	and	fresh	and	natural	that	they	would	appear	to	expand	like	the	buds	at	the	approach	of	spring,	though	they	lay	half-smothered	between	two	musty	leaves	in	a	library,—ay,	to	bloom	and	bear	fruit	there,	after	their	kind,	annually;	for	the	faithful	reader,	in	sympathy	with	surrounding	Nature.	(1862,	p.	668)	One	can	see	the	deliberate	refrain	from	signification	in	the	above	quote,	since	Thoreau	does	not	show	how	the	growing	of	buds	between	the	pages	of	a	book	extends	to	the	process	of	reading,	but	this	certainly	does	not	prevent	us	from	making	the	words	polysemic	by	interpreting	them.	The	turn	of	phrase	lacks	any	further	direction,	and	as	such,	is	not	determined	by	Thoreau’s	compositional	choices.	Rather,	the	direction	of	development	is	placed	within	the	powers	of	nature	herself,	which	we	are	a	part	of;	specifically,	the	development	of	those	words	are	expected	to	walk,	to	follow	the	restorative	development	of	how	we	understand	words	to	function	as	buds.	Thoreau	obviously	did	not	invent	botanical	embryos,	and	yet	he	had	imported	that	world	with	only	the	observation	that	those	words	would	“expand	like	the	buds	at	the	approach	of	spring”	(p.	668).	What	does	that	mean	to	
you?		
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Discussion		 For	Thoreau,	the	literature	that	gives	expression	to	nature	is	the	same	kind	of	literature	that	the	melancholic	subject	naturally	produces,	but	it	requires	an	awareness	of	the	void	that	it	creates,	a	vacuum	that	others	are	induced	to	fill	(Golemba,	1990).	It	invokes	a	language	that	is	imbued	with	analogical	meaning,	but	is	not	placed	“in	a	fixed	place	in	a	language	game”	(Rorty,	1989,	p.	18).	It	recruits	nature	(e.g.,	us)	to	do	the	work	of	imbuing	words	with	analogical	meaning,	just	as	the	melancholic	crypt	holds	a	secret	that	affects	the	trajectory	of	its	keeper	in	dark	ways.	What	Thoreau	had	accomplished,	through	his	experience	with	melancholia	and	his	desperate	escape	to	the	nowhere	of	walking,	was	a	recognition	of	literalization/demetaphorization.	This	effect	is	present	not	only	in	people	with	encrypted	melancholia,	as	I	discussed	in	my	review	of	Arsić’s	and	Abraham	and	Torok’s	research,	but	also	in	those	who	have	received	the	dispensation	of	Heaven	to	be	Walkers.	These	populations	are	probably	the	same	group	of	people,	since	I	would	argue	that	it	was	the	darkness	of	melancholia	that	led	Thoreau’s	to	exile	and	the	swamp.	Fortunately,	such	a	process	does	not	require	a	psychedelic	substance.	Going	on	a	literal	trip	yourself	goes	directly	from	melancholia	to	those	nighttime	walks	where	one	gets	lost.		 How	does	getting	lost	in	the	middle	of	the	swamp	replace	the	psychedelic	experience?	The	answer	to	that	question	was	most	succinctly	answered	in	Walden	post-ether.	Many	of	Thoreau’s	written	concerns	about	losing	one’s	self	in	Walden	appeared	after	his	insights	in	“Walking.”	Thoreau	provided	several	examples	of	this	happening	to	himself,	to	his	guests,	and	to	other	people	in	the	town	of	Concord.	Becoming	lost	reproduces	the	psychedelic	experience,	which	for	many	alchemists	has	been	“the	projection	of	the	contents	of	the	naïve	prescientific	mind”	so	that	it	can	be	examined	(McKenna,	1992,	p.	262):	Not	till	we	are	completely	lost,	or	turned	round—for	a	man	needs	only	to	be	turned	round	once	with	his	eyes	shut	in	this	world	to	be	lost—do	we	appreciate	the	vastness	and	strangeness	of	nature.	Every	man	has	to	learn	the	points	of	compass	again	as	often	as	he	awakes,	whether	from	sleep	or	any	abstraction.	Not	till	we	are	lost,	in	other	words	not	till	we	have	lost	the	world,	do	we	begin	to	find	ourselves,	and	realize	where	we	are	and	the	infinite	extent	of	our	relations.	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	459)	To	find	ourselves	anew	means	that	we	have	positioned	ourselves	without	any	discernable	relation	to	public	culture.	This	makes	the	lost	walker	ideally	suited	to	recognize	melancholia	that	might	be	buried	within	one’s	identity.	Once	that	melancholia	is	recognized,	the	walker	can	examine	the	crypt	and	introject	any	desires	from	it	for	as	long	as	they	desire.	Once	this	occurs,	the	experience	of	returning	to	civilization	will	force	the	subject	to	“learn	the	points	of	compass	again”	and	allow	the	subject	have	a	wider	range	of	introjections	than	before.		
Coda		 The	quotation	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter	surreptitiously	captures	the	mechanics	of	melancholia.	The	traumatic	loss	of	a	brother	caused	a	magical	incorporation	of	a	whole	person	within	one’s	identity	in	metaphorical	fashion,	but		
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one	in	which	the	metaphor	has	been	lost	to	the	keeper	of	that	crypt,	that	“Egyptian	temple.”	Thoreau’s	journey	into	his	mind,	into	the	woods	at	night,	brings	us	all	back	to	this	metaphor.	The	process	of	walking,	of	renouncing	any	claim	to	or	recognition	of	the	place	upon	which	we	stand,	makes	it	possible	for	us	to	realize	that	our	histories	often	belie	a	resignation	of	what	is	ours	in	favor	of	an	old	identity	that	we	refuse	to	process.	This	is	the	home	of	those	so-called	“many	catechisms	and	religious	books	twanging	a	canting	peal	round	the	earth.”	Thoreau	was	induced,	by	the	secret	of	the	fact	that	he	was	living	for	others	even	after	their	departure,	to	“involuntarily	rest	of	his	oar.”	His	oar	wanted	to	go	to	nature	to	experience	the	color	of	bruised	berries,	to	feel	the	sensation	of	a	river	on	his	naked	body,	and	to	write	for	an	audience	that	may	turn	out	to	be	his	next	friend,	not	a	mere	patron	who	would	pay	him	money.	This	urge	to	generate	meaning	and	to	bury	that	meaning	under	a	mountain	of	detail,	was	the	project	of	Thoreau’s	first	book.	It	exquisitely	demonstrated	the	acrobatics	of	an	inner	world	that	leaves	most	people	feeling	left	out,	resentful,	and	suspicious.	At	the	end	of	the	day,	Thoreau’s	first	book,	a	counter-monument	and	an	autobiography	of	the	fusion	of	two	men,	failed	to	transmit	the	loss	that	he	was	attempting	to	mourn	because	his	quest	to	achieve	fame	as	a	writer	led	him	to	the	ironic	production	of	an	inflexible	archive	of	loss.		 The	exit	from	this	lack	of	accommodation,	this	identification	with	and	insistence	on	a	specific	non-metaphorical	metaphor,	is	to	get	lost	in	the	most	profound	and	literal	ways	possible.	One	must	lose	everything:	the	self	and	the	world.	Thoreau	did	it	by	first	experiencing	an	embarrassing	commercial	failure,	and	his	subsequent	understanding	that	his	publication	opened	himself	to	the	criticism	of	an	industry	that	he	did	not	care	about.	By	experiencing	irony	first-hand,	by	losing	promises	of	fame,	fortune,	and	friends,	he	retreated	into	the	wilderness,	and	found	himself	within	it	recognizing	the	most	important	friendship	of	his	life.	Nature	showed	him	how	he	had	been	exercising	a	“trained	incapacity”	to	recognize	metaphors	(Burke,	1935/1984a,	p.	7).	The	experience	of	an	environment	utterly	elided	of	metaphors	led	Thoreau	to	understand	how	to	write	in	a	way	that	would	provoke	his	readers	to	contribute	their	own	meaning,	instead	of	assuming	that	they	would	blindly	follow	the	author’s	enigmatic	secrets.	
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Chapter	Three:	Reading	Rainbow	
	As	I	was	desirous	to	recover	the	long	lost	bottom	of	Walden	Pond,	I	surveyed	it	carefully,	before	the	ice	broke	up,	early	in	’46,	with	compass	and	chain	and	sounding	line.	—Walden,	Version	C,	circa	1849	(Schacht,	n.d.,	“The	Pond	in	Winter,”	para.	6a)			
Walden’s	discussion	of	sounding	Walden	Pond	began	as	a	solitary	sentence.	If	we	restrict	our	reading	to	this	sentence,	we	only	get	to	know	that	Thoreau	did	it	“carefully”	while	the	pond	was	frozen,	using	standard	surveying	and	sounding	equipment.	The	matter	of	recovering	“the	long	lost	bottom	of	Walden	Pond”	appears	to	be	an	unencumbered	and	straightforward	task.	Thoreau	is	the	only	subject	with	whom	the	reader	can	identify.	Thoreau	expanded	this	account	significantly	after	his	experience	with	publishing	A	Week	in	1849.	Not	only	did	Thoreau	add	detail	about	his	method,	but	he	also	discussed	how	other	people	dealt	with	the	question	of	Walden	Pond’s	bottom.	By	the	time	Thoreau	was	finished	with	Walden,	the	epigraph	had	expanded:	There	have	been	many	stories	told	about	the	bottom,	or	rather	no	bottom,	of	this	pond,	which	certainly	had	no	foundation	for	themselves.	It	is	remarkable	how	long	men	will	believe	in	the	bottomlessness	of	a	pond	without	taking	the	trouble	to	sound	it.	I	have	visited	two	such	Bottomless	Ponds	in	one	walk	in	this	neighborhood.	Many	have	believed	that	Walden	reached	quite	through	to	the	other	side	of	the	globe.	Some	who	have	lain	flat	on	the	ice	for	a	long	time,	looking	down	through	the	illusive	medium,	perchance	with	watery	eyes	into	the	bargain,	and	driven	to	hasty	conclusions	by	the	fear	of	catching	cold	in	their	breasts,	have	seen	vast	holes	"into	which	a	load	of	hay	might	be	driven,"	if	there	were	anybody	to	drive	it,	the	undoubted	source	of	the	Styx	and	entrance	to	the	Infernal	Regions	from	these	parts.	Others	have	gone	down	from	the	village	with	a	"fifty-six"	and	a	wagon	load	of	inch	rope,	but	yet	have	failed	to	find	any	bottom;	for	while	the	"fifty-six"	was	resting	by	the	way,	they	were	paying	out	the	rope	in	the	vain	attempt	to	fathom	their	truly	immeasurable	capacity	for	marvellousness.	But	I	can	assure	my	readers	that	Walden	has	a	reasonably	tight	bottom	at	a	not	unreasonable,	though	at	an	unusual,	depth.	I	fathomed	it	easily	with	a	cod-line	and	a	stone	weighing	about	a	pound	and	a	half,	and	could	tell	accurately	when	the	stone	left	the	bottom,	by	having	to	pull	so	much	harder	before	the	water	got	underneath	to	help	me.	The	greatest	depth	was	exactly	one	hundred	and	two	feet;	to	which	may	be	added	the	five	feet	which	it	has	risen	since,	making	one	hundred	and	seven.	This	is	a	remarkable	depth	for	so	small	an	area;	yet	not	an	inch	of	it	can	be	spared	by	the	imagination.	What	if	all	ponds	were	shallow?	Would	it	not	react	on	the	minds	of	men?	I	am	thankful	that	this	pond	was	made	deep	and	pure	for	a	symbol.	While	men	believe	in	the	infinite	some	ponds	will	be	thought	to	be	bottomless.	(1985,	pp.	549-551)	
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Interpreted	literally,	this	is	mostly	a	straightforward	survey	of	surveys.	It	compares	Thoreau’s	method	to	the	unfounded	methods	of	some	of	his	neighbors.	However,	despite	Thoreau’s	recognition	that	there	were	many	stories	told	about	the	bottomless	Walden	Pond,	Thoreau	was	thankful	that	these	stories	are	symbolically	sustainable.	Why	was	Thoreau	thankful	that	others	gazed	into	the	pond	and	saw	illusions?	Why	was	Thoreau	thankful	that	others	brought	their	ball	and	chain	to	Walden?	Let	us	return	to	the	riddle	of	Thoreau’s	efforts	to	“recover	the	long	lost	bottom	of	Walden	Pond”	by	exploring	the	illusions	and	marvels	of	his	neighbors.	How	does	exploring	other	peoples’	methods	serve	the	purpose	of	sounding	Walden	Pond?	 	The	answer	to	that	riddle	has	to	do	with	a	three-fold	symbol.	If	we	begin	with	the	fact	that	Thoreau	began	this	paragraph	with	a	laconic	and	literal	description	of	his	survey	of	the	pond	and	then	expanded	it	with	the	suggestion	that	the	pond’s	depth	and	purity	serves	as	a	symbol	that	includes	other	people’s	attempt	to	assess	its	depth,	then	Thoreau’s	discussion	suggests	that	the	three	individuals	involved,	by	their	mere	presence,	are	doing	interpretation.	An	interpretation	that	I	propose	here	has	to	do	with	the	various	techniques	that	are	used	to	interpret	
Walden.	With	respect	to	the	multiple	claims	concerning	the	bottom	of	Walden	Pond,	there	are	several	techniques	at	work.	These	techniques	fall	into	three	categories:	illusive	surveying,	self-sounding,	and	friendship.	The	first	set	of	techniques	involved	villagers	avoiding	the	activity	of	sounding	altogether.	These	people	appeal	to	tradition	and	perpetuate	fallacious	foundations	for	belief,	or	as	Thoreau	wrote,	no	foundation	at	all.	However,	Thoreau	did	not	write	that	he	questioned	his	neighbors	about	their	sounding	techniques.	Thoreau	wrote	that	he	had	witnessed	his	neighbors	compromising	themselves,	planking	on	the	frozen	pond,	and	gazing	through	the	murky	blue	ice	in	an	“illusive”	attempt	to	reckon	the	contradictory	voids	in	the	bottom	of	the	pond	with	their	own	eyes.	These	people,	trusting	no	instruments	but	their	eyes,	fool	themselves	into	seeing	holes	at	the	bottom	of	the	pond	that	lead	to	who-knows-where.	Shadows,	tricks	of	light,	and	slight	variations	of	texture	are	all	capable	of	nurturing	the	delusion	that	there	is	only	an	apparent	bottom	to	the	pond.	Similarly,	this	attitude	fosters	the	belief	that	
Walden	contains	holes	in	its	bottom	that	carry	readers	to	a	mythology.	Still	others,	who	did	not	follow	folklore	blindly,	adhered	to	strict	self-reliance	by	using	an	imported	fifty-six	pound	weight	attached	to	a	heavy	one-inch	rope	(Harding,	1995,	p.	278).	Such	a	monstrosity	would	need	to	be	carted	into	the	woods,	and	could	not	have	been	carried	by	Thoreavian	sauntering.	These	villagers	came	to	the	pond	with	expectations	and	fancy	that	could	not	be	contained	within	the	“reasonable”	mandate	of	reality.	These	competitive	weight	lifters,20	similar	to	the	ice	gazers,	fooled	themselves	into	believing	that	the	pond	was	bottomless	because	their	equipment	was	more	appropriate	for	exhibition,	competition,	or	anchoring	and	less	appropriate	for	measuring	depth.	They	were	not	measuring	the	pond’s	depth.																																																									20	According	to	historical	records,	throwing	a	fifty-six	pound	weight	was	a	sanctioned	athletic	competition	(Haug,	1909).		
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Instead,	they	were	actually	measuring	their	“capacity	for	marvellousness,”	which	has	“never	been	measured”	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	330).	By	using	an	exceptionally	heavy	apparatus	that	is	more	appropriate	for	assessing	prowess	than	for	sounding	depth,	many	people	have	approached	the	meaning	of	Walden	weighed	down	with	technique	imported	from	the	competitive	elsewhere.	These	people	reach	the	same	conclusion	about	the	bottom	of	the	pond	as	the	villagers	who	stare	into	the	ice	and	see	the	Styx.		Finally,	Thoreau	discussed	his	own	technique,	which	used	an	instrument	deceptively	similar	to	the	other	villagers	who	brought	their	burdens	from	the	village	to	the	ponds.	In	fact,	Thoreau’s	technique	is	a	kind	of	hybrid	of	illusive	surveying	and	self-sounding	in	terms	of	technique.	The	only	difference	was	that	Thoreau’s	sounding	line	was	much	lighter	and	more	compact,	borrowed	from	the	forest	and	his	tackle,	the	stone	being	something	that	must	be	found	with	surveying	eyes,	and	the	fishing	line	being	an	artifact	from	civilization	that	must	be	felt	and	handled	like	rope.	What	made	Thoreau’s	technique	successful	was	the	fact	that	the	lighter	line	and	weight	allowed	him	to	feel	the	alternation	between	when	the	stone	was	resting	on	the	pond	floor,	which	cannot	be	directly	assessed,	and	when	the	stone	was	suspended	in	the	water.	Thoreau	was	able	to	feel	this	difference	because	he	received	“help”	from	the	water,	or	more	accurately,	when	the	sediment	was	not	adhering	to	the	stone.	This	is	similar	to	the	calculation	of	a	mathematical	limit,	which	must	be	done	indirectly.	Thoreau’s	collaboration	with	the	pond	enabled	him	to	notice	that	the	pond’s	depth	is	both	reasonable	and	unusual.	Thoreau’s	decision	to	cast	these	three	techniques	as	three	different	personae	suggests	that	we	are	meant	to	identify	with	(at	least	one	of)	them.	According	to	Burke,	to	identify	with	another	only	requires	the	partial	joining	of	interests	(1950,	pp.	20-23).	Anyone	who	reads	about	these	individuals	is	likely	to	identify	with	at	least	one	of	them.	For	readers	who	wish	to	appeal	to	ready-made	illusions	or	who	wish	to	import	their	own	cultural	background	to	interpret	the	text,	then	the	amateur	surveyor	who	lays	on	the	ice	and	the	fifty-six	pound	weightlifter	offer	safe	and	hospitable	alternatives	to	friendship	with	Walden.	Thoreau	did	not	hold	any	ill	will	toward	his	readers	who	identify	with	these	foils.	In	contrast,	A	Week	has	few	accommodations	for	readers	who	may	be	less	prepared	or	willing	to	engage	or	participate	with	Thoreau’s	swerves	and	riddles.	There	is	little	space	for	non-friends	to	engage	A	Week,	as	his	address	to	strangers	is	laden	with	intimate	expectation	and	promise.	Instead	of	foisting	on	the	reader	a	dilemma	between	friendship	and	alienation,	the	reader	of	Walden	encounters	alternative	options	for	rhetorical	identification.	Choosing	between	the	illusive	surveyor,	the	self-sounder,	and	the	friend	is	a	serious	and	continuing	choice	in	Walden.	Yet,	despite	Walden’s	hospitality,	only	friendly	collaboration	between	reader	and	text	yields	an	accurate	assessment	of	the	depth	of	the	text	(Buell,	2010).	Thoreau	had	high	expectations	for	friendship,	and	the	demands	on	the	reader	that	are	embedded	in	Walden	demonstrate	Thoreau’s	hope.	If	the	reader	has	any	hope	of	becoming	Walden’s	friend,	then	they	must	try	to	be	sensitive	to	the	text’s	moments	of	gravitas.	Because	friendship	for	Thoreau	involved	both	giving	and	receiving	virtue	(Crosswhite,	2010),	Walden	sometimes	gives	to	the	reader,	and	sometimes	it		
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takes	from	the	reader,	and	this	reader	is	expected	to	reciprocate.	Often	Walden’s	reader	gazes	into	its	depth	and	purity	to	see	or	feel	the	weight	of	one’s	self	or	myths	reflected.	Being	a	friend	to	Walden	involves	a	manifold	challenge	to	the	reader	to	generate	in	the	space	between	brain	and	page	where	they	should	take	flights	of	interpretation,	and	where	they	should	focus	on	identifying	specific	and	carefully	constructed	meaning.		
Walden	is	not	simply	a	chameleon	that	morphs	to	fit	the	reader’s	fancy.	It	is	much	more	than	that.	It	only	appears	that	way	to	Walden’s	non-friends.	Thoreau	had	many	important	things	to	say	about	a	wide	variety	of	activities,	and	so	an	interpretation	of	Walden’s	passages	is	not	simply	right	or	wrong.	If	the	reader	pays	attention,	Walden	takes	the	reader	in	and	pushes	back.	The	reader	can	go	too	far	afield	and	stumble	into	traps	of	irony,	and	these	traps	are	not	simple	negations.	The	reason	for	this	is	because	Thoreau	was	not	about	to	let	the	lay	reader	flounder	into	resentment,	but	as	Burke	(1937/1984b)	pointed	out,	they	should	be	exposed	and	then	invited	into	the	comic	frame.	Thoreau	learned	that	lesson	after	A	Week.	While	Thoreau	wrote	that	the	villagers	reached	unfounded	conclusions	about	the	pond’s	bottom,	he	did	not	ridicule	them.	In	fact,	he	was	thankful	for	the	fact	that	the	pond	is	both	deep	and	pure,	since	it	attracts	the	techniques	that	form	the	basis	for	friendly	collaboration.	Through	the	polysemic	nature	of	sounding	the	pond,	I	read	Thoreau	as	counting	on	readers	to	follow	their	own	bias	to	reach	unfounded	conclusions	about	the	text’s	meaning.	Hopefully	these	readers	notice	themselves	in	the	comic	frame,	but	if	they	do	not,	they	must	go	their	own	way.	Thoreau	wanted	some	of	his	readers	to	proliferate	illusions	of	interpretation	or	impose	their	own	meanings	on	it.	Doing	so	produces	teachable	moments,	and	is	preferable	to	feeling	excluded	from	the	experience	altogether.	Reading	Walden	becomes	richer	when	it	is	read	as	a	possible	friendship.	This	is	perhaps	Lawrence	Buell’s	(1995)	most	important	notice	about	Walden,	and	one	that	requires	additional	work.	Buell	was	able	to	make	this	argument	by	focusing	on	
Walden	as	a	work	of	nature	writing	and	as	a	work	that	inspired	other	nature	writers.	This	argument	about	friendly	collaboration	is	bolstered	by	several	of	Buell’s	observations	about	Walden	and	other	products	of	nature	writing:	(1)	it	deploys	a	deceptive	operation	of	metaphor,	(2)	the	persona	of	Thoreau	is	not	stable,	nor	does	it	develop	linearly,	and	(3)	there	is	important	intertextual	matter	that	informs	the	reader	about	the	character	of	the	author.	These	arguments	are	also	components	for	the	remainder	of	this	dissertation:	The	first	argument	about	metaphor	explains	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	in	Chapter	Four	(Golemba,	1990),	the	second	argument	about	Thoreau’s	personae	explains	Thoreau’s	language	of	ascent,	also	in	Chapter	Four	(Milder,	1995),	and	the	intertextual	argument	helps	to	explain	how	another	nature-writer	responded	to	Walden	in	Chapter	Five.	In	this	chapter,	I	examine	these	three	sub-arguments	and	apply	them	to	
Walden	and	Pilgrim	at	Tinker	Creek	(2007).	This	comparison	reveals	textual	offers	of	friendship	and	how	they	accommodate	faux	friends.	Walden	bears	out	the	relationship	between	metaphor,	personae,	and	the	boundary	between	the	text’s	inside	and	outside.	Two	of	these	sub-arguments	support	the	argument	about	friendship	in	reading	through	Tinker	Creek.	Reading	Tinker	Creek	is	strikingly		
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similar	to	reading	Walden.	My	main	reason	for	selecting	Tinker	Creek	for	comparison	here	has	to	do	with	how	it	is	responsive	to	Walden	as	a	polemic,	an	argument	I	develop	in	Chapter	Five.	However,	I	am	introducing	Dillard	in	this	chapter	because	her	work	corroborates	two	of	Buell’s	arguments	that	illuminate	the	friendly	potential	of	Walden.		
Introducing	Pilgrim	at	Tinker	Creek	
Pilgrim	at	Tinker	Creek	was	Annie	Dillard’s	big	break.	In	May	1968,	Dillard	earned	a	master’s	degree	in	English,	conducting	a	formal	analysis	of	Walden’s	“The	Pond	in	Winter.”	In	her	thesis,	Dillard	argued,	“Thoreau	drenched	himself	in	Walden	Pond,	instilling	in	himself,	drop	by	drop,	a	sense	of	the	world’s	reality”	(1968,	p.	10).	Walden	Pond	is	responsive	to	her	visitors,	Dillard	went	on	to	elaborate,	and	the	pure	water	in	its	cup	fosters	no	secrets	or	deceptions.	It	charts	all	disturbances	and	incursions	of	its	contents	before	returning	to	its	liquid	originality.	For	Dillard,	such	a	grail	is	a	perfect	metaphor:	“it	is	not	like	heaven,	it	is	heaven”	(p.	24).	Thoreau,	according	to	Dillard,	literally	“turns	its	readers	into	Thoreaus”	(p.	4).	While	I	am	mindful	of	Dillard’s	notice	of	literalness	in	Thoreau’s	rhetoric,	I	would	insist	that	the	reader	doesn’t	quite	become	a	Thoreau.	Instead,	a	successful	partnership	between	
Walden	and	its	reader	imbues	the	reader	with	a	few	drops	of	Walden’s	purity.	After	Dillard	completed	her	thesis,	she	“lived	quietly	on	Tinker	Creek	in	Virginia’s	Roanoke	Valley,	observing	the	natural	world,	taking	notes,	and	reading	voluminously	in	a	wide	variety	of	disciplines”	(Dillard,	2007,	p.	286),	similar	to	Thoreau.	In	addition,	she	began	to	read	texts	on	philosophy,	the	history	of	science,	and	biology	with	an	unusual	urgency	(Dillard,	1987).	She	collated	her	research	onto	note	cards	(Dillard,	2007,	p.	280),	and	set	herself	to	write	her	own	semi-Christian	version	of	Walden.	She	published	her	text	in	1974,	and	the	next	year,	she	was	rewarded	with	the	Pulitzer	Prize	for	Nonfiction.	
Tinker	Creek	is	not	a	retread	of	Walden,	but	it	does	bear	a	striking	similarity	to	it	in	several	ways.	One	of	the	most	salient	differences	between	the	two	texts	is	the	fact	that	Tinker	Creek	does	not	cultivate	the	comic	corrective	that	is	so	crucial	in	
Walden.	There	are	few	moments,	if	any,	in	which	Dillard	catches	the	reader	in	a	moment	of	irony.	This	is	likely	due	to	the	fact	that	Dillard’s	project	was	to	bring	her	natural	explorations	into	her	empirical	and	textual	world	to	understand	a	personal	divine.	Nevertheless,	despite	these	differences,	the	two	texts	do	contain	similarities.	Most	notably,	the	two	texts	are	similar	with	respect	to	their	arrangement	into	two	parts	with	a	significant	contrast	between	them.	
Tinker	Creek	engages	in	social	criticism	only	indirectly;	for	the	most	part,	Dillard	used	her	text	to	explore	the	intersections	between	her	theological	orientation	and	the	natural	world.	The	result	is	that	her	text	has	two	main	parts,	divided	into	the	first	and	second	halves	and	ordered	according	to	Neoplatonic	Christian	theology	(p.	279).	The	first	half	consists	of	a	series	of	chapters	that	Dillard	identified	as	via	positiva,	which	theologians	have	described	as	the	rigor	of	identifying	the	positive	attributes	of	God	(pp.	279-280).	The	second	half	consists	of	
via	negativa,	which	involves	the	identification	of	the	traits	that	God	does	not	possess	(pp.	279-280).	On	the	one	hand,	Dillard’s	via	positiva	cultivates	the	wholesome	and		
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apparently	divine	aspects	of	her	natural	observations	and	research,	such	as	the	presentist	pleasure	of	rubbing	and	scratching	a	puppy’s	belly,	or	the	curious	alliance	between	Dillard	and	spiders,	or	the	satisfaction	of	using	praying	mantises	to	control	garden	pests	without	chemicals.	The	midpoint	of	the	text	is	a	chapter	about	a	flood	at	Tinker	Creek	(p.	280).	Dillard	then	allows	her	mostly	rosy	picture	of	creation	to	be	dashed	by	the	predictable	brutalities	of	survival	and	the	disgusting	aesthetics	of	animal	excess,	both	of	which	are	topics	in	the	narrative.	Dillard’s	via	negativa	broods	on	the	disturbing	and	grotesque	aspects	of	nature	that	defy	her	understanding	and	acceptance.	For	example,	she	intuits	that	the	fecundity	of	“‘acres	and	acres	of	rats’	has	a	suitably	chilling	ring	to	it	that	is	decidedly	lacking	if	I	say,	instead,	‘acres	and	acres	of	tulips’”	(p.	167).	Other	examples	include	the	injustice	that	parasites	exist,	the	hard	lifestyle	of	Eskimos,	and	the	ravenous	appetite	of	the	locust.		Dillard’s	concern	with	making	an	artistic	statement	about	God	and	nature	inevitably	leads	her	text	away	from	concerns	about	Thoreauvian	friendship.	What	remains	interesting	regarding	Tinker	Creek,	then,	like	Walden,	is	their	relationships	with	metaphor	and	the	importance	of	intertextual	details	to	its	meaning.	The	remainder	of	this	chapter	will	be	focused	on	teasing	out	the	metaphorical,	personal,	and	intertextual	factors	in	Walden’s	possible	friendship	with	its	reader	and	identifying	the	ways	in	which	Tinker	Creek	validates	its	predecessor.		
Befriending	Walden	and	Tinker	Creek		 As	I	discussed	in	Chapter	Two,	Thoreau	advanced	a	complex	and	groundbreaking	theory	of	friendship	in	A	Week.	This	theory	defined	friendship	as	a	process	that	involved	the	reciprocal	giving	and	taking	of	virtue	that	temporarily	joins	together	individuals	(Crosswhite,	2010).	I	argued	that	when	Thoreau	published	A	Week,	he	was	prejudiced	against	endowing	inanimate	objects	with	the	role	of	friend.	I	also	argued	that	the	fiasco	of	that	book’s	publication	caused	a	sustained	crisis	(Milder,	1995)	that	made	Thoreau	confront	this	error	and	consider	nature	itself	as	a	candidate	for	his	model	of	friendship.		 In	light	of	Thoreau’s	consideration	of	non-human	agents	as	potential	friends,	I	argue	that	Thoreau	endeavored	to	make	Walden	do	more	than	A	Week	could	accomplish:	to	engage	in	friendship	between	itself	and	(some	of)	its	readers.	To	a	certain	extent,	Buell	already	made	this	argument	in	the	guise	of	“a	fuller	communication	in	which	the	reader	becomes	a	legitimate	partner,	feels	freer	to	make	what	he	will	of	Thoreau,	and	ultimately	digests	Thoreau’s	texts	more	fully	now	that	the	word	has	been	made	flesh”	(Buell,	1995,	p.	382).	However,	I	find	myself	clarifying	what	Buell	would	readily	affirm	regarding	the	finer	points	of	what	that	partnership	entails	and	how	Thoreau	engaged	a	varied	readership	with	parameters	on	those	relationships.	The	main	reason	for	this,	I	believe,	is	that	Buell	does	not	respond	to	Thoreau’s	theory	of	friendship.	The	nature	of	Walden’s	collaboration	is	not	the	same	for	all	of	its	readers,	and	not	determined	solely	by	readers	or	solely	by	the	text.	Because	friendship	between	Walden	and	its	readers	is	not	pre-established,	the	text	engages	the	reader	as	a	possible	friend	(i.e.,	as	a	stranger).	Depending	on	how	that	relationship	develops,	it	is	an	open	question	of	whether	the	reader	will	function	as	a	friend,	and	it	hinges	on	how	the	reader	engages	with	the	text	on	the	
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three	fronts	that	I	extracted	from	Buell’s	analysis:	metaphor,	personae,	and	the	world	outside	of	the	text.		
Metaphor		 The	common	thread	between	Walden	and	Tinker	Creek	with	respect	to	metaphor	is	the	way	in	which	metaphors	seem	to	be	ubiquitous,	and	yet	when	the	text	is	examined	without	relation	to	the	reader,	the	metaphors	are	not	in	abundance.	This	curious	difference	between	what	a	New	Critic	would	find	in	the	text	and	what	a	reception	study	would	find	makes	the	audience	the	critical	part	of	textual	analysis	for	both	Walden,	Tinker	Creek,	or	any	text	that	deploys	a	rhetoric	that	resembles	what	Henry	Golemba	has	referred	to	as	Thoreau’s	“language	of	desire”	(1990,	p.	7),	a	concept	I	explore	in	detail	in	Chapter	Four.	In	terms	of	Walden,	the	textual	ecosystem	of	symbols	appears	to	be	a	reprise	of	Thoreau’s	ideas	and	practices,	and	Buell	(1995)	has	noted	that	there	is	a	temptation	(which	should	be	resisted)	to	read	
Walden	as	autobiography.	A	few	of	the	symbols	are	metaphors,	but	most	the	symbols	are	fertile	words	and	phrases	that	invite	metaphorical	interpretation.	Furthermore,	these	symbols	and	metaphors	are	released	as	the	text	progresses.	
Tinker	Creek	functions	in	a	similar,	albeit	more	explicit	way.	Most	of	Dillard’s	are	reacquired;	at	least	one	of	her	symbols	is	silently	allowed	to	escape.		 The	fact	that	Walden	contains	metaphors	is	not	a	controversial	claim	in	light	of	the	research	discussed	so	far,	and	it	should	be	recalled	that	this	argument	did	not	exist	before	Francis	Matthiessen’s	American	Renaissance	(1941;	Buell,	1995;	Bickman,	1992).	In	that	seminal	primer	of	American	Studies	(Abelove,	2003),	Matthiessen	noted	that	the	seasons	in	Walden	correlate	with	the	spiritual	metamorphosis	of	a	naturist	into	a	social	critic—an	estranged	student	who	returned	to	the	Emersonian	promise	of	Transcendentalism	with	the	boon	of	naturism.	For	Matthiessen,	Thoreau’s	Walden	is	a	gospel	of	political	economy.	Deploying	the	metaphor	terminology	of	I.	A.	Richards	(1936)	to	analyze	Matthiessen’s	argument,	naturism	was	merely	the	vehicle	for	the	tenor	of	social	responsibility.		 The	problem	with	this	reading	of	Matthiessen’s	perspective	is	that	most	of	what	people	read	as	Thoreau’s	metaphors	are	actually	not	‘his’	metaphors.	As	Buell	pointed	out,	Thoreau	largely	abandons	the	economy	metaphor	after	it	is	established	in	the	text’s	opening	chapter	(1995,	p.	281),	creating	a	precedent	for	the	remainder	of	the	text.	However,	the	curious	thing	about	this	claim	is	that	the	vast	majority	of	the	moments	in	which	the	reader	thinks	that	‘economy’	is	used	as	a	metaphor	of	environmental	ecology,	it	is	not.	Instead,	aside	from	passing	references	to	political	economy	and	the	economy	of	living,	the	opening	chapter	discusses	actual	economy,	which	derives	from	the	Greek	οἰκονομία	(oikonomia),	or	“household	management”	(economy,	n.d.).	In	addition,	the	string	of	letters	forming	‘house’	appears	93	times	in	“Economy.”	Thoreau’s	‘economy’	is	literal,	following	Arsić’s	proposition	to	read	
Walden	literally	and	resist	metaphorical	interpretation	(2016).	However,	Arsić’s	directive	is	hardly	a	common	sentiment;	given	the	readiness	of	Thoreauvian	researchers	to	introduce	metaphorical	readings	into	the	text,	my	own	practice	of	allegorizing	Thoreau’s	prose	for	my	chapter	epigraphs,	as	well	as	my	repeated	question	“What	does	that	mean	to	you?”,	it	is	necessary	to	consider	both	literal	(to		
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the	author)	and	metaphorical	(to	the	reader)	interpretations,	thereby	creating	an	interpretive	situation	in	which	meaning	becomes	polysemic.21	Walden	thus	uses	environmental	imagery	in	ways	that	do	not	exhaust	their	potential	uses,	even	though	there	is	a	common	and	persistent	belief	that	meaning	pre-exists	a	given	act	of	interpretation.	It	is	probable	that,	given	the	mechanism	at	work	in	the	process	of	reading	Walden,	the	metaphorical	functionality	is	the	result	of	what	Buell	and	Golemba	(1990;	who	I	will	discuss	in	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter)	refer	to	as	a	co-authorship	that	makes	it	difficult	to	tell	when	the	creation	of	meaning	ends,	if	it	does	at	all.		 In	addition	to	creation,	Walden	appears	to	be	in	a	constant	process	of	self-destruction	and	re-creation	as	it	is	read.	According	to	Martin	Bickman	(1992),	Thoreau	seems	to	have	been	particularly	fixated	on	undermining	his	previous	chapters	in	the	first	half	of	the	text;	after	“Economy”	and	before	“The	Ponds,”	each	successive	chapter	unexpectedly	appears	to	discuss	a	topic	in	such	a	way	that	undermines	or	abandons	the	arguments	made	in	previous	chapters.	Just	as	the	eiron	undermines	an	alazon	and	that	eiron	goes	on	to	become	someone	else’s	alazon	(Muecke,	1969),	Thoreau	undermined	many	of	his	‘past’	literary	constructions,	making	it	difficult	to	identify	when	he	believed	what	he	wrote.	These	pasts	are	not	buried	under	overwhelming	mountains	of	detail,	like	they	are	in	A	Week.	Instead	of	being	lost	and	forgotten,	the	reader	is	left	wondering	when	or	if	those	details	will	find	a	reprise.	Various	readers	over	the	years	have	appreciated	Thoreau’s	catch	and	release	treatment	of	symbols,	and	some	have	used	his	technique	more	explicitly	in	their	own	works.		 Like	Walden,	Dillard’s	Tinker	Creek	is	a	rich	storehouse	of	fertile	symbols,	but	Dillard’s	strategy	is	more	explicit,	making	her	text	a	useful	foil.	Her	technique	consisted	of	producing	a	master	metaphor,	and	then	using	that	metaphor	to	pierce	an	array	of	secondary	symbols	for	the	reader	to	interpret.	The	master	metaphor	of	
Tinker	Creek	that	sets	off	the	interpretive	cascade	is	Dillard’s	identity	claim	as	a	hunter	who	stalks	and	pierces	symbols,	with	her	book	being	“the	straying	trail	of	blood”	(2007,	p.	15).	Dillard’s	narrator	often	releases	those	pierced	symbols,	but																																																									21	Here	I	follow	Richard	Rorty’s	extension	of	Nietzsche’s	definition	of	truth	as	dead	metaphor,	whereas	a	metaphor,	properly	speaking,	is	alive	(Edwards,	1997,	p.	127):	“If	you	want	to	be	remembered	by	future	generations,	go	in	for	poetry	rather	than	for	mathematics.	If	you	want	your	books	to	be	read	rather	than	respectfully	shrouded	in	tooled	leather,	you	should	try	to	produce	tingles	rather	than	truth.	What	we	call	common	sense—the	body	of	widely	accepted	truths—is,	just	as	Heidegger	and	Nabokov	thought,	a	collection	of	dead	metaphors.	Truths	are	the	skeletons	which	remain	after	the	capacity	to	arouse	the	senses—to	cause	tingles—has	been	rubbed	off	by	familiarity	and	long	usage.	After	the	scales	are	rubbed	off	a	butterfly’s	wing,	you	have	transparency,	but	not	beauty—formal	structure	without	sensuous	content.	Once	the	freshness	wears	off	the	metaphor,	you	have	plain,	literal,	transparent	language—the	sort	of	language	which	is	ascribed	not	to	any	particular	person	but	to	‘common	sense’	or	‘reason’	or	‘intuition,’	ideas	so	clear	and	distinct	you	can	look	right	through	them”	(Rorty,	1989,	p.	152).		
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they	continue	to	be	the	object	of	a	narrative	stalking	as	they	flee	and	leave	trails,	and	the	narrator	keeps	them	in	the	wings	of	the	narrative	proscenium—ready	at	hand	for	the	moment	when	they	are	returned	to	the	reader’s	attention	for	further	interpretation.	In	contrast,	Walden	overrides	his	statements	and	chapters	in	the	production	of	disturbing	contradictions	for	readers	to	ponder	(Bickman,	1992).	As	Arsić	(2016)	observed,	Thoreau	was	a	meticulous	editor	of	his	Walden	drafts,	and	his	maintenance	of	contradictions	throughout	the	invention	process	indicates	that	contradictions	were	a	deliberate	feature	of	Walden.	The	constellations	of	symbols,	and	the	way	that	they	are	reprised	and	cause	ironic	developments,	are	clearly	aspects	of	Walden	and	Tinker	Creek	that	hinge	on	how	one	relates	to	the	texts.	The	readers	who	embrace	either	illusive	surveying	or	self-sounding	have	a	high	likelihood	of	overlooking	these	changes	or	concluding	that	Thoreau	was	wrong;	they	conclude	that	all	of	the	symbols	are	advocated	and	that	the	resulting	contradictions	should	be	resolved	so	that	some	truth	can	be	attained.	In	contrast,	the	reader	who	befriends	Walden	realizes	that	we	are	all	wrong	and	in	flux,	a	truth	that	should	not	be	elided	in	favor	of	some	truth	that	has	yet	to	be	synthesized.	Walden’s	friend	catches	and	accepts	change,	and	understands	that	it	is	acceptable	for	symbols	to	be	receptive	to	metaphorical	interpretation,	and	that	metaphors	have	finite	and	renewable	lifetimes.	Once	this	dynamic	is	identified,	it	becomes	an	edifying	reveal	of	the	queerness	that	Thoreau	and	Dillard	experienced	and	cultivated	throughout	their	lives.	As	the	next	section	discusses,	this	flux	is	present	in	Walden	by	what	Buell	referred	to	as	multiple	authorial	personae	that	are	neither	stable	nor	presented	linearly.		
Personae	Thoreau’s	pursuit	of	fractured	and	nonlinear	depictions	of	authorial	presence	in	Walden	makes	it	more	difficult	for	readers	to	become	familiar	with	‘him,’	and	it	makes	it	more	difficult	for	the	reader	to	know	if	“Thoreau”/Walden	is	a	friend	(i.e.,	to	name	him/it	as	a	friend).	This	destabilization	also	makes	it	more	difficult	for	the	reader	to	predict	Thoreau’s	specific	motives	when	he	wrote	his	prose.	In	other	words,	Walden	casts	Thoreau	and	its	reader	as	strangers,	as	possible	friends,	without	saying	so.	In	contrast,	Tinker	Creek	makes	great	effort	to	cast	its	reader	as	a	witness	to	a	glorious	yet	strange	creation	and	a	subject	in	the	kingdom	of	God,	which	does	not	require	the	fragmentation	of	her	narrator.	In	the	next	section,	I	discuss	Tinker	Creek’s	sustained	attempt	to	conceal	the	identity	of	the	narrator	without	this	fragmentation.			 The	idea	that	any	text	is	the	product	of	a	single	author	has	been	a	common	target	of	scholarly	assault,	but	this	idea	has	proven	to	be	extremely	durable,	eliding	Buell’s	disturbing	thesis	that	there	is	not	a	singular	or	coherent	Thoreau	who	wrote	
Walden.	This	lack	of	authorial	stability	has	also	given	Robert	Milder	(1995)	cause	to	find	what	he	called	Thoreau’s	“rhetoric	of	ascent”	(p.	62),	which	I	discuss	in	Chapter	Four.	Michel	Foucault,	Jacques	Derrida,	and	Roland	Barthes	have	each	argued	that	the	idea	of	an	author	that	exercises	authority	over	text	or	reader-response	is	problematic	(Buell,	1995,	p.	372).	Yet,	despite	the	efforts	of	these	scholars,	there	is	broad	consensus	among	lay	readers	and	scholars	that	“Thoreau”	composed	Walden		
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and	his	philosophy	can	be	extracted	from	it	(see	Arsić,	2016,	p.	140).	The	reason	for	this	recalcitrance	is	that	the	author’s	byline	is	a	functional	part	of	the	reading	process,	just	as	the	rhetorical	situation	associated	with	a	text	influences	the	text’s	meaning	(Bitzer,	1968),	regardless	of	how	much	it	has	been	constructed	to	fit	the	needs	of	the	communicative	encounter	(Vatz,	1973).	When	a	writer	posits	a	conventional	‘author,’	he	or	she	acknowledges	the	text’s	contribution	toward	agency	and	remains	what	Henry	Louis	Gates,	Jr.	referred	to	as	“a	participant	in	an	articulated	realm	of	social	practice”	(quoted	by	Buell,	1995,	p.	372).	When	a	text	has	a	byline,	it	is	necessary	to	recognize	the	reality	of	authorial	agency,	but	it	is	not	necessary	to	posit	a	pre-existing	singular	author	for	a	text	to	exercise	agency	on	behalf	of	a	mutable	individual	who	transformed	during	the	invention	of	the	text.	The	reader	constructs	and	reconstructs	an	image	of	the	author	using	and	interpreting	a	collection	of	evidence.	Far	from	being	a	weakening	of	the	power	of	the	author,	this	fragmentation	might	even	be	useful,	as	the	previous	section	demonstrated	regarding	the	discarding	of	symbols.	Furthermore,	it	may	also	be	useful	to	posit	a	non-linear	progression	from	naiveté	to	enlightenment,	as	Buell	discussed.		 Two	technical	facts	about	Walden’s	composition	make	it	obvious	that	the	idea	of	a	single	Thoreauvian	persona	within	it	is	a	verifiable	illusion.	First,	the	composition	of	Walden	has	a	complex	history.	It	started	nominally	in	1845,	proceeded	through	eight	drafts,	and	was	eventually	published	nine	years	later	in	1854	(Milder,	1995).	Thoreau	experienced	most	of	the	profound	transformations	in	his	life	during	this	time,	with	the	obvious	exception	being	the	death	of	his	brother.	Clapper’s	examination	of	the	extant	handwritten	records	of	Walden	held	at	the	Huntington	Library	show	that	Thoreau	was	occasionally	willing	to	preserve	early	portions	of	the	manuscript	with	only	minimal	editing.22	This	means	that	as	Thoreau	grew	in	environmental	maturity,	some	of	the	debunked	ideas	and	preconceptions	that	he	left	behind	were	given	sanctuary	within	Walden	(Buell,	1995;	Milder,	1995).		 In	terms	of	biography,	Thoreau’s	relationship	with	nature	went	through	several	transitions.	Buell	has	identified	five	phases	in	Thoreau’s	attitude	toward	nature:	(1)	pastime,	(2)	recreational	resort,	(3)	place	of	comfort,	(4)	occupation,	and	then	(5)	cause	(1995,	p.	138).	In	addition,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	Two,	Thoreau	transformed	from	a	man	who	could	not	see	inanimate	objects	as	friends	to	one	who	found	opportunities	for	parity	and	self-transformation	in	his	openness	to	friendship	with	nature.	This	lesson	about	nature	required	considerable	embarrassment	and	financial	stress	on	Thoreau’s	part—a	circuitous	route	to	enlightenment	that	probably	did	not	end	with	Walden’s	publication.		 Because	of	this	complex	history	of	self-transformation,	as	well	as	Thoreau’s	tendency	to	preserve	his	ironic	ideas	without	comment	rather	than	to	elide	them,	Buell	is	right	to	conclude	that	there	is	a	temptation	to	read	Walden	as	autobiography.	However,	Buell	urges	caution.																																																									22	This	statement	cannot	be	overgeneralized.	For	example,	“Reading”	was	virtually	complete	by	the	time	Thoreau	left	Walden	Pond	in	1847.	In	contrast,	several	paragraphs	in	the	“Spring”	chapter,	which	appeared	in	the	first	version,	especially	the	sandbar	paragraph,	were	subjected	to	thorough	editing	(Schacht,	n.d.).		
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Reading	Walden	as	autobiography	is	problematic	because	the	text	tends	to	disguise	the	historical	moments	in	which	Thoreau	experienced	ironic	humility.	Thoreau’s	story	of	self-transformation	is	highly	focused	on	Thoreau’s	“odyssey	from	environmental	naiveté	to	enlightenment”	(p.	115).	For	the	most	part,	I	agree	with	Buell’s	assessment,	and	Thoreau’s	life	experiences	that	do	not	fit	neatly	into	that	rubric	tend	to	be	disguised	in	the	text.	To	find	all	of	the	autobiographical	notes	in	
Walden,	the	reader	must	look	beyond	the	author’s	personae	as	projected	by	the	text	and	look	to	other	personae	in	the	text.	For	example,	the	carnival	of	authorial	voices	in	Walden	does	not	have	a	mimetic	voice	of	Thoreau’s	attitude	toward	publishing	before	1849.	Such	a	naïve	Thoreau	was	never	there	undisguised	in	any	version	of	the	Walden	manuscript.	In	contrast,	Thoreau’s	confident	unawareness	about	his	publishing	prospects	is	well	preserved	in	A	Week.	Instead	of	casting	his	publishing	naiveté	with	a	fresh	recollection	of	his	past	obliviousness,	Thoreau	told	a	short	anecdote	about	a	Native	American	who	tried	and	failed	to	make	money	by	selling	baskets.	After	introducing	this	character,	Thoreau	then	identified	with	this	person	because	he	too	tried	to	sell	“a	basket	of	a	delicate	texture”	(1985,	p.	338).	Thoreau	protects	his	embarrassment	and	the	authority	of	“Thoreau”	by	identifying	with	the	Native	American.		 Another	reason	why	it	is	inappropriate	to	read	Walden	as	autobiography	is	because	Thoreau’s	personae	do	not	progress	linearly	(Buell,	1995),	a	deliberate	distortion	that	defamiliarizes	the	reader	from	the	author.	The	fact	that	the	personae	are	presented	in	a	nonlinear	series	is	easy	to	establish.	The	story	of	the	Native	American	basket-weaver	occurs	in	the	opening	pages	of	the	text	and	was	added	in	1852,	whereas	passages	that	were	composed	relatively	early	in	the	composition	process	occur	much	later	in	the	text’s	form;	“Reading”	appears	much	later	than	“Economy,”	and	yet	it	was	complete	by	1849	(Schacht,	n.d.).	One	reason	why	Thoreau	would	have	presented	his	personae	nonlinearly	is	because	he	was	deliberately	trying	to	throw	the	reader	off	of	the	trail	of	his	own	path	toward	enlightenment.	This	may	have	been	a	way	for	Thoreau	to	keep	his	own	way	from	becoming	a	mimetic	exercise.	Of	course,	it	is	possible	to	unravel	the	nonlinearity,	but	the	illusive	surveyor	and	the	self-sounder	are	less	likely	to	make	that	discovery.	Only	Walden’s	friend	has	the	awareness	that	a	friend	also	has	the	responsibility	of	attending	to	the	messy	nonlinearity	of	an	individual	before	that	person’s	history	of	lessons	can	be	appreciated,	and	even	then,	one	cannot	be	certain	of	the	results.	If	Thoreau	was	serious	about	having	each	person	find	their	own	way,	then	it	makes	sense	that	he	would	obscure	his	own	example	within	its	pages	as	much	as	possible,	or	at	least	until	the	reader	has	woken	up.	Did	Thoreau	know	a	Native	American	who	tried	to	make	money	by	selling	woven	baskets?	We	may	never	know	the	answer	to	that	question	because	Thoreau’s	biography	does	not	inform	us	whether	such	a	person	existed.	Even	though	the	multiplicity	of	Thoreavian	personae	and	their	nonlinearity	has	affected	our	ability	to	plumb	Walden	for	Thoreau,	it	has	also	had	the	equally	important	side	effect	of	turning	other	matter	that	tells	the	story	about	Thoreau	and	his	world	into	a	precious	resource	(Buell,	1995).	As	the	next	section	shows,	the	relationships	between			
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Walden,	Tinker	Creek,	and	this	“intertextual”	domain	is	itself	a	matter	for	Thoreau,	Dillard,	and	their	respective	readers	to	explore	(p.	93).		
The	Intertexual		 The	importance	of	the	world	outside	of	any	given	text,	whether	it	is	a	pond,	a	creek,	or	other	textual	sources,	cannot	be	overestimated.	As	Carolyn	Porter	has	argued,	“the	traditional	boundaries	between	the	literary	and	the	extraliterary	have	faded”	(quoted	by	Buell,	1995,	p.	85).	This	is	important	for	two	reasons.	First,	as	Dwight	Conquergood	(Madison,	2005,	pp.	169-171)	and	Buell	(1995)	have	demonstrated,	troubling	the	boundary	between	fiction	and	non-fiction	is	an	important	focal	point	for	ethnographers	and	writers	to	demonstrate	that	there	is	a	fuzzy	boundary	between	mimesis	and	poiesis.	Second,	as	I	discuss	in	this	section,	the	world	outside	the	text,	particularly	secondary	sources,	shapes	the	reader’s	interpretation	of	the	text.	Because	many	other	authorial	texts	and	secondary	sources	have	been	revealed	to	be	either	questionable	or	revealed	something	questionable,	the	reader	is	induced	to	do	a	significant	amount	of	detective	work.	This	work	goes	a	long	way	toward	inducing	the	reader	to	stand	as	a	legitimate	partner	of	the	text.	Intertextual	data	on	Annie	Dillard	also	reveals	a	need	for	significant	work	to	be	done	to	determine	who	is	narrating	Tinker	Creek.	This	question	of	who	narrates	Tinker	Creek	is	an	important	issue	that	I	address	in	Chapter	Five.		 The	effect	of	Thoreau’s	biography	on	interpretations	of	Walden	has	been	traced	throughout	the	waxing	and	waning	of	Walden’s	fame	ever	since	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century.	Buell	went	so	far	as	to	argue	that	it	is	this	intertextual	matter	that	has	produced	so	many	interpretations	of	Walden.	Perhaps	because	of	Thoreau’s	guarded	personal	life	and	his	ability	to	destabilize	the	narrator’s	persona	in	Walden,	Thoreau	enthusiasts	and	scholars	alike	have	zealously	investigated	the	man.	This	fixation	on	his	biographical	details	has	led	to	the	proliferation	of	apocryphal	stories	by	a	disparate	number	of	people	who	have	pushed	their	own	agendas.23	Secondary	resources	have	circulated	among	Thoreau’s	readers	for	decades,	which	has	led	Thoreau	being	placed	on	the	proverbial	pedestal	and	in	the	virtual	gutter.	First,	James	Lowell’s	animosity	toward	Thoreau	was	instrumental	in	producing	the	impression	that	Thoreau	was	nothing	more	than	a	copy	of	Emerson	(Fink,	1992;	Harding,	1982).	To	compound	this	problem,	Emerson’s	infamous																																																									23	The	most	famous	apocryphal	story	about	Thoreau	concerns	the	night	he	spent	in	jail.	During	that	night,	which	would	have	occurred	in	July	1846,	Thoreau	was	supposedly	visited	by	Emerson,	who	asked,	“Henry,	why	are	you	in	there?”	Thoreau	is	said	to	have	replied,	“Waldo,	why	are	you	not	in	here?”	Neither	Thoreau	nor	Emerson	made	any	mention	of	this	meeting,	but	we	know	from	Emerson’s	journal	that	he	did	not	support	Thoreau’s	political	belligerence	(Sattelmeyer,	1989).	Furthermore,	there	has	been	endless	speculation	about	who	paid	Thoreau’s	fine.	It	had	to	have	been	someone,	since	he	was	released	the	next	day,	and	someone	continued	to	pay	the	poll	tax	repeatedly	in	the	years	following	the	incident	(Harding,	1982).		
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eulogy	to	Thoreau	and	his	questionable	editing	of	Thoreau’s	posthumous	publications	reinforced	this	illusion	(Sattelmeyer,	1995).	The	effect	of	Lowell’s	iconoclasm	and	Emerson’s	interference	kept	Thoreau	in	obscurity	for	the	remainder	of	the	19th	century,	and	he	would	have	remained	there	if	it	had	not	been	for	a	publisher’s	use	his	oeuvre	for	profit	(Buell,	1995).	This	delay	and	the	capitalistic	motivation	that	ended	it	further	enhanced	the	potential	for	apocryphal	stories	to	creep	into	Thoreau’s	biography.	The	effect	of	the	seemingly	unreliable	nature	of	Thoreau’s	intertextual	details	has	been	to	cast	Thoreau	as	a	mythical	character,	one	that	requires	a	significant	amount	of	work	to	sort	out.	In	one	sense,	the	infection	of	Thoreau’s	biography	with	apocryphal	details	seems	to	confirm	Paul	Ricoeur’s	suggestion	that	we	are	here	engaging	in	hermeneutics,	and	that	we	should	not	be	satisfied	with	the	obvious	(Bessette,	2016,	p.	149).	The	first	temptation	is	to	abandon	the	intertextual	and	practice	New	Criticism.	However,	this	doesn’t	help,	as	Thoreau	seems	to	have	been	the	first	person	to	warn	us	off	on	the	first	few	pages	of	Walden	(Buell,	1995).	Those	pages	“reflect	a	stage	of	his	existence	now	over	and	done	with”	(p.	377).	Since	details	about	Thoreau	have	been	infected	with	suspicion	and	intrigue,	the	effect	of	the	reading	experience	has	been	to	allow	the	reader	to	be	an	important	and	active	component	in	the	construction	of	meaning	(p.	382).	My	interpretation	of	the	various	methods	of	assessing	the	depths	of	Walden	Pond	offers	the	specialness	of	friendship	described	in	A	Week	to	the	text-reader	relationship,	while	at	the	same	time	offering	safe	alternatives	to	friendship	should	it	not	obtain.	Giving	special	credence	to	the	text	and	the	reader	simultaneously	is	necessary,	and	like	Pascal’s	vases,	the	relationship	of	Walden	with	its	friends	invokes	a	connection	that	dissolves	the	boundary	between	the	containers	of	text	and	reader	in	a	dynamic	way	that	I	discuss	in	the	next	chapter.	Like	Thoreau’s	Walden,	background	information	about	Annie	Dillard	has	been	fertile	ground	for	scholarly	work,	and	its	use	has	produced	a	predictable	divergence	from	New	Criticism.	In	her	biographical	writings	outside	Tinker	Creek,	Dillard	revealed	that	she	had	a	more	affluent	childhood	than	Thoreau.	One	of	Dillard’s	ancestors	started	the	company	American	Standard,	a	plumbing	brass	foundry	(Dillard,	1987,	p.	61).	She	was	encouraged	to	explore,	and	was	allowed	to	walk	around	her	neighborhood,	alone,	as	soon	as	she	could	say	her	telephone	number	(p.	42).	Her	parents	were	non-conformists	and	showered	her	with	attention,	and	they	kept	her	entertained	with	comedy,	love,	and	an	amazing	amount	of	permissiveness	(p.	50-56),	with	one	striking	exception	(pp.	9-10).		One	matter	from	Dillard’s	early	life	that	requires	close	attention	is	the	way	in	which	she	wrote	from	the	perspective	of	a	man.	When	she	was	ten,	her	father	unexpectedly	resigned	from	his	career	and	sailed	down	the	Allegheny	and	Ohio	rivers	for	six	weeks	(pp.	9-10),	and	she	“was	just	waking	up	then,	just	barely”	(p.	10).	Two	years	later,	she	started	to	write	a	nature	narrative	“about	a	man,	a	sort	of	metaphysician,	in	his	fifties”	(Dillard,	1988,	p.	165	as	quoted	in	part	by	Clark,	1991,	p.	168	and	as	cited	by	Slovic,	1992,	p.	67).	After	showing	it	around,	she	decided	to	stop	the	practice	of	writing	as	a	man,	probably	because	she	did	not	like	people’s	reactions	(Dillard,	1988).	This	sample,	with	its	gender-nonconforming	writing,		
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perhaps	even	transgender	writing,	was	the	beginning	of	Tinker	Creek	(pp.	165-166).	
Tinker	Creek	is	curiously	agender,	displaying	a	striking	“effacement	of	authorial	identity”	(Slovic,	1992,	p.	66).	Twenty-five	years	after	its	publication,	Dillard	confessed	that	“Because	a	great	many	otherwise	admirable	men	do	not	read	books	American	women	write,	I	wanted	to	use	a	decidedly	male	pseudonym”	(2007,	p.	280).	Even	after	using	her	real	name	when	Harpers	published	serialized	portions	of	the	text,	she	continued	have	a	desire	to	elide	her	true	gender;	she	wanted	to	publish	her	book	“with	a	decidedly	male	pseudonym”	(p.	280)	as	A.	Dillard,	hoping—as	we	all	hope,	and	hope	in	vain—someone	might	notice	only	the	text,	not	considering	the	jacket,	its	picture,	or	the	advertising;	and	not	remembering	some	one	else’s	impression	of	the	book,	or	its	writer,	or	its	other	readers;	not	knowing	the	writer’s	gender,	or	age,	or	nationality—just	read	the	book,	starting	cold	with	the	first	sentence.	(pp.	280-281)	The	publishers	talked	her	out	of	it,	and	also	convinced	her	to	allow	a	picture	of	her	to	appear	on	the	dust	jacket	(p.	281).	Dillard	adds,	“I	regret	both	decisions.	I	acknowledge,	however,	that	living	in	hiding	would	be	cumbersome”	(p.	281).		 I	suggest	that	Dillard’s	choice	to	write	from	the	perspective	of	a	man	enabled	her	to	be	a	deft	observer	and	nature-writer.	Compared	to	Thoreau,	Dillard	had	none	of	the	Thoreauvian	frugality,	no	problems	with	employment,	and	no	traumatic	deaths	of	siblings.	However,	her	father	did	stage	a	brief	abandonment	of	his	family,	enabled	by	her	mother,	and	she	did	experience	heteronomy	by	allowing	her	queer	desire	to	write	with	a	male	style	and	byline	to	conform	to	conventional	norms.	In	any	event,	Dillard	induced	literalization/demetaphorization:	she	“enact[ed]	a	stylistics	of	bias,	writing	out	the	very	gesture	of	perception	as	a	kind	of	poetics”	(Clark,	1989,	p.	107).	Suzanne	Clark	argued	that	Dillard	invented	this	stylistic	tool,	resisting	the	postmodern	argument	that	“the	subjective	pronoun	I	is	always	male”	(1991,	p.	157,	p.	169).	In	terms	of	rhetorical	invention,	this	is	true.	The	eliding	style	to	which	Clark	refers	is	nothing	new,	and	it	is	a	powerful	way	to	induce	melancholia.	Transgender	people	invent	this	style	by	presenting	a	persona	that	is	different	from	one’s	“subconscious	sex”	and	the	effects	of	it	often	require	medical	assistance	(Serano,	2007,	p.	82).	It	may	even	be	possible	that	writing	from	the	perspective	of	a	man	was	what	her	psyche	wanted,	since	she	wanted	to	use	a	male	pseudonym.	Even	in	that	case,	her	choice	to	abandon	that	male	style	and	byline	at	the	behest	of	others	would	have	had	the	same	result.	Julia	Serano,	a	professional	biologist	and	a	transfemale	activist,	has	described	the	experience	of	gender	dissonance	as	“a	sort	of	gender	sadness—a	chronic	and	persistent	grief	over	the	fact	that	I	felt	so	wrong	in	my	body”	(p.	85).	As	time	goes	on	this	feeling	of	persistent	grief	becomes	a	kind	of	gender	melancholia,	buried	under	a	layer	of	what	Butler	has	referred	to	as	“antimetaphorical	activity”	(quoted	by	Prosser,	2006,	p.	268).		Clark	(1991)	argued	that	Dillard’s	deliberate	eliding	of	feminine	identity	in	
Tinker	Creek	produces	a	dissonance	between	the	text	and	the	obvious	picture	and	name	of	a	female	on	the	book	cover.	The	narrating	subject	is	agender,	but	there	are	several	references	to	men.	For	example,	Dillard	wrote,	“Like	a	blind	man	at	the	ball	game,	I	need	a	radio”	(Dillard,	2007,	p.	54).	The	narrator	makes	no	reference	to	a	woman	or	femininity	at	all	in	this	fashion.	The	only	uses	of	female	pronouns	are	in	
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reference	to	other	insects,	animals,	or	specifically	to	other	women	and	girls	that	are	clearly	differentiated	from	the	narrator.	The	narrator	is	a	hunter,	a	stalker	of	symbols	who	stabs	them	and	forces	them	to	let	their	blood	mark	the	ground.	If	I	did	not	know	who	had	written	the	text,	I	would	probably	have	guessed	that	the	author	was	a	man	who	was	attempting	to	conceal	his	sex.	
Walden	and	Tinker	Creek	are	alike	in	the	sense	that	interpretations	of	their	meaning	can	change	dramatically	depending	on	what	the	reader	knows	about	them.	Thoreau	was	reluctant	to	allow	his	readers	to	know	too	much	about	him	through	his	journal,	and	he	carried	his	secretive	practices	into	his	masterpiece	by	eliding	himself	to	the	point	that	other	people	filled	in	the	gaps	with	legends	and	assumptions.	Perhaps	he	did	this	in	the	hopes	that	his	book	would	attain	its	own	life	and	be	treated	as	an	equal	to	its	reader.	In	the	cases	of	Walden	and	Tinker	Creek,	both	authored	by	literary	giants,	illusive	surveyors	and	self-sounders	are	likely	to	idolize	and	fetishize	the	text,	respectively.	Friends	see	Walden	eye-to-text.	Likewise,	Dillard	went	to	great	lengths	to	conceal	her	gender,	first	by	hiding	it	from	herself,	and	then,	when	the	prospect	of	book	publication	approached	reality,	she	almost	hid	it	from	her	readers	in	the	hopes	of	achieving	parity	with	them.		
Coda		 Readers	of	Walden	are	free	to	identify	themselves	with	the	text	in	any	way	that	they	please.	This	is	a	welcome	improvement	on	A	Week.	Thoreau’s	readers	can	choose	the	role	of	illusive	surveyor,	self-sounder,	or	friend.	If	the	reader	chooses	to	trust	tradition	and	lays	prone	on	its	surface	for	answers,	they	will	coldly	see	what	is	readily	at	hand.	If	the	reader	chooses	self-sounding	and	expects	to	compete	for	the	right	to	its	answers,	they	will	import	an	endless	supply	of	what	they	have	and	their	resolve	will	only	become	stronger.	If	the	reader	chooses	to	befriend	it	with	a	sharing	of	substance	and	meaning,	they	will	work	with	Walden	and	become	something	unexpected.	No	matter	what	paths	they	take,	the	experience	is	sure	to	encounter	some	metaphors.	If	the	reader	is	attentive	enough,	they	might	even	notice	that	many	of	those	metaphors	are	like	newly	minted	coins	that	are	constantly	burying	the	defaced	metaphors	of	old.	This	may	make	the	reader	aware	that	the	person	who	wrote	the	text	experienced	profound	changes	across	a	decade	of	discoveries,	setbacks,	and	insights.	They	will	realize	this	path,	like	any	path	through	life,	is	a	disorganized	mess	of	ironic	lessons	and	loving	offers	of	friendship	with	the	world.	Stable	boundaries,	binaries,	and	bodies	become	recognized	as	useful	illusions.	Finally,	if	the	reader	is	motivated	enough,	they	can	seek	to	become	more	familiar	with	these	myths,	and	gain	an	unexpected	success	in	becoming	a	whole	individual,	one	that	finds	satisfaction	in	the	knowledge	that	true	friendship	involves	parity,	not	deference	or	agony.	As	more	friendships	are	formed	with	Walden,	it	appears	less	like	a	rigid	codex	filled	with	monochromatic	letters,	and	more	like	a	virtual	rainbow	of	life.		 		 	
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Chapter	Four:	Walden’s	Forms		 At	a	certain	season	of	our	life	we	are	accustomed	to	consider	every	spot	as	the	possible	site	of	a	house.	I	have	thus	surveyed	the	country	on	every	side	within	a	dozen	miles	of	where	I	live.	In	imagination	I	have	bought	all	the	farms	in	succession,	for	all	were	to	be	bought,	and	I	knew	their	price.	I	walked	over	each	farmer's	premises,	tasted	his	wild	apples,	discoursed	on	husbandry	with	him,	took	his	farm	at	his	price,	at	any	price,	mortgaging	it	to	him	in	my	mind;	even	put	a	higher	price	on	it—took	everything	but	a	deed	of	it—took	his	word	for	his	deed,	for	I	dearly	love	to	talk—cultivated	it,	and	him	too	to	some	extent,	I	trust,	and	withdrew	when	I	had	enjoyed	it	long	enough,	leaving	him	to	carry	it	on.	This	experience	entitled	me	to	be	regarded	as	a	sort	of	real-estate	broker	by	my	friends.	Wherever	I	sat,	there	I	might	live,	and	the	landscape	radiated	from	me	accordingly.	What	is	a	house	but	a	sedes,	a	seat?—better	if	a	country	seat.	I	discovered	many	a	site	for	a	house	not	likely	to	be	soon	improved,	which	some	might	have	thought	too	far	from	the	village,	but	to	my	eyes	the	village	was	too	far	from	it.	Well,	there	I	might	live,	I	said;	and	there	I	did	live,	for	an	hour,	a	summer	and	a	winter	life;	saw	how	I	could	let	the	years	run	off,	buffet	the	winter	through,	and	see	the	spring	come	in.	The	future	inhabitants	of	this	region,	wherever	they	may	place	their	houses,	may	be	sure	that	they	have	been	anticipated.	An	afternoon	sufficed	to	lay	out	the	land	into	orchard,	wood-lot,	and	pasture,	and	to	decide	what	fine	oaks	or	pines	should	be	left	to	stand	before	the	door,	and	whence	each	blasted	tree	could	be	seen	to	the	best	advantage;	and	then	I	let	it	lie,	fallow,	perchance,	for	a	man	is	rich	in	proportion	to	the	number	of	things	which	he	can	afford	to	let	alone.	—Walden,	Version	E,	circa	1852-1853	(Schacht,	n.d.,	“Where	I	Lived,	and	What	I	Lived	For,”	para.	1)			 At	face	value,	the	epigraph	to	this	chapter	appears	to	be	an	autobiographical	account	of	Thoreau’s	life	and	passion.	It	begins	with	a	casual	account	of	himself	as	a	surveyor,	which	involves	communication	and	interaction	with	his	neighbors	and	the	environment.	However,	the	reader	makes	it	not	even	halfway	through	the	paragraph	before	Thoreau	leaves	his	imagined	series	of	neighbors	and	their	partitioned	lots	behind,	and	goes	on	to	summarize	the	moments	when	he	rested	during	his	daily	walks.	He	sat	long	enough	for	time	to	come	full	circle,	and	followed	where	the	seasons	would	take	him.	He	took	up	residence	at	the	place	where	he	was	sitting,	and	contemplated	the	modifications	and	divisions	that	he	would	have	liked	to	make	to	that	site.	He	considered	each	tree	near	his	curtilage	and	whether	the	tree	should	be	removed,	and	even	thought	of	relocating	his	house	in	deference	to	an	array	of	diseased	trees.	He	concluded	that	it	is	most	profitable	to	do	neither,	but	to	stand	again	and	continue	sauntering.	This	creates	a	mystical	confidence	that	the	next	place	in	which	he	chooses	to	rest	will	also	be	suitable	for	residence	and	imaginary	partitioning,	and	a	healthy	relationship	with	his	surroundings.	
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Beyond	its	face	value,	the	epigraph	perhaps	symbolizes	the	relationship	between	Walden	and	its	reader.	The	paragraph	was	a	relatively	late	addition	to	
Walden.	In	1849,	when	Thoreau	had	published	A	Week,	the	beginning	of	“Where	I	Lived,	and	What	I	Lived	For”	opened	promptly	with	the	business	of	establishing	his	residence	at	Walden	Pond.	Since	the	epigraph	was	produced	by	a	much	more	mature	Thoreau	than	the	one	who	first	endeavored	to	explain	where	he	lived	and	for	what	purpose,	it	makes	sense	that	Henry	Golemba	argued	that	it	is	an	example	of	rhetorical	play	(1990,	p.	214).	I	accept	this	invitation	to	play,	and	I	cultivate	this	fertile	plot	of	text	and	use	it	to	introduce	the	business	of	this	chapter.	
Walden	uses	an	impressive	array	of	literary	devices	as	its	rhetorical	toolkit.	Play	is	just	one	example	of	what	Golemba	referred	to	as	Thoreau’s	“language	of	desire”	(1990,	p.	233,	p.	234),	“a	language	whose	meaning	seems	to	evaporate	as	the	reader’s	eye	follows	Thoreau’s	words,	enticing	the	reader	to	fill	the	gaps	with	his	or	her	own	meaning,	transforming	the	reader	into	a	coauthor	of	the	text”	(p.	7).	Additionally,	in	the	spirit	of	a	language	that	feeds	upon	the	desires	of	the	reader,	Golemba	appropriates	the	words	of	Thoreau’s	friend,	H.	G.	O.	Blake,	who	described	Thoreau’s	prose	as	“a	letter	posted	but	never	quite	delivered”	(p.	228).	We	are	then	asked	to	speculate	as	to	what	that	letter	contains	without	having	it	in	our	possession.	We	cannot	ask	Thoreau	what	he	wrote,	since	he	(other	than	being	deceased)	does	not	have	the	letter	in	his	possession	either.	Its	status	seems	perpetually	in	the	delivery24	between	author	and	reader.	Beyond	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire,	Walden	also	exhibits	larger	formal	structures	that	potentially	disrupt	the	purported	locations	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire.	Irony	is	the	main	trope	that	emerges	from	Thoreau’s	“rhetoric	of	ascent”	(Milder,	1995,	p.	62).	Unlike	Golemba’s	coining	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire,	Milder	defined	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	as	“the	architectural	staircase	designed	to	conduct	the	reader	gradationally	from	one	plane	of	being	to	another	and	to	prompt,	methodize,	and	confirm	the	writer’s	self-transcendence”	(p.	62).	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	turns	its	self-transcendence	on	the	text	itself,	sowing	doubt	about	whether	those	sentences	that	embody	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	and	the	structure	of	his	rhetoric	are	correct.	In	the	previous	chapter,	I	discussed	the	relationship	between	Walden	and	its	reader,	defining	that	relationship	as	a	possible	friendship.	In	Chapter	Two,	I	discussed	Thoreau’s	theory	of	friendship	and	Crosswhite’s	(2010)	analysis	of	it.	In	
Walden,	friendship	occurs	on	a	larger	and	a	smaller	scale.	The	smaller	scale	is	the	context	of	a	collection	of	Pascal’s	vases,	in	which	friends	are	actively	locked	in	an	evanescent	embrace	of	“indwelling”	(p.	166)	that	allows	them	to	give	and	receive	appropriations	of	virtue,	and	because	this	indwelling	is	a	process,	that	virtuous	process	transcends	the	individuals	who	at	any	given	moment	are	engaged	in	friendship	(pp.	168-171).	The	process	will	survive	particular	friendships,	transcending	to	the	larger	scale	of	friendship;	when	friends	drift	apart,	they	carry	on																																																									24	Delivery,	besides	being	a	canon	of	rhetoric,	derives	from	the	Anglo-Norman	French	delivrer	(delivery,	n.d.),	which	means	“to	render	free,	independent”	(délivrer,	n.d.).		
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echoes	of	their	past	friendships,	and	when	they	indwell	with	new	friends,	the	processes	of	friendship	that	had	passed	out	of	sight	resurface,	demonstrating	the	immortality	of	friendship.	At	the	same	time,	friends	and	their	old	processes	of	friendship	are	subjected	to	revision,	destabilizing	virtue.	Like	the	“indwelling”	of	friendship	(Crosswhite,	2010,	p.	166),	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	passes	underneath	his	rhetoric	of	ascent	like	water	under	a	bridge.	There	are	two	basic	scales	of	form.	The	smaller	scale	is	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire.	It	is	the	stream	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	that	makes	it	necessary	for	the	bridge	to	be	built.	The	larger	scale	is	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent,	which	allows	
Walden’s	reader	and	persona	to	cross	over	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire,	change,	and	move	forward	in	the	adventure	of	life.	These	two	simultaneous	occurrences	of	form	make	for	a	complex	interaction,	making	it	necessary	for	me	to	read	the	epigraph	allegorically	so	that	this	chapter	can	review	rhetorical	analyses	of	Walden.	I	see	myself	as	one	of	those	farmers	who	hopes	that	Thoreau’s	persona	will	walk	over	the	foundations	of	my	lifestyle,	taste	the	fruit	of	my	wild	flavor,	improve	the	future	of	my	stock	in	life,	and	make	a	convincing	claim	that	my	word,	my	deed,	is	worth	more	than	it	is.	The	ease	with	which	the	epigraph	lends	itself	to	this	kind	of	reading	suggests	that	there	is	something	queerly	playful	going	on	here.	Thoreau	will	play	this	game	in	the	world	of	imagination	until	just	before	a	permanent	transaction	is	made.	Then,	we	will	part	ways	so	that	I	may	continue	to	cultivate	the	place	of	my	residence	with	the	belief	that	I	have	increased	the	value	of	my	world.		
Walden	saunters	through	this	world,	sometimes	with	wild	unpredictability,	and	then	disrupts	this	routine	each	hour.	If	the	reader	needs	more	of	a	hint	that	Thoreau	is	in	a	serious	mood	to	play,	consider	the	fact	that	Thoreau’s	hour	lived	through	the	four	seasons	and	somehow	induced	the	future	residents	to	believe	that	Thoreau	knew	that	they—we—were	coming.	Walden	does	not	sit	still	for	more	than	an	hour.	In	that	hour,	it	is	possible	to	review	the	contents	of	the	text	and	re-experience	the	transcendence	of	opposed	chapters,	the	descent	into	winter,	and	the	recovery	of	spring	(Buell,	1995;	Milder,	1995;	Bickman,	1992).	Then,	after	that	hour	is	done,	the	text	and	the	reader	continue	sauntering	through	a	wilderness,	having	remade	themselves	and	updated	their	moral	foundations.	The	epigraph’s	two-part	structure,	folded	within	a	single	block	of	text,	is	a	heuristic	for	Walden’s	form	and	framework	for	friendship.	In	the	first	half,	Walden	tells	the	reader	that	its	interactions	with	the	reader	are	happening	in	a	sequential	structure,	with	each	interaction	occurring	in	the	proceeding	present	within	the	reading	experience.	This	is	form	that	occurs	on	a	small	scale,	conversing	with	each	discrete	grower-of-meaning	as	they	are	encountered.	Walden	converses	with	each	moment	of	the	reader,	flourishes	with	the	presence	of	the	reader,	confers	advantage	to	its	dynamic	companion,	and	then	moves	on,	having	done	service	with	a	language	of	desire.	In	the	second	half	of	the	epigraph,	Walden	centers	itself	for	a	longer	period	of	time,	and	beholds	the	reader	as	a	prospective	friend.	The	intervals	of	these	longer	periods	of	contemplation	have	moral	significance.	This	is	form	that	occurs	on	a	large	scale,	anticipating	what	will	appear	after	the	writer	and	reader	alike	have	learned	what	they	can	from	each	other	and	moved	on	as	different	personae.		
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This	chapter	engages	in	the	always-risky	practice	of	creating	perspective	by	incongruity.	As	James	Jasinski	(2001)	has	argued,	the	most	common	way	that	scholars	execute	Burke’s	perspective	by	incongruity	is	through	rhetorical	invention.	“Extending	Burke’s	insight	into	the	relationship	between	metaphor	and	perspective	by	incongruity,”	Jasinski	pointed	out,	“a	number	of	scholars	have	examined	the	use	of	radical	metaphor	(or	catachresis)	as	a	way	of	generating	perspective	by	incongruity”	(p.	434).	Golemba	and	Milder	represent	the	two	perspectives	that	constitute	the	raw	material	for	my	analysis.	Like	my	treatment	of	Buell’s	analysis	of	Thoreau’s	nature-writing	in	the	previous	chapter,	I	will	be	engaging	with	both	Golemba	and	Milder	on	the	finer	points	of	how	they	conceptualize	Thoreau’s	form—specifically,	how	their	forms	interact.	Since	Golemba	and	Milder	have	different	interests	regarding	what	Walden	has	to	offer,	their	two	perspectives	are	somewhat	incongruous.	Buell,	Golemba,	and	Milder	are	each	invested	in	the	idea	of	collaboration	between	reader	and	text,	but	in	different	ways.		 In	this	chapter,	I	examine	the	patterns	created	by	the	interaction	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	and	rhetoric	of	ascent.	Before	I	engage	Golemba’s	and	Milder’s	arguments,	I	review	two	projects	that	are	helpful	in	showing	how	they	interact.	The	first	project	has	to	do	with	Burke’s	concepts	of	literature	as	form	(1931/1968)	and	literature	as	equipment	for	living	(1941/1973).	The	second	cluster	of	research	has	to	do	with	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	(1987)	spatial	analysis	of	the	interactions	between	nomadic	peoples,	the	institutions	of	civilization,	and	the	hybrid	groups	of	itinerant	artisans.	Once	I	have	provided	this	theoretical	framework,	I	discuss	the	forms	as	they	appear	in	Walden.	It	will	not	be	possible	to	provide	an	exhaustive	inventory	of	these	forms	for	two	reasons.	First,	the	particular	forms	as	they	exist	in	
Walden	by	itself	are	multiple,	and	a	complete	inventory	would	exceed	the	scope	of	a	dissertation	(none	of	the	sources	cited	here	attempt	an	exhaustive	inventory	either).	Second,	because	the	forms	are	due	to	change,	dissolve,	and	regenerate	depending	on	who	is	reading	the	text	and	which	pages	are	being	read,	the	potential	number	of	forms	can	be	proliferated	ad	infinitum.		
Review	of	Theory	
	 Burke,	Deleuze,	and	Guattari	are	the	main	theory	sources	for	this	chapter.	Burke’s	theoretical	contributions	are	needed	for	two	reasons.	First,	Burke	has	provided	a	framework	for	the	form	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire.	Second,	Burke	has	defined	literature	as	equipment	for	living,	which	highlights	the	importance	of	the	interaction	between	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	and	his	rhetoric	of	ascent	as	a	model	for	friendship.	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	(1987)	contributions	are	needed	to	show	how	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	and	his	rhetoric	of	ascent	interact	in	a	way	that	produces	mere	agony	for	some	readers	and	robust	friendship	for	others.		
Burke’s	Literature	In	this	section,	I	discuss	Burke’s	discussion	of	literature	as	form	(1931/1968)	and	literature	as	equipment	for	living	(1941/1973).	I	argue	that	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	has	Burkean	form.	That	form	interacts	with	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	to	demonstrate	to	the	reader	how	friendship	provides	frameworks	for	accepting	how	
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the	world	works	(Burke,	1937/1984b).	That	model	demonstration	of	friendship	updates	those	frames	to	create	and	adapt	to	a	dynamic	moral	environment.	The	ethical	updating	exhibited	by	the	Thoreauvian	friendship	in	Walden	is	equipment	for	living.			
Burkean	Form	Burke’s	form	is	useful	here	because	it	helps	illuminate	the	multiple	individuated	forms	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	within	Walden.	Burke	proposed	a	relatively	narrow	definition	of	form	for	literary	experiences	(1931/1968),	and	it	is	compatible	with	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	(2009)	concept	of	desire	(i.e.,	desiring-production)	that	I	use	in	this	dissertation.	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	is	the	second	component	of	the	two-part	sequential	structure	that	Burke	called	literary	form	(1931/1968,	p.	31).	In	Burke’s	typology	(pp.	124-183),	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	fulfills	what	he	would	refer	to	as	repetitive	qualitative	form.	As	far	as	where	form	comes	from,	Burke’s	tracing	of	individuated	forms	to	an	abstract	Symbol	and	then	to	a	pattern	of	experience	(pp.	152-153)	also	applies	in	this	case;	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	derives	from	the	pattern	of	experience	known	as	melancholia,	which	for	many	people	is	a	constant	companion	under	capitalism,	a	primary	reason	why	
Walden	is	durable.	Burke’s	form	is	a	two-part	sequence,	and	it	is	compatible	with	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	philosophy.	In	Burke’s	Counter-statement,	form	is	a	sequence	that	consists	of	two	steps:	the	first	step	arouses	an	appetite,	followed	by	a	second	step	that	adequately	satisfies	that	appetite	(p.	31).	At	first	glance,	it	may	appear	that	this	definition	will	have	to	be	modified	because	it	assumes	that	desire	is	a	lack,	and	as	such,	it	is	incompatible	with	my	deployment	of	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	(2009)	positive	understanding	of	desire.	However,	this	is	not	the	case.	The	important	point	to	keep	in	mind	here	is	that	Burkean	form	is	designed	specifically	to	account	for	desires	in	the	context	of	reading.	With	the	exception	of	some	texts	generated	by	interactive	computer	software,	choose-your-own-adventure	stories,	or	suggestive	prose/poetry	(of	which	Walden	is	a	member),	the	relevant	desires	that	may	be	pursued	by	a	reader	are	done	at	the	behest	of	conventional	meaning	that	is	decoded	during	reading.	For	the	most	part,	readers	simply	do	not	practice	their	desires	the	way	they	normally	do	in	the	business	of	living.	Specifically,	the	only	degrees	of	freedom	that	readers	have	are	the	affirmative	yet	binary	choice	to	stop	or	continue	reading	and	the	relatively	narrow	but	positive	freedom	to	interpret	the	text.	This	is	why	it	is	appropriate	to	describe	the	initial	step	in	Burkean	form	as	the	arousing	of	the	reader’s	desire	in	a	context	that	immediately,	by	virtue	of	the	reading	experience,	restricts	its	independent	pursuit	by	the	reader	until	the	second	step.	The	reader	actually	desires	a	lack.	If	this	lack	is	to	be	satisfied,	the	reader	chooses	to	wait	for	the	text	to	do	the	desiring	for	them	or	finds	some	way	into	greater	interpretive	freedom.		 In	addition	to	laying	out	form’s	textual	structure	as	a	simple	two-part	sequence,	Burke	also	found	it	necessary	to	posit	a	typology	of	forms	(1931/1968,	pp.	123-138),	and	some	of	those	types	apply	to	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire.	That	language	tends	to	exhibit	qualitative	progressions	of	form,	which	escapes	the		
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audience’s	notice	until	the	sequence	completes,	similar	to	inductive	conclusions	(see	pp.	124-125).	The	Burkean	form	that	I	identify	in	Walden	also	tends	to	repeat	(see	p.	125).		 How	artists	invent	the	various	progressions	of	literary	form	was	of	particular	interest	to	Burke	(pp.	138-183),	and	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	can	be	traced	through	this	inventional	process.	Artists	have	various	patterns	of	experience	that	they	use	as	the	material	for	formal	progression,	and	when	a	pattern	is	put	into	a	formula,	it	assumes	the	guise	of	a	Symbol	(pp.	149-153).	Burkean	Symbols	are	derived	from	bodily	processes,	such	as	sleeping	and	awakening,	natural	rhythms	and	cycles,	such	as	the	seasons,	and	recurring	human	situations	or	conditions,	such	as	melancholia	(see	pp.	149-152).	Thoreau’s	melancholia	is	a	pattern	of	his	experience,	which	I	argue	produced	what	I	call	a	“Clarity-Mystery	Symbol,”	of	which	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	is	the	second	part	that	satisfies	the	reader’s	appetite.	Various	literary	forms	owe	their	success	to	the	existence	of	certain	expectations	that	audiences	have	when	they	read	literature,	and	artists	are	keen	to	engineer	their	works	to	appeal	to	enduring	expectations	(pp.	153-158).	Part	of	the	durability	of	Walden	as	a	work	of	literature	is	due	to	the	persistence	of	melancholia	as	a	condition	of	life	under	capitalism.	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	is	instrumental	in	helping	readers	recover	from	that	condition.	This	review	of	Burkean	form	helps	to	illuminate	the	diversity	of	ways	in	which	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	manifests	within	Walden,	and	the	addition	of	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	(1987)	spatial	analysis	will	bring	a	dynamism	to	this	framework.	Because	Walden’s	text	was	designed	to	work	with	meaning	recovered	by	readers	at	strategic	points	(Golemba,	1990),	the	text	owes	much	of	its	enduring	importance	to	the	contributions	of	readers	who	became	published	authors	themselves	(Buell,	1995),	not	to	mention	the	countless	lay	readers	who	only	have	themselves	and	their	acquaintances	for	an	audience.	There	are	endless	examples	in	which	a	particular	scholar	argues	that	a	particular	passage	in	Walden	has	a	particular	meaning.	Years	later,	another	scholar	is	likely	to	produce,	and	indeed	has	produced,	another	reading	of	the	same	passage	with	a	wildly	and	fortuitously	different	result.25	In	response	to	this	freedom,	Golemba	argued	that	there	are	limits	on	Walden’s	meaning.	I	partially	agree	with	Golemba.	My	contention,	however,	is	that	Walden’s	perceived	patterns	of	elasticity	of	meaning	mutate	at	different	points	in	the	reading	process.	As	Golemba	pointed	out,	there	are	moments	when	Walden	reserves	the	reader’s	interpretive	freedoms;	there,	the	prose	does	not	lend	itself	to	multiple	meanings.	In	other	locations,	Golemba	continued,	Walden	deploys	a	rhetorical	device	that	presents	a	supple	turn	of	phrase.	Both	of	these	moments	are	a	product	of	text-reader	interaction.	The	challenge	seems	to	be	that	we	should	ascertain	the	ley	lines	dividing	elasticity	and	rigidity,	as	Golemba	does,	but	my	approach	appreciates	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent,	which	I	argue	causes	those	ley	lines	to	move,	and	explaining	that	movement	requires	the	theoretical	assistance	of																																																									25	The	most	frequently	analyzed	passage	in	Walden,	concerning	Thoreau’s	loss	of	a	dove,	horse,	and	hound,	has	resulted	in	a	cornucopia	of	interpretations	(Cavell,	1972).		
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Deleuze	and	Guattari	(1987).	The	advantage	of	this	approach	is	that	it	becomes	possible	to	understand	why	it	would	be	useful	to	publish	a	document	that	is	often	put	to	seemingly	inappropriate	purposes	(and	within	a	social	environment	in	which	the	standard	of	appropriateness	is	fluid).26	In	other	words,	my	approach	has	the	advantage	of	explaining	aberrant	readings	rather	than	dismissing	them	as	outliers.	The	next	section	shows	how	this	dynamism	can	be	an	effective	demonstration	of	how	friendship	helps	us	be	and	stay	ethical.		
Burke’s	Literature	as	Equipment	for	Living	Burke’s	theory	of	literature	as	equipment	for	living	reveals	that	the	process	of	reading	Walden	yields	directions	that	help	us	locate	the	important	lessons	for	the	changing	circumstances	of	life.	Burke	saw	in	pragmatism	a	call	to	analyze	literature’s	status	as	a	perspective	of	a	situation	so	that	it	might	be	recognized,	put	to	use,	tested,	and	proliferated	(1935/1984a,	1941/1973).	Walden	does	this	by	showing	that	the	necessary	tools	in	its	kit	are	not	located	‘in’	its	pages.	Burke’s	analysis	of	literature	as	equipment	for	living	can	be	broken	down	into	three	key	lessons:	transforming	liabilities	into	assets,	producing	perspective	by	incongruity,	and	responding	to	changing	situations.	Abandoning	a	strict	focus	on	inert	aesthetic	beauty,	which	is	created	by	the	comfortable	for	the	comfortable,	Burke	argued	that	the	most	important	pragmatic	power	of	literature	is	through	its	function	of	equipping	readers	to	deal	with	threats,	with	irony	being	simultaneously	the	most	volatile	and	useful	of	the	lot	(1941/1973),	which	builds	frames	of	rejection	and	acceptance	(Burke,	1937/1984b).	Literature	furnishes	this	equipment	through	the	various	formal	progressions,	showing	the	interrelations	of	situations	and	desires	(1931/1968).	Arousing	appetites	in	the	midst	of	various	situations	and	forcing	readers	to	learn	lessons	about	how	characters	or	personae	pursue	their	desires	helps	prepare	readers	to	turn	“liabilities	into	assets”	(1941/1973,	p.	17).	Doing	this	requires	readers	to	be	able	to	question	their	pieties	and	recognize	the	advantages	and	deficiencies	of	their	“trained	incapacities”	(1935/1984a,	p.	7).	Trained	incapacities	are	important,	partially																																																									26	Golemba	provided	an	example	of	inappropriate	interpreting	of	Walden.	When	Golemba	was	“gnawing	on	this	problem”	of	positing	an	interpretation	that	went	too	far,	he	saw	a	television	advertisement	by	the	National	Bank	of	Detroit	that	exploited	one	of	the	most	famous	and	most	elastic	passages	in	the	“Conclusion”	chapter:	“If	one	advances	confidently	in	the	direction	of	his	dreams,	and	endeavors	to	live	the	life	which	he	has	imagined,	he	will	meet	with	a	success	unexpected	in	common	hours”	(1990,	p.	184).	The	video	that	Golemba	recalled	focused	on	a	boy	who	was	“traipsing	through	the	woods,”	and	simultaneously	dreaming	about	his	future	(p.	184).	According	to	Golemba’s	account,	images	of	a	new	car,	a	house,	a	boat,	and	other	images	of	middle-class	status	flashed	on	the	screen,	obviously	enticing	viewers	to	contemplate	the	bank’s	ability	to	provide	low-interest	loans	so	that	they	could	make	their	similar	dreams	a	reality.	I	would	argue,	however,	that	it	is	because	of	the	advertisement’s	use	of	the	sentence	out	of	its	context	that	allowed	for	such	a	wild	interpretation	to	take	place.		
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because	it	is	the	unfortunate	side	effect	of	specialization	that	affects	all	life,	but	also	because	our	interests	govern	the	critical	tests	of	success	that	would	indicate	whether	it	is	time	to	change	our	perspective	and	reset	our	trained	incapacities	(p.	16,	p.	100-102).	A	change	of	perspective	requires	a	change	in	piety,	and	a	change	in	piety	requires	a	change	in	our	interests	(p.	37-49).	There	are	two	different	kinds	of	perspectives,	or	frames:	frames	of	rejection,	or	“debunking,”	and	frames	of	acceptance	(Burke,	1937/1984b,	pp.	21-25,	pp.	92-107).	The	most	common	frames	simply	debunk,	as	it	happens	in	tragedy,	but	it	is	possible	to	combine	debunking	with	a	frame	of	acceptance,	which	hybridizes	it	into	the	comic	frame	(p.	93-94,	p.	166	as	discussed	by	Carlson,	1986,	pp.	447-448	as	discussed	by	LeBaron,	2010).	A	comic	frame	is	powerful,	as	it	accepts	our	foibles	without	making	ourselves	impervious	to	change,	but	it	is	still	one	perspective.	Our	ability	to	see	a	situation	from	more	than	one	set	of	interests	creates	a	new	perspective	of	a	situation,	a	perspective	by	incongruity	(Burke,	1935/1984a,	pp.	89-96).	A	perspective	by	incongruity	is	a	parallax	view	of	a	situation	and	the	classificatory	means	of	ordering	it	(p.	69-70,	p.	74).	Since	any	perspective	involves	disciplinary	bracketing	and	the	deliberate	overlooking	of	various	patterns	and	phenomena,	it	is	simply	not	possible	for	incompatible	perspectives	to	be	reconciled	so	that	they	can	be	retired	in	favor	of	a	superior	perspective	(Anders,	2011).	The	deliberate	cultivation	of	incongruent	perspectives	is	akin	to	the	discovery	that	there	are	many	ways	to	slice	a	block	of	cheese,	and	that	there	is	no	way	for	a	critic	to	completely	avoid	the	disappointment	(or	outrage)	that	one	feels	when	we	discover	that	our	favorite	method	of	cheese-cutting	is	violated	by	others;	the	judgment	of	impiety	is	a	natural	reaction,	and	is	sometimes	appropriate	(Burke,	1935/1984a,	p.	102-107).	The	abandonment	of	one’s	ability	to	impugn	impiety	interferes	with	one’s	critical	abilities,	making	perspective	by	incongruity	useful	for	studying	the	metaphorical	dimensions	of	a	situation	(p.	107-111).	A	metaphor	is	a	coin:	it	has	two	sides,	and	those	sides	cannot	be	reconciled	into	a	single	image	without	destroying	the	material	and	form	of	the	coin.	Adequately	responding	to	situations	is	one	of	the	main	reasons	to	read	literature,	and	as	critical	beings,	we	look	to	literature	as	equipment	for	living	so	that	we	can	deploy	the	correct	strategy	competently	(Burke,	1941/1973,	p.	293-304).	According	to	Burke,	artists	create	literature	by	programming	their	own	situational	strategies	into	their	art	(p.	301).	We	read	these	stories	so	that	we	can	hope	to	learn	the	strategies	vicariously.	There	are	a	few	important	factors	that	make	this	a	challenging	enterprise.	First,	as	it	is	often	difficult	to	recognize	which	strategies	we	read	should	be	applied	to	the	various	situations	in	our	lives,	similar	situations	may	require	subtle	strategies	and	we	need	to	know	why	difficult	strategies	are	needed	when	easier	ones	are	available	(p.	298-299).	Second,	and	more	importantly,	some	strategies,	such	as	irony,	cannot	be	learned	vicariously,	and	must	be	learned	the	hard	way	by	experiencing	what	it	is	like	to	be	an	alazon	or	by	identifying	with	one	in	the	process	of	reading	(Burke,	1945/1969).	Irony	is	arguably	the	most	difficult	strategy	of	all,	and	as	such,	probably	requires	the	use	of	qualitative	progression	to	convey.	Since	there	is	no	static	guide	on	“How	to	Avoid	Becoming	an	Alazon,”	the			
	 98	
strategy	that	deals	with	it	as	a	human	situation	cannot	skirt	the	necessity	of	becoming	or	identifying	with	an	alazon	(p.	512).	Burke’s	analyses	on	form	and	literature	as	equipment	for	living	are	important	for	the	proceeding	discussion	of	how	forms	are	constructed	and	dissolved.	There	are	definite	forms	that	operate	within	the	reading	experience	of	
Walden,	but	what	makes	the	reading	experience	impossible	master	is	Golemba’s	(1990)	notice	that	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	has	a	tendency	to	“evaporate”	(p.	7).	In	the	next	section,	I	discuss	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	analysis	of	the	historical	struggle	between	nomadic	peoples,	sedentary	peoples,	and	itinerant	peoples	(1987).	Their	analysis	has	identified	an	asymmetrical	process	that	causes	space	to	become	striated,	smoothened,	and	excavated.	Their	spatial	analysis	provides	an	understanding	of	why	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	evaporates,	why	that	special	language	seems	to	be	nomadic,	and	helps	the	current	project	to	capitalize	on	that	instability	and	use	it	as	equipment	for	living	with	friends	instead	of	merely	tolerating	its	agonizing	effects.		
Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	Spatial	Analysis	of	the	War	Machine	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	main	use	in	this	chapter	is	to	analyze	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	and	his	rhetoric	of	ascent	as	two	parallel	processes	that	interact	in	important	ways.	A	Thousand	Plateaus	(1987)	spent	a	significant	amount	of	space	discussing	the	epic	history	of	civilization	and	how	it	involves	various	different	processes.	Deleuze	and	Guattari	were	process	philosophers,	and	so	their	interest	in	how	and	why	spatial	structures	appear	to	change	over	time	is	important	for	explaining	how	and	why	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	interacts	and	morphs	with	his	rhetoric	of	ascent.	In	this	section,	I	first	discuss	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	account	of	the	struggle	between	nomadic	peoples,	sedentary	peoples,	and	itinerant	peoples.	Then,	I	present	their	analysis	of	the	three	respective	spaces	that	are	created	by	those	peoples:	smooth	space,	striated	space,	and	holey	space.		
	 The	War	Machine	Deleuze	and	Guattari	were	interested	in	the	historical	antagonism	between	human	groups	and	how	their	interaction	provokes	war,	and	I	am	interested	in	their	investigation	here	because	it	provides	an	insight	into	why	critics	have	described	
Walden	as	an	agony.	The	human	groups	that	Deleuze	and	Guattari	used	to	theorize	about	the	war	machine	were	the	steppe	nomads	in	Mongolia,	the	sedentary	civilizations	that	provoked	them	to	fight,	and	the	itinerant	metallurgists	who	were	struggling	to	find	professional	survival	in	their	midst.	The	conquests	of	the	Kahn	family	led	to	bloody	battles	in	northeast	Asia,	but	there	was	a	notorious	inability	of	the	nomads	themselves	to	disband	or	destroy;	as	Deleuze	and	Guattari	wrote,	“The	hesitation	of	the	nomad	is	legendary,”	which	led	civilization	to	assimilate	the	techniques	of	the	nomadic	warriors	so	that	it	could	wage	war	(p.	418).	Unfortunately,	this	appropriation	of	nomadic	techniques	and	its	development	into	organized	warfare	has	proven	to	be	just	as	dangerous	to	civilization	as	the	nomads	themselves	(p.	419).	This	danger	came	as	a	result	of	the	State’s	inability	to	allow	nomadic	technique	to	derive	from	its	“rhythmic”	nature	and	not	from	“statistical”		
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analysis	(p.	390).	In	the	midst	of	war,	itinerant	metallurgists	found	a	way	to	form	underground	connections	between	these	two	worlds	(pp.	412-413).	As	I	argue	later	in	this	chapter,	the	danger	that	the	State	creates	for	itself	in	this	interaction	manifests	in	the	literature	on	Walden	in	terms	of	New	Critics	who	wished	to	distill	the	nomadic	war	machine	that	they	surmised	as	an	essential	property	of	Thoreau’s	prose,	ignoring	the	fact	that	that	agony	was	a	product	of	Walden	failing	to	conform	to	a	framework	that	ignored	the	role	of	the	interpreter.		In	this	section,	I	proceed	through	this	presentation	in	three	steps.	First,	I	compare	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	analysis	of	nomadic	peoples	and	sedentary	peoples.	Second,	I	discuss	their	analysis	of	the	hesitation	on	the	part	of	the	nomads	and	the	apparatus	of	capture	that	sedentary	peoples	deploy	to	assimilate	the	nomad’s	war	technique.	Finally,	I	address	their	discussion	of	the	itinerant	peoples	and	how	they	maintain	contact	with	both	nomadic	peoples	and	sedentary	peoples.		For	Deleuze	and	Guattari,	war	is	produced	by	a	continuing	interaction	between	nomadic	peoples	and	sedentary	peoples	(pp.	412-413).	For	Deleuze	and	Guattari,	the	home	of	the	nomad	is	nowhere,	similar	to	the	Thoreauvian	who	walks	“sans	terre”	(Thoreau,	1862,	p.	657).	On	the	one	hand,	the	steppe	nomads	were	fearsome	warriors,	but	they	were,	strictly	speaking,	undisciplined	and	had	a	trained	incapacity	for	organizing	themselves	into	armies,	following	the	commands	of	civil	leaders,	or	becoming	civil	leaders	themselves	(Deleuze	&	Guattari,	1987,	p.	418).	They	knew	how	to	set	their	horses	to	graze	and	how	to	rejuvenate	themselves	by	eating	their	dead	animals	(Rubruck,	1900),	but	they	could	not	become	civilized,	since	that	would	require	becoming	sedentary	and	adopting	a	home	(Deleuze	&	Guattari,	1987,	p.	418).	The	battle	prowess	of	nomads	was	a	significant	source	of	interest	to	sedentary	societies	(p.	404).	The	difficulty	here	is	that	it	is	a	moot	task	to	identify	where	the	actual	innovation	comes	from:	the	nomads	or	the	State	(p.	404)?		The	inability	of	nomadic	peoples	to	take	control	of	civilization	leads	to	a	legendary	hesitation	that	gives	sedentary	peoples	an	opportunity	to	seize	the	nomad	warrior’s	mode	of	operation,	impose	statistical	analysis,	and	adapt	the	art	of	war	for	sedentary	purpose	(p.	390).	The	leaders	of	civilization	had	an	uneasy	success	in	integrating	the	nomad’s	horse	and	technique	into	its	forces,	hence	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	naming	of	the	process	a	war	machine,	as	they	explain	that	it	is	the	encroachment	of	sedentary	society	and	its	appropriation	of	land	that	induces	nomads	to	fight.	The	State	rationalizes	this	provocation	in	the	names	of	national	security	and	resource	availability.	However,	the	way	that	nomadic	peoples	lived	and	fought	was	fundamentally	different	from	the	way	that	civilization	builds	up	structures	and	performs	analysis	(pp.	390-391).	In	the	end,	the	attempts	by	sedentary	peoples	to	take	nomadic	warfare	turned	out	to	be	enormously	productive	and	destructive	at	the	same	time,	leading	to	an	epic	seesaw	between	nomadic	and	sedentary	ways	of	life	(pp.	474-500).	The	danger	that	the	nomadic	war	machine	posed	to	the	State	came	as	a	result	of	the	State’s	inability	to	allow	nomadic	techniques	to	remain	nomadic	(p.	389).	When	the	State	appropriates	nomadic	techniques,	it	tends	to	cherry	pick	and	warps	those	techniques	to	suit	the	ideologies	and	traditions	of	civilization	through	statistics	(p.	390).	Nomads,	by	contrast,	allow	the	“rhythms”	of	nature	to	dictate	
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those	techniques	directly	(p.	390).	For	Deleuze	and	Guattari,	nomads	deploy	a	science	based	on	what	they	called	the	“Numbering	Number”	(1987,	p.	389)	a	quantitative	value	that	acts	autonomously.	In	contrast,	States	deploy	a	science	that	is	based	on	what	Deleuze	and	Guattari	referred	to	as	“the	numbered	number”	(p.	391).	The	difficulty	in	distinguishing	between	the	numbering	number,	which	is	“rhythmic”	(p.	390)	“with	several	[numerical]	bases	at	the	same	time”	(p.	391),	and	the	numbered	number,	which	is	“a	statistical	element”	(p.	390),	is	arguably	the	largest	source	of	problems	in	modern	military	organizations.	An	example	that	illustrates	this	problem	is	the	“rule	of	three”	found	in	the	U.S.	Marine	Corps;	according	to	military	lore,	the	basic	military	organization,	the	fireteam,	functions	effectively	only	if	the	fireteam	leader	is	in	command	of	three	fireteam	members	(Freedman,	1998,	para.	12).	The	same	principle	is	in	place	for	squad	leaders	who	usually	command	three	fireteams,	and	this	sometimes	is	true	for	even	larger	command	structures.	State	science	would	say	that	any	more	than	three	subordinates	always	leads	to	inefficiency,	and	this	conclusion	has	been	reached	because	military	strategists	have	experimented	with	other	command	structures	and	concluded	through	statistical	analysis	that	deviating	from	the	rule	of	three	is	inferior.	In	practice,	however,	as	command	structures	become	larger	in	scale,	this	rule	actually	becomes	less	and	less	important,	and	high	rank	officers	are	often	in	charge	of	more	than	three	subordinate	units	simultaneously.	These	deviations	from	the	rule	are	simply	an	example	of	nomadic	science	permitting	the	numbering	number	to	dictate	the	most	advantageous	command	configuration.	As	Deleuze	and	Guattari	have	explained,	because	there	is	no	clear	connection	between	the	wilderness	homelessness	of	the	nomad	and	the	sedentary	center	of	the	agrarian,	anyone	who	can	make	a	connection	stands	to	reap	advantages	(pp.	404-415).	The	period	of	time	of	interest	to	Deleuze	and	Guattari	for	this	analysis	was	the	fifth	to	fourth	centuries	BCE	in	Asia	(p.	351).	In	this	time	period,	metallurgy	was	a	trade	that	could	be	pursued	professionally,	and	Deleuze	and	Guattari	came	upon	this	topic	because	they	asked,	“How	do	the	nomads	invent	or	find	their	weapons?”	(p.	403).	The	nature	of	the	job	of	the	metallurgist	required	resources	that	had	to	come	from	the	wilderness,	and	required	technology	and	infrastructure	that	only	civilization	could	provide	(p.	409).	There	had	to	be	some	way	for	these	workers	to	get	resources	to	their	foundries,	and	for	Deleuze	and	Guattari,	there	were	two	primary	ways	that	this	was	done.	First,	the	most	primitive	way	was	to	follow	others	until	they	could	find	it,	and	then	bring	it	back	to	the	workshop	(p.	409).	However,	this	is	obviously	risky,	since	going	into	the	wilderness	opened	these	artisans	to	attack	by	the	nomads.	The	artisans	were	able	to	avoid	confrontation	with	the	nomads	by	inventing	a	second	strategy:	hiring	specialized	merchants	to	do	the	job	(p.	409,	p.	415).		The	story	of	the	war	machine	is	an	important	empirical	basis	for	what	has	been	a	notoriously	abstract	discussion	of	three	kinds	of	spaces.	In	the	next	section,	I	present	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	use	of	the	story	of	the	war	machine,	which	shows	how	spatial	structures	affect	each	other.				
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Three	Spaces:	Smooth,	Striated,	Holey		For	Deleuze	and	Guattari,	the	phenomenon	of	space	is	itself	dynamic	and	subject	to	perceptual	changes,	and	these	changes	can	be	observed	in	how	the	text	of	
Walden	is	perceived:	smoothening,	striating,	and	excavating.	Deleuze	and	Guattari	argued	that	these	processes	are	mutually	created:	space	is	striated	because	it	is	experienced	as	smooth,	space	is	smoothened	because	it	has	been	experienced	as	striated,	and	space	is	excavated	because	it	is	difficult	to	discern	the	boundary	between	smooth	and	striated	space.	These	processes	also	have	asymmetrical	existence	(p.	480).	Because	these	processes	operate	in	directions	that	undermine	and	form	the	conditions	for	each	other’s	existence,	there	is	no	space	that	is	purely	smooth,	striated,	or	excavated	(p.	388).	As	I	discuss	later	in	this	chapter,	this	forbidden	purity	and	stability	also	applies	to	Walden’s	prose;	its	text	is	never	perceived	as	purely	smooth,	striated,	or	holey,	and	that	mixture	is	in	flux.	Smooth	space	embodies	the	principle	of	nomos	(p.	481),	which	means	‘law,’	‘custom,’	or	‘melody’	(nomos,	n.d.).	This	principle	is	not	published	by	civil	scientists	or	lawyers,	is	not	ad	hoc,	and	is	not	represented	by	creative	songwriters.	Instead,	this	‘melody’	refers	to	the	self-caused	patterns	and	rhythms	of	nature.	It	is	the	idea	that	when	the	ice	cracks	in	the	spring,	it	is	best	to	listen	and	walk	elsewhere.	Sailors	know	that	the	sea	manages	its	own	affairs,	and	all	historical	efforts	to	chart	the	spatial	limits	of	nautical	reality	have	eventually	highlighted	the	ways	in	which	the	current	understanding	does	not	fit	reality	(p.	479).	Charts	of	individual	oceans	needed	to	be	redrawn	and	navigational	techniques	had	to	be	reviewed	when	the	globe’s	structure	was	unveiled	(p.	479).	Furthermore,	even	after	the	whole	surface	of	the	globe	was	charted,	the	exploration	of	the	air	and	the	abyss	of	space	at	“a	tangent	to	this	sphere”	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	579)	caused	a	strangely	familiar	revolution	in	charting	and	navigation	techniques.	For	the	nomad	as	well	as	the	saunterer,	a	space	is	smoothened	simply	because	someone	else	tried	to	striate	it,	and	it	is	the	moment	in	which	those	striations	are	invalidated	during	major	Kuhnian	paradigm	shifts	(Kuhn,	1996)	that	space	is	instantly	set	smooth	in	our	perception.	At	some	point,	people	did	settle	down	and	became	sedentary,	and	they	needed	to	articulate	the	principle	of	logos	(Deleuze	&	Guattari,	1987,	p.	369,	p.	478),	which	means	‘word’	(logos,	n.d.).	This	is	the	enunciation	of	the	world,	its	laws,	and	the	efforts	of	civilization	to	improve	upon	mere	survival.	The	sea	is	a	dangerous	place,	and	it	can	be	made	immensely	safer	if	ship	captains	know	how	to	expedite	their	crossing	and	have	maps	at	their	disposal.	When	logos	dominates,	the	sailor	goes	the	way	the	calculations	indicate,	even	when	those	calculations	are	slightly	wrong	(p.	479).	Shipping	lanes	facilitate	and	enable	trade,	which	is	enormously	profitable	for	shrinking	the	size	of	the	global	village.	For	the	sedentary	member	of	civilization,	a	space	is	striated	by	considerable	effort,	and	that	effort	is	seen	as	worthwhile	only	when	there	is	no	chart	that	adequately	accounts	for	its	contours	and	when	Kuhnian	normal	science	experiences	a	crisis.	It	only	takes	one	story	of	a	saunterer	stumbling	beyond	the	boundaries	of	a	map	to	inspire	new	theories	of	cartography.	The	smoothness	of	nomos	and	the	striations	of	logos	are	constantly	revising	each	other,	and	this	two-way	interaction	is	asymmetrical	(Deleuze	&	Guattari,	1987,		
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p.	480).	It	is	helpful	to	compare	this	interaction	with	the	processes	of	science	and	performance.	The	process	of	science	has	been	described	by	Thomas	Kuhn	(1996),	since	Kuhn’s	framework	exhibits	the	same	kind	of	asymmetry.	The	performance	model	has	been	described	by	Dwight	Conquergood	(1998).	Kuhn	made	waves	in	academia	when	he	argued	that	science	does	not	progress	linearly,	but	instead	progresses	through	an	alternation	between	normal	science	and	periods	of	crisis.	In	his	framework,	the	crises	sometimes	give	rise	to	paradigm	shifts,	and	some	theories	are	abandoned	and	new	ones	are	created	to	serve	as	the	basis	for	the	next	period	of	normal	science.	In	terms	of	scientific	progress,	this	framework	can	be	simplified	into	the	idea	that	science	sometimes	has	to	take	one	step	backward	to	take	two	steps	forward.	In	addition	to	Kuhn’s	Structure	of	Scientific	Revolutions,	Conquergood	offered	an	argument	that	addresses	the	problematic	relationship	between	mimesis	and	poiesis.	Conquergood	noticed	that	it	is	in	the	circumstances	where	there	are	performing	bodies	in	relationship	with	other	performing	bodies	that	a	space	of	
kinesis	becomes	possible,	giving	rise	to	a	process	of	“breaking	and	remaking”	that	has	been	a	powerful	aid	in	pedagogy,	since	it	dissolves	the	difference	between	teacher	and	student	(p.	32).	These	two	kinds	of	process,	the	cycle	of	normal	science	and	periods	of	crisis	for	Kuhn,	and	the	rhythm	of	breaking	and	remaking	for	Conquergood	(following	Homi	Bhabha;	p.	32),	is	the	same	kind	of	asymmetry	that	Deleuze	and	Guattari	identified	in	the	interaction	between	smooth	space	and	striated	space.	The	smoothening	of	space	does	not	erase	the	progress	achieved	by	the	striation	of	space,	but	it	does	involve	a	crisis	in	which	an	upheaval	resets	a	striated	space	into	a	smooth	space	(p.	480).	The	gradient	of	the	next	space	smoothening	is	dictated	by	the	misalignment	between	nomos	and	logos,	which	is	an	epistemic	problem.	Over	time,	each	movement	of	striation	and	smoothening	brings	about	some	kind	of	revision,	and	the	revision	harbors	the	seeds	of	a	future	smoothening	of	space.	It	is	impossible	to	predict	the	places	and	scales	that	space	will	be	smoothened	or	striated	next.	The	volatile	interaction	between	smoothening	and	striating	space	creates	a	hybrid	method	of	following	that	unveils	the	exciting	life	of	matter	(pp.	404-415).	The	itinerant	follows	the	work,	and	stays	as	long	as	there	is	a	living	to	be	made	(p.	409).	For	carpenters	and	woodworkers,	the	act	of	transforming	wood	into	lumber	requires	the	artisan	to	follow	the	grain	of	the	wood	and	to	understand	the	itinerant	lives	of	trees	(p.	409).	However,	for	woodworkers,	this	following	has	a	stationary	base	of	operation:	a	workshop	with	heavy	equipment	and	controlled	environmental	conditions.	This	fusion	of	deference	to	nature	and	sedentary	accumulation	of	infrastructure	produces	many	surprises	regarding	how	matter	functions.	For	Deleuze	and	Guattari,	“what	metal	and	metallurgy	bring	to	light	is	a	life	proper	to	matter,	a	vital	state	of	matter	as	such,	a	material	vitalism	that	doubtless	exists	everywhere	but	is	ordinarily	hidden	or	covered,	rendered	unrecognizable,	dissociated”	(p.	411).	According	to	Deleuze	and	Guattari,	metallurgists	were	the	first	specialized	artisans,	and	their	emergence	coincided	with	the	formation	of	secret	groups,	guilds,	and	associations	(p.	412).	The	opacity	of	these	groups	and	the	secrecy	of	their	machinations	produce	the	appearance	of	subterranean	networks,		
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with	artisans	who	seem	to	disappear	and	reappear	elsewhere,	unexpectedly	(p.	412).	 Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	development	of	the	smooth,	the	striated,	and	the	excavated	is	an	important	way	of	thinking	about	how	Walden’s	forms	causes	changes	to	how	it	appears	to	readers.	These	changes	are	not	caused	entirely	by	the	text	itself,	and	the	reader	is	not	solely	responsible	for	Walden’s	instability.	The	remainder	of	this	chapter	is	devoted	to	analyzing	different	levels	of	scale	in	Walden	and	how	they	interact.		
Thoreau’s	Language	of	Desire		 Thoreau’s	“language	of	desire”	(Golemba,	1990,	p.	7)	fulfills	the	reader’s	appetites,	rounding	out	the	second	step	of	Burkean	form.	It	should	be	pointed	out	that,	before	1849,	Thoreau	was	already	familiar	with	the	art	of	writing	vagueness	into	his	prose,	due	to	his	process	of	literalization	(Arsić,	2016).	More	than	simply	writing	with	an	occasional	flair	for	the	mysterious,	Thoreau’s	breakthrough	involved	the	development	of	a	Burkean	Symbol	that	utilized	his	ability	to	construct	sentences	with	mysterious	deficits	of	clarity.	Clarity	is	the	foundation,	interspersed	with	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	(Golemba,	1990).	In	each	of	the	individuated	forms,	more	inviting	sentences	and	paragraphs	provide	special	contrast,	producing	a	striated	alternation	between	a	check	on	the	free	exercise	of	interpretation	and	an	open	permission	to	interpret	(p.	7).	This	give	and	take	is	the	same	kind	of	giving	and	receiving	that	occurs	in	healthy	friendship.		 To	substantiate	this	argument,	this	section	proceeds	in	two	steps.	First,	I	use	J.	Lyndon	Shanley’s	(1957)	first	version	of	Walden	to	prove	that	Thoreau	already	knew	how	to	construct	vague	passages	before	1849.	Second,	I	present	Golemba’s	arguments	and	discuss	some	examples	that	he	extracted	from	Walden	that	exhibit	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire.		 Before	I	discuss	these	topics	in	this	section,	it	is	important	to	point	out	that	the	boundary	between	this	section	and	the	next	section,	which	discusses	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent,	cannot	be	perfectly	discrete.	Ultimately,	I	argue	that	these	scales	of	form	have	a	fuzzy	boundary	that	gives	rise	to	a	holey	space	at	the	borderlands.	Because	of	this	fuzziness,	it	will	not	be	possible	to	separate	the	scales	of	form	completely.		
Walden’s	Form	before	the	Crisis		 Thanks	to	Shanley’s	reconstruction	of	the	first	version	of	Walden,	it	is	easy	to	establish	that	Thoreau	knew	how	to	deploy	sentences	that	ended	up	inviting	interpretive	play	before	1849.	To	provide	an	example,	I	analyze	Thoreau’s	famous	passage	about	losing	a	dog,	a	horse,	and	a	bird.	The	context	in	which	the	passage	appears	does	not	lend	itself	to	the	alternations	of	rigidity	and	elasticity	that	Thoreau	added	to	Walden	after	1849.	Instead,	this	passage	is	vague	because	it	was	written	so	that	almost	any	contemporary	reader	would	identify	with	the	author,	connect	with	his	feelings	of	loss	and	his	quest	for	recovery,	and	agree	with	his	conclusion.	The	purpose	of	this	identification	is	to	induce	the	reader	to	understand	that	Thoreau	and	the	reader	shared	a	kinship	regarding	their	experiences	of	nature’s	secrets.	
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	 Before	I	analyze	the	passage	about	Thoreau’s	lost	dog,	horse,	and	bird,	I	want	to	quote	the	passage	closer	to	its	original	context	and	then	make	an	easy	conclusion	about	why	the	passage	has	sparked	so	many	interpretations:	You	will	pardon	some	obscurities,	for	there	are	more	secrets	in	my	trade	than	in	most	men’s	and	yet	not	voluntarily	kept,	but	inseparable	from	its	very	nature.	I	would	gladly	tell	all	that	I	know	about	it,	and	never	paint	“No	Admittance”	on	my	gate.	[para.	23]	I	long	ago	lost	a	hound,	a	bay	horse,	and	a	turtledove,	and	am	still	on	their	trail.	Many	are	the	travellers	I	have	spoken	concerning	them,	describing	their	tracks	and	what	calls	they	answered	to.	I	have	met	one	or	two	who	had	heard	the	hound,	and	the	tramp	of	the	horse,	and	even	seen	the	dove	disappear	behind	a	cloud,	and	they	seemed	as	anxious	to	recover	them	as	if	they	had	lost	them	themselves.	[para.	24]	To	anticipate,	not	the	sunrise	and	the	dawn	merely,	but,	if	possible,	Nature	herself!	How	many	mornings,	summer	and	winter,	before	yet	any	neighbor	was	stirring	about	his	business,	have	I	been	about	mine!	No	doubt,	many	of	my	townsmen	have	met	me	returning	from	this	enterprise,	farmers	starting	for	Boston	in	the	twilight,	or	woodchoppers	going	to	their	work.	It	is	true,	I	never	assisted	the	sun	materially	in	his	rising,	but	doubt	not,	it	was	of	the	last	importance	only	to	be	present	at	it.	[para.	25]	So	many	autumn,	ay,	and	winter	days,	spent	outside	the	town,	trying	to	hear	what	was	in	the	wind,	to	hear	and	carry	it	express!	I	well-nigh	sunk	all	my	capital	in	it,	and	lost	my	own	breath	into	the	bargain,	running	in	the	face	of	it.	If	it	had	concerned	either	of	the	political	parties,	depend	upon	it,	it	would	have	appeared	in	the	Gazette	with	the	earliest	intelligence.	At	other	times	watching	from	the	observatory	of	some	cliff	or	tree,	to	telegraph	any	new	arrival;	or	waiting	at	evening	on	the	hill-tops	for	the	sky	to	fall,	that	I	might	catch	something,	though	I	never	caught	much,	and	that	manna-wise,	would	dissolve	again	in	the	sun.	[para.	26]	(1985,	p.	336)	It	is	safe	to	say	that	the	passage	that	discusses	the	dog,	the	horse,	and	the	bird—paragraph	24—is	not	about	animals.	Since	Thoreau	probably	did	not	own	any	animals	beyond	feeding	them	on	occasion,	the	reader	is	waved	away	from	a	literal	interpretation,	and	this	is	what	has	inspired	so	many	interpretations.	Their	use	here	seems	to	be	a	parable	about	something	else,	which	can	be	informed	by	examining	the	context	of	the	surrounding	paragraphs.	Thoreau’s	dog,	horse,	and	bird	were	lost	so	that	his	reader	could	identify	with	a	persona	who	is	about	to	show	that	the	secret	of	nature	is	secure;	alternative	interpretations	exist	because	of	a	failure	to	consider	text	that	appears	before	and	after	the	passage.	Stanley	Cavell	(1972)	argued	that	it	is	not	important	to	decode	the	symbols	that	connect	with	these	specific	animals.	Instead,	argued	Cavell,	we	connect	with	the	topic	of	loss	more	deeply	than	our	connections	with	these	animals	or	whatever	they	may	represent,	as	Thoreau	was	supposedly	connecting	with	loss	because	“he	has	not	reached	the	secrets	of	his	trade”	(p.	49).	If	I	had	quoted	the	passage	out	of	context,	then	Cavell’s	reading	would	seem	to	be	appropriate	and	complete.	Indeed,	we	are	supposed	to	identify	with	Thoreau.	However,	I	have	a		
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larger	reading;	there	is	more	to	this	form,	reaching	into	the	surrounding	text	and	enveloping	paragraph	24.	The	theme	of	this	form	is	anticipation	of	an	unbreakable	secret,	being	exposed	to	it,	and	then	learning	that	it	is	secure.	Before	my	quotation	begins	in	paragraph	23,	Thoreau	had	been	offering	his	awkward	forensic	deliberations	about	how	he	had	“desired	to	spend”	his	past	years	and	thinking	about	how	to	get	more	time	out	of	each	second	(1985,	pp.	335-336).	Ignoring	the	passages	after	paragraph	24,	it	makes	sense	that	Cavell	would	fixate	on	an	allegory	of	loss.	Nevertheless,	after	paragraph	24,	Thoreau	then	applies	this	urge	to	recover	loss	to	his	nature	walks	in	the	early	morning.	Like	the	reader	trying	to	recover	a	lost	secret	from	Thoreau’s	lost-animals-paragraph,	Thoreau	too	had	tried	to	do	the	same	in	the	blowing	wind.	Alas,	he	merely	“lost	[his]	own	breath	into	the	bargain.”	Thoreau’s	use	of	the	word	“bargain”	is	ironic,	since	it	only	occurs	in	Walden	when	loss	is	conspicuous.27	Besides,	nature’s	secret	has	never	really	been	lost	because	we	never	had	it,	just	as	Thoreau	never	really	had	those	animals.	My	reading	of	the	vagueness	of	the	animals-paragraph	is	a	way	for	Thoreau	to	speak	to	many	audiences	who	have	experienced	their	own	particular	losses	when	they	thought	they	had	a	bargain.	Trying	to	listen	for	words	uttered	by	gusts	of	wind,	or	trying	to	watch	all	come	and	go,	or	trying	to	catch	the	falling	sun,	or	something	that	you	thought	you	had…	none	of	these	are	likely	to	be	remembered	beyond	childhood,	and	so	the	losses	of	various	animals,	which	were	common	in	the	19th	century,	would	make	for	better	rhetorical	identification	so	that	the	reader	can	be	warned	that	the	symbolism	of	the	dog,	horse,	and	bird	is	truly	Thoreau’s	secret.28																																																									27	“Bargain”	is	always	used	ironically	in	Walden.	In	“Economy,”	‘bargain’	is	used	three	times.	The	first	use	is	in	the	quoted	passage,	providing	maturity	to	his	attempt	to	hear	the	wind	speak.	The	second	use	of	‘bargain’	in	“Economy”	refers	to	the	Irish	shanty	that	Thoreau	purchased	for	the	lumber	that	would	be	used	to	sheathe	his	cabin.	There,	Thoreau	had	carefully	pulled	the	nails	from	the	lumber	and	gathered	them	for	reuse	in	his	cabin.	Unfortunately,	another	Irishman	stole	them	while	Thoreau	was	gone.	The	last	occurrence	of	‘bargain’	in	“Economy”	refers	to	Thoreau’s	years	teaching,	and	he	laments	that	he	had	lost	his	“time	into	the	bargain”	(1985,	p.	377).	After	“Economy,”	‘bargain’	reappears	in	“Baker	Farm.”	There,	Thoreau	uses	the	word	‘bargain’	twice	to	describe	the	bad	deals	that	John	Field	received	in	his	lifestyle	choices	involving	his	work	and	his	extravagant	diet.	The	last	occurrence	of	‘bargain’	in	Walden	is	in	“The	Pond	in	Winter.”	The	epigraph	to	Chapter	Three	of	this	dissertation	contains	this	appearance	of	‘bargain,’	which	refers	to	the	illusive	surveyor	getting	“watery	eyes”	by	lying	on	the	ice.	28	Thoreau’s	insight	into	this	kind	of	unbreakable	secret	may	have	been	discovered	early	in	his	relationship	with	Emerson’s	daughter,	Edith.	In	a	letter	on	February	10,	1843,	he	wrote	about	her	unique	words,	praising	the	way	in	which	“she	talks	a	language	of	her	own	while	she	understands	ours”	(quoted	by	Golemba,	1990,	p.	223).	This	semi-baby-talk	produces	a	mode	of	communication	that	“never	descends	to	explanation,”	and	secures	an	uncommon	secret	with	“an	eternal	silence”	(p.	224).	It	is	interesting	that	Thoreau	should	notice	that	Edith’s	stories	should	be	so	effective			
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Vague	and	mysterious	sentences	are	not	the	key	to	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire.	If	they	were,	religious	scripture	would	be	far	less	interesting	and	enduring,	and	the	wind’s	political	secrets	would	be	old	hat.	Furthermore,	it	would	be	enough	simply	to	tell	a	story	about	irony	that	did	not	require	the	audience	to	identify	with	an	alazon,	rather	than	inducing	the	reader	to	experience	irony	for	themselves.29	Nevertheless,	symbolic	obscurity	is	a	key	to	the	Symbol	that	I	am	trying	to	articulate.	
	
Symbolizing	Thoreau’s	Language	of	Desire		Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	participates	in	what	I	call	a	“Clarity-Mystery”	Symbol.	The	initial	step	in	the	Burkean	format,	the	arousal	of	appetite,	is	“Clarity.”	This	is	the	textual	moment	in	which	we	are	searching	for	a	way	to	adapt	Thoreau’s	uncompromising	philosophies	to	our	lives.	Alternately,	the	consummating	step	in	the	Burkean	format,	the	adequate	satisfaction	of	appetite,	is	“Mystery.”	This	is	the	textual	moment	in	which	Thoreau	hands	us	the	reins,	and	we	indulge	in	our	interpretive	freedom.	This	Symbol	often	repeats	itself	using	different	rhetorical	devices.	When	Walden	is	analyzed	in	this	way,	the	space	of	the	text	is	striated,	sometimes	repeating	itself	with	grooves	of	Clarity-Mystery-Clarity-Mystery-etc.	It	is	important	to	recognize	that	this	analysis	does	not	exclude	other	forms	and	other	ways	of	reading	the	text.	The	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol	is	not	ubiquitous	in	Walden;	it	is	simply	one	part	of	its	formal	ecosystem,	and	there	are	structural	patterns	that	do	not	appear	to	be	instances	of	Burkean	form.	Some	portions	maintain	clarity,	while	other	portions,	such	as	the	‘Secrecy-Identification-Clarity’	passage	about	Thoreau’s	animals,	do	not	neatly	fit	into	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol.	In	this	section,	I	present	my	argument	in	two	steps.	First,	I	present	Golemba’s	argument	and	my	remedial	objections.	Then,	once	the	framework	for	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	has	been	laid	out,	I	discuss	some	examples.		
Befriending	Thoreau’s	Agony	of	Language	Golemba’s	analysis	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	is	the	basis	for	my	presentation	of	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol.	Golemba	argued	that	there	are	repeated	instances	in	which	Walden	alternates	between	two	different	kinds	of	voices.	One	of	these	voices	is	what	Golemba	referred	to	as	the	“primary	voice”	(1990,	p.	214).	This	primary	voice	gives	way	to	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	long	enough	for	a	rhetorical	device	to	stage	its	disruption	of	clarity.	Then,	once	order	has	been	toppled,	the	primary	voice	returns,	leaving	the	reader	perpetually	off	balance	and	unable	to																																																																																																																																																																						because	of	her	refusal	to	explain	herself;	his	argument	predates	a	similar	argument	made	by	Walter	Benjamin,	who	argued	that	“it	is	half	the	art	of	storytelling	to	keep	a	story	free	from	explanation	as	one	reproduces	it”	(2007,	p.	89).	29	The	first	paragraph	of	“The	Ponds”	contains	an	allegory	that	tells	the	reader	that	the	true	flavor	of	the	huckleberry	cannot	be	carted	to	town,	but	must	be	eaten	by	the	hand	that	picked	it.	If	it	is	not,	then	the	vessel	used	to	transport	the	fruit	to	will	rub	off	the	“ambrosial	and	essential	part	of	the	fruit”	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	461).	The	fact	that	Thoreau	added	this	observation	in	Clapper’s	Version	E	(1852-1853;	Schacht,	n.d.)	reinforces	the	point	that	irony	cannot	be	learned	vicariously.		
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locate	truth	anywhere	except	in	the	“agon	over	language’s	inability	to	communicate	profound	truths”	(p.	233).	Like	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	war	machine,	this	agon	is	real,	but	it	is	hardly	the	whole	story.	The	diversity	of	these	rhetorical	devices	not	only	conceals	its	underlying	Symbol,	but	it	also	forms	connections	to	other	portions	of	the	text.	Furthermore,	beyond	the	tension	between	Thoreau’s	primary	voice	and	his	language	of	desire,	it	is	possible	to	glimpse	a	calming	demonstration	of	friendship	that	engages	friends	both	near	and	far.	I	believe	that	the	primary	voice,	which	Golemba	posited	in	Walden,	is	an	unnecessarily	agonizing	fusion	of	voices	that	Thoreau	uttered	during	the	nine	years	of	the	book’s	composition.	One	of	these	pictures	of	a	primary	voice	that	Golemba	painted	solidifies	the	coauthoring	process	into	one	specific	message	about	“language’s	inability	to	communicate	profound	truths”	(p.	233),	and	puts	Golemba	temporarily,	self-consciously,	out	of	Buell’s	company.	Golemba’s	thinking	at	this	point	is	Hegelian	in	his	insistence	that	Walden’s	co-authoring	ultimately	drives	toward	a	purpose,	and	that	purpose	is	the	discounting	of	the	truth-finding	powers	of	language.	Here	Golemba	has	presented	a	“Thoreau”	in	such	a	way	that	there	is	a	
primus	inter	pares	(“first	among	equals”;	primus	inter	pares,	n.d.;	Burke,	1941/1973,	p.	516),	a	kind	of	fusion	of	Thoreauvian	voices	that	subversively	assaults	language	simply	to	expose	its	limitations.	Ironically,	Golemba’s	attempt	to	synthesize	a	purpose	for	this	carnival	diminishes	Walden’s	interpretive	fertility.	As	indeterminate	as	Golemba	found	Walden,	deeming	the	text’s	meaning	indeterminate	is	itself	determining.	Golemba	even	noticed	this,	which	suggests	that	even	he	acknowledged	that	it	is	necessary	to	know	what	it	is	like	to	become	the	alazon:	Regardless	whatever	value	has	been	found,	his	language	involves	loss.	His	wild	rhetoric	finds	power	in	that	loss	as	a	way	to	intensify	desire,	to	enkindle	the	hope	that	writer	and	reader	could	correspond	if	only	they	practiced	more	“ardor	and	devotion.”	If	only	we	read	his	letters	more	closely,	or	more	often,	or	read	more	of	his	writings,	or	more	interpretations	of	other	readers,	or	more	writings	by	authors	he	has	read,	somehow	we	could	arrive	at	a	settled	understanding	of	what	he	means.	Some	of	us	will	pretend	that	we	have	in	fact	achieved	such	an	understanding.	Then	the	“Expedition”	can	end,	the	searching	cease,	the	frustration	rest.	In	that	hubristic	moment	when	readers	pose	as	“some	Oedipus,”	proud	about	having	“solved”	one	of	language’s	enigmas,	the	Sphinx	of	language	“will	go	dash	her	head	against	a	rock.”	(Golemba,	1990,	p.	235)	Even	though	Golemba	hedged	his	claim	by	admitting	that	“indeterminacy	may	be	indeterminate”	(p.	8),	his	answer	to	Thoreau’s	Sphinx	(especially	his	fixed	matrix	of	alternation	between	clarity	and	mystery)	limits	the	possibilities.	If	Thoreau’s	point	in	1854	was	simply	to	show	that	there	is	a	higher	order	of	truth	that	language	cannot	adequately	describe,	then	the	final	pages	of	A	Week,	which	concluded	that	“the	most	excellent	speech	finally	falls	into	Silence”	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	318),	would	have	made	another	labor-intensive	book	superfluous.	Golemba	was	closer	to	being	correct	by	linking	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	to	a	carnival	(1990,	p.	2014),	which	is	forever	open	to	change.	A	carnival	is	also	not	necessarily	agonizing	for	all	witnesses,	although	it	does	have	that	relationship	with	the	State	(Stallybrass	&	White,	1986).	If		
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the	reader	accepts	Burke’s	ironic	conclusion	about	adopting	the	position	of	the	
primus	inter	pares	and	instead	prepares	for	the	necessity	of	returning	to	a	smooth	space,	then	the	agony	of	language	that	Golemba	posited	can	be	adjusted	into	a	comic	relationship	that	fosters	and	challenges	the	limits	of	friendship.	The	language	of	desire,	which	Golemba	positioned	in	the	interstices	of	
Walden’s	primary	voice,	is	a	collection	of	rhetorical	devices	that	gives	the	reader	clearance	to	take	flights	of	interpretation.	There	are	two	reasons	for	this	variety.	First,	diversity	maintains	the	subtlety	of	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol.	Second,	and	more	importantly,	this	diversity	conceals	the	fact	that	there	are	two	types	of	Mystery	devices:	one	that	functions	as	a	self-contained	Mystery	in	the	textual	here-and-now,	and	another	that	requires	a	reference	to	a	faraway	moment	elsewhere	in	
Walden	or	outside	the	text.	The	rhetorical	devices	that	Thoreau	used	to	execute	his	language	of	desire	are	diverse,	and	this	variety	conceals	the	underlying	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol.	Golemba	named	several	devices	that	Thoreau	used	to	create	his	language	of	desire:	ambiguity,	exaggeration,	indirection,	paradox,	parody,	and	play	(1990,	p.	214).	My	impression	is	that	Golemba	thought	that	these	devices	are	items	in	a	kind	of	writer’s	grab	bag,	whereby	Thoreau	had	access	to	enough	of	a	diversity	of	rhetorical	devices	to	produce	Mystery	that	the	reader	would	be	unlikely	to	recognize	the	underlying	Symbol.	If	a	species	of	life	is	diverse	enough,	it	cannot	be	recognized	as	a	species.	To	some	extent,	I	think	this	is	true	for	Walden	as	well,	since	as	soon	as	the	reader	starts	to	track	the	Symbol	through	the	text,	the	reader	is	no	longer	participating	in	the	alternation	between	frustration	and	freedom,	but	is	instead	fixated	on	recognizing	the	devices.	As	long	as	the	Symbol	remains	subtle,	the	reader	can	be	called	on	to	give	meaning.	Nevertheless,	I	think	that	there	is	a	more	important	reason	for	this	diversity	than	simply	keeping	the	reader	on	task.		The	rhetorical	devices	that	Golemba	identified	can	be	divided	into	two	groups	by	how	they	function.	Some	of	these	devices	function	without	much	else	than	to	be	placed	in	the	Clarity-Mystery	sequence.	For	instance,	an	ambiguous	sentence	does	not	cease	being	ambiguous	if	it	is	taken	out	of	context.	If	anything,	it	becomes	more	ambiguous.	This	is	also	the	case	with	indirection.	These	devices	can	be	quoted	out	of	context	without	them	devolving.	However,	the	other	devices,	which	include	exaggeration,	paradox,	parody,	and	especially	play	(Bateson,	2000),	cannot	be	removed	from	their	contexts	without	harming	our	ability	to	recognize	them.	To	know	exaggeration,	we	need	to	know	what	is	being	exaggerated.	Paradox	requires	awareness	of	statements	elsewhere	in	the	intratextual	environment	to	produce	the	experience	of	inconsistency.	If	the	inconsistent	passages	are	severed	from	each	other,	then	paradox	disappears.	Parody	also	requires	awareness	of	statements	made	elsewhere,	but	it	is	different	from	paradox	because	it	refers	to	styles	that	exist	intertextually.	If	the	reader	lacks	awareness	of	the	shadow	style	to	which	parody	refers,	then	parody	devolves	into	mere	absurdity.	Similarly,	if	a	witness	to	play	misses	the	“metacommunicative”	(p.	188)	“play	frame”	(p.	185),	then	play	becomes	serious.	This	functionality	of	the	rhetorical	devices	used	to	execute	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	can	be	read	as	an	allegory	of	friendships	that	exist	in	our	midst	as		
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well	as	distant	friendships	that	do	not	exist	here	and	now.	Since	the	variety	of	rhetorical	devices	keeps	the	reader	on	the	task	of	giving	or	recovering	meaning,	these	devices	keep	the	friendship	between	text	and	reader	alive.	Without	the	variety,	the	reader	is	at	a	higher	risk	of	discovering	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol	and	disrupting	the	receiving	and	giving	that	needs	to	occur	for	the	process	of	friendship	to	take	place.	There	is	a	real	price	to	be	paid	for	this	formal	understanding.	Furthermore,	beyond	the	immediate	possibility	of	friendship	between	Walden	and	its	reader,	there	is	an	echo	of	the	kind	of	relationship	that	we	have	with	our	friends	that	are	not	in	our	immediate	circle.	Most	of	our	friends	are	distant	from	us	in	terms	of	sheer	proximity;	long-distance	by	itself	does	not	dissolve	friendship.	The	use	of	exaggeration,	paradox,	parody,	and	play—the	rhetorical	devices	that	function	by	virtue	of	distance—are	analogies	for	long-distance	friendship	when	they	fulfill	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire.	Our	acquaintances	might	do	or	say	things	in	our	presence	that	enter	our	long	term	memories,	and	most	of	the	time	those	memories	are	given	no	further	thought.	Then,	when	we	encounter	a	situation	that	causes	those	memories	to	resurface,	and	if	we	are	lucky	to	remember	where	the	memory	came	from,	we	might	realize	that	our	old	acquaintance	was	perhaps	a	friend.	The	same	happens	to	others	who	have	received	our	pearls	of	wisdom.	Walden	helps	us	recognize	this	potential,	and	shows	us	that	all	strangers,	even	the	sour	ones	long	gone,	may	continue	to	impart	virtue.	The	giving	and	receiving	that	occurs	during	the	individuated	forms	of	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol	can	feel	like	a	struggle.	The	affinity	between	agony	and	friendship	demonstrates	that	the	negotiation	of	meaning	in	speech	communication	can	be	either	beneficial	or	harmful,	with	a	thin	line	in	between,	a	topic	that	I	return	to	later	in	this	chapter.	Ambiguity,	exaggeration,	indirection,	paradox,	parody,	and	play	is	a	diverse	set	of	rhetorical	devices	that	maintain	the	subtlety	of	Thoreau’s	Mystery,	and	this	population	is	large	enough	that	they	can	function	locally	and	globally	in	Walden’s	textual	environment.	This	maintains	the	alternation	between	giving	and	receiving	meaning	between	text	and	reader	that	does	friendship	in	a	way	that	Thoreau	merely	described	in	exquisite	detail	in	A	Week.	Not	only	does	this	move	Thoreau	beyond	the	theoretical	into	the	practical,	a	matter	that	is	of	critical	importance	in	Chapter	Five	and	the	Conclusion,	but	it	also	furnishes	the	current	discussion	with	some	examples	of	formal	progression.		
Individuated	Forms	of	Thoreau’s	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol	While	there	is	no	shortage	of	examples	of	Thoreau’s	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol,	it	makes	sense	to	begin	with	one	that	has	already	been	quoted	in	this	chapter.	The	epigraph	for	this	chapter,	the	opening	paragraph	of	“Where	I	Lived,	and	What	I	Lived	For,”	individuates	the	Symbol.	The	first	seven	paragraphs	of	that	chapter	were	added	after	1849	(Schacht,	n.d.),	and	those	passages	were	central	to	Golemba’s	attempt	to	reverse	engineer	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire.	The	frequency	with	which	Thoreau	repeated	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol	in	these	seven	paragraphs	is	reason	enough	to	tap	the	beginning	of	its	rich	vein	of	examples.	In	addition	to	the	epigraph,	I	also	discuss	an	example	of	paradox	in	Thoreau’s	“Higher	Laws”	chapter,	which	later	in	this	chapter	serves	as	the	breaking	of	ground	into	the	holey	space	of	Walden.	
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According	to	Golemba,	Thoreau	interrupts	his	primary	voice	several	times	in	the	opening	paragraphs	of	“Where	I	Lived,	and	What	I	Lived	For.”	It	is	perhaps	important	to	clarify	that	Golemba	did	not	define	this	pattern	in	terms	of	Burkean	form.	For	Golemba,	the	first	pattern	that	he	noticed	there	was	a	“three-part	structural	pattern—Play,	then	Sentence,	followed	by	Parodic	Release”	(p.	214).	These	elements	are	often	sparsely	diffused	in	larger	passages.	Sentence	“echoes	the	primary	voice,”	whereas	Play	and	Parodic	Release	are	incarnations	of	punning	and	exaggeration,	respectively	(p.	214).	While	my	formal	analysis	does	not	fit	Golemba’s	reading,	since	Burkean	form	consists	of	two	parts,	not	three,	Golemba’s	Parodic	Release	can	be	read	as	an	initiation	of	repetitive	Burkean	form.		 The	epigraph	contains	several	instances	of	play;	Golemba	noticed	one	of	them	and	recovered	its	meaning	with	his	desire	to	see	Thoreau	play,	which	makes	for	a	case	study	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire.	When	Thoreau	identified	the	etymological	origin	of	house	in	the	word	“seat,”	or	sedes,	he	also	quipped	that	it	would	be	better	if	the	seat	were	a	country	seat.	Golemba	read	it	as	a	playful	pun.	I	did	not	read	the	statement	in	that	way.	Instead,	I	read	it	as	paradox.	In	the	previous	chapter	in	Walden,	“Economy,”	Thoreau	claimed	that	he	intended	to	build	“a	house	which	will	surpass	any	on	the	main	street	in	Concord	in	grandeur	and	luxury,	as	soon	as	it	pleases	me	as	much	and	will	cost	me	no	more	than	my	present	one”	(1985,	p.	361).	If	Thoreau	had	such	an	irritation	with	expensive	houses,	why	would	he	play	on	the	word	“seat”	and	suggest	in	a	later	version	of	the	manuscript	that	it	is	better	if	the	stone	under	him	were	upgraded	to	an	aristocratic	mansion	(see	Schacht,	n.d.)?	Yes,	this	passage	is	a	play	on	words,	but	it	can	also	be	a	paradox,	depending	on	how	it	is	read.	The	playfulness	is	diminished	if	the	paradox	is	made	salient,	and	casting	the	statement	as	play	minimizes	the	seriousness	of	the	paradox.	This	is	to	be	expected	when	it	comes	to	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire,	and	it	is	therefore	against	the	spirit	of	that	language	to	discount	Golemba’s	desire	to	read	it	his	way.		 The	other	example	that	I	want	to	discuss	is	located	in	“Higher	Laws”	and	develops	an	instance	of	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol	through	Thoreau’s	careful	and	paradoxical	use	of	‘respect.’	There,	the	term	‘respect’	is	used	several	times	as	a	key	to	Thoreau’s	philosophy.	At	the	end	of	the	chapter,	however,	the	final	word	is	‘respect,’	and	it	is	used	in	a	way	that	clashes	with	the	entire	chapter	like	a	braying	donkey.	In	fact,	that	alarm	is	so	striking	that	it	opens	a	network	of	holes	in	the	text	for	a	new	nonlinear	itinerary	of	friendship	to	be	explored.		 For	most	of	“Higher	Laws,”	Thoreau’s	philosophy	of	‘respect’	is	focused	on	the	context	of	his	vegetarian	diet.	In	a	striking	change	from	the	younger	Thoreau	who	went	fishing	with	Edward	Sherman	Hoar,	Thoreau	confessed	(in	Version	A,	Schacht,	n.d.),	“I	have	found	repeatedly,	of	late	years,	that	I	cannot	fish	without	falling	a	little	in	self-respect”	(1985,	p.	493).	He	went	on	to	explain	that	he	used	to	be	a	fisher,	and	that	he	still	feels	the	urge	to	eat	meat.	Nevertheless,	his	urges	were	gradually	lessening,	and	his	access	to	a	variety	of	grains	and	vegetables	allowed	him	to	lessen	the	temptation.	His	primary	reasons	for	leaving	fishing	behind	were	that	it	produced	“trouble	and	filth”	(p.	493).	The	trouble	for	Thoreau	was	his	sense	of	disappointment	that	the	catching,	fileting,	and	cooking	produces	such	little	edible	fish.	The	filth	for	Thoreau	was	his	awareness	that	an	omnivore’s	kitchen	requires	far	
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more	cleaning	to	keep	up	a	“respectable	appearance	each	day,	to	keep	the	house	sweet	and	free	from	all	ill	odors	and	sights”	(p.	493).			 The	last	paragraph	of	“Higher	Laws”	produces	a	paradox	by	again	referring	to	‘respect.’	There,	Thoreau	tells	a	story	about	John	Farmer,	who	was	ending	a	hard	day	of	work,	had	just	bathed,	and	was	about	to	think	about	the	possibility	of	a	frost	that	evening.	Before	he	could	attend	to	this	problem,	however,	he	heard	the	sound	of	a	flute	player,	which	is	almost	certainly	a	Thoreau	disguise	(Buell,	1995,	p.	376).	The	sound	“harmonized	with	his	mood”	and	seemed	to	awaken	a	voice	from	within,	asking,	“Why	do	you	stay	here	and	live	this	mean	moiling	life,	when	a	glorious	existence	is	possible	for	you?	Those	same	stars	twinkle	over	other	fields	than	these”	(Thoreau,	1985,	pp.	499-500).	Alas,	John	Farmer	could	not	understand	how	to	accomplish	such	a	migration.	“All	that	he	could	think	of	was	to	practise	some	new	austerity,	to	let	his	mind	descend	into	his	body	and	redeem	it,	and	treat	himself	with	ever	increasing	respect”	(p.	500).		 Thoreau’s	paradoxical	use	of	‘respect’	in	“Higher	Laws”	produces	a	holey	space	in	Walden,	but	it	is	difficult	to	see	where	the	hole	goes	if	one	merely	looks	for	incidents	of	‘respect’	in	other	sentences	throughout	the	chapter.	If	one	does	that,	then	the	reader	will	most	certainly	stop	following	the	hole	before	it	reaches	its	destinations.	In	the	next	section,	I	return	to	Thoreau’s	use	of	and	engagement	with	the	topic	of	‘respect.’	This	wait	is	necessary,	because	(as	far	as	I	can	see,	which	may	not	be	the	whole	distance)	Thoreau	had	in	mind	a	lesson	that	had	to	do	with	the	principles	of	striation	and	smoothening	themselves,	and	goes	far	beyond	a	lecture	about	‘respect.’	Recognizing	this	lesson	depends	on	the	reader’s	crossing	of	a	striation	that	produces	a	lesson	about	friendship	and	its	ability	to	reconstruct	our	morals.		 It	does	not	take	too	much	imagination	to	notice	that	the	repeated	iterations	of	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol	striate	the	space	of	Walden.	How	Thoreau’s	prose	is	striated	depends	on	the	reader.	In	the	next	section,	I	discuss	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent,	which	identifies	structural	forms	that	occur	on	larger	scales	than	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire.	The	addition	of	this	scale	of	structural	arrangement	complexifies	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol	considerably,	breaking	the	established	understandings	of	what	sentences	belong	to	Clarity	or	Mystery,	and	giving	opportunities	for	new	striations	and	glimpses	of	a	subterranean	network	of	intratextual	holes.		
Thoreau’s	Rhetoric	of	Ascent		 Thoreau’s	‘rhetoric	of	ascent’	is	a	term	invented	by	Milder	to	refer	to	the	experience	of	reading	Walden	and	observing	a	Thoreau	that	transforms	and	elides	his	transformations.	This	produces	a	tension	between	Thoreau’s	endorsement	of	diversity	and	his	presentation	of	his	own	way	as	a	respected	truth.	According	to	Milder,	Thoreau	out-feints	this	paradox	and	the	reader’s	suspicions,	but	the	irony	of	this	effort	eventually	becomes	salient.	The	insight	that	emerges	from	this	irony	settles	into	another	“way,”	only	to	be	exposed	as	merely	another	face	of	the	alazon.	This	cycle	of	upheaval	and	regrouping	repeats	over	and	over	again.	What	makes	this	ascent	so	difficult	to	track	is	that	Thoreau	does	not	properly	order	those	steps	(Buell,	1995),	nor	does	he	specify	the	intervals	of	the	rise	and	run	(Bickman,	1992),		
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leaving	the	reader	with	little	illumination	concerning	where	the	next	step	is	located	and	where	it	is	going.	The	obscurity	actually	gives	Thoreau	the	needed	cover	to	produce	his	language	of	desire,	since	it	is	already	difficult	to	identify	what	he	believed	at	any	specific	point	in	the	text.	To	understand	the	text,	we	striate	it,	and	this	has	two	effects.	In	each	possible	version	of	the	striated	ascent,	individual	steps	taken	through	the	text	tend	to	smoothen	how	the	reader	has	striated	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire.	In	addition,	the	elusiveness	of	Walden’s	grand	structure	smoothens	all	candidates	for	striation.	The	only	“structure”	that	seems	to	survive	revision	is	the	seasonal	progression.	I	refer	to	this	“structure”	in	quotation	marks	because	Thoreau’s	daily	observations	in	“Spring”	indicate	that	earth’s	seasons,	which	can	be	articulated	by	the	cycle	of	a	single	day,	tend	to	undermine	this	simplicity.	Without	structure,	the	reader	is	asked	to	be	familiar	with	the	text	in	its	entirety.	Once	that	happens,	we	are	able	to	see	the	moments	of	Thoreau’s	itinerancy.	One	of	Thoreau’s	moments	of	itinerancy	is	his	preoccupation	with	the	problem	of	respectability,	which	can	only	be	solved	with	irony	and	friendship.		 This	section	makes	this	argument	in	three	steps.	First,	I	present	the	arrangement	form	of	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent.	Robert	Milder	(1995)	and	Martin	Bickman	(1992)	have	done	the	most	research	in	this	area.	I	apply	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	spatial	analysis	of	the	war	machine	to	the	efforts	by	New	Critics	to	striate	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent.	Then,	once	I	have	discussed	how	these	efforts	to	decode	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	led	to	the	agony	that	Golemba	named	as	the	purpose	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire,	I	discuss	a	fuzzy	area	where	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	resets	the	striations	that	readers	keep	creating	to	track	his	language	of	desire.	This	fuzzy	area	is	a	fertile	ground	for	us	to	open	a	subterranean	network	in	Thoreau’s	text.	My	own	journey	resurrects	a	specific	occurrence	of	‘respect’	that	belongs	to	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire.	Finally,	I	address	the	larger	discussion	that	comes	into	view	thanks	to	the	holey	space	and	the	access	points	that	are	flagged	by	those	instances	of	‘respect.’	Ultimately,	I	argue	that	Thoreau’s	engagement	with	respectability	is	a	problem	that	is	insoluble	by	us	in	isolation.	We	need	to	adjust	our	assessment	of	what	is	respectable	through	the	comic	corrective,	and	that	requires	an	ironic	counterpart.	However,	that	comic	corrective	merely	helps	us	to	ascend	one	level.	To	maintain	our	ascent,	we	also	need	friendship.		
The	Spatial	Effects	of	Thoreau’s	Rhetoric	of	Ascent		 	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	induces	readers	to	posit	large-scale	striations	that	disrupt	patterns	found	in	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire,	and	the	ambiguous	middle	ground	of	this	process	reveals	a	subterranean	network	of	connections.	Thoreau’s	version	of	the	“organic	principle”	(Matthiessen,	1941,	pp.	133-175	as	discussed	by	Buell,	1995	and	Bickman,	1992),	his	numbering	number,	has	been	agonizingly	difficult	to	describe	in	more	concrete	terms,	and	many	have	been	lured	into	that	project.	Thoreauvian	scholars	have	inadvertently	striated	Walden’s	form,	changing	its	nomos	into	the	academic	logos	of	New	Criticism.	This	perception	of	war	between	text	and	reader	is	itself	evidence	of	Walden’s	ability	to	make	the	reader	experience	irony	and	understand	Thoreau’s	friendly	aspirations.	Each	step	of	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	lingers	long	enough	for	the	reader	to	striate	
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individuated	forms	of	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol.	Then,	irony	becomes	salient	when	the	next	step	of	the	ascent	smoothens	the	forms	and	makes	Thoreau’s		language	of	desire	possible	and	obscures	authorial	intent.	The	steps	that	make	up	that	ascent	are	rough	and	difficult	to	identify,	but	significant	progress	has	been	made.	The	vagueness	of	the	ascent	not	only	creates	voids	in	the	language,	but	it	also	leaves	room	for	holes	where	Walden	and	reader	can	co-create	an	itinerary	that	turns	the	reader	into	a	kind	of	artisan	that	follows	both	the	smoothness	of	the	text	as	well	as	the	striations.	One	of	these	moments	of	itinerancy	is	Thoreau’s	engagement	with	the	concept	of	‘respect.’	Assessing	what	is	respectable	is	a	significant	issue	during	one’s	ethical	journey	through	life,	one	that	is	insoluble	without	the	assistance	of	irony	and	friendship.		 In	this	section,	I	make	this	argument	in	three	steps.	First,	I	show	that	
Walden’s	examination	by	New	Critics	has	produced	an	agonizing	reading	tradition.	Second,	I	discuss	how	a	transition	from	agony	to	friendship	can	be	made.	Finally,	I	discuss	the	particulars	of	the	interaction	between	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	and	his	language	of	desire.		
New	Criticism’s	Agony	over	Walden		 Attempts	to	structure	Walden’s	form	have	been	underway	since	1941	and	the	resulting	theories	have	been	problematic	because	of	the	legacy	of	New	Criticism.	According	to	Bickman	(1992),	Francis	Matthiessen’s	(1941)	groundbreaking	analysis	of	Walden	marked	the	moment	in	which	academia	suddenly	intensified	its	efforts	to	striate	the	text’s	larger	forms.	The	reason	for	this	surge,	argued	Bickman,	was	because	Matthiessen	borrowed	a	term	from	Coleridge	and	described	the	book’s	structure	as	“organic	form”	(p.	134).	This	organic	form	is	an	“architectural	beauty,”	which	“has	gradually	grown	from	within	outward,	out	of	the	necessities	and	character	of	the	indweller,	who	is	the	only	builder,	—out	of	some	unconscious	truthfulness,	and	nobleness,	without	ever	a	thought	for	the	appearance”	(quoted	by	Bickman,	1992,	p.	41).	After	Matthiessen,	R.	P.	Adams	(1952	as	cited	by	Bickman,	1992)	made	the	next	major	attempt	to	crack	this	organic	form.	Adams	argued	that	Thoreau	accomplished	the	organic	form	through	a	“pattern	of	symbolic	death	and	rebirth”	that	projects	“a	revolt	against	static	mechanism	in	favor	of	dynamic	organicism”	(1952,	p.	424).	Later,	other	scholars,	such	as	Sherman	Paul,	Charles	Anderson,	and	Lauriat	Lane,	Jr.,	proposed	their	own	ideas	of	this	organic	form	in	terms	of	Walden’s	seasons	(Bickman,	1992).	Bickman	concluded	that	although	Matthiessen’s	followers	used	organicism	to	“provide	insight	into	the	book	and	make	previously	unseen	connections	among	its	parts,	the	entire	notion	of	organic	form	became	too	vague	and	automatic,	a	critical	commonplace	that	served	to	stop	further	examination”	(p.	42).	Bickman	pointed	out	that	the	organic	form	filtered	out	the	“many	readers’	experience	of	the	book	as	asymmetrical	and	self-contradictory,	of	being	constantly	off	balance”	(p.	42).	He	also	admitted	that	this	was	due	to	the	dominance	of	New	Criticism	that	has	been	present	in	his	discipline	ever	since	Matthiessen.	The	present	occupation	of	this	area	of	research	is	now	supposedly	less	concerned	with	the	production	of	new	readings	of	Walden,	and	more	concerned	with	the	problem	of	explaining	why	there	are	so	many	divergent	readings	(p.	43).		
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However,	the	legacy	of	New	Criticism	is	powerful,	which	sequesters	text	from	reader.	It	seems	that	Bickman’s	version	of	the	project	was	still	unwilling	to	consider	an	interaction	between	text	and	reader:	Bickman	concluded	that	the	“text	itself	is	always	moving	toward	structuring	itself,	yet	always	pulling	back	from	doing	so”	(p.	44).	Thus	Bickman	defended	Matthiessen’s	claim	that	Walden’s	meaning	is	built	only	by	its	solitary	indweller,	Thoreau.		 The	agony	between	structure	and	disorganization	in	Walden	is	a	unique	product	of	interaction	with	New	Critics,	not	a	structure	or	a	meaning	that	is	housed	entirely	within	the	text.	Thoreau’s	organic	form	has	been	grist	for	the	production	of	academic	agony	in	Thoreauvian	studies.	This	organic	form	was	made	possible	because	of	Thoreau’s	literalization/demetaphorization,	which	allows	nature	to	take	responsibility	for	his	prose’s	polysemic	potential.	As	Walden’s	legacy	grew,	New	Critics	targeted	the	symbolic	fertility	of	its	organic	form.	These	critics,	for	theoretical	and	professional	reasons,	were	obliged	to	assume	that	any	structuration	of	the	text	had	to	occur	without	collaboration	with	the	reader.	This	meant	that	the	pattern	of	giving	and	receiving	between	text	and	reader	was	recast	as	strictly	internal	to	the	text,	not	so	much	erasing	the	diversity	of	reader	interpretations	as	projecting	the	process	of	reading	into	the	artifact.	The	conclusion	that	Bickman	made	in	seeing	the	text	as	self-structuring	and	self-de-structuring	thereby	alters	Thoreau’s	numbering	number	into	a	numbered	number.	This	move	instigates	the	
Walden	experience	to	become	an	agony	of	language,	as	Golemba	noted.	In	other	words,	critics	find	Walden	becoming	warlike	because	they	sought	to	appropriate	
Walden’s	nomos	and	change	it	into	the	logos	of	New	Criticism.	This	effort	by	New	Critics	to	diminish	what	could	be	an	interaction	of	Walden	with	the	reader	and	instead	stuff	it	into	the	text	unwittingly	reproduced	the	same	emergence	of	war	that	Deleuze	and	Guattari	identified	between	nomads	and	the	State.		
Transitioning	from	Agony	to	Friendship		 The	experience	of	reading	Walden	can	change	from	agonizing	to	friendly,	but	change	is	difficult,	and	it	will	not	avoid	the	alternation	of	striation	and	smoothening.	The	difference	between	agonizing	over	Walden’s	prose	and	befriending	it	is	relational	and	attitudinal.		The	relational	difference	between	agony	and	friendship	is	found	in	the	various	ways	that	people	debate	with	each	other	(Brockriede,	1972).	Wayne	Brockriede	pointed	out	that	it	is	remarkably	productive	to	examine	the	relationship	between	arguers	in	terms	of	a	metaphor	of	sexual	relationship.	Any	arguer	who	uses	coercion	or	subterfuge	to	force	or	trick	someone	else	into	having	sex	or	adopting	a	belief	fails	to	realize	the	greater	possibilities	of	love	and	philosophical	argumentation	(p.	6).	Philosophical	love,	Brockriede	argued,	cannot	take	place	without	reciprocity	on	both	sides	of	the	debate;	each	side	must	be	equal	and	willing	to	change	(pp.	6-7).	Unfortunately,	most	texts	are	unable	to	change	because	most	authors	write	with	a	unified	and	imperious	voice.	The	beautiful	thing	about	Walden	is	that	the	text	does	change	its	mind	(both	as	a	property	of	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	and	as	a	property	of	the	multiple	encounters	with	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire),	and	so	it	is	possible	to	engage	with	Walden	as	a	friend	during	the	reading		
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process.	What	makes	this	so	difficult	to	do	in	the	case	of	Walden	is	that	there	is	still	a	powerful	expectation	that	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	is	a	competition.	Even	Milder	(1995)	fell	into	this	trap	when	he	argued	that	Walden’s	reader	is	“a	rival	for	interpretive	honors	whose	function	is	to	run	a	fine	race	yet	place	a	distant	second	to	the	author”	(p.	80).	What	friendship	with	Walden	requires	is	the	recognition	that	the	reader	is	expected	and	able	to	keep	up	with	it	in	a	bi-directional	relay,	to	be	willing	to	striate	the	text	and	be	receptive	and	responsive	when	those	striations	are	smoothened	by	Thoreau’s	ascent.	The	attitudinal	difference	between	agony	and	friendship	is	found	in	the	ways	that	we	understand	friendship,	according	to	Thoreau’s	own	account	in	A	Week.	Recall	that	he	posited	two	different	understandings,	one	that	followed	a	structural	framework	as	an	achievement,	and	another	that	followed	a	process	framework	as	an	ongoing	saga	of	giving	and	receiving	that	survives	the	denouement	of	particular	relationships.	As	the	irony	of	Golemba’s	analysis	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	demonstrates,	any	statement	about	how	Walden’s	rhetoric	functions,	even	if	it	accounts	for	the	reader,	is	itself	a	striation.	The	agony	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	will	be	reproduced	if	we	conceive	of	friendship	with	Walden	as	a	relationship.	This	produces	the	expectation	of	a	certain	relational	identity	as	a	foundation	for	the	proceeding	analysis,	and	the	shock	that	occurs	when	supposedly	foundational	identity	fails	to	be	durable	is	the	war	that	Deleuze	and	Guattari	found	between	nomadic	peoples	and	sedentary	peoples	(1987).	A	key	to	avoiding	the	agony	associated	with	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	war	machine	is	to	appreciate	their	technique	to	avoid	immuring	the	process.	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	analysis	has	itself	avoided	war	because	they	expected	resmoothening.	All	striations	are	bound	to	be	smoothened,	and	the	current	analysis	is	no	different.	Therefore,	my	orientation	in	my	striation	is	not	to	capture	the	nomadic	nature	of	the	reading	experience	and	take	friendship	for	granted.	Eventually,	Thoreau	moved	on,	and	left	his	renewed	companions	to	tend	to	their	own	improved	farms.	I	expect	the	same	to	happen	here,	and	so	I	shall	not	make	any	claims	about	how	Walden	essentially	functions.	Instead,	I	catalog	the	rhetorical	effects	that	have	been	observed	and	to	offer	an	explanation	for	why	it	happened.	This	move	avoids	the	imposition	of	purpose,	and	allows	the	nomos	of	Walden	to	sing	its	own	desires.	To	do	otherwise	would	halt	the	procession	of	my	friendship	with	Walden	that	survives	in	this	text.	I	have	appropriated	my	own	virtue	from	Walden;	that	virtue	also	has	its	own	life	and	does	not	oblige	Walden	to	continue	grinding	against	the	river	of	this	dissertation.	In	other	words,	Walden	does	not	have	to	remain	my	friend,	for	the	virtue	that	I	appropriated	lives	on.	Furthermore,	as	the	next	chapter	makes	clear,	this	friendship	will	be	challenged.		
From	Striated	Ascent	to	Smoothened	Language		 Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	in	Walden	sets	the	pace	for	a	rhythmic	striation	and	smoothening	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire.	Matthiessen	and	his	followers	have	produced	the	beginning	strokes	of	a	stable	picture	of	Walden’s	structure,	since	
Walden’s	structure	involves	its	readers’	contributions	to	a	degree	that	the	State	of	New	Criticism	is	not	prepared	to	accept.	Nevertheless,	the	accumulated	work	by	these	scholars	is	still	important.	At	an	archival	level,	Walden	is	(mostly)	the	same	
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thing	it	was	in	1854.30	Large-scale	structural	forms	are	visible	and	can	be	readily	verified,	although	this	does	not	preclude	the	existence	of	others.	As	the	epigraph	to	this	chapter	suggests,	Walden	accommodates	a	wide	variety	of	arrangement	theories.	Whatever	the	pattern,	changes	to	the	author’s	personae	are	frequent	enough	that	the	changes	are	noticeable,	but	not	so	frequent	that	it	is	impossible	to	discern	any	structure	at	all.	What	is	important	is	the	reader’s	perception	of	Thoreau.	In	other	words,	Walden	contains	personae	that	linger	just	long	enough	to	develop	an	apparent	relationship	with	the	reader.	These	brief	and	recurring	relationships	generate	expectations	about	Thoreau’s	agenda,	and	these	expectations	affect	how	the	reader	engages	with	his	prose.	Specifically,	how	the	reader	striates	Thoreau’s	prose	into	iterations	of	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol	is	affected	by	how	the	reader	perceives	the	text’s	persona.	The	reader	uses	Thoreau’s	persona	as	a	lens	to	read	the	text,	and	so	when	Thoreau	changes,	the	reading	changes.	This	dynamic	is	a	matter	of	reader	perception,	and	when	that	perception	changes,	the	striations	of	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol	are	reset	and	the	text	is	smoothened,	which	makes	it	available	for	striation	once	more.		 The	research	on	Walden’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	has	identified	various	different	scales	of	structure	in	Walden.	There	are	grand-level,	chapter-level,	and	paragraph-level	scales,	each	with	different	kinds	of	structure.	At	its	most	grand	scale,	Walden	has	a	two-part	structure;	the	first	part	consists	of	a	series	of	essay-like	chapters	(Bickman,	1992).	The	early	chapters	tend	to	be	preoccupied	with	whatever	topic	is	named	by	the	chapter’s	title,	and	show	less	concern	for	narrative	(p.	54).	The	second	part	flips	this	priority,	focusing	more	on	narrative	and	the	progression	of	the	seasons	(Buell,	1995).	When	the	text	is	examined	at	the	scale	of	whole	chapters,	the	early	chapters	exhibit	a	certain	kind	of	structure	that	is	less	obvious	in	the	later	chapters	(Bickman,	1992).	The	early	chapters	co-exist	as	contrasting	pairs,	with	each	chapter	complementing	and	contradicting	its	companion	(p.	51).	At	the	still	smaller	scale	of	individual	paragraphs,	each	chapter	contains	paragraphs	that	appear	to	disagree	with	the	rest	of	the	chapter,	and	these	errant	paragraphs	are	less	obvious	in	the	second	part	of	the	book	in	which	narrative	and	seasonal	progression	dominate	(p.	53).		While	there	is	consensus	that	Walden	has	structures	that	change	depending	on	the	scale	being	considered,	there	is	far	less	agreement	over	the	particular	details	of	those	structures.	At	the	grand-level,	there	is	much	disagreement	over	where	the	grand-level	transition	happens.	When	I	first	began	to	contemplate	this	question,	my	initial	conclusion	was	that	the	transition	occurs	in	Chapter	9,	“The	Ponds.”	Bickman	located	some	semblance	of	a	transition	at	the	end	of	Chapter	12,	“Brute	Neighbors”																																																									30	Thoreau	did	not	issue	a	second	edition	of	Walden	during	his	lifetime	(Thoreau,	2007).	He	did,	however,	make	written	alterations	to	his	print	copy,	which	had	involved	a	number	of	typographic	corrections	(p.	379).	In	addition,	editors	over	the	decades	have	continued	in	this	tradition	of	being	faithful	to	the	original	text,	and	only	changing	it	to	amend	obvious	punctuation	errors	and	make	the	text’s	conventions	of	hyphenation	and	spelling	consistent	throughout	the	document	(pp.	379-396).		
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(p.	52).	Like	Thoreau’s	own	research	identifying	the	boundary	separating	winter	from	spring,	I	would	suggest	that	the	transition	between	Walden’s	two	grand	parts	is	not	a	single	discrete	boundary,	but	is	instead	many	transitions	that	do	not	line	up	with	each	other	and	are	themselves	vague.	At	the	smaller	scales	of	chapters	and	paragraphs,	the	structural	research	has	been	far	more	successful	in	identifying	the	chapter	pairings	and	errant	paragraphs	in	the	first	part	of	Walden	(p.	53).	The	second	portion	of	the	text	has	been	more	difficult	to	striate,	since	the	major	organizing	device	are	the	seasons	themselves	(p.	54).	In	“Spring,”	the	second-to-last	chapter,	Thoreau	observes	that	a	day	is	a	synecdoche	of	the	seasons,	indicating	to	the	reader	that	the	second	segment	may	be	exceptionally	difficult	to	striate.	If	each	day	is	a	cycle	within	the	larger	cycle	of	the	seasons	(with	perhaps	more	than	one	process	at	work),	then	it	is	equally	as	difficult	to	apply	such	an	oscillation	to	the	text.	Even	though	Walden	becomes	more	like	a	narrative	as	it	attends	to	the	seasonal	changes	(p.	54),	Thoreau	does	not	track	the	progressions	of	individual	days.		My	reading	of	the	text	places	a	significant	transition	from	the	first	to	the	second	parts	of	Walden	in	Chapters	11-13:	“Higher	Laws,”	“Brute	Neighbors,”	and	“House	Warming.”	These	chapters	were	expanded	considerably	after	1849	(see	the	chart	by	Adams	&	Ross,	1988,	p.	58	as	reproduced	by	Schacht,	n.d.).	Bickman	made	a	similar	notice	of	a	boundary	in	Chapter	12,	and	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	Chapter	11	is	a	contrast-pair	with	Chapter	12	(Bickman,	1992,	p.	51).	It	is	likely	that	a	shift	towards	narrative	emphasis	begins	in	earnest	in	“The	Ponds”	(Chapter	9,	which	also	received	significant	revisions	after	1849,	Schacht,	n.d.),	and	that	the	custom	of	positing	contrast-pairs	gradually	tapers	off	after	“Brute	Neighbors”	(Bickman,	1992,	p.	52).	Of	course,	it	is	likely	that	there	are	other	transition	markers,	which	would	make	the	change	from	the	first	to	second	parts	less	like	a	boundary	and	more	like	a	natural	process	with	many	degrees	of	freedom.		 The	vague	boundary	that	exists	in	the	gray	area	of	Chapters	11-13	is	a	staging	ground	for	a	holely	space	where	Thoreau	creates	a	subterranean	passageway	that	can	be	followed.	I	discussed	the	first	indicator	of	a	hole	in	the	previous	section	where	Thoreau	ironically	deployed	‘respect’	in	“Higher	Laws.”	In	addition,	up	until	this	point	in	Walden,	the	chapters	had	been	matched	into	self-contained	contrast	pairs,	and	these	chapters	tended	to	contain	paragraphs	that	contradicted	their	own	chapters	(pp.	51-55).	This	custom	signals	to	the	reader	that	the	contradiction	over	‘respect’	was	a	phenomenon	that	was	contained	within	“Higher	Laws.”	“Higher	Laws”	ends	with	a	“cul-de-sac”	of	morality	(Milder,	1995,	p.	138),	and	the	beginning	of	“Brute	Neighbors”	initiates	a	sharp	descent	from	that	“spiritual	peak”	(p.	138),	almost	as	if	Thoreau	was	trying	to	“recover	the	upward	direction	of	his	life	by	cleansing	himself	through	nature”	(p.	137).	The	turn	is	obviously	located	at	the	chapter	boundary.	The	following	chapter	in	Walden,	“Brute	Neighbors,”	begins	with	the	archetypal	dialogue	between	the	self-respecting	Hermit	and	the	charming	Poet	about	the	prospect	of	fishing,	giving	the	impression	that	the	author	was	eating	his	pride	and	was	on	the	cusp	of	abandoning	his	vegetarian	diet	for	the	sake	of	socializing	with	a	charismatic	friend.	Nevertheless,	if	the	holely	space	is	explored,	it	becomes	evident	that	‘respect’	is	about	much	more	than	just	Thoreau’s	diet.	In	the	next	section,	I	discuss	the	passages	immediately	after	this	
	 118	
dialogue	and	in	“House	Warming,”	which	is	immediately	after	Bickman’s	transition	point	for	Walden’s	grand	structure.	Thoreau’s	unpredictable	and	incongruous	personae,	which	come	and	go	like	Thoreau’s	sauntering	through	his	bog,	smooth	the	space	of	the	text,	sometimes	overwriting	previous	understandings	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	with	subsequent	re-readings.	The	ground	of	the	space	shifts	and	exposes	the	familiar	tension	between	striating	and	smoothening.	Finally,	the	third	kind	of	space	is	involved,	which	shares	affinities	with	both	striating	and	smoothening—an	itinerant	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol.	This	is	a	hybrid	space	that	exists	in	between	individual	rhetorical	devices	and	Thoreau’s	shifts	of	personae.	This	hybrid	space	excavates	holes	in	Thoreau’s	text	and	illuminates	a	subterranean	intratextual	network.		
Spatial	Excavation	between	Thoreau’s	Forms		 The	most	interesting	channel	of	interaction	between	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	and	his	language	of	desire	has	to	do	with	a	holey	space.	There	is	definitely	a	channel	of	interaction	between	the	striations	of	his	rhetoric	of	ascent	and	the	smoothening	of	his	language	of	desire.	At	its	most	simple,	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	is	how	he	keeps	his	personae	obscure,	which	allows	his	language	of	desire	to	appear	as	a	collection	of	voids	of	meaning.	In	addition,	the	phenomenon	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	becoming	resmoothened	is	easy	to	establish	virtually	everywhere	in	the	text…	except	where	the	boundary	between	smoothening	and	striating	is	difficult	to	identify:	The	smoothening	that	Thoreau	creates	with	his	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol	regarding	respect	in	“Higher	Laws”	breaks	this	mold	in	the	middle	of	his	text,	along	with	the	transition	from	the	first	half	of	the	text	to	the	second	half	of	the	text,	opens	a	subterranean	network	that	connects	to	multiple	places	like	a	constellation	of	word	associations	with	a	secret	pattern	embedded	in	the	text.	This	network	has	a	center	in	“Higher	Laws,”	and	the	radiating	arms	are	indicated	by	hints	that	are	found	in	“Brute	Neighbors”	and	“House	Warming.”		 In	this	section,	I	make	this	argument	in	two	steps.	First,	I	briefly	show	how	the	crossing	of	the	striations	of	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	induces	a	temporary	smoothening	of	his	language	of	desire.	Then,	I	explore	how	the	fuzzy	boundary	between	the	striated	and	smooth	regions	uncovers	a	holey	space	that	reaches	into	(at	least)	ten	other	chapters.	This	exploration	sets	the	stage	for	my	discussion	in	the	next	section	regarding	Thoreau’s	itinerant	discussion	of	respect,	friendship,	and	ethics.			
	 Interaction	between	the	Smooth	and	the	Striated	Forms	of	Walden		 It	is	easy	to	establish	that,	using	the	epigraph	to	this	chapter,	crossing	the	striations	of	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent	can	smoothen	his	language	of	desire.	In	Golemba’s	analysis	of	the	language	of	desire	at	the	beginning	of	“Where	I	Lived,”	he	identified	only	one	instance	of	play	in	the	epigraph.	I	find	this	to	be	interesting,	since	there	is	more	than	just	one	instance	there	that	can	serve	as	Mystery.	In	addition	to	the	play	on	‘seat,’	Thoreau	also	played	on	several	other	words	and	phrases.	Before	the	‘seat’	comment,	Thoreau	mentioned	that	he	“walked	over	each	farmer's	premises.”	This	is	also	wordplay,	but	it	is	subtler,	since	Thoreau	does	not	provide	an		
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etymological	connection.	For	those	readers	who	do	not	have	a	philosophical	or	argumentation	background,	it	is	likely	that	they	will	miss	the	complex	meaning	of	‘premises’	until	they	reach	the	“Reading”	chapter	and	are	warned	to	be	aware	of	such	tricks.	If	Golemba	noticed	it,	he	did	not	let	on.	In	addition,	Thoreau	deploys	a	more	complex	play	when	he	wrote,	“Wherever	I	sat,	there	I	might	live,	and	the	landscape	radiated	from	me	accordingly.”	The	latter	half	of	this	sentence	runs	counter	to	scientific	principles	of	light	and	visual	observation,	and	perfectly	summarizes	Thoreau’s	phenomenology,	which	becomes	the	source	of	surrealism	in	“The	Ponds.”	After	one	reads	“The	Ponds”	the	phrase	is	no	longer	a	mystery,	showing	that	how	the	reader	striates	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	depends	in	large	part	on	what	version	of	Thoreau	the	reader	has	in	mind.	This	shift	in	striation	is	the	domain	of	smooth	space.		
	 Following	the	Holey	Space	in	Walden	The	gap	between	smooth	space	and	striated	space	is	the	ground	of	holey	space	(Deleuze	&	Guattari,	1987).	The	previous	paragraph	just	demonstrated	that	the	gap	in	Walden	exists	at	the	lowest	level	of	individual	statements.	At	the	higher	levels,	especially	his	chapter	headings,	Thoreau	casts	his	structural	arrangements	into	doubt	with	careful	phrasing	and	framing	in	“Brute	Neighbors.”	In	addition,	he	makes	an	even	more	explicit	signal	in	the	following	chapter,	“House	Warming.”	Together,	these	hints	suggest	a	larger	philosophy	about	‘respect’	that	can	be	found	by	following	that	word	to	another	individuation	of	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol	in	“Economy,”	as	well	as	abundant	instances	of	Clarity	in	which	‘respect’	is	used.	In	“Brute	Neighbors,”	Thoreau	casts	doubt	on	the	chapter	organization	of	his	text	through	deliberate	ambiguity.	In	that	chapter,	Thoreau	begins	with	the	dialogue	between	the	Hermit	and	the	Poet,	and	then	proceeds,	after	a	short	paragraph	of	rhetorical	questioning,	to	tell	fable	after	fable	featuring	local	wildlife.	These	fables	round	out	the	remainder	of	that	chapter.	The	rhetorical	questions	that	precede	these	fables	are	curiously	crafted:	“Why	do	precisely	these	objects	which	we	behold	make	a	world?	Why	has	man	just	these	species	of	animals	for	his	neighbors;	as	if	nothing	but	a	mouse	could	have	filled	this	crevice?”	(1985,	p.	502).	What	are	“these”	objects	and	creatures?	What	is	“this”	crevice?	One	way	to	read	“these”	is	in	reference	to	the	animals	and	objects	referred	to	in	the	remainder	of	the	chapter.	However,	however	populous	the	chapter	is,	the	selection	is	not	complete.	There	are	mice,	phoebes,	otters,	turtledoves,	chickens,	ants,	squirrels,	cats,	a	few	loons,	ducks,	and	a	common	name	for	a	dog.	There	is	a	brief	mention	of	a	horse	in	the	abstract,	but	where	did	the	owls	go?	Warring	ants	and	the	loons	receive	by	far	the	most	attention,	leaving	the	rest	of	the	animals	with	minimal	narrative	resolution.	“These”	is	ambiguous—a	reoccurrence	of	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	made	possible	by	his	reference	to	them	before	they	appear	to	the	reader.	Why	do	what	objects	make	up	the	world?	Is	it	because	they	happen	to	be	the	subjects	that	constitute	the	fables	contained	within	that	chapter?	My	reading	of	these	rhetorical	questions	is	that	“these”	are	the	objects	extrapolated	from	phenomena,	and	that	question	goes	beyond	the	crevice	of	“Brute	Neighbors.”	Thoreau	is	asking	why	it	is	that	our	ordering	of	objects	into	a	bracketed	chapter	should	be	taken	for	granted.	When	the		
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question	is	posed	to	the	reading	of	Walden,	Thoreau	is	asking	why	it	is	that	the	text’s	world	is	ordered	into	discrete	chapters.	This	comparison	seems	particularly	apt,	since	the	book	up	until	this	point	had	been	listing	a	procession	of	various	chapter	animals,	each	with	their	own	companion	(Bickman,	1992),	almost	as	if	Thoreau	were	some	kind	of	Noah	and	Walden	were	his	ark.	Thoreau’s	deconstruction	of	Walden’s	internal	structural	arrangement	is	made	more	explicit	in	the	following	chapter,	“House	Warming.”	There,	Thoreau	describes	what	made	him	feel	at	home	and	what	he	thought	would	be	his	ideal	house.	Instead	of	a	conventional	house	divided	into	separate	rooms	with	each	serving	a	special	function,	Thoreau	preferred	a	house	with	an	open	loft	and	no	inner	walls	that	would	striate	the	space	into	rooms.	The	ceiling	would	be	decorated	with	dynamic	and	tricky	shadows,	thrown	by	fire.	All	the	utilities	and	conveniences	would	be	ready	at	hand.	Our	monarchs	used	such	grand	halls	during	a	golden	age,	and	visitors	were	assumed	to	be	familiar	as	soon	as	the	door	was	opened.	It	is	not	necessary	to	suggest	that	Thoreau	is	speaking	of	language	and	metaphor.	He	makes	the	connection	explicit	in	the	next	paragraphs:	It	would	seem	as	if	the	very	language	of	our	parlors	would	lose	all	its	nerve	and	degenerate	into	paralaver	[parlor	talk]	wholly,	our	lives	pass	at	such	remoteness	from	its	symbols,	and	its	metaphors	and	tropes	are	necessarily	so	far	fetched,	through	slides	and	dumb-waiters,	as	it	were;	in	other	words,	the	parlor	is	so	far	from	the	kitchen	and	workshop.	The	dinner	even	is	only	the	parable	of	a	dinner,	commonly.	As	if	only	the	savage	dwelt	near	enough	to	Nature	and	Truth	to	borrow	a	trope	from	them.	How	can	the	scholar,	who	dwells	away	in	the	North	West	Territory	or	the	Isle	of	Man,	tell	what	is	parliamentary	in	the	kitchen?	However,	only	one	or	two	of	my	guests	were	ever	bold	enough	to	stay	and	eat	a	hasty	pudding	with	me;	but	when	they	saw	that	crisis	approaching	they	beat	a	hasty	retreat	rather,	as	if	it	would	shake	the	house	to	its	foundations.	Nevertheless,	it	stood	through	a	great	many	hasty-puddings.	(p.	517)	Scholars	tend	to	interpret	these	statements	as	a	nudge	by	Thoreau	to	attend	to	the	etymological	histories	of	the	words	that	he	uses.	Doing	so	helps	the	reader	to	realize	just	how	subtle	and	specific	his	language	is.	I	agree	that	the	reader	should	be	prepared	to	maintain	this	awareness	of	language’s	metaphorical	origins.	However,	I	think	that	there	is	more	to	this	analogy	than	just	a	reminder	that	we	need	to	be	aware	that	“dinner”	meant	something	that	took	place	earlier	in	the	day,	a	meaning	that	is	itself	located	earlier	in	our	history.	The	area	where	cooking	occurs	(i.e.,	the	kitchen)	is	not	just	a	history	of	meaning	located	in	the	past—it	is	also	a	location	that	exists	now.31	Furthermore,	the	wink	of	“far	fetched”	is	explained,	made	far	too	obvious,	and	the	metaphors	of	chutes	and	elevators	linking	the	rooms	are	too	closely	associated	with	the	ways	that	we	need	to	be	aware	that	Thoreau	would	do	away	with	various	rooms	and	that	we	must	be	on	familiar	terms	with	his	royal	hall	of	text	when	we	open	its	pages.	In	Walden’s	first	version,	which	he	completed	before																																																									31	As	I	discuss	in	the	Conclusion	chapter,	Deleuze	(1994)	deploys	Hume’s	concept	of	‘contraction’	(pp.	70-71)	to	argue	that	the	past	exists	in	the	present.		
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he	left	Walden	Pond	in	1847,	his	text	had	no	chapter	divisions	(Shanley,	1957),	and	we	would	be	wise	to	read	and	be	familiar	with	the	text	without	limiting	our	view	to	each	room,	just	as	ecology	seeks	to	make	us	aware	that	no	system	is	closed.		 Once	the	divider	names	of	Walden’s	chapters	are	seen	to	be	less	like	walls	and	more	like	survey	markers,	it	quickly	becomes	apparent	to	a	seasoned	surveyor	of	Walden	that	Thoreau	means	for	us	to	be	shocked	by	how	many	connections	can	appear	when	we	follow	other	markers.	I	am,	of	course,	restricting	myself	to	occurrences	of	‘respect,’	and	the	marker	appears	in	the	text	many	times.	Most	of	the	appearances	of	‘respect’	have	to	do	with	aspects	of	meaning,	and	I	am	not	concerned	with	the	word	when	it	is	used	in	that	slight	respect.	I	am	interested	in	its	more	intense	usage,	which	is	related	to	a	traditional	angle	of	view,	enhanced	with	a	charge	of	deference	and	admiration.	We	can	look	at	something	in	a	certain	respect,	but	that	does	not	denote	the	same	degree	of	esteem	compared	to	when	we	treat	something	or	someone	with	respect.	‘Respect’	is	used	to	denote	deference	or	admiration	(or	lack	thereof)	17	times	in	Walden,	not	including	the	three	times	it	is	used	in	“Higher	Laws.”	Ten	other	chapters	feature	at	least	one	usage	of	the	word,	and	some	have	several.		 There	are	likely	many	other	caverns	that	wait	unearthing	in	the	holey	space	of	Walden.	These	holes	may	be	discovered	by	attending	to	symbols	deployed	in	any	of	the	various	chapters	and	accounting	for	them	outside	of	their	usual	crevices.	Once	the	subterranean	network	is	mapped,	it	should	be	possible	to	enjoy	a	moment	with	Thoreau	to	experience	a	problem	that	he	perhaps	feels	is	worthy	of	consideration,	and	witness	the	solutions	that	he	would	consider.	There	are	most	likely	other	subterranean	networks	concealed	underneath	the	hall	of	Walden,	but	it	seems	to	me	that	the	topic	of	‘respect’	is	important	enough	that	it	deserves	a	focused	discussion.	This	discussion	finds	Thoreau	subtly	identifying	friendship	as	the	critical	mechanism	that	makes	us	virtuous.		
Discussion		 Thoreau’s	networked	discussion	of	‘respect’	exposes	an	ethical	crisis	that	must	be	solved	with	irony	and	friendship.	This	crisis	becomes	salient	when	Thoreau	tells	the	reader	a	lot	about	what	he	does	not	respect,	less	about	what	he	does	respect,	and	far	less	about	what	is	respectable.	In	other	words,	since	Thoreau	locates	ethical	truth	out	in	the	world	and	limits	our	knowledge	to	our	own	experience,	knowing	what	is	ethical	is	a	paradox.	The	most	helpful	key	to	understand	this	paradox	comes	from	a	specific	instance	of	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol	in	Thoreau’s	discussion	of	fashion.	This	paradox	reaches	fever	pitch	as	well	as	solvency	when	it	comes	to	our	self-respect.	It	reaches	fever	pitch	because	self-respect	is	all-too-commonly	understood	to	be	individualistic	self-respect,	which	is	capable	of	many	frames	of	rejection,	but	only	affords	one	frame	of	acceptance	(Burke,	1937/1984b).	The	paradox	eventually	reaches	solvency	when	individualistic	self-respect	is	understood	to	be	an	illusion	and	replaced	with	self-consideration	and	friendship.	Thoreau’s	usages	of	‘respect’	in	Walden	tell	us	very	little	about	what	he	thinks	is	respectable.	Most	of	the	relevant	occurrences	of	‘respect’	in	Walden	have	to	
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do	with	specific	things,	animals,	and	people,	who	are	respected	by	society,	a	few	things	respected	by	Thoreau,	and	many	things	that	he	does	not	respect.	Thoreau	is	far	less	clear	regarding	what	or	who	is	truly	respectable.	He	wrote	in	two	separate	places	in	Walden	that	it	is	respectable	to	do	without	salt	when	one	cannot	afford	it,	or	to	be	poor	as	a	farmer.	However,	these	are	particular	things	and	conditions;	they	merely	give	us	economic	advice.	This	partly	explains	why	Buell	(1995)	noted	that	Thoreau	abandoned	the	economic	metaphor	of	nature.	It	is	also	a	reason	why	Milder	(1995)	argued	that	Thoreau	was	far	clearer	about	what	he	rejected	than	what	he	endorsed.	An	instance	of	the	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol	featuring	‘respect’	helps	illustrate	the	problem	of	respectability.	The	problem	of	respectability	is	that	it	is	hard	to	know	what	is	respectable.	Thoreau	grappled	with	this	problem	when	he	tried	to	please	his	mentor	and	sold	his	writing	to	make	a	living.	What	he	thought	would	be	respectable	was	mistaken,	and	it	required	a	lesson	in	irony	to	learn	that	it	is	a	problem.	This	is	why	he	demonstrates	the	irony	of	self-respect	in	“Higher	Laws.”	An	ambiguous	statement	in	“Economy”	captures	this	conundrum	more	explicitly.	There,	Thoreau	gives	the	details	of	his	critique	of	modern	fashion,	telling	the	reader	about	the	superfluous	fashionable	expenses	that	many	people	make	to	get	respect	from	others.	The	passage	in	question	follows	a	report	by	Thoreau	of	the	attitudes	of	his	neighbors	who	“behave	as	if	they	believed	that	their	prospects	for	life	would	be	ruined	if	they	should”	repair	their	fancy	pantaloons	with	patches	or	add	extra	seams	to	make	them	more	durable	(1985,	p.	340).	Thoreau	muses	that	a	person	would	sooner	attempt	to	walk	to	town	with	a	broken	leg	than	with	a	broken	pant	leg,	and	then	observes	that	this	person	“considers,	not	what	is	truly	respectable,	but	what	is	respected”	(p.	340).	What	does	that	mean	to	you?	What	I	find	amazing	about	this	statement,	which	was	added	after	1849,	is	that	‘respect’	derives	from	the	Latin	‘speciō,’	which	means,	“to	look	at”	(respect,	n.d.;	specere,	n.d.;	Schacht,	n.d.).	‘Speciō’	itself	derives	from	the	Greek	‘σκέπτομαι’	(sképtomai;	specio,	n.d.),	the	philosophy	of	the	skeptic.	In	Representative	Men,	Emerson	showed	that	the	skeptic’s	philosophy,	like	the	word’s	meaning,	is	“to	consider”	(1983.	p.	694).	To	respect	is	to	give	great	consideration.	In	short,	what	Thoreau	wrote	was	that	the	man	who	does	not	want	to	consider	repairing	his	fashionable	pantaloons	does	not	look	back	and	consider	what	is	truly	worthy	of	great	consideration.	No	wonder	respectability	is	so	hard	to	assess:	it	appears	to	be	circular,	requiring	the	very	thing	that	would	enable	its	assessment.		 The	paradox	of	a	person’s	ability	to	give	an	answer	to	what	is	truly	respectable	reaches	a	fever	pitch	with	individualistic	self-respect.	Thoreau’s	usage	of	self-respect	in	“Higher	Laws”	suggests	that	self-respect	equips	us	with	frames	of	“rejection”	or	“debunking”	(Burke,	1937/1984b,	pp.	21-25,	pp.	92-107)	to	resist	peer	pressure.	The	ironic	use	of	self-respect	at	the	end	of	“Higher	Laws”	allowed	John	Farmer	to	appeal	to	his	own	bodily	authority	as	a	“Farmer”	and	reject	Thoreau’s	flute.	In	the	second	paragraph	of	“Conclusion,”	Thoreau	observes	that	patriotic	individuals	all-too-often	do	not	have	self-respect.	They	use	the	frame	of	patriotism	to	reject	their	own	desires.	A	hasty	reading	of	that	“Conclusion”	paragraph	indicates	that	Thoreau	would	have	us	explore	the	world	in	isolation,	encouraging	the	brutality	of	nature	to	deploy	the	severest	storms	of	correction	in	a		
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costly	series	of	learning	experiences	that	would	make	our	lives	a	depressing	solitude.	In	this	version	of	respectability,	the	only	frame	of	acceptance	is	economic	necessity,	a	frame	that	Thoreau	left	behind	after	the	first	chapter	(Buell,	1995).		 	Even	if	we	could	tolerate	isolation,	individualistic	self-respect	does	not	get	us	very	far.	The	second	paragraph	of	“Conclusion”	goes	to	great	effort	to	produce	the	illusion	that	individualistic	self-respect	is	the	key	to	Thoreau’s	philosophy.	Indeed,	
Walden	presents	different	faces	to	different	kinds	of	readers.	To	the	critic	who	thinks	that	Walden	must	stand	on	its	own,	it	produces	a	simple	lesson:	war	is	to	be	expected,	and	one	should	be	prepared	to	withdraw	from	it	on	occasion	until	the	situation	becomes	tractable.	Indeed,	this	seems	to	be	the	lesson	that	Shannon	Mariotti	(2010)	gleaned	from	Thoreau.	That	conclusion	is	inevitable	as	long	as	the	options	are	restricted	to	a	binary	opposition	between	nomadic	existence	and	sedentary	life	in	the	city.	The	smoothening	nomos	is	bound	to	be	consolidated	by	the	striating	logos	of	the	State,	which	is	bound	to	be	resmoothened,	and	so	on	(Deleuze	&	Guattari,	1987).	This	“stealing	back	and	forth”	(Burke,	1937/1984b,	p.	103,	p.	104,	p.	141)	can	go	on	as	long	as	there	are	nomads	and	States;	that	agony	is	interminable.	The	irony	here	is	that	Thoreau’s	presentation	of	self-respect	only	appears	to	be	individualistic.	It	is	easy	to	construct	frames	of	rejection,	but	it	is	hard	to	construct	frames	of	acceptance;	both	are	needed	for	the	comic	corrective	(p.	93-94,	p.	166	as	discussed	by	Carlson,	1986,	pp.	447-448	as	discussed	by	LeBaron,	2010).	Thoreau’s	story	of	individualistic	self-respect	is	an	enigma,	and	the	challenge	is	to	follow	its	pieces	until	the	puzzle	gives	way.	The	second	paragraph	of	“Conclusion”	contains	clues	that	show	that	Thoreau	did	not	mean	for	self-respect	to	be	purely	individualistic.	Thoreau	challenged	us	“explore	the	private	sea,	the	Atlantic	and	Pacific	Ocean	of	one’s	being	alone”	(1985,	p.	578).	“Private”	and	“alone”	seem	to	be	sound	indications	of	solitude.	However,	etymologically,	they	derive	from	words	that	do	not	indicate	isolation	at	all.	“Private”	derives	from	the	Latin	“prīvō,”	which	means,	“to	set	free”	(privo,	n.d.).	“Alone”	derives	from	the	Middle	English,	contracting	“all	one”	(alone,	n.d.).	These	words	indicate	that	Thoreau	wants	us	to	explore	the	pantheistic	world	of	oneness,	a	possibility	of	connecting	to	anything	and	everything	that	is	immediately	confirmed	when	Thoreau	goes	on	to	claim	that	he	has	“more	of	God,	they	more	of	the	road”	(1985,	p.	578).	Then	in	the	next	two	sentences,	Thoreau	wrote	that	“It	is	not	worth	the	while	to	go	round	the	world	to	count	the	cats	in	Zanzibar”	(p.	578),	which	is	an	island,	or	isolated	place,	and	yet	we	should	do	precisely	that	until	we	“find	some	‘Symmes’	Hole’	by	which	to	get	at	the	inside	at	last”	(p.	578).	Counting	the	instances	of	‘respect’	on	the	island	of	Walden	until	a	hole	is	found	is	just	one	way	into	its	holey	space,	and	there	are	likely	other	ways	in.		Thoreau’s	story	of	individualistic	self-respect	is	an	allegory	for	the	fact	that	the	friendship	that	I	have	been	analyzing	in	this	dissertation	looks	a	lot	like	stereotypical	individualistic	self-respect.	Friendship	is	giving	and	receiving	(Crosswhite,	2010),	and	that	giving	and	receiving	leaves	behind	individual	friends,	even	ourselves,	since	it	is	the	appropriation	of	virtue	that	is	friendship,	not	the	union	of	particular	individuals.	The	advantage	that	this	friendship	has	for	the	current	discussion	is	that	the	virtues	that	are	appropriated	are	frames	of		
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acceptance.	Friendship	produces	frames	of	acceptance:	In	Thoreau’s	discussion	of	how	to	explore	“our	own	higher	latitudes,”	Thoreau	reminded	us	that	“there	are	continents	and	seas	in	the	moral	world	to	which	every	man	is	an	isthmus	or	an	inlet,	yet	unexplored	by	him”	(p.	578).	Each	person	is	guaranteed	to	have	a	connection	to	the	moral	world,	which	exists	outside	of	ourselves,	and	yet	we	can	only	see	inward,	and	so	we	must	introject	our	virtue	from	one	another.	For	Thoreau,	the	examination	of	our	own	desires	is	the	template	for	our	frame	of	acceptance.	The	challenge,	then,	is	how	to	adjust	our	own	frames	of	rejection	and	acceptance	so	that	our	self-respect	can	keep	us	from	falling	into	the	same	striations	of	morality.	That	isthmus	or	inlet	that	keeps	us	connected	to	the	moral	world	is	friendship.		
Coda	The	two-part	structure	of	this	chapter’s	epigraph	is	a	useful	heuristic	for	interpreting	Walden	in	different	ways.		At	one	level,	the	epigraph	is	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	and	his	rhetoric	of	ascent.	The	first	part	takes	place	with	interlocutors;	Thoreau	is	taking	turns	with	others	in	his	effort	to	improve	them	and	their	corner	of	the	earth,	the	cycle	of	a	Clarity-Mystery	Symbol.	The	second	part	takes	place	wherever	the	author’s	persona	sits,	with	a	landscape	that	radiates	out	from	him,	indicating	that	the	appearance	of	the	world	depends	largely	on	how	the	reader	understands	the	author,	and	that	the	author	is	going	to	move	to	his	next	point	of	ascent	after	an	hour,	or	a	year	or	two	of	residence.		At	another	level,	the	epigraph	suggests	the	possibilities	of	our	friendship	with	Walden.	The	first	part	is	a	stream	of	words	and	sentences	that	require	both	author	and	reader.	Walden	gives	wisdom	to	the	reader,	and	the	reader	gives	meaning	to	the	text,	refreshing	both.	This	stream	carves	what	appears	to	be	a	canyon	into	the	larger	body	of	the	text,	and	when	we	are	exploring	the	terrain	on	foot,	the	cliffs	must	be	crossed	at	various	bridges.	These	bridges	are	the	steps	of	transition	in	Thoreau’s	rhetoric	of	ascent,	but	at	some	point,	the	canyon	smoothens	and	the	steps	feel	more	natural,	like	a	story.	There	are	many	bridges,	and	many	maps	have	been	published	and	revised.	We	can	bring	a	map,	or	we	can	saunter	and	make	new	discoveries.	If	we	wander	the	terrain	without	a	map,	we	will	probably	get	lost	and	fall	into	traps.	Without	a	map,	the	reader	eventually	becomes	familiar	with	the	text’s	subterranean	geology	and	its	pitfalls,	and	it	becomes	less	and	less	necessary	to	walk	on	the	given	path.	The	canyons	that	previously	challenged	the	reader	are	recognized	as	merely	grooves,	striations	on	the	surface,	and	that	it	is	possible	follow	a	network	of	holes	to	other	parts	of	the	terrain	and	leave	the	bridges	behind.	The	entire	landscape	opens	up	to	us,	and	we	can	experience	new	itineraries.	The	giving	and	receiving	does	not	stop,	and	we	are	made	aware	that	many	of	our	past	acquaintances	are	actually	good	friends.	Walden	trains	us	to	recognize	this	and	help	each	other	build	our	own	comic	correctives.	Our	friendships	are	not	always	withdraws	from	civilization,	but	rather	are	sometimes	proceedings	that	happen	without	particular	regard	for	public	life	or	democracy.	Friendship	is	often	thought	of	as	a	private	affair.	It	is,	but	that	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	it	is	opposed	to	
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public	life.	It	is	set	free	from	it.	Its	only	concerns	are	giving,	receiving,	and	it	pays	dividends	through	our	cultivations	of	each	other	so	that	we	are	equipped	to	live.	 	
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Chapter	Five:	Walden’s	Queer	Agency		 There	was	an	artist	in	the	city	of	Kouroo	who	was	disposed	to	strive	after	perfection.	One	day	it	came	into	his	mind	to	make	a	staff.	Having	considered	that	in	an	imperfect	work	time	is	an	ingredient,	but	into	a	perfect	work	time	does	not	enter,	he	said	to	himself,	It	shall	be	perfect	in	all	respects,	though	I	should	do	nothing	else	in	my	life.	He	proceeded	instantly	to	the	forest	for	wood,	being	resolved	that	it	should	not	be	made	of	unsuitable	material;	and	as	he	searched	for	and	rejected	stick	after	stick,	his	friends	gradually	deserted	him,	for	they	grew	old	in	their	works	and	died,	but	he	grew	not	older	by	a	moment.	His	singleness	of	purpose	and	resolution,	and	his	elevated	piety,	endowed	him,	without	his	knowledge,	with	perennial	youth.	As	he	made	no	compromise	with	Time,	Time	kept	out	of	his	way,	and	only	sighed	at	a	distance	because	he	could	not	overcome	him.	Before	he	had	found	a	stock	in	all	respects	suitable	the	city	of	Kouroo	was	a	hoary	ruin,	and	he	sat	on	one	of	its	mounds	to	peel	the	stick.	Before	he	had	given	it	the	proper	shape	the	dynasty	of	the	Candahars	was	at	an	end,	and	with	the	point	of	the	stick	he	wrote	the	name	of	the	last	of	that	race	in	the	sand,	and	then	resumed	his	work.	By	the	time	he	had	smoothed	and	polished	the	staff	Kalpa	was	no	longer	the	pole-star;	and	ere	he	had	put	on	the	ferrule	and	the	head	adorned	with	precious	stones,	Brahma	had	awoke	and	slumbered	many	times.	But	why	do	I	stay	to	mention	these	things?	When	the	finishing	stroke	was	put	to	his	work,	it	suddenly	expanded	before	the	eyes	of	the	astonished	artist	into	the	fairest	of	all	the	creations	of	Brahma.	He	had	made	a	new	system	in	making	a	staff,	a	world	with	full	and	fair	proportions;	in	which,	though	the	old	cities	and	dynasties	had	passed	away,	fairer	and	more	glorious	ones	had	taken	their	places.	And	now	he	saw	by	the	heap	of	shavings	still	fresh	at	his	feet,	that,	for	him	and	his	work,	the	former	lapse	of	time	had	been	an	illusion,	and	that	no	more	time	had	elapsed	than	is	required	for	a	single	scintillation	from	the	brain	of	Brahma	to	fall	on	and	inflame	the	tinder	of	a	mortal	brain.	The	material	was	pure,	and	his	art	was	pure;	how	could	the	result	be	other	than	wonderful?	—Walden,	“Conclusion”	(Thoreau,	1985,	pp.	582-583)				 To	those	who	are	not	familiar	with	world	history	and	Indian	mythology,	the	epigraph	to	this	chapter	appears	to	be	a	simple	tale	of	artistic	serendipity	and	integrity:	an	allegory	of	Walden’s	transformation	from	divine	scintillation	into	“a	world	with	full	and	fair	proportions.”	An	artist	endeavors	to	make	something	that	is	perfect,	and	his	refusal	to	compromise	with	time	endows	him	with	endless	life.	While	he	does	nothing	but	work,	his	friends	fall	away,	and	his	civilization	and	others	decay,	and	they	make	room	for	better	ones	to	parallel	the	artist’s	quest.	Then,	when	the	work	is	completed,	the	staff	blossoms	and	gives	rise	to	something	even	more	wonderful	than	anything	that	the	artist	could	anticipate.	Walden	began	as	something	that	was	a	simple	striving	for	a	humble	yet	perfect	wooden	staff,	but	it	grew	over	
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several	drafts.	After	its	completion	and	even	after	the	death	of	the	author,	it	has	exceeded	anything	that	a	Thoreau	could	anticipate	when	he	went	into	the	woods	to	practice	his	art.	This	story	is	far	more	complex	than	it	appears.	The	reason	for	this	subtle	complexity	is	the	story’s	containment	of	large	amounts	of	content	within	several	words:	“Kouroo,”	“Candahar,”	and	“Kalpa.”	Although	the	contents	of	these	three	words	do	not	suffice	to	account	for	the	form	of	Thoreau’s	story,	it	begins	to	reveal	the	important	contrast	between	content	and	form,	two	key	concepts	in	this	chapter.	Kouroo	for	Thoreau	was	a	symbol	of	epic	conflict	from	which	the	artist	turned	away.	Kurukshetra,	in	Hindu	mythology,	was	the	site	of	a	devastating	vendetta	that	involved	the	Lord	Krishna	as	a	principal	character	(Lochtefeld,	2002).	The	tale	of	the	motivations	for	the	mythical	war,	the	counsel	Krishna	provided	to	his	friend	Arjuna	before	the	fighting,	and	the	battle,	is	detailed	in	the	Mahabharata,	“the	longest	poem	ever	written”	(Akademi,	1960,	p.	137;	Lochtefeld,	2002).	There	is	no	other	mention	of	the	conflict	or	its	lost	origins	in	Thoreau’s	story.	Ultimately,	the	war	that	takes	place	in	the	artist’s	nation	is	implicitly	acknowledged	and	set	aside	all	at	once,	similar	to	Thoreau’s	almost	complete	disregard	for	the	Mexican-American	war	that	broke	out	during	his	residence	at	Walden	Pond.	Thoreau	briefly	engages	with	the	topic	of	war	and	the	Mexican-American	war	explicitly	in	Walden	where	he	discusses	the	battle	of	the	ants	in	“Brute	Neighbors;”	instead	of	retreating	from	the	battle	and	withdrawing	from	the	political	issue,	he	allows	the	symbols	of	his	warrior	specimens	to	fall	out	of	his	window-frame,	his	frame	of	the	world,	before	they	finish	fighting.	The	war	becomes,	in	Erin	Rand’s	words,	a	“distant	enemy”	(2008,	p.	307).	The	dynasty	of	the	Candahars	for	Thoreau	was	a	symbol	of	the	exhaustion	of	imperial	ambition	after	Kouroo,	which	will	not	happen	in	the	foreseeable	future.	The	story	of	the	Mahabharata	presents	Krisha’s	mission	as	a	quest	to	wage	a	war	to	end	wars;	however,	his	obvious	failure	to	do	so	by	direct	confrontation	was	ultimately	an	open-ended	lesson.	The	artist’s	inscription	of	the	last	race	of	the	Candahars	into	sand	is	Thoreau’s	way	of	identifying	when	Krishna’s	quest	will	be	complete.	The	name	“Candahar”	is	a	reference	to	the	city	of	Kandahar,	the	second	largest	city	in	Afghanistan.	It	is	likely	that,	given	the	strategic	value	of	the	Kandahar	province,	conflict	in	the	region	will	not	end	in	the	foreseeable	future	(Holt,	2012;	Azami,	2008).	Therefore,	it	is	significant	that	Thoreau	indicated	that	Kandahar	will	cease	to	exist	and	the	name	of	its	people	will	wash	like	sand	long	before	the	artist	of	Kouroo	completes	his	work.	It	is	plausible	that	as	long	as	there	is	a	tradition	of	nation	states	that	use	words	to	represent	resources	as	scarce,	Kandahar	will	always	be	a	tempting	military	target.	Nevertheless,	the	artist	does	make	the	transition.	Kalpa	for	Thoreau	was	a	designation	for	a	transition	beyond	the	intervals	of	time.	Consider	the	statement,	“By	the	time	he	had	smoothed	and	polished	the	staff	Kalpa	was	no	longer	the	pole-star.”	The	statement	appears	to	be	a	reference	to	the	fact	that	the	stars	are	not	in	a	fixed	position	in	the	sky,	and	that	the	artist’s	quest	proceeded	to	such	lengths	that	the	stars	shifted	and	changed	configuration.	If	that	were	the	significance	of	the	statement,	then	Thoreau’s	preceding	reference	to	Kandahar	would	have	made	it	redundant.	The	statement	about	Kalpa	actually	means	something	more	specific	than	cosmic	duration,	since	Kalpa	is	not	a	star	(Thoreau,		
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1995).	A	kalpa	is	a	single	day	in	the	life	of	Brahma	(p.	318).	To	write	that	kalpa	was	no	longer	the	standard	indicates	that	Thoreau	was	referring	to	a	conceptual	shift	to	a	view	of	time	that	did	not	use	an	interval	as	a	unit.	In	other	words,	Thoreau	was	saying	that	the	artist	had	graduated	into	eternity—beyond	the	intervals	of	time.		 Thoreau’s	Kouroo	myth	exposes	an	impossible	dilemma	that	is	caused	by	representation,	which	poses	the	question	of	whether	agency	is	structure	or	process—form	or	content.	What	matters	more:	the	staff’s	flowering	that	turned	the	artist	to	stone	(Bickman,	1992,	p.	46)	and	the	tinder	shavings	that	timelessly	await	inspiration,	or	the	burning	intensity	that	unfolded	during	its	production	and	the	slow	exhuming	of	its	content?	After	all,	the	artist’s	quest	involved	the	departing	of	his	friends,	the	extinction	of	whole	civilizations,	and	the	development	of	better	ones.	Which	is	more	important:	the	ruination	of	past	relationships,	civilizations,	and	the	buried	artifacts,	or	the	current	ones	that	depend	on	their	ruination?	The	staff	had	to	be	completed	before	it	expanded,	and	the	embodiment	of	the	art	was	distilled	by	the	artist’s	“astonishment.”	Seen	as	a	representation,	a	specific	structure	represents	an	essential	content,	and	the	artist’s	agency	culminates	in	the	achievement	of	a	solid	artifact.	Yet,	the	completion	is	marked	by	a	sudden	expansion	from	within,	and	it	is	the	searching,	shaving,	abandoning,	fruiting,	and	creative	destruction	that	has	agency.	Structures	are	objects	of	analysis	in	the	myth,	but	the	system	that	was	produced	in	the	process	of	reading	and	analyzing	it	is	the	introduction	of	a	spark	to	a	pile	of	wood	shavings	and	its	interval	into	fire.	A	representation	of	becoming	of	structure	over	time	relies	equally	on	the	concepts	of	form	and	content;	the	artist	transitioned	into	an	eternal	process,	but	the	artist—Thoreau’s	persona—also	stayed	to	represent	the	tale.		 The	unpredictable	depth	of	Thoreau’s	story	and	the	“undecidability”	about	how	to	represent	(rhetorical)	agency	(Rand,	2008,	p.	314)	are	entangled	topics.	Thoreau’s	story,	both	in	the	microscopic	version	of	the	artist	of	Kouroo	and	in	the	macroscopic	version	of	Walden,	is	rhetorical,	meant	to	have	an	effect	that	fractures	content	from	form,	and	I	am	trying	to	reproduce	part	of	that	effect	in	this	introduction.	When	represented,	the	unpredictability	of	a	reading	of	Walden	cannot	be	surmised	by	either	its	structural	form,	its	content,	or	by	a	coherent	fusion	between	the	two.	In	the	same	way,	the	represented	agency	of	the	epigraph	story	cannot	be	resolved	as	either	structural	form	or	its	content.	The	research	on	the	topic	of	agency	in	rhetorical	studies	has	tried	to	resolve	the	dichotomy,	and	yet	even	our	best—Burke	(1945/1969),	Karlyn	Kohrs	Campbell	(see	Rand,	2008),	and	Erin	Rand	(2008)—are	affected	by	a	paradox	over	how	to	analyze	agency,	and	our	representations	are	the	cause.		 This	chapter	demonstrates	Walden’s	rhetorical	principle	of	difference	that,	for	all	its	investment	in	friendship	as	a	mechanism	that	allows	ethics	to	be	shared,	actually	alienates	some	of	us	from	friendship:	Walden	provokes	the	reader,	contorting	agency	in	ways	that	are	contingent	on	how	the	reader	responds.	Erin	Rand	(2008)	has	identified	the	polemic	as	one	particular	kind	of	rhetorical	form	that	does	this	by	jeopardizing	friendship	(Flannery,	2001),	queering	the	usual	conduit	between	rhetor	and	audience.	This	rhetorical	form	is	coextensive	with	what	Sarah	Hallenbeck	has	called	the	“crisis	of	agency”	(2012,	p.	18).	In	this	chapter,	I	follow		
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Burke’s	statements	about	the	paradox	of	substance	that	indicate	that	the	crisis	of	agency	cannot	be	solved	from	within	a	representational	medium.	Burke’s	paradox	of	substance,	the	crisis	of	agency,	and	even	the	crisis	of	representation,	are	cut	of	the	same	cloth,	and	the	only	way	out	of	this	chapter	is	not	just	through	an	analysis	of	what	Walden	as	a	polemic	is	or	represents,	but	through	a	pragmatic	assessment	of	what	the	reader	does	when	the	Walden	friendship	is	jeopardized.	Addressing	the	rhetorical	form	of	the	polemic	with	necessary	and	sufficient	formal	conditions	and	indeterminate	purpose,	as	Rand	has	done,	cannot	suffice,	since	such	a	move	essentializes	polemics	in	the	rubric	of	process	philosophy	(DeLanda,	2002).	To	get	beyond	essentialism,	it	is	necessary	to	deploy	the	concept	of	a	multiplicity,	a	tool	that	Deleuze	developed	for	the	question	of	becoming	(p.	10).	Using	the	concept	of	a	multiplicity	to	analyze	Rand’s	proposed	characteristics	of	the	polemic	allows	me	to	discuss	a	number	of	causal	mechanisms	to	explain	why	the	apparent	conventions	that	Rand	posited	exist,	and	to	show	why	Rand’s	own	polemic	violates	those	conventions.	We	have	not	exhausted	the	ways	in	which	a	polemic	may	function.		 This	chapter	makes	this	argument	in	two	main	phases.	The	first	phase	focuses	on	the	crisis	of	agency.	Burke’s	(1945/1969)	writings	about	agency	exemplify	the	paradox	of	substance,	revealing	that	it	is	impossible	to	separate	agency	from	purpose	in	a	representational	medium.	Deleuze	deployed	the	concept	of	a	multiplicity	to	finesse	this	impossibility	(Holland,	2013;	DeLanda,	2002).	The	second	phase	of	this	chapter	centers	and	then	decenters	Erin	Rand’s	(2008)	theory	of	the	polemic.	I	show	that,	arguendo,	Walden	qualifies	as	a	polemic	under	Rand’s	rubric,	and	then	I	use	the	Deleuzian	concept	of	the	multiplicity	to	explain	why	many	(but	not	all)	polemics	have	common	characteristics.	I	do	this	by	responding	to	Rand's	polemic	with	a	polemic	of	my	own	to	map	the	contingent	possibilities	of	polemics,	and	then	I	use	Tinker	Creek	as	an	example	of	one	of	those	contingencies,	which	responded	to	the	polemic	of	Walden	and	maintained	friendship.		
The	Crisis	of	Agency		 The	“crisis	of	agency”	(Hallenbeck,	2012,	p.	18)	is	a	symptom	of	contradictions	that	are	inherent	in	traditional	systems	of	representation.	Two	missions	that	undermine	each	other	are	responsible	for	this	crisis	(Arditi	&	Valentine,	1999,	p.	71).	The	first	mission	is	to	describe	and	control	the	intricate	motions	of	the	universe;	this	is	the	main	function	of	science,	which	views	reality	through	a	physicalist	frame.	The	second	mission	is	to	describe	and	control	the	intricate	actions	of	agents/actors;	this	is	the	main	function	of	free	will,	which	views	agents/actors	through	an	accountability	frame.	Because	the	universe	and	agents/actors	are	of	the	same	substance,	from	the	perspective	of	action,	the	forces	of	motion	and	action	are	integrated	into	a	feedback	loop	and	it	is	impossible	to	understand	either	in	isolation	(Burke,	1945/1969).	Deleuze	deployed	the	concept	of	the	multiplicity	to	provide	a	perspective	from	motion,	since	a	multiplicity	focuses	on	causal	mechanisms	to	explain	common	structural	forms	(DeLanda,	2002).	This	makes	it	possible	to	analyze	the	polemic	and	explain	why	Rand	described	it	using	four	formal	characteristics,	and	why	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	conclude	that	those	characteristics	cause	unpredictable	rhetorical	effects.	
	 130	
	 I	make	this	argument	in	two	steps.	First,	I	discuss	Burke’s	agency.	Burke’s	treatment	of	agency	makes	it	evident	that	there	is	something	paradoxical	when	the	passive	universe	of	motion	is	supplemented	with	agents/actors	and	viewed	from	the	perspective	of	those	agents/actors.	Burke’s	paradox	is	not	an	error	of	analysis—it	is	a	consequence	of	representation.	Second,	I	discuss	Deleuze’s	concept	of	a	multiplicity,	which	explains	identity	as	an	effect	by	making	it	necessary	to	think	about	purpose	from	the	perspective	of	polemical	agency	(i.e.,	“thinking	with”	a	polemic,	Holland,	2013,	p.	37).	A	multiplicity	makes	it	possible	to	understand	why	Rand	selected	essential	formal	characteristics	to	describe	polemics.		
Burke’s	Agency		 Burke’s	representation	of	agency	shows	that	it	is	entangled	with	questions	of	purpose.	In	Burke’s	Grammar	of	Motives	(1945/1969),	Burke	shifts	his	conceptualization	of	agency	between	motion	and	action	throughout	his	short	treatment	of	it.	Agency	ended	up	disappearing	in	a	discussion	about	mysticism,	since	it	shares	space	with	purpose	(pp.	292-320).	This	characterization,	embarrassing	as	it	seems,	is	not	unique	to	Burke.	Rather,	it	indicates	a	problem	inherent	in	Burke’s	representational	medium	of	discussion	that	necessarily	involves	a	moving	world	populated	with	actors	who	must	grapple	with	questions	of	purpose.		 Burke’s	representation	of	agency	was	driven	by	a	necessarily	inconsistent	commitment	between	action	and	motion.	The	first	part	of	the	reason	for	this	was	Burke’s	tracing	of	the	concept	to	Emerson’s	Nature,	where	he	found	the	kernel	of	agency	within	Emerson’s	analysis	of	the	endless	uses	to	which	natural	kinds	of	“commodity”	can	be	put	(p.	277).	Emerson’s	treatment	of	natural	commodities	casts	agency	as	a	series	of	means	(pp.	277-278).	It	is	made	subservient	to	agents	because	they	are	the	ones	who	order	the	selection	of	means	(p.	277-278).	This	selection	of	means	to	fulfill	ends	makes	agency	conceptually	derivative	of	action.	Purposive	action	is	required	to	‘appropriate’	those	commodities	toward	the	‘appropriate’	ends.	The	second	part	of	the	reason	for	Burke’s	inconsistency	was	that	he	also	relied	on	P.	W.	Bridgman’s	development	of	operationalism;	to	construct	a	functional	concept	of	operationalism,	Burke	acknowledged	that	science	needs	a	vast	array	of	instruments	that	“themselves	are	totally	without	purpose”	(p.	279).	For	example,	a	thermometer	does	not	act—it	moves,	even	though	it	exists	“only	as	a	result	of	human	purpose”	(p.	281).	For	Burke,	purpose	snuck	back	into	agency	when	he	included	the	acting	scientist	with	the	instrument	and	defined	agency	as	a	“corresponding	set	of	operations”	that	are	performed	by	a	scientist	(p.	280).	The	set	of	operations	fulfills	purpose	by	adding	the	scientist’s	recording	of	measurement,	which	is	simply	a	means	for	analysis,	since	“stress	upon	agency	fails	to	notice	the	demands	of	the	remaining	motivational	domains”	(p.	280).	Agency	is	motion	only	so	long	as	purpose	is	not	a	part	of	the	discussion,	but	it	becomes	action	as	soon	as	purpose	becomes	a	salient	factor.	Historians	are	fixated	on	describing	history	as	a	series	of	intervals	in	time,	each	of	which	is	“a	stage	in	some	historical	development”	toward	a	purpose	(p.	282).	This	is	illustrated	in	Thoreau’s	story	of	Kouroo	because	purpose	briefly	stopped	being	considered	when	Kalpa	ceased	to	have	significance	until	the	author		
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explained	to	the	reader	that	the	bodhisattva	artist	has	stayed	to	tell	the	tale	and	added	another	spark	of	serendipity.		 Agency	disappears	as	a	function	of	the	proliferation	of	purpose.	Burke	argued,	in	a	striking	anticipation	of	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	social	critique,	that	capitalism	is	responsible	for	a	transformation	of	sexual	desire	“as-agency”	into	sexual	desire	“as-purpose”	(p.	285).	For	Burke,	the	transformation	is	accomplished	through	the	mechanism	of	money	(pp.	285-286).	It	would	be	useful	to	say	that	Deleuze	and	Guattari	refined	this	description	as	the	actions	of	capitalists	to	add	and	delete	axioms	to	maximize	profit	(Deleuze	&	Guattari,	2009;	Holland,	1999).	Burke	tried	to	deny	the	necessity	of	purpose	by	defending	the	purifiability	of	agency	(1945/1969,	p.	287).	He	wrote,	“Since	agents	act	through	the	medium	of	motion,	the	reduction	of	action	to	motion	can	be	treated	as	reduction	to	Agency”	(p.	286).	However,	he	did	not	even	complete	the	next	paragraph	before	he	runs	into	the	agent	feedback	mechanism	that	denies	this	reduction.	Because	agents	act	with	a	purpose	in	view,	a	simple	movement	is	subject	to	“adjustments	rather	than	purpose”	(p.	287).	This	move	is	an	attempt	to	separate	movement	from	purpose	through	the	transitivity	of	adjustment.	I	find	this	move	unpersuasive.	As	Deleuze	(1994)	explained	in	his	appropriation	of	Hume,	agents/actors	have	memory,	which	is	a	container	for	purpose	located	in	the	contracted	future,	and	this	intervenes	in	the	world	of	motion.	As	long	as	there	are	agents/actors,	”reduction	of	action	to	motion”	is	impossible.		 Burke’s	(1945/1969)	paradoxical	engagement	with	agency	and	purpose	is	an	implication	of	describing	it	in	representational	language—an	instance	of	the	“paradox	of	substance”	(p.	21).	Despite	the	best	efforts	of	language	users,	any	representation	of	agency	is	going	to	put	action	and	motion,	process	and	structure,	form	and	content,	into	mixture.	Furthermore,	the	transitive	power	of	grammar	is	not	sufficient	cover	to	finesse	the	paradox,	and	no	amount	of	defining	is	going	to	solve	the	“crisis	of	agency”	(Hallenbeck,	2012,	p.	18).	In	fact,	Burke	argued	that	it	is	defining	that	causes	the	paradox	of	substance	(1945/1969).	In	the	next	section,	I	discuss	Deleuze’s	process	philosophy	to	show	how	it	is	possible	to	avoid	the	mixture	through	a	non-representational	analysis;	solving	the	problem	of	essentializing	polemics	requires	attacking	the	problem	by	thinking	with	polemics.		
Deleuze’s	Process	Philosophy	Reading	Deleuze	(1994)	solves	the	problem	of	identity	by	refusing	its	foundational	status,	and	my	deployment	of	Deleuze’s	philosophy	solves	the	problem	caused	by	the	positing	of	a	stable	polemical	form.	One	of	the	most	important	missions	of	Deleuze’s	process	philosophy	is	to	analyze	identity	in	terms	of	a	multiplicity	(DeLanda,	2002).	Using	a	multiplicity	in	process	philosophy	escapes	from	representational	thinking	(Holland,	2013).	Resisting	representational	thinking	is	important	when	analyzing	the	nature	of	polemics,	since	polemics	are	queer,	a	form	marked	with	an	unpredictability	(Rand,	2008)	that	is	curtailed	when	it	is	analyzed	in	terms	of	conventional	characteristics.	Analyzing	the	polemical	form	as	a	multiplicity	preserves	and	explains	its	unpredictability.		
	 132	
In	Deleuze’s	discussion	of	Hegel	in	Difference	and	Repetition	(1994),	the	problem	becomes	an	issue	when	identity	is	taken	as	foundational	and	difference	is	viewed	as	derivative.	When	identity	is	foundational,	identities	can	be	opposed,	essences	can	be	generalized	to	other	contexts,	universals	can	be	complexified	so	that	resemblances	can	be	detected,	and	analysis	can	end.	Deleuze	intervened	on	this	basic	assumption	of	representation	by	making	difference	foundational,	and	viewing	identity	as	derivative.	It	is	important	to	clarify	that	Deleuze	did	not	abandon	identity.	Deleuze	was	invested	in	explaining	identity	rather	than	assuming	identity	(DeLanda,	2002).	Deleuze	still	relied	on	foundations,	but	his	foundations	were	not	structural	or	essential.	Rather,	Deleuze’s	foundation	was	reading	and	thinking.		 One	of	the	most	important	missions	of	Deleuze’s	process	philosophy	is	to	analyze	identity	in	terms	of	a	multiplicity	(p.	9).	Deleuze	(1994)	proposed	that	we	should	analyze	process	through	an	appeal	to	the	concept	of	difference,	which	he	associated	with	the	mathematical	concept	of	the	differential	(p.	46).	The	differential	is	an	open-ended	array	of	ways	to	analyze	change,	and	it	is	interesting	to	point	out	that	the	methodology	of	differential	analysis	in	mathematics	itself	changes	depending	on	the	conditions	of	the	problem	(which	makes	it	an	effective	device	to	demonstrate	difference),	rather	than	remaining	a	static	method.	DeLanda	(2002)	explained	that	when	a	process	is	analyzed,	it	is	inevitable	that	the	examination	of	many	examples	of	it	will	reveal	that	there	are	similarities	(p.	10).	It	is	tempting	to	fixate	on	those	similarities	and	then	conclude	that	those	similarities	constitute	an	essence	(p.	10).	However,	“These	would	not	be	essences	of	objects	or	kinds	of	objects,	but	essences	of	processes,	yet	essences	nonetheless.	It	is	in	order	to	break	this	vicious	circle	that	multiplicities	are	introduced”	(p.	10).	For	Deleuzian	analysis,	multiplicities	are	the	only	way	to	account	for	similarities	of	form	without	returning	to	a	structuralist	analysis	of	form	(p.	10).	According	to	Jonathan	Roffe	(2010),	“A	multiplicity	is,	in	the	most	basic	sense,	a	complex	structure	that	does	not	reference	a	prior	unity”	(p.	181).	A	useful	example	of	a	multiplicity	for	Roffe	is	a	house:	A	house	is	a	patchwork	of	concrete	structures	and	habits.	Even	though	we	can	list	these	things,	there	is	finally	no	way	of	determining	what	the	essence	of	a	particular	house	is,	because	we	cannot	point	to	anything	out	of	the	house	itself	to	explain	or	to	sum	it	up—it	is	simply	a	patchwork.	(p.	181)	A	house	houses,	and	houses	house.	In	other	words,	a	multiplicity	is	not	defined	by	a	set	of	essences	or	forms,	since	it	is	those	essences	or	forms	which	need	to	be	explained	by	a	multiplicity	in	the	first	place.	Instead,	a	multiplicity	is	an	expansive	catalog	of	the	possibilities	(or	‘contingencies,’	if	we	follow	Farrell,	1993,	p.	77)	that	may	happen	during	a	process.	A	house	might	be	built	of	wall	frames	by	carpenters	and	be	inhabited	with	great	success;	the	same	plan	could	be	followed	by	amateurs	and	might	be	a	complete	disaster.	In	addition,	“We	can	imagine	a	time	when,	in	the	infancy	of	the	human	race,	some	enterprising	mortal	crept	into	a	hollow	in	a	rock	for	shelter”	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	344),	defying	the	current	stereotype	of	construction	and	creating	a	house	merely	by	occupying	it,	perhaps	for	the	first	time.	The	causal	mechanisms	that	attend	to	prior	conditions,	such	as	the	distribution	of	weight	and	the	consequences	of	the	choices	made	by	those	who	constructed	the	house	(e.g.,	carpenters,	geological	forces,	occupants),	explain	the	emergent	similarities	that	are	
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found	among	houses.	The	identity	of	a	house	is	something	to	be	explained	rather	than	taken	for	granted.		 Using	a	multiplicity	in	process	philosophy	enables	escape	from	representational	thinking.	However,	it	is	not	possible	to	do	this	by	using	a	multiplicity	merely	to	think	about	something.	In	other	words,	to	use	a	multiplicity	for	solving	the	problem	of	identity,	it	is	not	enough	to	think	“about	the	world”—rather,	a	multiplicity	works	by	“thinking	with	the	world”	(Holland,	2013,	p.	37).	For	example,	to	create	a	multiplicity	of	a	house	and	have	it	work	with	houses,	it	would	be	necessary	also	to	account	for	the	causal	mechanisms	that	affect	how	a	house	is	built,	and	the	best	way	to	do	that	is	by	building	a	house.	It	is	possible	to	build	a	house	in	the	virtual	space	of	thought	using	the	framework	of	a	multiplicity	if	one	follows	the	causal	mechanisms	that	influence	the	degrees	of	freedom	that	affect	builders	in	their	quest	to	actualize	a	house.	Alternatively,	and	more	topical	for	the	current	project,	it	is	also	possible	to	deploy	a	multiplicity	of	a	polemic.	The	advantage	to	this	approach	is	that	this	dissertation’s	medium	and	status	as	a	polemic	features	the	causal	mechanisms	that	influence	the	degrees	of	freedom	that	affect	polemicists	and	their	audiences,	and	it	does	this	automatically.	We	are	thus	in	the	position	of	actualizing	the	possibilities	that	a	polemic	unfolds	just	by	reading,	thinking,	and	responding,	achieving	a	non-representational	analysis	of	polemics	through	rhetorical	agency.	As	this	chapter	moves	into	the	next	section,	which	addresses	the	polemical	scope	of	queer	studies,	it	is	important	to	keep	Deleuze’s	concept	of	the	multiplicity	geared	toward	explaining	a	situation	of	an	unpredictable	form	with	characteristics	that	have	been	predicted.	The	current	situation	is	a	polemic,	a	concept	that	Erin	Rand	(2008)	identified	as	queer	with	certain	characteristics	that	she	herself	predicted.	She	brought	attention	to	the	polemic	in	order	to	address	the	question	of	rhetorical	agency,	and	answered	the	issue	of	whether	agency	belongs	to	texts	or	audiences	by	focusing	on	both	sides	of	the	rhetorical	equation	(p.	299).	She	answered	this	question	by	“suggesting	that	the	formal	features	of	texts	enable	agency”	(p.	299).	Her	definition	of	rhetorical	agency	as	“the	capacity	for	words	and/or	actions	to	come	to	make	sense	and	therefore	to	create	effects	through	their	particular	formal	and	stylistic	conventions”	has	the	advantage	of	including	texts	and	audiences	into	the	topic	of	agency	(pp.	299-300).	However,	this	view	is	also	problematic	because	it	posited	conventions,	which	do	precisely	what	DeLanda	warned	is	what	happens	when	essences	of	process	are	posited	without	a	continued	effort	to	explain	the	intensive	processes	that	sustain	those	characteristics.	The	next	section	focuses	on	deploying	a	multiplicity	to	demonstrate	the	mortality	of	those	conventions,	and	to	show	that	they	are	not	essential	to	the	rhetorical	form	of	the	polemic.	This	lack	of	essence	is	critical	to	retaining	the	queerness	of	polemics,	which	is	arguably	the	most	important	insight	of	Rand’s	arguments	about	polemics.		
The	Polemic’s	Queer	Rhetoric		 Erin	Rand’s	rhetoric	has	failed	to	resolve	the	crisis	of	agency.	This	is	good	news.	In	fact,	her	attempts	at	definition	have	simultaneously	reified	Burke’s	paradox	of	substance	and	shown	that	the	polemic	is	a	multiplicity.	Her	strategy	was	to	define		
	 134	
the	polemic	as	a	queer	rhetorical	form	and	to	posit	conventional	requirements	for	any	empirical	test	cases	and	to	define	the	polemic	in	terms	of	unexpected	purposes	to	which	audiences	have	appropriated	it.	The	characteristics	and	the	purposive	characteristic	that	she	posited	are	specific,	predicable,	and	generalizable.	However,	because	of	Rand’s	dual	definition	of	the	polemic,	it	becomes	clear	that	audiences	of	her	text,	herself	included,	should	be	prepared	for	adjustments	to	the	formal	characteristics	and	purposes	of	the	polemic.	This	becomes	clear	toward	the	end	of	her	article	where	she	identified	her	article	as	itself	a	form	of	“queer	polemicization”	(p.	314),	and	as	such,	she	rightly	flouted,	whether	or	not	she	realized	it,	the	arguably	essentializing	characteristics	that	she	laid	out	and	queered	them	in	a	striking	display	of	adjustability.	My	reaction	to	Rand’s	polemic	is	a	provisional	acceptance	of	the	formal	characteristics	that	she	laid	out,	but	displacing	its	implicit	Hegelian	framework	with	Deleuze’s	process-oriented	multiplicity	framework	to	explain	those	characteristics.	Therefore,	I	argue	that,	even	though	Rand’s	theory	qualifies	Walden	as	a	polemic,	it	(like	any	polemic)	requires	openness	to	alternative	processes	of	fulfillment	(Arditi	&	Valentine,	1999).	Paradoxically,	because	Rand’s	rhetoric	was	itself	polemical,	my	reaction	to	her	theory	has	given	her	a	significant	measure	of	success	in	causing	a	change	in	direction	that	expands	the	scope	of	queer	studies	beyond	a	framework	that	has	been	defined	by	Hegelian	thinking.	Walden	functions	in	the	same	way:	it	is	guaranteed	success	by	making	Thoreau’s	thesis	a	possible	“falling	away	of	a	friend”	(Flannery,	2001,	p.	122	quoted	by	Rand,	2008,	p.	307).	I	make	this	argument	in	two	steps.	First,	I	engage	Erin	Rand’s	theory	on	her	own	initial	terms.	I	follow	the	characteristics	that	Rand	set	out	as	the	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	the	constitution	of	a	polemic	and	show	that,	arguendo,	
Walden	qualifies	as	a	polemic	under	her	conventional	analysis.	Second,	I	consider	Rand’s	definitional	duality	and	cast	the	polemic	as	a	multiplicity.	By	producing	a	polemic,	this	permits	a	non-representational	demonstration	of	a	polemic’s	characteristics.	Rand’s	failure	to	control	the	uptake	of	her	polemic	within	this	project	ensures	that	her	polemic	has	been	successful,	just	as	Walden	guarantees	success	by	insisting	that	others	go	their	own	way,	especially	when	that	means	leaving	Walden	behind.	The	reader	is	then	invited	to	read	and	respond	to	this	polemic,	which	actualizes	its	contingent	possibilities	and	produces	queerness.		
Rand’s	Polemic		 The	first	part	of	Rand’s	theory	of	the	polemic	is	an	elegant	exercise	in	formal	theory	that	has	exploded	the	scope	of	queer	studies	(2008).	She	produced	a	groundbreaking	theory	and	took	seriously	the	old	idea	that	queerness	is	not	always	about	sex,	but	is	instead	a	matter	of	an	unpredictable	relationship	between	speech	and	its	uptake	by	audiences,	which	may	involve	sex.	This	was	made	possible	because	she	produced	a	theory	that	is	capable	of	focusing	exclusively	on	the	formal	characteristics	of	a	rhetorical	act	and	its	effects	rather	than	its	institutional	context.	This	is	particularly	important	to	the	current	project	because	it	has	made	it	possible	to	analyze	the	queer	dimensions	of	Walden,	a	text	that	followed	the	19th	century’s	
zeitgeist	and	reduced	the	topic	of	sex	to	a	single	sentence:	“Chastity	is	the	flowering	of	man”	(Thoreau,	1985,	p.	497).	Rand’s	archetypal	example	was	Larry	Kramer’s	
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inflammatory	gay	rights	rhetoric,	and	she	was	able	to	refrain	from	making	Kramer’s	topic	essential	to	her	proof.		 Rand	laid	out	four	characteristics	that	are	the	necessary	and	sufficient	conventional	conditions	for	polemical	rhetoric:	“[1]	alienating	expressions	of	emotion,	[2]	non-contingent	assertions	of	truth,	[3]	presumptions	of	shared	morality,	and	[4]	the	constitution	of	enemies,	audiences,	and	publics”	(2008,	p.	301).	As	they	stand,	Walden	meets	these	requirements,	but	Walden	is	more	complex	than	Kramer’s	rhetoric	with	respect	to	how	people	have	responded,	which	is	the	concern	of	the	fourth	characteristic.		
	 Alienating	Expressions	of	Emotion	According	to	Rand,	the	first	formal	feature	of	polemics	is	that	they	have	alienating	expressions	of	emotion.	Citing	Katheryn	Thomas	Flannery,	Rand	found	that	“the	salience	of	anger	is	often	noted	as	a	primary	component	of	polemics	in	general”	(p.	302).	Alienation	is	accomplished	without	recourse	to	content,	with	polemics	deploying	emotion	in	a	way	that	is	different	from	rhetorical	pathos	(p.	302).	This	form,	for	Rand,	is	through	a	sequence	of	non-emotional	descriptions	that	build	up	to	an	emotional	outburst.	
Walden	accomplishes	emotional	alienation	from	its	reader	in	two	ways.	The	first	way	that	this	is	accomplished	is	indirectly	through	its	heroic	demands	on	the	reader.	The	second	way	that	Walden	accomplishes	this	is	through	the	same	way	that	Kramer	did:	following	a	string	of	descriptions	and	building	to	an	explicit	emotional	crescendo.	The	first	way	that	Walden	alienates	its	reader	is	through	its	high	demands	on	its	reader.	To	show	why	this	can	result	in	alienation,	it	is	useful	to	compare	Walden	to	another	set	of	polemics	than	Kramer’s	diatribes.	A	more	Waldenesque	set	of	examples	of	a	polemic	that	alienates	the	reader	with	high	demands	on	its	reader	are	John	Milton’s	classical	writings.	Richard	Weaver	(1953)	described	Milton’s	writings	as	a	kind	of	“heroic	rhetoric”;	what	is	heroic	about	Milton’s	writings	is	that	“the	perception	of	his	judgments	requires	an	active	sensibility	incompatible	with	a	state	of	relaxation”	(p.	143).	One	has	to	focus	to	understand	Milton’s	verse.	It	is	also	interesting	to	note	that	Weaver	himself	characterized	Milton’s	writings	as	polemical.	
Walden	is	similar.	As	I	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	Golemba	(1990)	argued	that	Walden	was	written	with	“a	language	that	speaks	in	riddles,	a	tormenting	language	that	threatens	to	devour	those	who	fail	to	decode	its	mysteries”	(p.	232).	
Walden	violates	our	expectations,	does	not	allow	us	to	rest,	and	brutally	challenges	his	friends	to	adapt	to	its	literary	wilderness.	Such	a	challenge	can	be	profoundly	alienating	once	it	is	discovered.	This	is	why	the	faux	friendships	of	illusive	surveying	and	self-sounding,	which	are	discussed	in	Chapter	Three,	delay	the	recognition	of	the	intensity	of	Walden’s	terms	of	friendship.	The	second	way	that	Walden	accomplishes	emotional	alienation	from	the	reader	is	particularly	salient	in	two	places	in	the	text.	One	place	that	this	occurs	is	in	“The	Ponds.”	Another	place	is	in	the	latter	part	of	“Baker	Farm”	and	the	beginning	of	“Higher	Laws.”			
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The	most	obvious	example,	in	my	opinion,	of	Walden’s	alienation	of	the	reader	through	direct	emotional	expression	is	in	“The	Ponds.”	The	topic	that	led	to	the	outburst	is	Thoreau’s	description	of	a	pond	where	Thoreau	wanted	to	build	a	cabin	after	he	graduated	from	college,	with	a	Mr.	Flint	denying	his	desire.	In	“The	Ponds,”	Thoreau	provides	a	detailed	description	of	Flint’s	Pond,	or	Sandy	Pond,	and	the	activities	that	he	engaged	in	and	the	sights	and	sensations	that	he	enjoyed	while	there,	describing	the	small	waves	that	are	produced	by	the	wind	and	memorialized	in	the	sand.	Then,	in	a	fresh	paragraph,	Thoreau	emitted	his	outburst:	“What	right	had	the	unclean	and	stupid	farmer,	whose	farm	abutted	on	this	sky	water,	whose	shores	he	has	ruthlessly	laid	bare,	to	give	his	name	to	it?”	(1985,	p.	478).	He	followed	up	this	judgment	with	a	critique	of	the	ways	that	Flint’s	capitalistic	behavior	undermined	the	true	value	of	the	pond.	Today,	just	as	in	the	19th	century,	such	a	revelation	of	values	is	highly	divisive,	alienating	most	people	who	identify	with	Flint	and	embarrassing	the	rest	of	the	population	that	has	allowed	a	country	to	be	“manured	with	the	hearts	and	brains	of	men!	As	if	you	were	to	raise	your	potatoes	in	the	church-yard!	Such	is	a	model	farm”	(p.	479).	Historically,	churchyards	have	been	used	as	burial	grounds,	and	so	Thoreau	is	indicting	us	for	being	like	zombies	who	have	acquired	a	taste	for	farmers.	We	are	either	like	Flint	and	Emerson	and	guilty	of	naming	the	ponds	and	waves	as	“commodities”	of	nature,	or	we	are	complicit	through	our	slow	and	plodding	pursuit	of	American	dreams.	Another	way	that	Walden	accomplishes	emotional	alienation	from	the	reader	through	direct	emotional	expression	is	particularly	salient	in	Thoreau’s	reaction	in	“Higher	Laws”	to	John	Field’s	American	dreaming	in	“Baker	Farm.”	In	“Baker	Farm,”	Thoreau	was	a	guest	in	the	house	of	the	Field	family,	a	family	of	Irish	immigrants.	Mrs.	Field	is	perpetually	cleaning,	and	yet	the	shack	remains	dirty.	The	reason,	Thoreau	claims,	is	because	of	the	several	amenities	that	the	Fields	indulged	in:	a	rich	diet	that	included	tea,	coffee,	and	meat.	Thoreau	attempted	to	intervene	with	rationality,	and	treated	the	Fields	like	philosophers	who	would	carefully	consider	evidence.	John	Field	“heaved	a	sigh”	and	his	wife	stared	at	Thoreau	“with	arms	a-kimbo.”	(p.	487).	On	his	way	home,	Thoreau	heard	a	voice	of	conscience	in	his	head	telling	him	to	go	live	a	wild	life,	and	not	to	concern	himself	with	the	self-defeating	pursuits	and	stubbornness	of	John	Field	and	his	ilk.		Then,	at	the	beginning	of	“Higher	Laws,”	Thoreau’s	emotions	literally	go	raw:	As	I	came	home	through	the	woods	with	my	string	of	fish,	trailing	my	pole,	it	being	now	quite	dark,	I	caught	a	glimpse	of	a	woodchuck	stealing	across	my	path,	and	felt	a	strange	thrill	of	savage	delight,	and	was	strongly	tempted	to	seize	and	devour	him	raw;	not	that	I	was	hungry	then,	except	for	that	wildness	which	he	represented.	(p.	490)	Many	Thoreavians	quote	this	passage	out	of	context,	taking	it	as	a	representative	anecdote	for	Thoreau’s	honor	of	wildness	and	how	it	contradicted	his	vegetarian	preferences.	However,	when	it	is	combined	with	the	narrative	in	the	previous	chapter,	it	becomes	clear	that	Thoreau’s	urge	is	tied	to	his	frustration	at	his	failure	to	reach	the	Fields	with	reason,	and	his	urge	to	seize	the	woodchuck	is	a	pendulum	effect	of	the	situation.	Thoreau’s	reaction	can	be	savage	and	alienating,	since	not	everyone	would	want	to	eat	a	woodchuck,	let	alone	a	raw	one	that	might	still	be		
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alive.	It	is	also	unexpected,	not	only	because	of	Thoreau’s	transition	from	philosophy	to	savagery,	but	also	because	the	woodchuck	encounter	was	separated	from	Thoreau’s	encounter	with	John	Field	by	the	striation	of	a	new	chapter.		
	 Non-Contingent	Assertions	of	Truth	According	to	Rand,	the	second	formal	feature	that	polemics	have	is	the	assertion	of	non-contingent	truths.	This	characteristic	is	linked	to	the	first	characteristic:	the	reason	for	polemic’s	emotional	alienation	is	because	of	the	author’s	“passionate	conviction	in	a	particular	version	of	the	truth,	even	when	that	truth	may	not	be	evident	to	others”	(Rand,	2008,	p.	303).	Although	non-contingent	truths	do	not	form	the	totality	of	claims	made	by	a	polemic,	a	polemic	always	has	a	foundation	without	a	footing.	In	Rand’s	words,	“Polemics	forego	the	expected	methodological	construction	of	an	argument	through	the	presentation	of	evidence	and	logic	in	favor	of	a	simple	declaration	or	indictment”	(p.	303).	This	effectively	alienates	polemics	as	non-normal	from	the	rhetorical	tradition,	since	“Kenneth	J.	E.	Graham,	for	instance,	explains	that	the	rhetorical	is	marked	by	dialogue	and	debate,	involves	arguing	on	both	sides	of	an	issue,	and	is	necessarily	social	in	outlook”	(p.	303).	The	polemic	runs	the	risk	of	being	called	‘antirhetorical’	(Kenneth	Graham,	as	quoted	by	Flannery,	2001,	p.	116	and	Rand,	2008,	p.	303),	and	as	such,	it	“violates	the	norms	of	rhetoric”	(Rand,	2008,	pp.	303-304).	In	the	case	of	Walden,	its	non-contingent	truth	is	its	thesis:	each	person	should	find	their	own	way.	This	truth	finds	no	direct	support	anywhere	in	the	text;	it	vanishes	soon	after	it	appears,	only	to	re-appear	in	the	conclusion.	Thoreau’s	violation	of	the	norms	of	rhetoric	is	evident	when	his	“population	thinking”32	in	“Economy”	and	“Conclusion”	is	compared	to	the	reasoned	pantheism	found	in	the	rest	of	the	book.	In	particular,	the	placid	enlightenment	found	in	“Spring”	is	jarringly	disrupted	when	Thoreau	admonishes	the	reader	to	“love	your	life,	poor	as	it	is”	(see	Buell,	1995,	p.	249).		
Presumptions	of	Shared	Morality	According	to	Rand,	the	third	formal	feature	that	polemics	have	is	a	presumption	of	a	shared	morality.	This	presumption	leads	polemics	to	“take	on	a	discomfortingly	moralistic	or	self-righteous	tone.	Rather	than	moving	an	audience	through	a	series	of	logical	steps	to	forward	his	argument,”	Rand	argued,	the	polemicist	“describes	his	polemical	truth	as	a	moral—rather	than	rational—choice.	The	audience	is	therefore	not	so	much	persuaded	as	they	are	expected	or	morally	obliged	to	believe”	(2008,	p.	304).	This	move	displaces	“the	primacy	of	reason”	(p.	305)	and	introduces	one’s	moral	conscience	as	a	constituent	of	reason	and	rhetoric.																																																									32	Manuel	DeLanda	(2002)	used	this	term	to	describe	Deleuze’s	process	philosophy.	DeLanda	argued	that	Deleuze’s	philosophy	requires	the	existence	of	a	population	of	individual	cases	that	form	the	basis	for	manifold	analysis.	According	to	Ernst	Mayr,	“the	populationist	thinker	stresses	the	uniqueness	of	everything	in	the	organic	world”	(quoted	by	DeLanda,	2002,	p.	58).		
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Walden	is	replete	with	the	presumption	that	each	of	our	consciences	is	sacrosanct.	This	led	Buell	to	write:	Thoreau	seems	to	have	assumed	at	some	rather	early	point	that	readers	(as	opposed	to	the	general	public)	will	stay	with	him	and	complete	the	process	of	conversion	to	which	they	were	already	somewhat	disposed	by	immersing	themselves	so	completely	in	the	life	according	to	nature	that	they	will	refuse	to	reenter	civilized	life	again	on	the	same	terms	as	before.	Thoreau’s	refusal	to	organize	the	Walden	landscape	tidily	for	his	readers	may	be	one	sign	of	his	intent	to	get	us	lost	in	it.	(1995,	p.	135)	
Walden’s	reader	is	free	to	leave	at	any	time.	There	are	no	appeals	to	fear	or	vanity	designed	to	induce	the	reader	to	stay.	In	addition,	Thoreau’s	claim	that	each	person	should	find	their	own	way	is	coupled	with	his	argument	in	“Resistance	to	Civil	Government”	where	he	insisted	that	each	citizen	has	an	obligation	never	to	“resign	his	conscience	to	the	legislator”	(1849,	p.	190).	Thoreau	also	defended	John	Brown’s	morally	motivated	raid	on	Harpers	Ferry	(2001).	Rand	found	that	Kramer	embraced	the	role	of	“moralist,”	Foucault	identified	as	one	as	well	(Rand,	2008,	p.	305);	the	same	description	fits	Walden’s	persona	and	Thoreau	as	an	individual.		
	 Constitution	of	Enemies,	Audiences,	and	Publics		 This	characteristic	addresses	the	polemic’s	contextual	relationship	with	its	audiences	by	“dissolv[ing]	the	distance	between	the	audience	and	the	text	by	implicating	the	audience	as	the	cause	of	the	problem”	(p.	306).	While	Kramer’s	polemic	divides	his	audience	into	partisan	groups	that	produce	the	serendipity	of	new	theories	of	queerness	(pp.	309-311),	Walden	differs	because	it	not	only	keeps	itself	a	focus	of	attention,	but	also	invites	its	surviving	friends	to	take	advantage	of	that	attention	by	acting	with	the	knowledge	that	the	enemy	has	been	provoked.	The	special	adversarial	relationship	that	polemics	have	with	their	audiences	proves	to	be	divisive	rhetoric	(p.	306).	Rand	characterized	polemics	as	a	rhetorical	form	in	which	“allegiances	of	the	reader	or	audience	are	shaped	by	the	text	itself”	(p.	306).	Polemics	target	an	audience	that	is	complicit	with	a	true	adversary	and	“cultivates	the	partisanship	of	the	audience”	(p.	306).	Polemics	do	this	by	indicting	their	audiences	for	being	enablers	(pp.	306-307).	What	this	accomplishes	is	the	construction	of	two	different	kinds	of	enemies:	a	proximate	enemy	and	a	distant	enemy	(p.	307).	This	construction	of	two	different	kinds	of	enemies	that	differ	in	terms	of	their	relative	proximity	or	distance	from	the	rhetor	is	reminiscent	of	grammatical	third	persons	in	Algonquian	and	Salishan	languages	(both	of	which	are	Native	American)	in	which	the	third	person	actually	has	two	parts:	a	proximate,	or	a	more	topical	third	person,	and	an	obviative,	or	a	less	topical	third	person	(Mithun,	2001).33	The	proximate	enemy	in	polemics	is,	provocatively	and	paradoxically,	the	audience	itself	(p.	307).	This	is	why	Kathryn	Thomas	Flannery	described	the	warlike																																																									33	This	division	of	one’s	enemies	into	proximate	and	primary	groups	seems	have	a	history	that	could	be	further	explored.	For	example,	Michael	Hardt	has	noted	that	Deleuze	staged	a	response	to	Hegel	through	his	“care	in	positioning	the	relation	to	proximate	and	fundamental	enemies”	(1993,	p.	53).		
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quality	of	the	polemic	with	its	invoked	audience	and	the	relationship	as	being	like	“the	falling	away	of	a	friend”	(Flannery,	2001,	p.	122	quoted	by	Rand,	2008,	p.	307).	The	audience	is	posited	as	an	enemy	because	of	its	complicity	with	the	distant	enemy,	and	the	polemic	proposes	to	“activate	agency	among	the	proximate	audience”	to	stop	enabling	the	distant	enemy	(Rand,	2008,	p.	308).	However,	because	some	audience	members	may	have	actually	fallen	away	from	friendship	because	of	the	alienating	effects	of	the	polemic,	some	audience	members	would	be	untethered	from	the	polemic’s	second	persona	(Black,	1970	as	cited	by	Rand,	2008).	As	Rand	pointed	out,	“polemics	might	be	used	against	the	grain,	or	be	taken	up	by	other	audiences	and	for	other	purposes”	(2008,	p.	308).	In	Rand’s	rubric,	this	proximate	enemy	gives	rise	to	a	contest	over	what	to	do	with	the	polemic:	follow	the	polemicist’s	demands,	or	move	against	it	(p.	309).	Because	the	audience	of	a	polemic	faces	an	implicit	choice	about	the	future	of	its	relationship	with	the	rhetor,	the	audience	is	challenged	to	create	deliberative	rhetoric	(p.	309).			 Walden’s	constitution	of	audiences,	enemies,	and	public	space	is	complex.	While	it	is	true	that	Walden	invokes	a	proximate	enemy	that	enables	capitalism,	that	problem	does	not	completely	bracket	the	fertility	of	the	experience	of	responding	to	
Walden.	In	the	next	section,	I	discuss	a	response	that	has	been	able	to	maintain	friendship	with	the	text	and	took	it	in	an	unpredictable	direction,	despite	the	repelling	force	that	“offends	the	constituency”	(p.	307).	For	the	remainder	of	this	section,	I	discuss	the	standard	pattern	identified	by	Rand,	of	Walden’s	invocation	of	its	proximate	enemy,	an	oppositional	response,	and	the	controversy	that	was	generated	by	that	response.		 The	invoked	audience	of	Walden	is	a	discontented	crowd,	and	Thoreau	casts	many	of	us	as	proximate	enemies.	The	text	is	replete	with	references	to	its	readers,	identifying	them	as	ordinary	people	who	are	doing	an	endless	series	of	labors	to	rival	Hercules.	Other	references	attached	to	the	“you”	pronoun	in	the	text	identify	the	reader	as	spiritually	poor	and	hungry,	finding	it	hard	to	live	and	wondering	why,	and	driven	into	exhausting	debt	or	guilty	thievery	by	capitalism.	Thoreau	also	elaborates	his	attack	in	a	single	sentence	that	requires	heroic	attention	to	follow:	It	is	very	evident	what	mean	and	sneaking	lives	many	of	you	live,	for	my	sight	has	been	whetted	by	experience;	always	on	the	limits,	trying	to	get	into	business	and	trying	to	get	out	of	debt,	a	very	ancient	slough,	called	by	the	Latins	æs	alienum,	another’s	brass,	for	some	of	their	coins	were	made	of	brass;	still	living,	and	dying,	and	buried	by	this	other’s	brass;	always	promising	to	pay,	promising	to	pay,	tomorrow,	and	dying	today,	insolvent;	seeking	to	curry	favor,	to	get	custom,	by	how	many	modes,	only	not	state-prison	offenses;	lying,	flattering,	voting,	contracting	yourselves	into	a	nutshell	of	civility	or	dilating	into	an	atmosphere	of	thin	and	vaporous	generosity,	that	you	may	persuade	your	neighbor	to	let	you	make	his	shoes,	or	his	hat,	or	his	coat,	or	his	carriage,	or	import	his	groceries	for	him;	making	yourselves	sick,	that	you	may	lay	up	something	against	a	sick	day,	something	to	be	tucked	away	in	an	old	chest,	or	in	a	stocking	behind	the	plastering,	or,	more	safely,	in	the	brick	bank;	no	matter	where,	no	matter	how	much	or	how	little.	(1985,	p.	328)	
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In	other	words,	Thoreau	is	speaking	to	everyone	who	has	ever	stared	at	a	coin	as	a	child,	wondering	who	the	face	belonged	to,	and	then	later	felt	resentment	for	the	fact	that	they	will	never	to	appear	on	one—æs	alienum.	It	is	what	we	get	when	we	try	to	get	ahead	by	getting	other	people	into	debt	with	the	retail	smile	or	when	we	cause	inflation	with	conspicuous	consumption.	It	is	any	activity	that	defrauds	another	in	a	way	that	is	just	outside	of	the	reach	of	law.	It	is	the	result	of	the	corrupting	quest	to	own	another’s	brass…	the	sustaining	force	of	capitalism…	the	essence	of	what	qualifies	one	to	be	Thoreau’s	proximate	enemy.	Thoreau	is	not	addressing	Flint,	or	John	Farmer,	or	John	Field.	These	archetypes	either	have	no	motive	to	read	Thoreau,	or	have	confirmed	their	desperation	by	resigning	their	lives	to	a	dog-eat-dog	world.	Instead,	Thoreau	is	addressing	the	mass	of	his	readers	who	live	“lives	of	quiet	desperation”	(p.	329),	still	have	the	Thoreauvian	dream	of	living	free	and	wild,	and	yet	have	acquired	the	habit	of	squandering	their	lives	so	that	they	may	“play	life,	or	study	it	merely”	(p.	363).		 Walden’s	indictment	of	the	users	of	capitalism	has	attracted	its	own	collection	of	detractors.	In	fact,	it	seems	to	be	particularly	good	at	attracting	them.	Shortly	after	Thoreau’s	death,	his	old	nemesis,	Lowell	(1914),	accused	Thoreau	of	being	a	mere	strawberry	from	Emerson’s	garden	(p.	298).	Lowell’s	distaste	for	Thoreau	became	most	salient	in	his	pronouncement	that	he	“discovered	nothing”	(p.	300).	Since	then,	Thoreau’s	legacy	has	lived	on	seemingly	in	Emerson’s	shadow,	leaving	him	with	the	short	shrift	that	would	find	his	major	contribution	in	his	essay	“Resistance	to	Civil	Government.”	It	is	worth	pointing	out	one	recent	attack	on	Thoreau	in	The	New	Yorker.	Kathryn	Schultz	(2015)	came	forward	to	renew	Lowell’s	vitriol,	assailing	Thoreau’s	supposed	“moral	myopia”	and	reducing	him	to	“pond	scum”	(her	article’s	title).	Schulz’s	complaint	against	Thoreau	was	against	Thoreau’s	supposedly	excessive	stoicism,	the	fact	that	he	was	“narcissistic,	fanatical	about	self-control,	adamant	that	he	required	nothing	beyond	himself	to	understand	and	thrive	in	the	world”	(para.	6).	She	seemed	to	have	the	same	contempt	that	19th	century	entrepreneurs	had	toward	Thoreau,	lambasting	him	for	having	the	temerity	to	turn	his	back	on	the	world,	and	indulging	in	“original	cabin	porn”	(para.	6).	Most	of	this	pro-capitalism	rant	is	factually	suspect	and	partisan,	but	one	claim	in	it	I	have	to	admit	is	partially	true:	“Nor	was	he	interested	in	subjecting	his	claims	to	logical	scrutiny”	(para.	26).	The	response	to	The	New	Yorker	piece	was	substantial,	with	a	mixture	of	apologia	and	dismissal,	making	it	an	interesting	contrast	to	Kramer’s	rhetoric.	Writers	came	out	of	the	proverbial	woodwork	from	a	variety	of	naturist	and	Thoreauvian	strongholds,	such	as	the	Sierra	Club	(Mark,	2015),	the	Boston	Globe	(Primack	&	Miller-Rushing,	2015),	the	New	Republic	(Hohn,	2015),	and	the	Boston	
Review	(Waxman,	2015).	Shultz’s	article	drew	so	much	attention	that	one	of	my	colleagues,	Dr.	Joseph	Rhodes,	notified	my	advisor	and	me	about	the	article.	Sandy	Scott,	writing	for	a	blog	from	Concord,	Massachusetts,	summed	up	Shultz’s	critique	as	“an	amazing,	it	seems	willful,	misreading	of	Thoreau’s	work”	(2015,	para.	2).	Matthew	Towles,	in	a	more	investigatory	response,	traced	Shultz’s	motives	to	an	“effort	to	contrast	our	sentimental	view	of	Thoreau	with	how	he	lived	his	life”	(2015,	para.	4).	Donovan	Hohn,	writing	for	the	New	Republic	(2015),	questioned	the		
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very	need	for	such	a	correction,	pointing	out	that	so	much	time	has	passed	that	it	is	now	exceptionally	difficult	to	separate	the	apocryphal	from	the	genuine	origin,	and	that	such	a	quest	is	quite	beside	the	point	of	Walden.	While	each	generation	has	its	Thoreau	critics,	there	is	no	shortage	of	defenders	and	realists,	making	Thoreau’s	polemical	legacy	different	from	Kramer’s	inflammatory	rhetoric.	The	polemical	rhetoric	that	brought	Kramer	waves	of	rejection	and	serendipitous	response	has	been	a	tool	to	increase	Walden’s	visibility	in	the	moments	when	the	public	fails	to	understand	its	power.		
Readjusting	the	Polemic		 The	polemic	induces	its	own	polemicization,	which	makes	it	hard	to	pin	down	(Arditi	&	Valentine,	1999),	just	like	queerness	(Warner,	2002).	Rand’s	(2008)	article	is	one	such	example	of	this	morphing;	the	first	opportunity	for	adjustment	to	it	was	made	in	the	article	itself	through	its	own	polemicization	(p.	314).	In	addition,	I	offer	more	adjustment	here.	Specifically,	I	observe	that	Rand’s	own	empirical	analysis	‘fails’	to	move	outside	of	an	implicit	Hegelian	identity	framework,	since	the	formal	“characteristics	of	polemics	make	them	especially	prone	to	being	put	to	unforeseen	uses”	(p.	310).	The	‘failure’	of	Rand’s	argument	is	the	same	brand	of	failure	that	Rand	found	in	Campbell’s	and	Flannery’s	statements	about	agency.	These	failures	are	fuel	for	adjustment	of	the	polemic	as	a	multiplicity.	When	the	polemic	is	analyzed	as	a	multiplicity,	the	unpredictability	of	the	polemic	is	explained	and	its	connection	to	queerness	becomes	an	effect	of	process.		 I	make	this	argument	in	three	steps.	The	first	step	reviews	the	adjustment	that	Rand	made	to	the	four	necessary	and	sufficient	characteristics	of	the	polemic.	In	this	review,	I	show	how	the	appeal	to	purpose	allowed	Rand	to	depart	from	those	characteristics	and	identify	her	article	as	a	polemic,	even	though	it	does	not	meet	those	four	characteristics.	The	second	step	in	this	argument	addresses	the	Hegelian	language	in	Rand’s	article	(the	clear	empirical	preference	towards	analyzing	oppositional	provocations	to	Kramer’s	rhetoric)	and	the	need	to	recast	the	polemic	as	a	multiplicity.	I	bring	attention	to	the	fact	that	the	work	that	she	did	to	validate	the	polemic’s	characteristics	favors	attention	toward	provocations	that	are	clearly	against	Kramer’s	rhetoric.34	This	means	that	Rand’s	language	leaves	open	the	possibility	that	polemics	can	inspire	non-oppositional	provocations	from	the	polemic’s	friends.	Recasting	the	polemic	as	a	multiplicity	overcomes	this	oversight.	The	last	step	in	this	argument	actualizes	this	possibility.	To	do	this,	I	create	a	polemic,	making	the	contingent	possibilities	of	polemical	multiplicity	actual	by	involving	the	reader	in	this	process	of	actualizing	the	possibilities	of	polemical	multiplicity	through	thinking	and	considering	how	to	respond.	In	addition,	I	extrapolate	from	the	virtual	possibilities	of	my	multiplicity	to	return	to	Annie	Dillard’s	Pilgrim	at	Tinker	Creek	to	inform	a	missing	possibility	that	Rand	overlooked.																																																										34	Rand	(2008)	did	mention	“skeptics	or	believers”	(p.	306),	but	her	article	clearly	spent	most	of	its	audience	analysis	attending	to	the	opponents	of	Kramer’s	polemics.		
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	 Rand’s	Adjustment	of	the	Polemic		 The	adjustment	that	Rand	made	to	the	polemical	form	was	a	move	that	displaced	the	structural	essence	of	the	polemic	and	defined	it	in	terms	of	purpose.	Rand’s	own	article	displays	the	mutability	of	the	polemical	form,	since	by	identifying	her	own	text	as	polemical,	she	demonstrates	that	it	is	possible	to	produce	a	polemic	without	adhering	to	the	formal	characteristics	that	she	defined.	This	proves,	by	her	purposive	definition	and	her	own	example,	that	it	is	possible	to	provoke	an	unpredictable	response	in	such	a	way	that	adjusts	the	conventional	structure	of	polemical	agency.		 Rand’s	additional	definition	of	the	polemic	sets	her	definition	up	for	revision.	Citing	Arditi	and	Valentine,	Rand	argued	that	the	polemic	introduces	a	critical	gap	through	which	the	possibility	of	political	dissent	arises.	.	.	.	It	is	by	virtue	of	the	iterability	of	the	rules	of	political	participation	that	polemics	can	intervene	both	to	cite	and	redefine	the	rules	and	therefore	potentially	to	promote	radical	social	change.	(p.	313)	This	potentiality	of	having	one’s	own	iteration	of	the	rules	altered	or	subverted	“necessarily	introduces	risk”	(p.	314).	To	that	end,	Rand	redefined	the	polemic:	“The	polemic,	as	an	excessive	form	whose	volatility	and	tendency	to	be	taken	up	in	unexpected	ways	make	the	risk	of	undecideability	of	rhetorical	agency	especially	apparent,	is	therefore	productively	queer”	(p.	314).	Since	“the	effectivity	of	any	given	polemic	is	never	fully	determined	by	its	substance	or	intention[,]	this	is	a	move	that	de-essentializes	both	the	polemical	form	and	queerness	itself”	(p.	314).	Suddenly,	Rand’s	definition	of	a	polemic	has	become	a	multiplicity.	It	has	become	possible	that	a	polemic	can	fulfill	volatility	and	have	a	tendency	to	be	taken	up	in	unexpected	ways	that	do	not	fulfill	the	four	conditions.	Rand’s	article	is	one	such	example	of	a	polemic	that	does	not	fulfill	her	own	requirements.	Near	the	conclusion	of	her	article,	she	admitted	that	she	was	indulging	in	her	“own	bit	of	queer	polemicization”	(p.	314).	This	is	an	important	admission,	since	her	article	does	not	feature	any	of	the	conventional	polemical	characteristics.	This	is	okay	in	her	own	framework,	since	to	qualify	as	a	polemic	it	must	be	available	to	be	taken	up	by	others,	used	for	unexpected	purposes,	and	revised	to	serve	those	purposes.		Through	Rand’s	move	from	polemical	form	to	polemical	purpose,	however	unexpected	that	adjustment	and	purpose	might	be,	she	has	confirmed	Burke’s	observation	that	actors	adjust	agency	to	suit	their	own	purposes	(1945/1969,	p.	287).	In	addition,	since	essences	of	process	are	still	essences	nonetheless	(DeLanda,	2002),	defining	the	polemic	in	terms	of	its	appropriated	purposes	is	still	an	essence,	and	following	DeLanda,	that	essence	needs	to	be	explained.	The	next	section	makes	that	explanation	by	analyzing	the	polemic	as	a	multiplicity,	which	attends	to	the	polemic’s	causal	mechanisms	to	explain	structural	similarities.			
	 A	Rhetorical	Polemic		 Rand	perpetuates	a	Hegelian	dialectical	framework	in	her	analysis	of	the	polemic’s	formal	structure,	and	I	wonder	how	many	of	my	readers	are	responsible	for	allowing	people	like	her	to	continue	using	a	Hegelian	framework	to	publish		
	 143	
formal	analysis.	What	does	that	mean	to	you?	Specifically,	her	casting	of	the	polemic	as	four	structural	characteristics,	which	is	a	conventional	rhetorical	form	that	causes	it	to	be	used	for	unpredictable	purposes,	fails	to	account	for	the	causal	mechanisms	that	produce	the	similarities	that	polemics	have.	Rand	also	focused	on	responses	to	Kramer’s	polemical	rhetoric	that	adopt	the	position	of	the	polemic’s	proximate	enemy	and	paid	little	attention	to	Kramer’s	friends.	This	move	ignores	the	cases	in	which	Kramer’s	audience	maintains	polemical	friendship	but	acts	with	the	awareness	that	a	proximate	enemy	was	invoked.	These	cases	would	reveal	queer	strategies	that	can	be	deployed	with	polemics.	However,	by	focusing	on	oppositional	responses,	Rand	actually	reified	an	essentialist	foundation	while	masking	that	activity	by	claiming	that	she	was	de-essentializing	polemics.	In	other	words,	Rand	actually	reinforced	what	she	set	out	to	disrupt.	Furthermore,	if	the	reader	does	not	hold	individuals	like	Rand	accountable	for	perpetuating	this	kind	of	structuralist	masking	of	structuralism,	then	the	problem	of	essentialism	will	never	be	solved,	no	matter	how	much	Hegelian	thinkers	claim	to	be	ambivalent	about	identity	(see	Muńoz,	2009).	In	this	study,	I	use	this	response	in	two	ways.	First,	in	case	the	polemical	nature	of	my	argument	is	not	yet	salient,	I	map	the	ways	that	the	reader,	as	a	participant	in	academia,	might	respond	to	my	insinuation	that	they	are	responsible	for	allowing	this	situation	to	continue.	Second,	in	the	context	of	Walden,	I	return	attention	to	Annie	Dillard’s	Pilgrim	at	Tinker	Creek	as	a	kind	of	polemical	response	that	does	not	fit	into	Rand’s	believer/skeptic	binary.		
	 The	Multiplicity	of	Polemicization		 Rand’s	four	characteristics	of	the	polemic	are	necessary	effects	in	one	contingency	of	polemicization,	but	they	are	not	necessary	effects	in	all	contingencies	of	polemicization.	The	most	important	tool	that	helps	to	construct	the	multiplicity	of	a	polemic	is	the	idea	of	contingency,	which	has	to	do	with	how	agents/actors	respond	to	appearances	(Farrell,	1993).	This	means	that	the	audience	of	a	polemic	is	not	responding	to	emotional	expressions	that	the	polemic	essentially	has,	but	is	instead	responding	to	emotional	expressions	that	audiences	perceive.	This	shift	from	polemical	essence	to	polemical	contingency	is	one	way	to	escape	from	the	piety	of	essentialism,	since	contingencies,	if	they	obtain,	produce	the	structures	that	were	previously	seen	to	be	essential.	Specifically,	to	show	that	Rand’s	analysis	amounts	to	an	incomplete	multiplicity	of	the	polemic,	I	map	the	ways	in	which	someone	might	respond	to	the	polemical	nature	of	this	dissertation.	Without	waiting	for	an	actual	response,	I	use	Dillard’s	Tinker	Creek	to	explore	the	way	that	a	polemic’s	audience	can	be	the	polemic’s	friend	and	address	the	polemic’s	“public	space”	(Rand,	2008,	p.	309)	through	its	own	straightforwardness	(Thoreau,	1840).	
Tinker	Creek’s	queer	rhetoric	thus	serves	as	a	helpful	example	of	responsibility	for	others	who	find	themselves	at	the	margins	of	normalcy.		 The	most	important	tool	that	helps	to	construct	the	multiplicity	of	a	polemic	is	the	idea	of	the	contingency,	which	has	to	do	with	how	agents/actors	respond	to	appearances	(Farrell,	1993).	Thomas	Farrell	has	argued	that	as	rhetorical	beings,	we	do	not	respond	to	noumenal	realities,	but	rather,	we	respond	to	appearances.	In		
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addition,	Farrell	argued,	citing	Aristotle,	“Contingency	is	presupposed	on	the	very	notion	of	voluntary	agency,	since	it	makes	no	sense	to	deliberate	over	things	which	are	going	to	be	the	case	anyway	or	things	which	could	never	be	the	case”	(p.	77).	Appearances	may	or	may	not	be	identical	with	reality.	As	such,	the	polemical	involvement	of	emotional	alienation	is	not	a	matter	of	characteristics	that	polemics	essentially	have,	but	is	instead	a	matter	of	how	polemics	appear.	Benjamin	D.	Powell	(2007)	has	shown,	in	a	review	of	the	cognitive	neuroscientific	research	of	Vittorio	Gallese,	that	there	are	important	causal	mechanisms,	embedded	in	the	processes	of	mirror	neurons,	that	have	to	be	satisfied	for	actions,	such	as	emotional	expressions,	to	be	successfully	communicated.	Specifically,	the	successful	perception	of	an	action	made	by	another	individual	requires	that	the	perceiver	not	only	achieve	an	embodiment	of	the	same	action,	but	also	an	“embodiment	of	the	intended	goal”	(p.	113).	In	other	words,	the	perceptions	of	the	polemic’s	audience	are	contingent	on	what	the	audience	actually	embodies.	The	target	of	an	emotion	is	often	an	important	part	of	that	emotion	(Goldie,	2002).	The	polemic’s	friends	do	not	identify	with	the	proximate	enemy,	and	so	they	do	not	experience	alienation,	since	the	target	of	their	emotions	is	not	themselves.	In	contrast,	audiences	who	identify	as	the	polemic’s	proximate	enemy	experience	alienation,	since	their	embodied	anger	is	directed	inward.	In	the	case	of	Walden,	the	contingency	of	emotional	alienation	hinges	on	whether	the	audience	identifies	as	an	adherent	of	æs	alienum.	The	polemic’s	contingency	of	emotional	alienation	is	not	“just	as	likely	to	alienate—rather	than	satisfy	or	motivate—the	audience,”	as	Rand	argued	(2008,	p.	303),	but	is	instead	a	contingency	determined	by	the	audience.	This	shift	from	polemical	essence	to	polemical	contingency	is	one	way	to	escape	from	the	piety	of	essentialism,	since	contingencies	may	posit	the	structures	that	were	previously	seen	to	be	essential.	Rand’s	first	characteristic	holds	for	the	polemic’s	proximate	enemy,	not	the	polemic’s	friends,	since	the	polemic	causes	lasting	emotional	alienation	only	in	the	proximate	enemy.	For	the	polemic’s	friends,	the	polemic’s	emotional	expressions	are	not	durably	alienating;	the	polemic’s	friends	identify	with	the	polemicist.	Rand’s	discussion	of	the	four	characteristics	of	polemics	operates	without	much	regard	for	rhetorical	contingency,	and	as	such,	assumes	that	the	polemic’s	audience	is	always	going	to	have	an	arbitrary	likelihood	of	experiencing	alienation.	When	seen	as	a	structure	of	possibilities	rather	than	a	statistic,	the	four	characteristics	only	obtain	for	the	proximate	enemy,	which	may	not	be	present	to	a	polemic	at	all,	might	cause	widespread	alienation,	or	some	result	in	between.	When	Rand’s	four	characteristics	are	seen	only	as	essential	characteristics	of	how	a	polemic	would	appear	to	its	proximate	enemy,	we	realize	that	it	is	in	our	interests	to	accept	that	the	four	characteristics	are	contingent.	To	show	that	Rand’s	analysis	amounts	to	an	incomplete	multiplicity	of	the	polemic,	I	map	the	multiplicity	of	my	polemic:	the	context	of	an	intervention	of	the	enabling	behavior	of	an	academic	reader	who	is	a	member	of	a	discipline	that	is	perpetuating	Hegelian	thinking.	This	is	helpful	because	it	simplifies	the	manifold	nature	of	the	multiplicity	of	Thoreau’s	polemic,	which	has	a	long	history	and	a	changing	rhetorical	situation,	into	a	scenario	that	has	been	actualized	in	the	current	project.	This	strategy	of	thinking	with	polemics	instead	of	about	them	reveals	the		
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contingencies	for	which	Rand	both	succeeded	and	failed	to	provide	accounts,	and	it	allows	the	reader	to	expand	the	contingencies	as	far	as	the	outcome	may	warrant.	I	chose	this	particular	example	because,	following	Rand’s	account,	it	involves	a	polemicist	invoking	partisanship	by	naming	a	proximate	enemy	as	responsible	for	enabling	a	distant	enemy.	In	my	polemic,	I	have	implicated	the	reader	in	a	way	that	highlights	the	mechanics	of	co-dependency,	which	revolves	around	enablers	who	allow	something	undesirable	to	continue.	The	outcome	of	this	confrontation	is	not	a	binary	conclusion;	there	are	several	contingencies,	which	constitute	the	multiplicity	of	the	polemic.	These	contingencies	are	a	reflection	of	the	fact	that	when	agency	involves	actors/agents,	agency	is	subject	to	adjustment	based	on	the	purposes	envisioned	by	those	actors/agents.	I	use	the	term	‘polemic’	here	because	the	example	conforms	to	Rand’s	conventional	characteristics	and	is	at	risk	of	provoking	feelings	of	alienation,	implicating	my	reader	for	enabling	academia	for	perpetuating	Hegelian	thinking,	just	as	Rand	described	Kramer	did	in	his	gadfly	rhetoric	to	his	audiences	for	allowing	the	system	to	abuse	gays.	I	divide	audience	response	into	various	possibilities:	A	reader	as	‘friend’	or	as	‘enemy’.	‘Friend’	is	the	polemic’s	friend:	‘friend’	accepts	responsibility	for	my	claim,	and	recognizes	co-dependency	as	the	true	enemy,	the	inherent	barrier	that	prevents	the	extinction	of	Hegelian	thinking.	‘Friend’	ceases	the	enabling	behavior	(or	does	not	exhibit	enabling	behavior	in	the	first	place)	and	can	respond	in	a	few	ways:	either	(1)	join	my	camp	by	engaging	the	proximate	enemy	(i.e.,	attack	other	enablers),	or	(2)	move	on	with	the	reading	process	having	taken	individual	responsibility	(i.e.,	completely	cease	co-dependent	behavior).	‘Enemy’	is	the	polemic’s	proximate	enemy:	the	‘enemy’	denies	responsibility	for	what	I	have	said	and	does	not	recognize	co-dependency	as	the	enemy.	The	‘enemy’	can	respond	in	a	few	ways:	either	(3)	fail	to	change	(i.e.,	continue	enabling)	or	(4)	deploy	the	powers	of	rhetorical	invention	to	formulate	a	response	to	me	as	to	why	my	polemic	is	wrong	or	misguided.	Rand’s	analysis	primarily	focused	on	the	oppositional	responses	of	Crimp	and	Edelman,	and	positioned	them	into	the	fourth	contingency.	The	remainder	of	her	analysis	involved	a	cursory	acknowledgment	of	the	rest	of	the	respondents	to	Kramer’s	rhetoric,	lumping	them	into	the	first	and	perhaps	the	third	contingency.	This	leaves	the	second	and	third	contingencies	relatively	unexplored.	Unfortunately,	the	enemy	who	fulfills	the	third	contingency	is	usually	silent,	and	so	it	is	difficult	to	explore	it	rhetorically.	This	leaves	the	second	contingency	in	need	of	an	accounting.	To	investigate	the	actual	results	of	this	second	contingency,	I	am	not	going	to	guess	how	the	reader	is	going	to	respond,	but	I	will	I	use	Dillard’s	Tinker	Creek	to	exemplify	a	way	that	a	polemic’s	audience	can	be	the	polemic’s	friend	and	correct	the	polemic	through	its	own	straightforwardness.	Dillard’s	rhetoric	in	Tinker	Creek	deliberately	cultivates	strangeness	(Slovic,	1992).	Given	this	pattern	of	cultivation,	which	has	reached	into	most	of	her	writings,	and	in	particular,	Dillard’s	use	or	disavowal	of	gender	nonconforming	writing	in	Tinker	Creek	to	induce	her	own	melancholia	and	blindfold	herself	to	metaphorical	meaning	(Abraham	&	Torok,	1994a),	her	strategy	is	queer.	Moreover,	Dillard	positioned	Tinker	Creek	as	Walden’s	friend	and	responded	in	an	oblique	way	by	exploiting	the	other	contingencies	of	
Walden’s	polemics.	Specifically,	Dillard	did	not	participate	in	Walden’s	attack	on	its	
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proximate	enemy,	the	enabling	behaviors	of	capitalism,	æs	alienum.	In	fact,	Dillard	engaged	in	no	conventional	social	criticism	whatsoever.	Within	the	confines	of	the	text	itself	(i.e.,	ignoring	supplemental	material	that	Dillard	produced),	the	gender	of	the	narrator	is	not	identifiable	if	the	reader	does	not	assume	that	the	narrator	and	the	author	are	the	same	person.	Suzanne	Clark	argued	that	Dillard’s	displacement	of	her	gender	reifies	the	absence	of	women	in	nature	writing,	a	criticism	that	has	been	directed	at	Thoreau	in	particular	(1991).	Thoreau	made	virtually	no	analysis	on	the	subjection	of	women,	and	some	of	his	comments	in	Walden	can	be	interpreted	as	sexist	(Golemba,	1990).	Of	course,	Thoreau	was	deliberately	presenting	the	stereotyped	individualist	man	as	a	front,	and	so	there	is	cause	to	be	suspicious	of	his	genuineness	regarding	these	comments.	Nevertheless,	Dillard’s	strategy	of	befriending	Walden	and	implicitly	exposing	an	oversight	in	it	through	her	own	example	is	a	perfect	example	of	Thoreau’s	prescription	for	satirical	attack:	“Truth	does	not	turn	to	rebuke	falsehood;	her	own	straightforwardness	is	the	severest	correction”	(1840,	p.	118).	
Tinker	Creek’s	queer	rhetoric	thus	serves	as	a	helpful	example	of	responsibility	for	others	who	find	themselves	at	the	margins	of	normalcy.	As	many	queer	people	have	found	the	hard	way,	complaining	about	intolerable	circumstances,	such	as	a	dearth	of	women	writers,	has	the	unfortunate	effect	of	drawing	attention	from	the	very	sources	of	misery	that	produce	those	intolerable	circumstances.	Michael	Warner	has	written	about	a	similar	problem:	“those	who	write	opaque	left	theory	might	very	well	feel	that	they	are	.	.	.	writing	to	a	public	that	does	not	yet	exist,	and	finding	that	their	language	can	circulate	only	in	channels	hostile	to	it”	(2002,	p.	130).	This	is	one	reason	why	queerness	is	driven	into	silence,	where	it	is	then	agitated	by	polemicists	like	Thoreau	and	Kramer.	Dillard’s	rhetoric	suggests	that	it	may	be	possible	to	exploit	the	imaginative	aspects	of	the	public	sphere	to	occlude	the	enemy	from	detecting	activists,35	thereby	protecting	them	from	retaliation	long	enough	for	a	counterpublic	to	take	shape.	Dillard’s	Tinker	
Creek	exemplifies	a	form	of	rhetoric	that	does	this	by	not	producing	a	‘complaint,’	but	rather	by	producing	a	defilade	‘plaint,’	which	refrains	from	addressing	the	object	of	attack.	“Though	the	folly	be	not	corrected,”	wrote	Thoreau,	the	poet	is	satisfied	that	truth	has	inspired	the	voice	of	genius,	and	made	possible	the	next	level	of	genius	(1840,	p.	118).	This	next	level,	according	to	Thoreau,	is	love,	which	is	a	quality	that	has	been	sorely	missed	from	polemics,	given	their	warlike	quality.	However,	if	the	polemic’s	audience	can	respond	to	it	beyond	complaint,	there	is	an	opportunity	not	only	to	display	queerness	in	an	unlikely	safe	space	of	a	battlefront,	but	also	to	invite	additional	queer	results.																																																									35	José	Esteban	Muñoz	(1999)	made	a	strikingly	similar	observation	in	his	analysis	of	an	exhibit	by	the	late	queer	cubano	artist	Felix	Gonzalez-Torres.	The	exhibit	is	of	a	strangely	ordinary	photograph	taken	by	Peter	Muscato	of	a	ripped	blank	billboard	and	a	surrounding	empty	lot	fenced	off	with	barbed	wire	(p.	171).	According	to	Muñoz,	viewers	of	the	exhibit	are	split	between	awareness	and	ignorance	due	to	the	photograph’s	representation	of	“an	absence,	a	lacuna,	a	void	gesturing	to	something	valuable,	loved,	and	missing”	(p.	170).		
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Coda		 Thoreau’s	Kouroo	myth	serves	many	purposes.	It	exposes	the	necessary	mixture	of	form	and	content.	It	also	embodies	the	unfolding	flower	of	Walden,	showing	that	purpose	can	be	both	perfect	and	mutable.			 The	Kouroo	myth	exposes	the	necessary	mixture	of	form	and	content.	Burke’s	analysis	of	the	motion	of	agency	produced	a	paradox	due	to	the	mechanics	of	representation.	Our	focus	on	purpose	has	allowed	us	to	intervene	on	agency	and	adjust	it	with	action,	but	our	intervention	within	a	representational	medium	has	made	it	impossible	to	separate	action	from	motion,	form	from	content	(Burke,	1945/1969).	Deleuze	(1994)	helps	us	to	get	beyond	representation	by	using	a	multiplicity	to	think	non-representationally	(Holland,	2013).	Furthermore,	by	responding	to	polemics,	the	reader	can	think	with	polemics,	multiply	the	contingencies	of	polemical	response	and	respond	to	the	emotional	challenge	to	wage	war.		 The	Kouroo	myth	is	the	unfolding	flower	of	Walden,	showing	that	purpose	can	be	both	perfect	and	mutable.	There	is	a	polemical	ingredient	in	Walden,	and	it	gives	emotional	depth	to	Thoreau’s	anti-capitalistic	rage.	That	scintillating	animosity	is	still	burning	Walden’s	readers,	as	evinced	by	the	continued	fight	between	Thoreauvian	detractors	and	apologists.	However,	this	warlike	behavior	does	not	exhaust	the	possibilities	of	Walden.	There	are	some	who	have	read	it,	who	appreciate	the	seriousness	of	Thoreau’s	critique	of	“Economy,”	and	who	know	that	there	are	ways	to	engage	that	discussion	without	instigating	the	habit	of	combat.	Annie	Dillard	is	one	of	those	transcendent	warriors.	She	demonstrated	how	to	make	her	point	without	piercing	Walden.	Annie	Dillard’s	rhetoric	is	queer;	she	not	only	wore	that	queerness	by	eliding	her	gender	within	her	narrative,	but	she	also	walked	far	beyond	it	into	the	natural	and	uncomfortable	world	of	strangeness	(Slovic,	1992).	This	accepts	and	cherishes	Thoreau’s	mission	to	create	a	work	of	perfection,	and	also	responds	in	a	way	that,	as	Rand	(2008)	has	pointed	out,	creates	space	for	deliberative	agency.		 	
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Conclusion		 There	is	a	dawn	lurking	behind	the	hills	of	every	horizon	at	noon	tide;	there	are	ears	that	hear	the	drowsy	cricket,	and	eyes	that	see	the	glittering	dews	even	then.	—Walden,	“Conclusion,”	from	one	of	Thoreau’s	handwritten	manuscript	pages;	Beinecke	Library,	Yale	University	(Thoreau,	1970,	p.	448)				 When	I	began	this	project,	my	advisor	gave	me	his	copy	of	The	Annotated	
Walden	(1970),	an	intimidating	tome	featuring	a	photographic	copy	of	the	first	edition	of	Walden.	In	the	margin	on	each	page	are	footnotes	explaining	various	literary	references	that	modern	readers	are	thought	to	need	in	order	to	understand	various	code	words	and	obscure	allusions.	The	first	time	I	leafed	through	it,	I	could	not	fathom	how	it	could	be	possible	to	add	any	more	footnotes,	since	there	are	precisely	1,008	of	them	there.	When	I	found	the	book	in	my	mailbox,	I	immediately	opened	it,	and	discovered	a	note	from	my	advisor,	telling	me	that	he	had	owned	the	book	for	years	and	never	opened	it.		 The	challenge	presented	by	this	artifact	is	the	same	challenge	that	Thoreau	had	in	his	quest	to	recover	from	melancholia,	and	it	is	the	same	challenge	that	
Walden’s	reader	has	in	realizing	why	they	are	living	a	life	of	“quiet	desperation”	(1985,	p.	329).	Beginning	the	recovery	of	my	losses	and	continuing	the	heroic	adventure	of	life	has	been	an	enormous	challenge	for	me	over	the	years,	and	I	have	discovered	that	my	relationship	with	Walden	is	a	symbol	of	the	beginning	of	that	process	with	myself.	After	I	began	to	undergo	my	gender	transition,	I	started	to	explore	ways	to	unlock	another	way	of	understanding	Walden,	just	as	I	was	exploring	ways	to	unlock	another	way	of	understanding	myself.	Something	was	buried	in	this	text	that	was	given	to	me,	just	as	my	lost	desires	had	been	buried	in	my	psyche,	waiting	for	introjection.	One	day,	an	insight	occurred	when	I	was	examining	the	last	page	of	“Conclusion.”	Beyond	“THE	END.”	was	a	photocopy	of	a	page	from	one	of	Thoreau’s	handwritten	manuscript	pages	(Thoreau,	1970,	p.	448).	At	first	I	could	not	read	Thoreau’s	scrawl,	and	for	years	I	ignored	it.	After	all,	Thoreau’s	effects	have	all	been	deciphered	and	published,	right?	Then,	one	day,	while	I	was	alone,	I	looked	at	the	cryptic	writing,	and	the	words	slowly	came	to	me.	I	read	the	words	aloud	without	paying	attention	to	the	meaning,	and	when	I	repeated	the	words	with	the	motivation	of	understanding	them,	I	realized	that	there	was	a	sentence	there	that	I	did	not	remember	encountering	before,	but	it	felt	familiar,	almost	like	I	had	it	once	and	then	lost	it.	I	went	back	to	check	the	manuscript:	the	sentence	is	not	in	any	Clapper	version	of	Walden	(Schacht,	n.d.).	I	tried	to	look	up	the	phrase	on	the	Internet.	Nothing.	I	do	not	presume	to	claim	that	I	am	the	first	person	to	decipher	the	passage—rather,	it	was	a	personal	achievement	that	was	key	to	the	futures	of	my	own	life	as	well	as	the	life	of	this	dissertation.	That	sentence	is	the	epigraph	to	this	chapter.	
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	 The	epigraph	to	this	chapter	is	a	useful	way	to	introduce	the	two	implications	that	need	to	be	discussed	in	this	conclusion.	These	implications,	which	affect	communication	studies,	have	to	do	with	melancholia	and	queer	studies.		 First,	when	I	decrypted	the	epigraph,	I	realized	that	the	epigraph	is	an	appropriate	way	to	discuss	my	discipline’s	engagement	with	the	concept	of	melancholia.	My	own	deciphering	of	the	epigraph	describes	how	a	reader	of	Walden	induces	the	beginning	of	recovery	from	melancholia:	by	producing	an	environment	that	encourages	the	reader	to	believe	that	one’s	desires	are	legitimate,	thus	leading	to	the	subject’s	discovery	of	melancholia	and	the	long	process	of	the	subject’s	recovery.	At	the	time	that	I	discovered	the	epigraph,	there	was	still	much	work	to	be	done	to	complete	this	project,	and	I	had	already	made	the	important	step	of	recognizing	my	own	melancholia.	I	only	needed	to	absorb	the	import	from	the	statement,	to	make	its	desires	my	own,	which	required	work.	However,	for	me,	the	remaining	work	was	not	an	achievement	per	se.	For	others,	such	as	queers	of	color,	that	additional	work	may	be	far	more	challenging.	Unfortunately,	José	Esteban	Muñoz	(1999)	assumed	that	the	melancholic	subject	will	become	aware	of	their	melancholic	condition	and	that	introjection	of	the	contents	of	the	melancholic	crypt	is	only	going	to	be	stalled	by	extrinsic	conditions,	such	as	economic	class.	This	assumption	homogenizes	our	epistemic	conditions,	describing	just	one	possibility	of	the	condition	of	melancholia.		 Second,	the	epigraph	challenges	the	discipline’s	habit	of	dialectical	engagement	by	challenging	our	preconceptions	about	the	appearances	of	darkness,	sounds,	and	light.	Special	subtleties	occur	when	it	is	noon	where	we	are:	many	horizons	toward	the	west	are	producing	a	different	dawn,	and	not	everyone	notices;	at	noon,	crickets	are	chirping	softly	enough	that	only	the	most	sensitive	ears	detect	them,	and	each	one	is	unique;	there	is	just	enough	moisture	on	the	grass	to	be	seen	by	the	most	discerning	microscopic	perspective,	and	each	drop	of	dew	is	different.	In	other	words,	the	subtleties	in	Walden	require	a	meticulous	imagination	and	attentiveness	from	the	reader	for	the	text	to	be	understood	at	all,	and	each	interpreter	who	achieves	friendship	with	Walden	reaches	a	wild	and	legitimate	interpretation.	Unfortunately,	the	current	scholarship	on	polysemy	has	concluded	that	when	the	spectrum	of	possible	interpretations	reaches	a	wide	enough	envelope,	a	text	is	no	longer	exemplifying	polysemy,	but	is	instead	demonstrating	the	Derridean	concept	of	dissemination	(Ceccarelli,	1998).	One	of	the	implications	of	this	project	is	to	place	dissemination	under	the	umbrella	of	polysemy,	not	outside	of	it.	To	some	this	is	an	unacceptably	queer	result,	and	that	when	interpretations	are	far	enough	afield	then	they	are	opposed	to	the	text’s	meaning.	This	dissertation	challenges	Muñoz’s	(2009)	dialectical	assumption.		 This	conclusion	chapter	explores	these	implications	in	two	steps.	The	first	step	initiates	the	business	of	wrapping	up	the	dissertation	by	addressing	the	research	questions	that	were	proposed	in	the	Introduction	chapter.	The	second	step	of	this	conclusion	addresses	the	two	implications	themselves.	Specifically,	the	implications	of	both	melancholia	and	queer	studies	intersect	with	the	research	of	José	Esteban	Muñoz.	Muñoz	produced	research	on	both	of	these	topics,	but	his	understanding	of	melancholia	(1999)	did	not	address	Butler’s	(1997)	discussion		
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about	the	disavowal	of	desire,	and	his	metaphysical	orientation	(2009)	was	Hegelian.	This	second	step	lays	out	the	remedies	that	need	to	be	made	to	Muñoz’s	research	so	that	his	efforts	to	give	voice	to	the	disparaged	minorities	of	the	queer	community	can	be	appreciated	through	a	Deleuzian	lens	with	a	robust	understanding	of	melancholia	that	finds	utopian	comfort	in	the	present.		
Answering	the	Research	Questions		 The	first	research	question,	which	inquires	into	the	relationship	between	Thoreau’s	melancholic	writing	discussed	in	the	Introduction	chapter	and	his	“language	of	desire”	(Golemba,	1990,	p.	233,	p.	234),	was	answered	by	the	analysis	in	Chapter	Four.	The	second	research	question,	which	inquires	into	how	this	relationship	implicates	queer	studies	and	queer	movements,	was	partially	answered	in	Chapter	Five,	and	will	require	additional	discussion	in	this	chapter.		
Research	Question	1	The	first	research	question	inquires	into	the	relationship	between	Thoreau’s	melancholic	writing	and	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire.	Thoreau’s	melancholic	writing	was,	of	course,	produced	out	of	his	melancholia,	which	was	hatched	early	in	his	life,	and	can	be	traced	back	at	least	to	Margaret	Fuller’s	rejection	of	Thoreau’s	“The	Service”	from	publication	in	The	Dial	(Fink,	1992).	Melancholia	is	made	possible	because	mourning	has	been	stalled;	for	whatever	reason,	the	arresting	of	mourning,	made	possible	by	the	disavowal	of	desire,	maintains	the	illusion	that	the	memory	of	the	lost	object	is	the	lost	object	(Butler,	1997;	Torok,	1994;	Abraham	&	Torok,	1994a).	The	encrypted	fantasy	that	occurs	at	the	beginning	of	mourning	is	a	subconscious	skill	of	demetaphorization,	which	induces	the	subject	to	take	literally	what	is	metaphorical	(Abraham	&	Torok,	1994a).	Thoreau’s	“language	of	desire”	(Golemba,	1990,	p.	233,	p.	234),	which	I	argue	was	put	into	increased	practice	when	he	recognized	his	own	long	relationship	with	demetaphorization	during	his	experience	with	ether,	was	his	way	of	writing	with	a	deliberate	blindness	and	receptivity	to	metaphorical	fertility.	A	phrase	that	is	written	in	a	language	of	desire	is	one	that	can	function	metaphorically,	but	does	not	by	itself.	When	readers	encounter	these	phrases,	they	commonly	assume	that	there	is	a	metaphor	and	are	induced	to	recover	it	from	“a	letter	posted	but	never	quite	delivered	(p.	228).	The	trick	with	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	is	that	the	reader	thinks	that	the	recovery	is	sourced	by	one’s	memory	of	the	text,	which	may	be	true,	but	sometimes,	the	recovery	is	sourced	from	elsewhere,	a	selection	made	by	one’s	own	desires.		
Research	Question	2	The	second	research	question	inquires	into	how	the	answer	to	the	first	research	question	implicates	the	future	of	queer	studies	and	queer	movements.	The	connection	between	melancholia	and	Thoreau’s	language	of	desire	involves	a	recognition	of	the	capability	of	language	to	be	used	with	open-ended	metaphorical	functionality	that	does	not	erase	literal	meaning,	and	that	a	reader	can	be	called	upon	to	participate	as	a	coauthor	in	the	unique	role	of	adding	metaphorical	interpretation	(p.	7).	This	addition	of	a	metaphorical	layer	on	top	of	Thoreau’s	literal		
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meaning	leads	to	polysemy.	To	do	this	requires	an	occasional	displacement	of	the	text	as	the	arbiter	of	meaning	and	supplementing	those	moments	with	invitations	to	the	reader	to	participate	as	co-author	(p.	7;	Buell,	1995).	This	self-adjusting	give	and	take	of	invitation	is	the	foundation	for	the	friendship	that	was	described	in	Chapters	Three	and	Four.	Chapter	Five	discussed	how	the	incongruous	perspectives	of	friendship	intersect	with	the	form	of	the	polemic	where	friendship	between	text	and	reader	is	jeopardized	(Flannery,	2001	as	quoted	by	Rand,	2008).	The	unpredictability	of	polemics	derives	from	the	ability	of	the	audience	to	swerve	in	directions	that	are	not	directed	by	the	polemic	(Rand,	2008),	creating	a	contingency	that	possibly	maintains	or	possibly	departs	from	the	particular	friendship	with	the	polemic.	This	contingency	of	the	polemic’s	audience	to	react	in	a	way	that	cannot	be	determined	by	an	essential	content	of	the	polemic	or	intent	of	the	polemicist	is	why	Rand	found	polemics	to	be	queer	(p.	310).	This	move	expands	the	traditional	scope	of	queerness,	putting	non-sexual	topics	within	the	scope	of	queer	studies	(pp.	311-312).36	However,	this	general	implication	does	not	address	communication	studies	scholarship.	Therefore,	I	want	to	focus	on	a	few	important	texts	by	Muñoz	that	put	these	implications	into	sharp	relief	for	the	discipline.		
Muñoz		 Muñoz’s	attention	to	minorities	of	a	minority	is	an	important	site	for	the	interaction	between	melancholia,	queer	studies,	and	queer	culture,	since	these	were	main	areas	of	his	research.	However,	my	arguments	here	point	to	more	work	that	should	be	done	with	Muñoz,	since	I	have	found	a	gap	in	his	discussion	of	melancholia	theory,	and	I	find	his	discussion	of	process	philosophy	to	be	dismissive.	Muñoz’s	focus	on	minorities	who	have	the	need	to	live	and	flourish	within	the	minority	status	of	the	queer	community	is	too	important	to	be	cast	aside	because	of	these	oversights.	Therefore,	I	want	to	address	the	foundations	for	his	two	texts,	
Disidentifications	(1999),	and	Cruising	Utopia	(2009).	The	first	text	developed	a	theory	of	disidentification	that	relies	on	an	understanding	of	melancholia	that	neglects	Butler’s	(1997)	updated	arguments	about	melancholia.	The	second	text	deployed	queerness	from	within	a	Hegelian	metaphysic.	I	do	not	propose	to	fix	these	problems	here,	since	that	may	require	a	reexamination	of	the	artifacts	that	Muñoz																																																									36	This	move	does	not	delegitimize	a	concern	of	queer	studies	for	the	impact	that	capitalism	has	had	in	the	derogation	of	populations	that	do	not	facilitate	the	reproduction	of	capitalistic	labor.	Queer	studies	rightfully	maintains	the	timely	and	sustained	attention	to	the	suppressive	practices	of	capitalism.	However,	my	move	merely	calls	attention	to	Michael	Warner’s	observation	that	“people	didn’t	sweat	much	over	being	normal	until	the	spread	of	statistics	in	the	nineteenth	century”	(1999,	p.	53)	and	Leslie	Feinberg’s	(1996)	observation	that	there	was	a	time	when	gender	conformity	did	not	have	its	current	normative	power.	Furthermore,	there	may	be	a	future	in	which	those	norms	might	fade.	In	those	contexts,	normativity	still	had	rhetorical	force,	but	it	did	not	exist	in	sex	and	gender.	If	that	were	not	the	case,	then	queer	forms	could	not	antedate	capitalism	and	pre-capitalistic	polemics	would	not	have	unpredictable	functionality.		
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examined	or	analysis	of	additional	material.	Instead,	I	want	to	provide	suggestions	for	future	research	so	that	that	Muñoz’s	critical	insights	can	be	appreciated	in	new	ways.		
Disidentification		 Muñoz’s	(1999)	invocation	of	disidentification	is	a	departure	from	the	binary	of	identification	and	counter-identification	(p.	97).	This	“third	term”	is	invented	by	virtue	of	the	capabilities	that	recovered	melancholic	subjects	have	through	the	previous	incorporation	of	their	losses	(p.	97).	However,	Muñoz’s	explication	of	melancholia	theory	without	attention	to	Butler	(1997)	proves	to	be	limited.	Here,	I	address	disidentification	as	a	condition	involving	melancholia,	and	then	discuss	what	work	needs	to	be	done	to	update	Muñoz’s	analysis.	For	Muñoz,	disidentification	“is	a	strategy	that	tries	to	transform	a	cultural	logic	from	within”	(1999,	p.	11).	It	is	a	“survival	strategy”	(p.	18)	that	involves	a	constant	foregrounding	of	“that	lost	object	of	identification”	(p.	30).	It	is	a	line	that	“is	not	easy	to	follow	inasmuch	as	it	is	neither	linear	nor	in	any	way	straight.	It	is,	in	fact,	a	very	queer	trajectory”	(p.	39).	Specifically,	“Disidentification	for	the	minority	subject	is	a	mode	of	recycling	or	re-forming	an	object	that	has	already	been	invested	with	powerful	energy.	It	is	important	to	emphasize	the	transformative	restructuration	of	that	disidentification”	(p.	39).	From	my	understanding	of	Muñoz’s	argument,	because	minorities	within	minorities	have	their	heroes	delegitimated	by	authority	figures	in	the	public	sphere	and	by	some	in	queer	counterpublic	enclaves,	queers	of	color	and	gender	nonconforming	individuals	have	found	themselves	afflicted	with	melancholia,	and	some	of	them	have	been	able	to	recover	by	introjecting	from	their	melancholic	crypts.		 Unfortunately,	Muñoz	failed	to	appreciate	the	nuances	of	melancholia	theory	that	Butler	published	two	years	prior	to	the	publication	of	Muñoz’s	text.	Muñoz	presented	disidentification	as	a	strategy	that	matches	the	“oppositional	reception”	that	Stuart	Hall	proposed	can	be	done	to	media	messages	(p.	26)	and	one	that	accomplishes	its	restructuring	through	de/reterritorialization	(p.	58,	p.	185).	In	this	analogue,	“Disidentification	is	therefore	about	the	management	of	an	identity	that	has	been	‘spoiled’	in	the	majoritarian	public	sphere”	(p.	185).	In	Butler’s	(1997)	analysis	of	melancholia,	the	melancholic	subject	has	disavowed	their	desire,	and	when	this	observation	is	filtered	through	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	metaproductive	understanding	of	desire	(2009),	that	disavowal,	when	combined	with	loss,	shrinks	the	dynamic	ownership	of	one’s	desires	to	static	identity.	In	other	words,	the	melancholic	subject	affirms	the	spoiled	nature	of	those	desires	and	resigns	oneself	to	mere	existence	and	desire-as-lack.	Muñoz	does	not	explain	how	any	‘unspoiling’	might	take	place.	This	is	evident	in	his	presentation	of	the	mechanics	of	disidentification.	The	clearest	evidence	of	this	is	in	one	of	his	endnotes.	As	Muñoz	wrote,	“Melancholia	is	a	process	that	also	depends	on	introjection.	In	my	analysis,	this	introjection	is	described	as	the	‘holding	on	to’	or	incorporation	of	or	by	a	lost	object”	(p.	203).	It	is	obvious	that	Muñoz	was	conflating	introjection	and	incorporation,	claiming	that	the	two	activities	are	“coterminous”	(p.	13,	p.	15).	In	my	reading	of	Butler’s	analysis,	introjection	and	incorporation	are	not	identical,	but		
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instead	share	a	terminus	(i.e.,	where	one	ends	the	other	begins).	Indeed,	all	of	the	research	that	I	have	discussed	in	this	dissertation	by	Butler,	Abraham,	Torok,	Leader,	and	Arsić	indicates	that	when	introjection	is	restored,	introjection	grows	as	it	proceeds	and	swells	to	occupy	the	space	of	incorporation	in	the	“vampiric”	(p.	13)	manner	that	Muñoz	described.	However,	that	vampirism	takes	time	and	approaches	a	coterminous	state	but	never	rests.	It	is	important	to	point	out	Torok’s	(1994)	observation	that	introjection	and	incorporation	differ	most	significantly	in	the	timed	nature	of	how	they	occur;	introjection	is	a	gradual	process	in	which	one’s	menu	of	desires	slowly	expands	through	experimentation	and	observation,	whereas	incorporation	is	a	rapid	task	that	is	quickly	accomplished,	and	it	is	sustained	during	melancholia	by	the	demetaphorized	fantasy	of	swallowing	and	the	burying	of	that	fantasy	to	make	it	seem	literal	(p.	113).	In	the	case	of	grieving	through	introjection,	incorporation	is	done	first	before	grieving	can	commence.	This	means	that	the	transition	from	melancholia	to	disidentification	involves	a	process	in	which	introjection	and	incorporation	are	not	coterminous,	but	have,	at	best,	a	coterminous	limit	that	will	never	obtain.		 Muñoz’s	Disidentifications	does	not	account	for	the	transition	from	melancholia	to	disidentification,	but	that	does	not	mean	that	melancholics	are	doomed.	I	suggest	that	future	research	should	search	for	individuals	like	Thoreau	who	have	had	the	experience	of	melancholia	and	who	managed	to	‘unspoil’	their	own	identities	in	a	move	from	melancholia	to	disidentification.	Of	course,	Chapter	Two	of	this	dissertation	shows	that	melancholia	is	stabilized	because	of	disavowal,	and	there	are	many	reasons	why	someone	may	disavow	their	desires.	Therefore,	more	examples	of	recovery	should	be	explored	so	that	queer	people	can	envision	utopia	in	the	apparent	dystopia	of	the	present.		
Finding	Utopia	in	Queerness		 The	feeling	that	queerness	is	displaced	by	the	present	and	points	instead	to	a	utopian	future	is	a	result	of	Hegelian	thinking,	a	sentiment	that	I	do	not	share.	Muñoz	(2009)	argued	that	queerness	is	not	yet	here,	and	relied	on	arguments	from	Ernst	Bloch	and	Hegelian	idealism	to	make	that	argument.	Unfortunately,	Muñoz	was	dismissive	of	process	philosophy.	Deleuze’s	process	philosophy	(1994)	locates	utopia	in	the	unfolding	present,	not	in	a	future	that	attacks	the	present.	Thoreau	matched	Deleuze’s	conclusion	with	a	narrative	of	utopia	that	is	more	than	merely	possible	or	potential,	but	one	that	he	actually	achieved	in	his	day.	Furthermore,	both	Thoreau	and	Deleuze	responded	to	falsity	positively	rather	than	negatively.	While	I	sympathize	with	Muñoz’s	project	in	Cruising	Utopia,	I	would	submit	that	his	hasty	dismissal	of	process	philosophy	came	from	his	Hegelian	thinking.	This	section	serves	to	“brag,”	borrowing	a	term	from	Thoreau	(1985,	p.	361,	p.	389),	to	reassure	queers	that	utopia	actually	exists	now.		 Muñoz	argued	that	queerness	is	not	yet	here,	and	relied	on	arguments	from	Ernst	Bloch	and	Hegelian	idealism	to	make	that	argument.	Muñoz’s	(2009)	project	was	a	response	to	what	he	referred	to	as	Edelman’s	polemic	against	the	agenda	of	the	present	moment	in	political	culture,	a	culture	that	stipulates	that	the	future	is	the	child	(sexual	reproduction;	p.	11).	Although	Muñoz	was	critical	of	Edelman	for		
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sending	queer	thought	into	a	nihilistic	negation	of	political	participation,	Muñoz	confessed	that	he	found	a	lot	to	like	about	Edelman’s	diagnosis.	Nevertheless,	Muñoz	rejected	Edelman’s	prescription,	saying	‘No’	to	Edelman’s	‘No,’	complaining	that	Edelman’s	argument	“quickly	replaced	the	romance	of	community	with	the	romance	of	singularity	and	negativity”	(p.	10).	Muñoz’s	“anti-antirelationality”	(p.	14)	involved	a	Blochian	understanding	of	time	in	which	queers	retain	and	cherish	memories	of	the	“no-longer-conscious,”	which	is	located	in	the	present	moment	(p.	12).	This	trace	enables	“a	critical	hermeneutics	attuned	to	comprehending	the	not-yet-here”	(p.	12).	The	not-yet-here	is	a	perfection	of	the	no-longer-conscious,	a	utopia.	In	this	framework,	queerness	itself	is	“a	temporal	arrangement	in	which	the	past	is	a	field	of	possibility	in	which	subjects	can	act	in	the	present	in	the	service	of	a	new	futurity”	(p.	16).	Unfortunately,	Muñoz	was	dismissive	of	process	philosophy.	Although	Muñoz	never	cited	Deleuze	or	process	philosophy	by	name,	he	did	make	a	passing	reference	to	the	“antiutopian	critic”	who	“has	a	well-worn	war	chest	of	post-structuralism	pieties	at	her	or	his	disposal	to	shut	down	lines	of	thought	that	delineate	the	concept	of	critical	utopianism”	(p.	10).	I	can	certainly	see	how	process	philosophy	could	be	included	under	the	umbrella	of	post-structuralism,	although	such	an	ism	suggests	that	process	philosophy	eschews	all	attention	to	structure,	which	is	simply	not	true.	Muñoz’s	main	project	was	to	respond	to	the	habitual	thinking	that	takes	the	superficially	“pragmatic	gay	agenda”	as	the	only	game	in	town	for	queers;	this	flavor	of	pragmatism	is	a	myopic	desire	for	belonging	that	asks	for	“mere	inclusion	in	a	corrupt	and	bankrupt	social	order”	(p.	20).	In	this	sense,	Muñoz	found	a	need	for	a	rejection	of	the	status	quo	that	had	enough	forward	thinking	to	inspire	hope	for	queer	people	who	did	not	want	to	sell	their	souls	to	heteronormativity.	As	much	as	I	consider	myself	a	Deleuzian	and	a	Thoreauvian,	I	am	attracted	to	Muñoz’s	project,	but,	strictly	speaking,	I	do	not	identify	with	Muñoz’s	complaint	against	“straight	time”	(p.	22)	and	I	feel	the	alienating	pushback	of	Muñoz’s	polemic,	which	refused	to	consider	process	philosophy.		 Deleuze’s	process	philosophy	locates	utopia	in	the	unfolding	present,	not	in	a	future	that	attacks	the	present.	Deleuze	folded	the	past	and	the	future	within	the	present,	and	deployed	Hume’s	concept	of	‘contraction’	to	show	how	processes	in	the	present	explain	the	phenomena	of	past	and	future	(1994,	pp.	70-71).	It	is	tempting	to	understand	contraction	as	the	drafting,	signing,	and	enforcement	of	contracts.	After	all,	contracts	exist	in	the	present	moment,	and	their	power	derives	from	the	presence	of	signatures	that	represent	the	oaths	that	the	contract’s	parties	made	in	the	past	to	do	something	in	the	future.	However,	such	an	analogy	is	flawed;	Derrida	(1988)	has	famously	critiqued	the	idea	that	a	person	who	signs	a	document	remains	the	same	person	who	could	be	subject	to	that	document’s	future	enforcement.	Instead,	I	offer	an	understanding	of	contraction	from	another	context:	Thoreau	contracted	melancholia.	This	contraction,	along	with	the	effects	of	Thoreau’s	return	from	melancholia	with	the	boon	of	demetaphorization,	has	survived	Thoreau’s	death	and	continues	in	the	present	moment	in	the	form	of	records,	memories,	sympathies,	and	a	language	of	desire	that	produces	recovery.	The	contraction	continues	to	have	a	passive	(Deleuze,	1994,	p.	71)	inertia	that	is	an	inheritance		
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passed	from	instant	to	instant,	which	continues	to	affect	the	trajectory	of	Thoreauvian	research,	the	use	of	his	biography	in	this	dissertation	to	inform	the	reader,	and	so	on.	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	Anti-Oedipus	is	utopian	because	it	located	the	contraction	of	capitalism’s	failure.	Following	Marx,	Deleuze	and	Guattari	argued	that	capitalism	produces	schizophrenic	thinking,	which	is	the	agency	of	capitalism’s	disruption,	which	will	culminate	as	permanent	revolution	(2009;	Holland,	1999).	In	other	words,	as	bad	as	the	present	looks	to	those	of	us	who	see	a	present	that	“is	so	poisonous	and	insolvent”	(Muñoz,	2009,	p.	30),	Deleuze	folded	harm,	plan,	and	solvency	together	into	an	imminent	process	like	Thoreau,	producing	the	image	of	a	toothless	Buddhist	master	relaxing	in	the	certainty	that	things	are	actually	unfolding	as	they	should.		 Thoreau	matched	Deleuze’s	conclusion	with	a	narrative	of	utopia	that	is	more	than	merely	possible	or	potential,	but	one	that	he	actually	achieved	in	his	day.	Thoreau	derived	immense	comfort	in	his	insistence	that	moral	reform	begins	first	with	the	individual,	and	that	such	a	technique	is	bound	to	have	long-lasting	effects.	As	a	consequence	of	this	insistence	on	taking	responsibility	for	one’s	own	moral	contributions,	Thoreau	took	it	upon	himself	to	refuse	to	pay	for	a	poll	tax,	which	precipitated	his	arrest	by	Sam	Staples,	the	tax	collector	(Harding,	1982).	Thoreau	was	completely	willing	to	go	to	jail	for	tax	evasion	(p.	199),	which	serves	as	one	of	the	most	poignant	examples	of	his	ability	to	find	utopia	in	a	‘broken’	situation.	This	is	why	Thoreau	found	utopia	in	the	present	moment:	I	did	not	read	books	the	first	summer;	I	hoed	beans.	Nay,	I	often	did	better	than	this.	There	were	times	when	I	could	not	afford	to	sacrifice	the	bloom	of	the	present	moment	to	any	work,	whether	of	the	head	or	hands.	I	love	a	broad	margin	to	my	life.	Sometimes,	in	a	summer	morning,	having	taken	my	accustomed	bath,	I	sat	in	my	sunny	doorway	from	sunrise	till	noon,	rapt	in	a	revery,	amidst	the	pines	and	hickories	and	sumachs,	in	undisturbed	solitude	and	stillness,	while	the	birds	sing	around	or	flitted	noiseless	through	the	house,	until	by	the	sun	falling	in	at	my	west	window,	or	the	noise	of	some	traveller's	wagon	on	the	distant	highway,	I	was	reminded	of	the	lapse	of	time.	I	grew	in	those	seasons	like	corn	in	the	night,	and	they	were	far	better	than	any	work	of	the	hands	would	have	been.	They	were	not	time	subtracted	from	my	life,	but	so	much	over	and	above	my	usual	allowance.	I	realized	what	the	Orientals	mean	by	contemplation	and	the	forsaking	of	works.	For	the	most	part,	I	minded	not	how	the	hours	went.	The	day	advanced	as	if	to	light	some	work	of	mine;	it	was	morning,	and	lo,	now	it	is	evening,	and	nothing	memorable	is	accomplished.	Instead	of	singing	like	the	birds,	I	silently	smiled	at	my	incessant	good	fortune.	As	the	sparrow	had	its	trill,	sitting	on	the	hickory	before	my	door,	so	had	I	my	chuckle	or	suppressed	warble	which	he	might	hear	out	of	my	nest.	My	days	were	not	days	of	the	week,	bearing	the	stamp	of	any	heathen	deity,	nor	were	they	minced	into	hours	and	fretted	by	the	ticking	of	a	clock;	for	I	lived	like	the	Puri	Indians,	of	whom	it	is	said	that	"for	yesterday,	today,	and	tomorrow	they	have	only	one	word,	and	they	express	the	variety	of	meaning	by	pointing	backward	for	yesterday	forward	for	tomorrow,	and	overhead	for	the	passing	day."	This	was	sheer	idleness	to		
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my	fellow-townsmen,	no	doubt;	but	if	the	birds	and	flowers	had	tried	me	by	their	standard,	I	should	not	have	been	found	wanting.	A	man	must	find	his	occasions	in	himself,	it	is	true.	The	natural	day	is	very	calm,	and	will	hardly	reprove	his	indolence.	(1985,	pp.	411-412)	There	are	multiple	indicators	of	affirmative	utopia	in	this	presentist	presentation.	First,	Thoreau	identifies	with	the	Puri	Indians	who	used	demonstrative	temporal	gestures.	What	is	interesting	about	this	finger	pointing	is	that	they	are	all	spatial	references,	which	point	to	places	in	the	present.	Second,	Thoreau’s	moment	of	utopia	itself	does	not	defy	the	value	system	of	enterprise	that	gave	his	“fellow-townsmen”	cause	to	dissect	the	hours	of	the	day	and	criticize	his	day	as	“sheer	idleness.”	Instead,	his	description	of	what	he	did	was	in	terms	of	“something	that	a	thing	is	not”	(Burke,	1945/1969,	p.	23),	which	involved	not	using	a	clock	or	a	calendar.	This	omission	of	criticism	is	important	and	I	discuss	it	in	more	detail	in	the	next	paragraph.	Finally,	when	Thoreau	wrote	that	“if	the	birds	and	flowers	had	tried	me	by	their	standard,	I	should	not	have	been	found	wanting,”	he	was	distancing	himself	from	the	dictum	of	Daniel	5:27:	“Thou	art	weighed	in	the	balances,	and	art	found	wanting”	(Thoreau,	1995,	p.	109).	Instead	of	rejecting	the	scales	of	the	enterprising	culture	that	saturated	his	civilization,	he	identified	with	the	birds	and	flowers,	who	taught	Thoreau	by	example	to	relax	during	the	passing	of	the	day	and	to	appreciate	“the	gospel	according	to	this	moment”	(1862,	p.	673).		 Both	Thoreau	and	Deleuze	responded	to	falsity	positively	rather	than	negatively.	Thoreau’s	positive	response	is	showcased	in	the	long	quote	in	the	previous	paragraph.	There,	he	follows	his	two-step	progression	toward	genius	that	he	laid	out	in	his	“Persius”	essay	(1840).	There,	the	first	advancement	toward	genius	consisted	of	the	graduation	from	complaint	to	plaint,	which	made	it	possible	to	move	from	plaint	to	love.	Thoreau’s	omission	of	a	critique	of	capitalism	in	his	moment	of	utopia	shows	that	truth’s	“straightforwardness	is	the	severest	correction”	(p.	118).	The	reason	why	this	is	not	simply	a	mode	of	escapism	can	be	seen	with	more	clarity	by	turning	to	Deleuze.	In	Deleuze’s	project	of	answering	Hegel’s	dialectic,	Deleuze	was	very	much	aware	that	any	move	against	Hegel	would	feed	into	the	form	of	the	dialectic	as	a	negation,	and	as	Judith	Butler	has	observed,	would	merely	prove	Hegelian	thinking	(Hardt,	1993).	According	to	Michael	Hardt,	“From	this	perspective,	opposition	itself	is	essentially	dialectical,	and	hence	‘opposition	to	the	dialectic	itself’	can	only	mean	a	reinforcement	or	repetition	of	the	dialectic”	(p.	52).	Instead	of	posturing	his	response	as	an	attack	or	a	negation	of	Hegel	that	produces	continuity	with	the	target,	Deleuze	made	two	powerful	responses	(p.	53).	First,	he	insisted	“that	the	history	of	philosophy	contains	real	discontinuities,”	as	exemplified	by	the	Hegel-Nietzsche	relationship,	since	“the	Nietzschean	attack	on	the	master-slave	relation”	is	“carried	out	on	planes	completely	removed	from	Hegel’s	discourse”	(p.	53).	Second,	and	more	in	line	with	a	Thoreauvian	plaint,	Deleuze	proposed	that	we	should	“move	away	from	the	dialectic,	to	forget	the	dialectic”	(p.	53).	Deleuze	put	that	dictum	into	practice	in	his	later	writings,	in	which	Hegelian	thinking	is	so	refreshingly	absent	that	there	is	not	
	 157	
even	an	echo	of	Deleuze’s	disposal	of	Hegel.37	In	this	sense,	Thoreau	and	Deleuze	share	an	affinity;	Thoreau’s	utopia	forgets	capitalism,	and	Deleuze’s	utopia	forgets	Hegel.	While	I	sympathize	with	Muñoz’s	project	in	Cruising	Utopia,	I	would	submit	that	his	hasty	dismissal	of	process	philosophy	came	from	his	embrace	of	Hegelian	thinking.	I	see	two	kinds	of	indicators	of	Muñoz’s	hastiness.	The	first	indicator	is	Muñoz’s	preference	to	categorize	effective	counterpublics	as	oppositional.	The	second	indicator	is	Muñoz’s	admission	that	his	rhetoric	is	polemical.	The	first	indicator	of	Muñoz’s	hasty	dismissal	of	process	philosophy	is	an	assumption	that	effective	counterpublics	are	automatically	oppositional.	This	can	be	demonstrated	by	examining	an	example	from	Cruising	Utopia	in	which	he	indulged	in	what	I	would	characterize	as	‘queer	time,’	or	what	Muñoz,	citing	Bloch,	referred	to	as	the	“no-longer-conscious”	(2009,	p.	12).	This	kind	of	time	differs	from	Muñoz’s	“straight	time”	(p.	22).	This	example	involved	Muñoz’s	friend,	Kevin	Aviance,	a	professional	performer	who	was	dancing	in	a	gay	dance	club:	There	is	not	much	room	for	steps,	and	Aviance	does	not	need	them.	This	particular	dance	is	about	his	hands.	His	hands	move	in	jerky	mechanical	spasms.	They	frame	his	face	and	his	outfit.	He	dances	to	the	house	music	that	the	DJ	is	playing	especially	for	him.	He	is	elevated	from	the	dance	floor	but	also	surrounded	by	dancers	who	are	now	dancing	with	him.	He	is	both	onstage	and	one	of	the	throng,	one	with	the	music.	It	makes	sense	that	he	is	elevated.	He	is	there	not	because	he	is	simply	a	better	dancer	than	the	other	clubgoers	around	him	(he	is)	but	because	he	is	the	bridge	between	quotidian	nightlife	dancing	and	theatrical	performance.	(2009,	p.	77)	In	this	quotation,	which	I	have	carefully	extracted	from	its	context,	there	is	no	critique,	no	rebuke	of	heteronormative	“straight	time.”	Instead,	Muñoz	and	his	queer	readers	enjoy	a	utopian	moment	that	actually	existed	in	the	present	and	continues	to	contract,	in	which	Aviance	reveled	in	an	ecstasy	that	shares	similarities	with	the	bliss	that	Thoreau	must	have	also	felt	leisurely	sitting	in	his	doorway.	In	the	next	sentence,	however,	Muñoz	returns	to	Hegelian	negation,	stipulating	that	Aviance	himself	“defies	the	codes	of	masculinity	that	saturate	the	dance	floor”	(p.	77).	I	see	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	Aviance’s	purpose	was	defiance,	although	he	did	connote	“gender	ostracism”	(p.	74).	The	agency	of	his	dance	was	simple:	“He	performs	the	powerful	interface	between	femininity	and	masculinity	that	is	active	in	any	gender,	especially	queer	ones”	(p.	79).	Personally,	I	think	that	Aviance	would	have	found	just	as	much	“self-making”	(p.	75)	in	his	dance	if	he	were	performing	above	a	crowd	that	did	not	espouse	such	codes.	Nevertheless,	I	must	admit	that	it	is	possible	that	Aviance	was	dancing	out	of	defiance.	My	point	is	not	to	debate	about	Aviance’s	motives,	and	not	to	suggest	that	counterpublics	never	operate	effectively	with	opposition	as	their	framework.	Some	counterpublics	and	dances	oppose.	Nevertheless,	I	insist	that,	following	Thoreau,	a	non-oppositional	counterpublic,																																																									37	As	Brian	Massumi	wrote	in	his	translator’s	forward	to	A	Thousand	Plateaus,	“Hegel	is	absent,	being	too	despicable	to	merit	even	a	mutant	offspring”	(Deleuze	&	Guattari,	1987,	p.	x).		
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especially	one	that	shifts	the	labor	burden	of	opposition	onto	the	State,	can	be	devastatingly	effective.	The	second	kind	of	indicator	of	Muñoz’s	hasty	dismissal	of	process	philosophy	is	the	presence	of	polemical	form	in	his	text.	Muñoz	makes	it	clear	that	not	only	did	he	view	Edelman’s	No	Future	as	a	polemic,	but	he	also	viewed	his	own	response	to	Edelman	as	a	polemic	(p.	22).	In	light	of	Erin	Rand’s	(2008)	claim	about	the	polemic	as	a	queer	rhetorical	form,	I	would	submit	that	Muñoz’s	polemic	is	ample	evidence	of	a	certain	irony	in	his	pronouncements	that	queerness	is	not	yet	here,	since	the	practice	of	polemical	rhetoric	is	an	embodiment	of	queerness	wherever	it	happens.	Unfortunately,	Muñoz’s	canonization	of	Hegelian	thinking	blinded	him	from	these	alternatives	to	negation.	Before	I	conclude	this	dissertation,	I	want	to	“brag,”	following	Thoreau	(1985,	p.	361,	p.	389),	on	behalf	of	queers,	that	utopia	actually	exists	now,	even	though	queers	like	Muñoz	and	myself	have	experienced	and	will	continue	to	endure	enormous	suffering.	Thoreau	wrote	that	his	bragging	was	the	kind	of	cocksure	confidence	that	a	rooster	exudes	when	filled	with	the	certainty	that	it	is	daytime.	Thoreau	was	so	sure	that	taking	responsibility	for	one’s	desires	would	be	fulfilling	that	he	did	not	find	it	necessary	to	interfere	with	the	machinations	of	the	expedient	State	(Thoreau,	1849).	As	he	wrote	in	“Resistance	to	Civil	Government”,	It	is	not	a	man's	duty,	as	a	matter	of	course,	to	devote	himself	to	the	eradication	of	any,	even	the	most	enormous,	wrong;	he	may	still	properly	have	other	concerns	to	engage	him;	but	it	is	his	duty,	at	least,	to	wash	his	hands	of	it,	and,	if	he	gives	it	no	thought	longer,	not	to	give	it	practically	his	support.	(p.	195)	Those	“other	concerns	to	engage	him”	are	the	exercise	of	desire	and	conscience,	which	are	far	more	important	than	always	trying	to	fix	other	people’s	unwillingness	to	do	the	same.	To	do	otherwise	would	be	to	buy	into	the	rubric	of	heteronomy	that	causes	melancholia,	which	produces	its	own	solution.	In	this	sense,	I	am	served	with	the	question	of	how	to	address	Muñoz’s	complaint	against	capitalism’s	suppression	of	queers	of	color.	In	Thoreauvian	fashion,	I	respond	as	Thoreau	responded	to	the	illusive	surveyor	and	self-sounder,	that	I	am	thankful	that	Muñoz	complained,	for	he	protested	in	his	own	way,	as	I	protest	in	mine.	In	addition,	as	Thoreau	explained	in	
Walden,	railroad	ties	have	another	name:	sleepers.	The	sleepers	are	the	planks	that	secure	the	smooth	functioning	of	the	railways.	Without	the	sleepers,	there	would	be	no	commerce,	no	capitalism.	We	who	want	this	are	the	sleepers,	and	“I	am	glad	to	know	that	it	takes	a	gang	of	men	for	every	five	miles	to	keep	the	sleepers	down	and	level	in	their	beds	as	it	is,	for	this	is	a	sign	that	they	may	sometime	get	up	again”	(1985,	p.	396).	I	am	thankful	that	Muñoz	complained,	for	he	gives	me	my	own	plaint,	that	this	awfulness	that	is	“straight	time”	will	unravel	itself	as	it	jostles	more	sleepers	out	of	their	beds	and	into	the	waking	world.		
Coda?		 Because	this	dissertation	seeks	to	expand	discussion	rather	than	to	close	it,	this	final	coda	is	deliberately	incomplete,	departing	from	its	conventional	meaning.	Therefore,	the	way	that	I	wish	to	bring	this	dissertation	to	a	close	and	continue	to		
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maintain	a	space	for	discussion	about	the	topics	of	Thoreau’s	melancholia,	Walden’s	friendship,	and	queer	agency	is	through	a	return	to	the	situation	that	started	this	discussion.	Mark	Jiminez	and	Beau	Chandler’s	sit-in	at	the	Dallas	county	clerk’s	office	in	2012	contains	the	necessary	ingredients	that	validate	the	arguments	that	have	been	made	in	this	dissertation,	but	it	does	so	in	a	way	that	also	raises	another	question	that	must	be	answered	by	the	reader.	How	does	one	decide	which	desires	to	exercise?	In	other	words,	since	Jiminez	and	Chandler’s	desires	involved	changes	in	priority	caused	by	events	in	the	real	world,	it	is	important	to	recognize	that	Thoreau’s	compassion	for	the	natural	environment	is	an	important	lesson	that	must	be	appreciated	whenever	the	legitimacy	of	desire	is	made	salient	and	questioned.	Escaping	from	the	matrix	of	opposition	is	difficult	because	it	then	turns	the	search	for	the	limits	of	one’s	knowledge	into	a	critique	of	oneself	rather	than	a	critique	of	others.	This	can	be	a	difficult	task	for	people	who	are	in	relatively	comfortable	circumstances.	However,	Thoreau	promised	an	unexpected	degree	of	satisfaction	of	a	life	taken	to	its	limits,	and	all	it	requires	is	the	constant	fronting	of	oneself.			 A	coda	brings	closure	via	additional	structure	(coda,	n.d.),	and	the	expectation	of	closure	at	this	juncture	created	by	the	codas	in	each	of	the	preceding	chapters	must	be	acknowledged	and	allowed	to	fail.	It	is	my	hope	that	this	project	is	able	to	sustain	discussion	about	melancholia	and	desire	in	ways	that	are	serendipitous	and	not	merely	representative	of	my	arguments.	So,	if	responses	to	this	project	reveal	failures,	and	if	the	corrections	bring	improvement,	then	my	argument	will	have	been	a	success.		 Jiminez	and	Chandler’s	sit-in	is	more	relevant	to	my	project	than	a	simple	effort	to	contrast	Walden	and	“Resistance	to	Civil	Government.”	In	my	opening	chapter,	I	used	Jiminez	and	Chandler’s	encounter	with	Texas	law	to	show	an	expression	of	desire,	even	though	the	motivations	for	that	clash	that	emerged	must	be	placed	within	the	context	of	LGBTQ	activism.	The	impression	that	I	created	in	my	presentation	suggested	that	the	only	inherent	bar	to	their	quest	to	get	marriage	recognition	was	the	law.	One	would	think	that	as	soon	as	the	Obergefell	v.	Hodges	decision	in	2015	vacated	the	Texas	ban	on	gay	marriage,	the	two	men	would	be	expeditiously	on	their	way	to	a	traditional	marriage	ceremony.	That	was	not	the	case.	In	reality,	Jiminez	and	Chandler	chose	to	postpone	their	ceremony	due	to	the	illness	and	death	of	Chandler’s	mother	(Taffet,	2017).	David	Taffet	reported,	“As	they	worked	their	way	through	the	grieving	process,	they	decided	to	set	a	new	date	and	picked	April	20,	2017,	their	five-year	anniversary.	Then	the	November	election	happened	and	they	decided	to	push	the	date	up”	due	to	fears	that	new	judges	and	laws	would	interfere	with	their	plans	(para.	13).	We	all	know	how	common	situational	exigencies	can	be	and	how	deftly	they	can	interfere	with	our	desires;	Jiminez	and	Chandler’s	situation,	which	led	from	a	choice	to	delay	and	mourn	to	a	choice	to	sacrifice	an	anniversary	wedding,	was	no	different.	Our	lives	are	set	with	multiple	desires	and	obstacles,	and	it	is	the	challenge	of	life	to	choose	which	ones	to	prioritize—the	task	of	planning	their	achievement	that	never	ends.		 Walden	is	replete	with	this	complex	network	of	competing	desires.	Set	in	an	environment	that	Thoreau	chose	to	give	the	appearance	of	isolation	and	rugged	individualism	(Golemba,	1990),	it	is	easy	to	fall	into	the	illusion	that	Thoreau	was	a		
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paragon	of	simplicity	and	easy	choices.	That	was	not	the	case.	Thoreau	was	busy	at	Walden	Pond	and	often	made	himself	unavailable	to	visitors.	It	is	thus	understandable	that	he	produced	a	textual	world	in	which	he	was	beset	with	attractive	sources	of	introjection.	He	did	this	in	many	different	and	subtle	ways,	such	as	with	birds	that	approved	of	his	simple	lifestyle,	or	during	his	time	boating	on	the	pond	and	playing	a	game	of	chase	with	a	laughing	loon,	or	his	being	kept	awake	by	moaning	melancholic	owls,	or	his	address	to	a	friend	with	whom	he	enjoyed	his	longest	friendship,	Walden	Pond.	By	describing	each	of	these	encounters	as	occasions	for	identification,	he	was	giving	us	opportunities	to	legitimate	non-human	and	non-organic	subjects	for	the	mutual	appropriation	of	virtue.	These	sources	of	friendship	were	so	abundant	a	mile	from	the	nearest	human	neighbor	that	one	has	to	consider	just	how	much	more	complex	that	network	of	friends	was	when	Thoreau	lived	with	his	family	or	with	the	Emerson	family,	hence	Thoreau’s	advice	to	seek	simplicity.		 This	dissertation	therefore	appears	to	be	creating	a	curious	paradox.	This	paradox	results	from	the	cultivation	of	a	friendship	with	the	reader,	which	is	also	jeopardized.	That	friendship	is	at	risk	because	I	brought	up	the	possibility	that	you	are	responsible	for	sustaining	the	oppositional	logic	of	Hegel.	I	also	agreed	with	Thoreau’s	claim	that	each	person	should	exercise	their	desires,	even	if	that	means	choosing	a	path	that	attacks	a	federal	armory.	This	is	a	reality	for	all	activists	who	desire	to	clash	with	others	and	Right	Great	Wrongs.	If	this	kind	of	person	experiences	gratification	from	the	agon,	then	it	is	a	curious	admonishment	to	Thoreau’s	logic	to	graduate	beyond	complaint.	Does	this	person	have	less	love	as	a	result?	An	answer	to	this	paradox	has	been	a	guide	to	my	writing	of	this	dissertation,	which	has	had	to	front	other	sources	with	which	I	disagree.	Certainly	there	are	sources	cited	in	this	dissertation	that	contain	arguments	about	Thoreau,	melancholia,	and	gender	that	I	would	consider	to	be	incorrect,	and	I	have	been	tempted	to	hold	these	sources	accountable	for	their	wrong	conclusions.	In	nearly	all	of	these	situations,	I	found	that	the	result	is	a	distraction,	and	when	I	amended	my	manuscript	to	set	those	corrections	aside,	I	found	satisfaction	in	the	enhanced	directness	of	my	desire	to	articulate	the	mythic	quest	for	the	restoration	of	desire.	Nevertheless,	there	have	been	a	number	of	occasions	where	correction	was	unavoidable.	In	those	situations	where	I	felt	forced	to	write	a	rebuke,	I	found	myself	realizing	that	my	correction	did	not	involve	a	truth	that	“turns	to	rebuke	falsehood,”	since	the	correction	did	not	involve	a	turn	(Thoreau,	1840,	p.	118).	There	is	a	kind	of	confrontation	that	never	requires	an	assessment	of	whether	the	rebuke	requires	a	turn,	and	Thoreau’s	friendship	provided	him	with	a	way.	In	the	first	version	of	Walden,	Thoreau	argued,		If	you	stand	right	fronting	and	face	to	face	to	a	fact,	you	will	see	the	sun	glimmer	on	both	its	surfaces,	as	if	it	were	a	cimeter,	and	feel	its	sweet	edge	dividing	you	through	the	heart	and	marrow,	and	so	you	will	happily	conclude	your	mortal	career.	(Schacht,	n.d.,	Ch.	2,	para.	22b)	This	confrontation	with	the	failings	of	one’s	facts	occurs	when	we	“settle	ourselves,	and	work	and	wedge	our	feet	downward	through	the	mud	and	slush	of	.	.	.	that	alluvion	which	covers	the	globe”	(Schacht,	n.d.,	Ch.	2,	para.	22a).	That	alluvion	(the		
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agency	of	creating	river	islands,	see	alluvion,	n.d.)	that	Thoreau	cared	most	to	cleave	was	you,	your	heart	and	marrow.	However,	this	confrontation	was	sedentary,	and	required	a	wedging	downward	that	was	still	ignorant	of	how	the	site	of	that	sweet	edge	can	be	found.	Later,	when	Thoreau	experienced	ego	death	from	ether	and	sauntering,	he	found	that	blade,	which	only	reveals	itself	on	the	occasion	of	that	“grand	surprise	on	a	sudden	revelation	of	the	insufficiency	of	all	that	we	called	Knowledge	before”	(Thoreau,	1862,	p.	671).	This	happy	death	cannot	be	found	with	a	compass	and	it	cannot	be	produced	with	intention.	Rather,	it	must	be	encountered	with	friendship	with	nature,	and	it	must	occur	as	an	effect	of	the	process	of	the	front.	This	is	a	case	in	which	the	complainer	“must	be	both	plaintiff	and	defendant	too”	(Thoreau,	1840,	p.	118).	Our	friendships,	like	Pascal’s	vases,	involve	the	fusion	of	containers,	and	when	a	friendship	exists,	the	need	to	confront	falsity	in	one’s	self	thus	applies	to	friendship	and	brings	us	to	see	both	sides	of	the	cutting	fact.	What	does	that	mean	to	you?	The	queerness	of	polemics	proves	that	the	way	to	these	confrontations	requires	that	the	way	to	it	needs	to	be	challenged.	Thoreau	understood	that	the	rock	foundation	was	a	limit	to	be	requested	from	nature’s	friendship	but	never	to	be	achieved.	When	Thoreau	claimed	that	“man’s	capacities	have	never	been	measured;	nor	are	we	to	judge	of	what	he	can	do	by	any	precedents”	(1985,	p.	330),	he	was	appropriating	Spinoza’s	virtue	(see	Spinoza,	1994,	pp.	155-156	as	discussed	by	May,	2009,	p.	206).	When	he	created	the	Walden	polemic,	he	induced	some	of	his	friends	to	confront	him.	A	polemic	is	the	site	of	that	confrontation	with	falsity,	and	it	is	thus	up	to	the	audience	to	determine	whether	friendship	will	be	retained.	It	is	this	dependency	on	friendship	that	makes	polemics	ethical.	It	is	this	dependency	on	confrontation	that	makes	polemics	pragmatic.	It	is	this	dependency	on	the	audience	that	makes	polemics	rhetorical.					 	
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